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16 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCloud v. Roy Riegels Chemicalsgreen2 sentences2010Although the general verdict rule may be a useful rule of appellate jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, see McCloud v. Roy Riegels Chemicals, 20 Cal.App.3d 928 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 910, 915 (1971), it is not the law in Maryland. 2010Although the general verdict rule may be a useful rule of appellate jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, see McCloud v. Roy Riegels Chemicals, 20 Cal.App.3d 928 , 97 Cal.Rptr. 910, 915 (1971), it is not the law in Maryland. | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. Aramark Sports & Entertainment Services, Inc.green2 sentences2006See Carter, 153 Md.App. at 233 , 835 A.2d 262 . 2006See Carter, 153 Md.App. at 233 , 835 A.2d 262 . | 1 | 1 |
Durante v. Braungreen2 sentences1993To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that there was: “(a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff, (b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (c) absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (d) ‘malice,’ or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of bringing an offender to justice.” Id. (quoting Durante v. Braun, 263 Md. 685, 688 , 284 A.2d 241, 243 (1971) quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173 , 122 A.2d 457, 460 (1956)). 1993To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that there was: “(a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff, (b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (c) absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (d) ‘malice,’ or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of bringing an offender to justice.” Id. (quoting Durante v. Braun, 263 Md. 685, 688 , 284 A.2d 241, 243 (1971) quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173 , 122 A.2d 457, 460 (1956)). | 1 | 1 |
Exxon Corp. v. Kellygreen2 sentences1993Malicious Prosecution The defendants’ next assignment of error focuses on the circuit court’s denial of their J.N.W.V. motion on the malicious prosecution count. “[T]he principles governing a suit for malicious prosecution ... are generally well-settled.” Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 693 , 381 A.2d 1146, 1149 (1978). 1993Malicious Prosecution The defendants’ next assignment of error focuses on the circuit court’s denial of their J.N.W.V. motion on the malicious prosecution count. “[T]he principles governing a suit for malicious prosecution ... are generally well-settled.” Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 693 , 381 A.2d 1146, 1149 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrackgreen2 sentences1993To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that there was: “(a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff, (b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (c) absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (d) ‘malice,’ or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of bringing an offender to justice.” Id. (quoting Durante v. Braun, 263 Md. 685, 688 , 284 A.2d 241, 243 (1971) quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173 , 122 A.2d 457, 460 (1956)). 1993To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that there was: “(a) a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff, (b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (c) absence of probable cause for the proceeding, and (d) ‘malice,’ or a primary purpose in instituting the proceeding other than that of bringing an offender to justice.” Id. (quoting Durante v. Braun, 263 Md. 685, 688 , 284 A.2d 241, 243 (1971) quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 173 , 122 A.2d 457, 460 (1956)). | 1 | 1 |
Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Woodgreen2 sentences1991See Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484 , 471 A.2d 297 (1984). 1991See Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484 , 471 A.2d 297 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Heron v. Strader
green
2 sentences2005But, it found that the notice was timely as to the malicious prosecution claim, id., because that cause of action did not accrue until the acquittal. 2004But, it found that the notice was timely as to the malicious prosecution claim, id., because that cause of action did not accrue until the acquittal. | 4 | 2004–2024 |
Prince George's County v. Blue
green
2 sentences2013App. 608 , 51 A.3d 42 (2012). 2013On August 30, 2012, the Court of Special Appeals, in a reported decision, upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, but reversed the judgment based on the jury verdict. 206 Md. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lippert v. Jung
green
2 sentences2003She contends that “utilizing a traffic violation as subterfuge to enable [appellees] maliciously to bring unwarranted charges, unsupported by any probable cause, against an innocent victim is a practice neither the law nor our society can tolerate.” When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, “we are ‘most often concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists.’ ” Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 473 , 805 A.2d 372 (2002) (quoting Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227 , 783 A.2d 206 (2001)). 2003She contends that “utilizing a traffic violation as subterfuge to enable [appellees] maliciously to bring unwarranted charges, unsupported by any probable cause, against an innocent victim is a practice neither the law nor our society can tolerate.” When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, “we are ‘most often concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists.’ ” Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 473 , 805 A.2d 372 (2002) (quoting Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227 , 783 A.2d 206 (2001)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Southern Management Corp. v. Taha
