malicious prosecution claim in Texas

2021See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 529 (“failing to fully and fairly disclose all material information and knowingly providing false information to the prosecutor are relevant to the malice and causation elements of a prosecution claim”). 14 elements of a malicious prosecution claim but ha[s] no bearing on probable cause.” See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 519 .

2021See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 529 (“failing to fully and fairly disclose all material information and knowingly providing false information to the prosecutor are relevant to the malice and causation elements of a prosecution claim”). 14 elements of a malicious prosecution claim but ha[s] no bearing on probable cause.” See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 519 .

2025See Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. 1996) (“To prevail in a suit alleging malicious prosecution of a civil claim, the plaintiff must establish . . . malice in the commencement of the [underlying] proceeding[.]”); Tex. Fam.

2000Thus, whether a malicious prosecution claim is based on the institution of a proceeding or the continuation of a proceeding, the requisite element of malice relates to the “commencement of the proceeding.” See id.

2021Id. at 292 . 2 While the failure of only one element defeats the malicious prosecution claim, see Digby v. Tex. Bank, 943 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, writ denied), we will briefly address all of the elements that were challenged before the trial court and on appeal. 12 When the decision to prosecute is left to another’s discretion, such as a law enforcement official or grand jury, a person cannot be said to have procured, or caused, the criminal prosecution unless the person knowingly provided materially false information to the decision maker.

1997In Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Lieck , however, we held that knowingly providing false information to a public official satisfies the causation element, rather than the lack-of-probablecause element, of a malicious prosecution claim. 881 S.W.2d at 293-94 .

2021King v. Graham, 126 S.W.3d 75, 78 (Tex. 2003); Reed v. Cleveland, No. 09-19-00136-CV, 2020 WL 6600968 , at *6 (Tex. App.— Beaumont Nov. 12, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2009Causation The second element of a malicious prosecution claim requires a claimant to present evidence that the decision to prosecute “would not have been made but for the false information supplied by the defendant.” King v. Graham, 126 S.W.3d 75, 78 (Tex.2003).

2015Even if we could con- stated "failing to fully and fairly disclose all material clude Lermon presented sufficient proof that Lee failed information and knowingly providing false information to disclose information, we cannot agree the evidence to the prosecutor are relevant to the malice and causation supports a reasonable inference that Dalton would not elements of a malicious prosecution claim but have no have prosecuted Lermon but for Lee's failure to disclose. bearing on probable cause." Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 519(emphasis added); but see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. We conclude there is no evi

2014In that case, the Supreme Court stated “failing to fully and fairly disclose all material information and knowingly providing false information to the prosecutor are relevant to the malice and causation elements of a malicious prosecution claim but have no bearing on probable cause.” Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 519 (emphasis added); but see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriquez, 92 S.W.3d 502, 510 (Tex. 2002) (evidence of a failure to disclose cannot support claim for false imprisonment because a plaintiff must prove defendant knowingly provided false information).

2023See Akin, 661 S.W.2d at 920 ; see generally Pettit v. Maxwell, 509 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).

2007In determining probable cause for the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, "[i]t is the events prior to the institution of the proceedings which must be examined, and only those events, to determine if the defendants had probable cause to act." Akin , 661 S.W.2d at 920 .

2023Their arguments and analysis with respect to exemplary damages are inapplicable because, as the Individual Appellants fail to acknowledge, the “malice” element for a malicious prosecution claim is not the same as a predicate finding of “malice” to establish liability for exemplary damages. 71 Malice, for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, is defined as “ill will, evil motive, gross indifference, or reckless disregard of the rights of others.” Hernandez v. Mendoza, 406 S.W.3d 351, 357 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); French v. French, 385 S.W.3d 61, 69 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denie

2022Their arguments and analysis with respect to exemplary damages are inapplicable because, as the Individual Appellants fail to acknowledge, the “malice” element for a malicious prosecution claim is not the same as a predicate finding of “malice” to establish liability for exemplary damages. 70 Malice, for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, is defined as “ill will, evil motive, gross indifference, or reckless disregard of the rights of others.” Hernandez v. Mendoza, 406 S.W.3d 351, 357 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); French v. French, 385 S.W.3d 61, 69 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denie

2019See Lang v. City of Nacogdoches, 942 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, writ denied) (discovery rule does not apply to a malicious prosecution claim where plaintiffs had access to public record and dismissal of criminal case against plaintiffs was a matter of public record and either plaintiffs or their attorneys could have discovered the dismissal by an examination of the public records).

