attorney-client privilege in Arizona

2026In Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb, this Court reiterated the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that the attorney-client privilege “only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.” 176 Ariz. 497 , 501-02 (1993) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 , 395-96 (1981)).

2026Here, Wife invoked none of these exceptions (although she now argues Mother’s presence is necessary due to her PTSD) but simply attempted to unilaterally extend the attorney-client privilege to encompass Mother through an Accomazzo agreement. 6 ¶17 We have also applied a “functional approach” that examines “the nature, purpose, and context within which the communication occurs.” Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 503 (1993). 2 For instance, in Clements, we recognized that, under applicable jail policies, communications between an inmate and his lawyer may remain confidential even if

2026Lee, 199 Ariz. at 56 ¶ 10. ¶22 Applying the three Hearn criteria, Belsanti did not impliedly waive the attorney-client privilege.

2026Co. v. Lee, 199 Ariz. 52 , 58 ¶ 15 (2000) (“[T]here is more than relevance and materiality needed to find waiver, for communications with counsel are almost always very relevant and material.”). 5 ¶21 Arizona has adopted the Hearn test, which applies three criteria for finding implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

2022In Bain v. Superior Court (Mills), 148 Ariz. 331 (1986), the court wrote: The Arizona statutes relating to the psychologist-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege are unique by containing express provisions specifying the conduct which will be deemed a waiver of the privilege.

2020(Emphasis added.) Like the psychologist-patient privilege, the behavioral health professional-client privilege prohibits testimony that falls “within the scope of the privilege.” See Bain v. Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 331, 334-36 (1986) (noting that A.R.S. § 32-2085 places the psychologist-patient privilege “on the same basis” as the attorney client privilege and that only the client “has the right to waive it as to any confidential communications with her psychologist”). ¶8 The superior court ruled M.S. could testify as an acquaintance witness under the exceptions contained in A.R.S. § 32-3283

2014See A.R.S. § 12-2234; Ulibarri, 184 Ariz. at 384 , 909 P.2d at 451 (noting that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage a client to provide all information to the attorney so the attorney can provide effective legal representation to the client”).

2014See A.R.S. § 12-2234; Ulibarri, 184 Ariz. at 384 , 909 P.2d at 451 (noting that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage a client to provide all information to the attorney so the attorney can provide effective legal representation to the client”).

2026See Clements, 249 Ariz. at 440 ¶ 10 (stating “the privilege applies only to those communications involving legal advice”). ¶19 Consequently, the argument that parties’ subjective expectations can define the attorney-client privilege with regard to third parties in certain circumstances would create an exception that could swallow the rule, especially in cases with sophisticated parties who seek to expand the scope of confidentiality.

2026Here, Wife invoked none of these exceptions (although she now argues Mother’s presence is necessary due to her PTSD) but simply attempted to unilaterally extend the attorney-client privilege to encompass Mother through an Accomazzo agreement. 6 ¶17 We have also applied a “functional approach” that examines “the nature, purpose, and context within which the communication occurs.” Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 503 (1993). 2 For instance, in Clements, we recognized that, under applicable jail policies, communications between an inmate and his lawyer may remain confidential even if

2014Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251 , 254 ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 282, 285 (2003). ¶ 9 In State Farm v. Lee, we adopted the following criteria, referred to as the Hearn test, for determining whether the attorney-client privilege has been waived when a litigant’s mental state is at issue: “(1) [The] assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit [or raising an affirmative defense], by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the ease; and (3) application of the privilege would h

2000The Hearn test sets forth three criteria that must be met to find an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege: (1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit [or raising an affirmative defense], by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected' information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to his defense. 68 F.R.D. at 581 . ¶ 11 The court of appeals found that prongs one and two were not s

2023Sup. Ct. 42, Ethical Rule (“ER”) 1.6(d)(4).” 3 Likewise, our precedent provides that a party who asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has waived the attorney-client privilege as “to the particular contentions asserted.” Cuffle, 171 Ariz. at 51-52 (holding “an attorney should be allowed to defend himself, at least with regard to the particular contentions asserted, by revealing ‘at least that much of what was previously privileged as is necessary’” (quoting Moreno, 128 Ariz. at 260 )); State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509 , 515-16 (1982) (stating an “attack on counsel’s competency[] has w

2023When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[i]t is not only the integrity of the attorney which is at stake but that of the entire fact-finding process,” and “the court must have before it all relevant facts relating to the claim.” State v. Moreno, 128 Ariz. 257, 260 (1981); see also State v. Cuffle, 171 Ariz. 49, 52 (1992) (holding the trial court must have all relevant facts relating to a claim questioning the competency of an attorney). ¶29 We have held “[t]he claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a direct attack on the competence of an attorney and constit