green
2 sentences2003Id. at 731-32 , 769 A.2d at 982 . 2003Id. at 731-32 , 769 A.2d at 982 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County
green
2 sentences2003She contends that “utilizing a traffic violation as subterfuge to enable [appellees] maliciously to bring unwarranted charges, unsupported by any probable cause, against an innocent victim is a practice neither the law nor our society can tolerate.” When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, “we are ‘most often concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists.’ ” Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 473 , 805 A.2d 372 (2002) (quoting Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227 , 783 A.2d 206 (2001)). 2003She contends that “utilizing a traffic violation as subterfuge to enable [appellees] maliciously to bring unwarranted charges, unsupported by any probable cause, against an innocent victim is a practice neither the law nor our society can tolerate.” When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, “we are ‘most often concerned with whether a dispute of material fact exists.’ ” Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 473 , 805 A.2d 372 (2002) (quoting Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227 , 783 A.2d 206 (2001)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pantazes v. Pantazes
green
2 sentences2001We held that although the language of the General Waiver and Release was ambiguous when read in isolation, when read in light of the circumstances of its formation and the § 737 expungement petition filed soon after it was signed, it clearly evidenced an intention by Michael and the State “to satisfy the § 737 requirement that he release ‘any person from tortious conduct arising from the charge’ in general; ... including] his claim for malicious prosecution.” 77 Md.App. at 723 , 551 A.2d 916 . 2001We held that although the language of the General Waiver and Release was ambiguous when read in isolation, when read in light of the circumstances of its formation and the § 737 expungement petition filed soon after it was signed, it clearly evidenced an intention by Michael and the State “to satisfy the § 737 requirement that he release ‘any person from tortious conduct arising from the charge’ in general; ... including] his claim for malicious prosecution.” 77 Md.App. at 723 , 551 A.2d 916 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Davis v. DiPino
green
2 sentences1999Davis v. DiPino, 121 Md.App. 28 , 708 A.2d 357 (1998). 1999Davis v. DiPino, 121 Md.App. 28 , 708 A.2d 357 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Carl M. Freeman Associates, Inc. v. Murray
green
2 sentences1994Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 119 (5th ed. 1984), states that if successful in a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff “may recover for any specific financial loss such as loss of present or prospective employment, or loss of business profits which can be proved with reasonable certainty to be caused by the prosecution.” If anything, this court implicitly approved of the element of “lost wages” in Freeman Ass'n v. Murray, 18 Md.App. 419 , 306 A.2d 548 (1973). 1994Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 119 (5th ed. 1984), states that if successful in a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff “may recover for any specific financial loss such as loss of present or prospective employment, or loss of business profits which can be proved with reasonable certainty to be caused by the prosecution.” If anything, this court implicitly approved of the element of “lost wages” in Freeman Ass'n v. Murray, 18 Md.App. 419 , 306 A.2d 548 (1973). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Shell Oil Co. v. Parker
green
2 sentences1974The appellants rely upon Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631 , 291 A. 2d 64 . 1974The appellants rely upon Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631 , 291 A. 2d 64 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Bernheimer Bros. v. Becker
neutral
2 sentences1972Scope of employment as a factor in a malicious prosecution claim is discussed in, among other cases, Bernheimer v. Becker, 102 Md. 250, 255 , 62 A. 526 (1905). 1972Scope of employment as a factor in a malicious prosecution claim is discussed in, among other cases, Bernheimer v. Becker, 102 Md. 250, 255 , 62 A. 526 (1905). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Central Railway Co. v. Peacock
green
2 sentences1972The critical question here is when the contract of carriage ended, since, as stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 A, comment c (1965), “A carrier is under no duty to one who has left the vehicle and ceased to be a passenger.” This was implicit in the holding in Central Ry. v. Peacock, 69 Md. 257 , 14 A. 709 (1888), where a carrier was held not liable for an assault by its conductor. 1972The critical question here is when the contract of carriage ended, since, as stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 A, comment c (1965), “A carrier is under no duty to one who has left the vehicle and ceased to be a passenger.” This was implicit in the holding in Central Ry. v. Peacock, 69 Md. 257 , 14 A. 709 (1888), where a carrier was held not liable for an assault by its conductor. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.