2013See Lang v. City of Nacogdoches, 942 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1997, writ denied) (holding discovery rule inapplicable to a malicious prosecution claim where plaintiffs had access to public record and dismissal of criminal case against plaintiffs was a matter of public record *438 such that they or their attorneys could have discovered by examining the public records); Patrick v. Howard, 904 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (holding that plaintiffs claims arising from wrongful criminal prosecution “do not fall into the rare class of cases where the discovery rule applies”)

2009See First Valley Bank v. Martin , 144 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. 2004) (providing that in order for false information to satisfy the causation element of a malicious prosecution claim, it must be material to the decision to prosecution).

2009See First Valley Bank v. Martin, 144 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex.2004) (providing that in order for false information to satisfy the causation element of a malicious prosecution claim, it must be material to the decision to prosecution).

2009Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517 ; Dangerfield v. Ormsby, 264 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).

2009Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517 ; Dangerfield v. Ormsby, 264 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth other legal theories other than tortious interference with contracts. 29 2008, no pet.).

2026Thus, “[w]here the gravamen of a plaintiff’s complaint is really another tort, [IIED] should not be available.” Id. (citing numerous cases); see Martinez v. English, 267 S.W.3d 521 , 530–31 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) (holding that plaintiff could not maintain IIED claim because its gravamen was the same as his malicious-prosecution claim).

2023Thus, “[w]here the gravamen of a plaintiff’s complaint is really another tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress should not be available.” Id. (citing numerous cases); see Martinez, 267 S.W.3d at 530– 31 (holding that plaintiff could not maintain IIED claim because its gravamen was the same as his malicious-prosecution claim).

2025P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788 , 792 n.3 (Tex. 2006) (listing the elements of a malicious prosecution claim).

2014P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. 2004).

2008See Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co. , 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1997); see also Coniglio v. Snyder , 756 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied). 2.

2000Digby , 943 S.W.2d at 919 ; Coniglio v. Snyder , 756 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).

2021Id. at 292 . 2 While the failure of only one element defeats the malicious prosecution claim, see Digby v. Tex. Bank, 943 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, writ denied), we will briefly address all of the elements that were challenged before the trial court and on appeal. 12 When the decision to prosecute is left to another’s discretion, such as a law enforcement official or grand jury, a person cannot be said to have procured, or caused, the criminal prosecution unless the person knowingly provided materially false information to the decision maker.

2000Digby , 943 S.W.2d at 919 ; Coniglio v. Snyder , 756 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).

2025See Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., 403 S.W.3d 390 , 394–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question was “legally defective” because it addressed an improper measure of damages); Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado, 396 S.W.3d 78, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question concerning a malicious-prosecution claim should not have been submitted because the claim “was foreclosed as a matter of law”); Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding that a jury questi

2025See Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., 403 S.W.3d 390 , 394–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question was “legally defective” because it addressed an improper measure of damages); Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado, 396 S.W.3d 78, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question concerning a malicious-prosecution claim should not have been submitted because the claim “was foreclosed as a matter of law”); Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding that a jury questi

2025See Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., 403 S.W.3d 390 , 394–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question was “legally defective” because it addressed an improper measure of damages); Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado, 396 S.W.3d 78, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question concerning a malicious-prosecution claim should not have been submitted because the claim “was foreclosed as a matter of law”); Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding that a jury questi

2025See Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., 403 S.W.3d 390 , 394–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question was “legally defective” because it addressed an improper measure of damages); Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado, 396 S.W.3d 78, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question concerning a malicious-prosecution claim should not have been submitted because the claim “was foreclosed as a matter of law”); Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding that a jury questi

2025See Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., 403 S.W.3d 390 , 394–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question was “legally defective” because it addressed an improper measure of damages); Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado, 396 S.W.3d 78, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question concerning a malicious-prosecution claim should not have been submitted because the claim “was foreclosed as a matter of law”); Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding that a jury questi

2025See Fazio v. Cypress/GR Houston I, L.P., 403 S.W.3d 390 , 394–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question was “legally defective” because it addressed an improper measure of damages); Soon Phat, L.P. v. Alvarado, 396 S.W.3d 78, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a jury question concerning a malicious-prosecution claim should not have been submitted because the claim “was foreclosed as a matter of law”); Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding that a jury questi

2023See Akin, 661 S.W.2d at 920 ; see generally Pettit v. Maxwell, 509 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).