2007Therefore, we agree with the state that Paris-Sheldon cannot “use the attorney-client privilege as a shield to block inquiry into an issue that she raised.” See Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 163 , 685 P.2d 1309, 1315 (1984) (“If the client himself does not treat the particular communication as privileged, that communication will not be recognized as a confidence.”). ¶ 16 Paris-Sheldon also contends, relying on Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 162 , 927 P.2d 822 (App.1996), that a trial court must determine whether a defendant’s motion for subs

2007Therefore, we agree with the state that Paris-Sheldon cannot “use the attorney-client privilege as a shield to block inquiry into an issue that she raised.” See Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 163 , 685 P.2d 1309, 1315 (1984) (“If the client himself does not treat the particular communication as privileged, that communication will not be recognized as a confidence.”). ¶ 16 Paris-Sheldon also contends, relying on Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office v. Superior Court, 187 Ariz. 162 , 927 P.2d 822 (App.1996), that a trial court must determine whether a defendant’s motion for subs

2025See Fodor, 179 Ariz. at 448 (“The test for determining whether a communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege is a subjective one; it focuses primarily on the state of mind of the client.”).

2006While this may be the State’s *299 view, it does not control because the existence of the attorney-client privilege is evaluated from the perspective of the party making the communication to the attorney. “ ‘An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when the party divulging confidences and secrets to an attorney believes that he is approaching the attorney in a professional capacity with the intent to secure legal advice.’ ” Alexander v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 162 , 685 P.2d 1309, 1314 (1984) (quoting Trinity Ambulance Serv., Inc., v. G & L Ambulance Serv., Inc., 578 F.Supp. 128

2023When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[i]t is not only the integrity of the attorney which is at stake but that of the entire fact-finding process,” and “the court must have before it all relevant facts relating to the claim.” State v. Moreno, 128 Ariz. 257, 260 (1981); see also State v. Cuffle, 171 Ariz. 49, 52 (1992) (holding the trial court must have all relevant facts relating to a claim questioning the competency of an attorney). ¶29 We have held “[t]he claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a direct attack on the competence of an attorney and constit

2023When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “[i]t is not only the integrity of the attorney which is at stake but that of the entire fact-finding process,” and “the court must have before it all relevant facts relating to the claim.” State v. Moreno, 128 Ariz. 257, 260 (1981); see also State v. Cuffle, 171 Ariz. 49, 52 (1992) (holding the trial court must have all relevant facts relating to a claim questioning the competency of an attorney). ¶29 We have held “[t]he claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a direct attack on the competence of an attorney and constit

2022Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1995)). 4 A. ¶11 The attorney-client privilege derives from a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to due process enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, section 4 of the Arizona Constitution, and from an accused’s right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, section 24 of the Arizona Constitution.

1999Co., 43 F.3d at 1327 (so long as reasonableness of insurer’s conduct is defended “on objective terms apart from the advice of counsel, the attorney-client privilege would be protected”). ¶35 Similarly, even though State Farm sought legal advice on whether to permit plaintiffs to stack benefits, the current record indicates it is relying on neither the fact, that it obtained such advice nor the advice itself to show that its decision to preclude stacking was reasonable and in good faith.

2026In Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb, this Court reiterated the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that the attorney-client privilege “only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.” 176 Ariz. 497 , 501-02 (1993) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 , 395-96 (1981)).

2019"To rule otherwise would make a premium out of [n]ot taking verbatim statements in order to avoid the disclosure required by the rules." Id. ; see also Austin v. Alfred , 163 Ariz. 397 , 403, 788 P.2d 130 , 136 (App. 1990) (stating that it "would be incongruous to allow a party" to use the attorney-client privilege as a strategic tool to "deny access of the opposing party to relevant information"). ¶87 Johnson cites Hickman v. Taylor , 329 U.S. 495 , 508-14, 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), and Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 , 399-401, 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), to s

2025Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251 , 253 ¶ 10 (2003) (citing cases).2 ¶12 Arizona’s crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applies “when there is a prima facie showing that a communication with an attorney was used to perpetuate a crime or fraud.” Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564 , 573 ¶ 34 (App. 2009) (citation omitted).

2024Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251 , 253 ¶ 10 (2003) (citing cases), this court reviews de novo findings that the attorney-client privilege has been waived, State ex rel.

2026Although the court of appeals applied a subjective standard, 5 its holding focused on the fact that the minor’s parents “were taking an understandable parental interest and advisory role in their minor son’s legal affairs,” and that the “presence of a parent in such a capacity at a meeting between child and counsel does not defeat the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 22 ¶ 12.

2025Noting that the parents “were taking an understandable parental interest and advisory role in their minor son’s legal affairs,” Sucharew held that “[t]he presence of a parent in such a capacity at a meeting between [a] child and counsel does not defeat the attorney-client privilege.” Id. (citation omitted).

