9 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnston v. Deidesheimergreen2 sentences2007The source of the statements appears to be our decision in Johnston v. Deidesheimer, 76 Colo. 559 , 232 P. 1113 (1925), where we considered a malicious prosecution claim alleging the wrongful filing of two lawsuits and attendant notices of lis pendens filed by the defendants. 2007The source of the statements appears to be our decision in Johnston v. Deidesheimer, 76 Colo. 559 , 232 P. 1113 (1925), where we considered a malicious prosecution claim alleging the wrongful filing of two lawsuits and attendant notices of lis pendens filed by the defendants. | 2 | 2 |
DeStefano v. Nicholsgreen2 sentences2007See Thompson, 84 P.3d at 504 ("The filing of a notice of lis pendens may form the basis of a claim for malicious prosecution.") (citing Johnston v. Deidesheimer, 76 Colo. 559, 561 , 232 P. 1113, 1114 (1925)); Westfield Dev. 2005Co., 84 P.3d 496, 503 (Colo.2004); Walford, supra. Whether the underlying claim was resolved in favor of the party prosecuting the malicious prosecution claim is a question of law. | 2 | 2 |
Walford v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.green2 sentences2022In fact, in her motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) she noted that the proceedings before the IEC were “probably sufficient to get past 12(b)(5).” 26 ¶ 51 Colorado courts have generally followed suit, holding that the first element of a malicious prosecution claim may be established if a defendant “was a party to or assisted in a criminal or civil proceeding against the plaintiff.” Walford v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 793 P.2d 620, 623 (Colo. App. 1990); see also Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 465 , 15 P.2d 1084, 1085 (1932) (“[O]ne of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution is 2022In fact, in her motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) she noted that the proceedings before the IEC were “probably sufficient to get past 12(b)(5).” 26 ¶ 51 Colorado courts have generally followed suit, holding that the first element of a malicious prosecution claim may be established if a defendant “was a party to or assisted in a criminal or civil proceeding against the plaintiff.” Walford v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 793 P.2d 620, 623 (Colo. App. 1990); see also Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 465 , 15 P.2d 1084, 1085 (1932) (“[O]ne of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution is | 1 | 2 |
Hewitt v. Ricegreen1 sentence2025A plaintiff must establish, in relevant part, that the defendant lacked probable cause to bring the prior action in order to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim.7 See Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408, 411 (Colo. 2007). ¶ 14 “Probable cause requires that the defendant believed ‘in good faith . . . in the [wrongful conduct] of the [plaintiff in the underlying action], and that such belief [was] reasonable and prudent.’” Salazar v. Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Slee v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2022In fact, in her motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) she noted that the proceedings before the IEC were “probably sufficient to get past 12(b)(5).” 26 ¶ 51 Colorado courts have generally followed suit, holding that the first element of a malicious prosecution claim may be established if a defendant “was a party to or assisted in a criminal or civil proceeding against the plaintiff.” Walford v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 793 P.2d 620, 623 (Colo. App. 1990); see also Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 465 , 15 P.2d 1084, 1085 (1932) (“[O]ne of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution is 2022In fact, in her motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) she noted that the proceedings before the IEC were “probably sufficient to get past 12(b)(5).” 26 ¶ 51 Colorado courts have generally followed suit, holding that the first element of a malicious prosecution claim may be established if a defendant “was a party to or assisted in a criminal or civil proceeding against the plaintiff.” Walford v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 793 P.2d 620, 623 (Colo. App. 1990); see also Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 465 , 15 P.2d 1084, 1085 (1932) (“[O]ne of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution is | 1 | 1 |
Hellas Construction, Inc. v. Rio Blanco Countygreen1 sentence2022Id.; see Hellas Constr., Inc. v. Rio Blanco Cnty., 192 P.3d 501, 504 (Colo. App. 2008). ¶ 55 We agree with this reasoning. | 1 | 1 |
Donovan v. Gingerbread House, Inc.green2 sentences1990See Donovan v. Gingerbread House, Inc., 536 F.Supp. 627, 632 (D.Colo.1982). 1990See Donovan v. Gingerbread House, Inc., 536 F.Supp. 627, 632 (D.Colo. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Land v. Hillgreen1 sentence1990See Land v. Hill, 644 P.2d 43 (Colo.App.1981) (guilty plea bars a malicious prosecution claim and is an affirmative defense to a false arrest claim). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Westfield Development Co. v. Rifle Investment Associates