2022See Akin, 661 S.W.2d at 920 ; see generally Pettit v. Maxwell, 509 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).

2023Their arguments and analysis with respect to exemplary damages are inapplicable because, as the Individual Appellants fail to acknowledge, the “malice” element for a malicious prosecution claim is not the same as a predicate finding of “malice” to establish liability for exemplary damages. 71 Malice, for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, is defined as “ill will, evil motive, gross indifference, or reckless disregard of the rights of others.” Hernandez v. Mendoza, 406 S.W.3d 351, 357 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); French v. French, 385 S.W.3d 61, 69 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denie

2022Their arguments and analysis with respect to exemplary damages are inapplicable because, as the Individual Appellants fail to acknowledge, the “malice” element for a malicious prosecution claim is not the same as a predicate finding of “malice” to establish liability for exemplary damages. 70 Malice, for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, is defined as “ill will, evil motive, gross indifference, or reckless disregard of the rights of others.” Hernandez v. Mendoza, 406 S.W.3d 351, 357 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.); French v. French, 385 S.W.3d 61, 69 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denie

2020See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792 (reasoning that the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims could have been brought under TTCA against the county); see also McFadden, 517 S.W.3d at 297–98 (concluding that a malicious prosecution claim could have been brought against the government employer as well as the employee under the TTCA).

2019See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792 (holding that the plaintiff’s claims about police officer’s malicious prosecution could have been brought under TTCA against the county); see also McFadden v. Olesky, 517 S.W.3d 287 , 297–98 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied) (stating that a malicious prosecution claim could have been brought against 5 Because Alford is entitled to absolute immunity, we need not address whether qualified immunity applies.

2020See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792 (reasoning that the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims could have been brought under TTCA against the county); see also McFadden, 517 S.W.3d at 297–98 (concluding that a malicious prosecution claim could have been brought against the government employer as well as the employee under the TTCA).

2019See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792 (holding that the plaintiff’s claims about police officer’s malicious prosecution could have been brought under TTCA against the county); see also McFadden v. Olesky, 517 S.W.3d 287 , 297–98 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied) (stating that a malicious prosecution claim could have been brought against 5 Because Alford is entitled to absolute immunity, we need not address whether qualified immunity applies.

2019Malicious prosecution cases “do not fall into the rare class of cases where the discovery rule applies.” Patrick v. Howard, 904 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ).

2013See Lang v. City of Nacogdoches, 942 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1997, writ denied) (holding discovery rule inapplicable to a malicious prosecution claim where plaintiffs had access to public record and dismissal of criminal case against plaintiffs was a matter of public record *438 such that they or their attorneys could have discovered by examining the public records); Patrick v. Howard, 904 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ) (holding that plaintiffs claims arising from wrongful criminal prosecution “do not fall into the rare class of cases where the discovery rule applies”)

2013See id.; Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 448 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).

2013See id.; Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).

2011See Graham , 473 U.S. at 166 , 105 S. Ct. at 3105 . [8] Of the claims that Swain asserted in his petition against the other employees, only the malicious prosecution claim referenced an official policy or custom, so we interpret this as the only official-capacity claim.

2011See Graham , 473 U.S. at 166 , 105 S. Ct. at 3105 . [8] Of the claims that Swain asserted in his petition against the other employees, only the malicious prosecution claim referenced an official policy or custom, so we interpret this as the only official-capacity claim.

2016Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co. , 952 S.W.2d 515 , 517 (Tex. 1997) ; Davis v. Prosperity Bank , 383 S.W.3d 795 , 802 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

2013Id.; Davis v. Prosperity Bank, 383 S.W.3d 795, 802 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).