2020Thomas v. Schneider, 212 Ariz. 292, 296, ¶ 19 (App. 2006) (applying the legislature’s definition of the scope of the attorney-client privilege).

2020Thomas v. Schneider, 212 Ariz. 292, 296, ¶ 19 (App. 2006) (applying the legislature’s definition of the scope of the attorney-client privilege).

2019"To rule otherwise would make a premium out of [n]ot taking verbatim statements in order to avoid the disclosure required by the rules." Id. ; see also Austin v. Alfred , 163 Ariz. 397 , 403, 788 P.2d 130 , 136 (App. 1990) (stating that it "would be incongruous to allow a party" to use the attorney-client privilege as a strategic tool to "deny access of the opposing party to relevant information"). ¶87 Johnson cites Hickman v. Taylor , 329 U.S. 495 , 508-14, 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), and Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 , 399-401, 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), to s

2019"To rule otherwise would make a premium out of [n]ot taking verbatim statements in order to avoid the disclosure required by the rules." Id. ; see also Austin v. Alfred , 163 Ariz. 397 , 403, 788 P.2d 130 , 136 (App. 1990) (stating that it "would be incongruous to allow a party" to use the attorney-client privilege as a strategic tool to "deny access of the opposing party to relevant information"). ¶87 Johnson cites Hickman v. Taylor , 329 U.S. 495 , 508-14, 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), and Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 , 399-401, 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), to s

2018See Buell, 96 Ariz. at 68 (quoting Clark, 289 U.S. at 15 (tracing history of the common-law attorney-client privilege to at least the time of Queen Elizabeth, and the common-law crime-fraud exception to the attorney- client privilege to the 19th century)).

2018See Buell v. Superior Court, 96 Ariz. 62, 68 (1964) ("A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law.") (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)).

2001See also Pearce v. Stone, 149 Ariz. 567, 572 , 720 P.2d 542, 547 (App.1986) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege is defeated by a showing of prima facie fraud on the part of the client.”); Buell v. Superior Court, 96 Ariz. 62, 68 , 391 P.2d 919, 924 (1964); State v. Fodor, 179 Ariz. 442, 450 , 880 P.2d 662, 670 (App.1994).

2001See also Pearce v. Stone, 149 Ariz. 567, 572 , 720 P.2d 542, 547 (App.1986) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege is defeated by a showing of prima facie fraud on the part of the client.”); Buell v. Superior Court, 96 Ariz. 62, 68 , 391 P.2d 919, 924 (1964); State v. Fodor, 179 Ariz. 442, 450 , 880 P.2d 662, 670 (App.1994).

2026Adel v. Adleman, this Court explained that a party seeking to assert the attorney-client privilege may produce a privilege log that identifies privileged communications by date, time, and participants, but does not reveal the communications themselves. 252 Ariz. 356 , 361 ¶ 14 (2022).

2025See, e.g., Adleman, 252 Ariz. at 363 ¶ 22 (considering whether privilege applied to text messages); Clements, 249 Ariz. at 441 ¶ 18 (addressing recordings of phone calls); Lund v. Myers, 232 Ariz. 310 , 310 ¶ 4, 311-12 ¶ 13 (2013) (addressing documents from attorney’s client file). ¶58 True, courts more narrowly construe the clergy-penitent and physician-patient privileges because they lack the common-law tradition of the attorney-client privilege.

2012See, e.g., Samaritan Found, v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 501 , 862 P.2d 870, 874 (1993) (“The privilege is intended to encourage the client in need of legal advice to tell the lawyer the truth” and is therefore “central to the delivery of legal services in this country.”); Matter of Pappas, 159 Ariz. 516 , 522-23 n. 11, 768 P.2d 1161, 1167-68 (1988) (stating that the attoxmey-client privilege exists, in part, to “foster the public’s confidence in the legal profession”); Granger v. Wisner, 134 Ariz. 377, 379 , 656 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1982) (“The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encour

2012See, e.g., Samaritan Found, v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 501 , 862 P.2d 870, 874 (1993) (“The privilege is intended to encourage the client in need of legal advice to tell the lawyer the truth” and is therefore “central to the delivery of legal services in this country.”); Matter of Pappas, 159 Ariz. 516 , 522-23 n. 11, 768 P.2d 1161, 1167-68 (1988) (stating that the attoxmey-client privilege exists, in part, to “foster the public’s confidence in the legal profession”); Granger v. Wisner, 134 Ariz. 377, 379 , 656 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1982) (“The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encour