green
2 sentences2007See Thompson, 84 P.3d at 504 ; Westfield, 786 P.2d at 1115 . 2004In West-field, we suggested that the element of favorable termination must be satisfied even where a lis pendens filing forms the basis of a claim for malicious .prosecution. 786 P.2d at 1119 n. 4 (‘We also note that the malicious prosecution claim that arises out of the main action may not usually be brought as a counterclaim since the main action has not yet terminated in favor of the counterclaim-ant. ... [But in this ease] the judgment against Westfield on the main action is now final.”). 11 We next turn to Thompson’s Restatement argument. | 2 | 2004–2007 |
Walker v. Van Laningham
green
1 sentence2022Thus, the opinion cannot be read to suggest that a party that reports alleged misconduct to the proper government authorities cannot be sued even if, when making that report, the party knew the report was factually or legally baseless. 15 enforcement with a “full, fair, and honest statement of the facts,” id. at 419 , 242 P. at 671 , he could not then be liable because the “officer incorrectly determine[d] that such facts constitute[d] a crime.” Id. at 417-18 , 242 P. at 670 . ¶ 29 Staiert asserts that Climax Dairy’s holding establishes that so long as a defendant’s complaint is factually trut | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Climax Dairy Co. v. Mulder
green
2 sentences2022Thus, the opinion cannot be read to suggest that a party that reports alleged misconduct to the proper government authorities cannot be sued even if, when making that report, the party knew the report was factually or legally baseless. 15 enforcement with a “full, fair, and honest statement of the facts,” id. at 419 , 242 P. at 671 , he could not then be liable because the “officer incorrectly determine[d] that such facts constitute[d] a crime.” Id. at 417-18 , 242 P. at 670 . ¶ 29 Staiert asserts that Climax Dairy’s holding establishes that so long as a defendant’s complaint is factually trut 2022Thus, the opinion cannot be read to suggest that a party that reports alleged misconduct to the proper government authorities cannot be sued even if, when making that report, the party knew the report was factually or legally baseless. 15 enforcement with a “full, fair, and honest statement of the facts,” id. at 419 , 242 P. at 671 , he could not then be liable because the “officer incorrectly determine[d] that such facts constitute[d] a crime.” Id. at 417-18 , 242 P. at 670 . ¶ 29 Staiert asserts that Climax Dairy’s holding establishes that so long as a defendant’s complaint is factually trut | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Melvin v. Pence
green
1 sentence2022In reaching its conclusion, the division cited Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423 (D.C. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Bradshaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2005Hewitt and VPA urge us to adopt a "totality of the cireumstances" analysis to determine whether a settlement in the underlying action results in a favorable termination, citing Bradshaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 157 Ariz. 411 , 758 P.2d 1313 (1988). 2005Hewitt and VPA urge us to adopt a "totality of the cireumstances" analysis to determine whether a settlement in the underlying action results in a favorable termination, citing Bradshaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 157 Ariz. 411 , 758 P.2d 1313 (1988). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Buckhannon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005In Buckhannon v. U.S. West Communications Inc., 928 P.2d 1331 (Colo.App.1996), the division never discussed or commented, much less ruled on, any of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim, because they were not an issue on appeal. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Albertson v. Raboff
green
2 sentences1990Id. at 379-82 , 295 P.2d at 409-10 . 1990Id. at 379-82 , 295 P.2d at 409-10 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
City of Aurora v. Aurora Firefighters' Protective Ass'n
green
2 sentences1990We decline to consider the first issue, see City of Aurora v. Aurora Firefighters’ Protective Ass’n, 193 Colo. 437 , 566 P.2d 1356 (1977), because trial by stipulation to a seven-person jury in a civil case does not affect a fundamental right. 1990We decline to consider the first issue, see City of Aurora v. Aurora Firefighters’ Protective Ass’n, 193 Colo. 437 , 566 P.2d 1356 (1977), because trial by stipulation to a seven-person jury in a civil case does not affect a fundamental right. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Sancetta v. APOLLO STEREO MUSIC COMPANY, INC.
green
2 sentences1990Sancetta v. Apollo Stereo Music Co., Inc., 44 Colo.App. 292 , 616 P.2d 182 (1980). 1990Sancetta v. Apollo Stereo Music Co., Inc., 44 Colo.App. 292 , 616 P.2d 182 (1980). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.