2023Diocese of Phx. v. Superior Court, 204 Ariz. 225, 229-31, ¶¶ 9, 13, 17 (App. 2003) (holding statutory amendment that “expands the attorney-client privilege” in civil cases inapplicable to criminal cases because the “amendment expressly applies only to civil cases,” reasoning that because the “amendment addresses only civil cases[,] [w]e will not assume that the Legislature meant anything other than what it said”); see also Rogers v. State, 255 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Nev. 2011) (holding that DUI arrestee’s statements to emergency medical technician (EMT) following motor vehicle accident were not prot

2021In doing so, the court found that Clements validated the original ruling and that Beasley “has met his burden of demonstrating the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.” This special action followed. 5 DISCUSSION ¶12 Because special action jurisdiction is appropriate to determine the application of a privilege, see, e.g., Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 204 Ariz. 225 , 227 ¶ 2 (App. 2003), this court accepts jurisdiction. ¶13 The State acknowledges that, to secure relief, it must show the superior court abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction or legal

2023Sup. Ct. 42, Ethical Rule (“ER”) 1.6(d)(4).” 3 Likewise, our precedent provides that a party who asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has waived the attorney-client privilege as “to the particular contentions asserted.” Cuffle, 171 Ariz. at 51-52 (holding “an attorney should be allowed to defend himself, at least with regard to the particular contentions asserted, by revealing ‘at least that much of what was previously privileged as is necessary’” (quoting Moreno, 128 Ariz. at 260 )); State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509 , 515-16 (1982) (stating an “attack on counsel’s competency[] has w

1986See State v. Lawonn, 113 Ariz. 113, 114 , 547 P.2d 467, 468 (1976) (the defendant, on appeal, raised the issue of lack of knowledge of a right waived by a guilty plea thereby waiving the attorney-client privilege as to this issue); see also State v. Moreno, 128 Ariz. 257, 260 , 625 P.2d 320, 323 (1981) (the defendant, by motion for a new trial, raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel thereby waiving his attorney-client privilege).

2022Id. at 573 ¶ 35. “[A] party attempting to set [] aside [the attorney-client privilege] must demonstrate a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish . . . that the crime-fraud exception applies.” Clements v. Bernini in and for Cnty. of Pima, 249 Ariz. 434 , 438 ¶ 1 (2020) (quoting U.S. v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (cleaned up). ¶34 Father asserts Mother’s counsel’s request that Father produce information relating to his alleged complaint to the Federal Bureau of Investigation regardi

2021In Clements, we held that the state was entitled to an in-camera inspection of an inmate’s recorded jail calls to determine whether an exception to the attorney-client privilege applied if it demonstrated “a factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.” Id. (quoting Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572 ). 9 ¶26 The court of appeals’ substantial probability standard announced in this case, on the other hand, seems better suited to a disclosure rule rather t

1999Mere relevance of the otherwise protected communications is considered sufficient. ¶ 14 In Elia v. Pifer, 194 Ariz. 74 , 977 P.2d 796 (App.1998), Division One of this court recently applied the Hearn test to determine whether the plaintiff, who had sued his former domestic relations attorney for malpractice, had waived the attorney-client privilege as to other attorneys plaintiff had retained later.

1999Mere relevance of the otherwise protected communications is considered sufficient. ¶ 14 In Elia v. Pifer, 194 Ariz. 74 , 977 P.2d 796 (App.1998), Division One of this court recently applied the Hearn test to determine whether the plaintiff, who had sued his former domestic relations attorney for malpractice, had waived the attorney-client privilege as to other attorneys plaintiff had retained later.

1994Cf. State v. Alexander, 108 Ariz. 556, 568 , 503 P.2d 777, 789 (1972) (fact that client has consulted an attorney, the dates and places of his visits, and similar matters are outside the attorney-client privilege).

1994Cf. State v. Alexander, 108 Ariz. 556, 568 , 503 P.2d 777, 789 (1972) (fact that client has consulted an attorney, the dates and places of his visits, and similar matters are outside the attorney-client privilege).

1993See Longs Drug Stores, 134 Ariz. at 427-28 , 657 P.2d at 415-16 (Communications to insurance investigators are not privileged, as they may be used by the investigator’s insurance company employer for purposes other than securing legal advice for the insured.); Butler v. Doyle, 112 Ariz. 522, 525 , 544 P.2d 204, 207 (1975) (Because insurance carriers may utilize statements received from their insureds for purposes independent of their insureds’ legal representation, they are not agents of the attorneys hired to represent their insureds.).

1993See Longs Drug Stores, 134 Ariz. at 427-28 , 657 P.2d at 415-16 (Communications to insurance investigators are not privileged, as they may be used by the investigator’s insurance company employer for purposes other than securing legal advice for the insured.); Butler v. Doyle, 112 Ariz. 522, 525 , 544 P.2d 204, 207 (1975) (Because insurance carriers may utilize statements received from their insureds for purposes independent of their insureds’ legal representation, they are not agents of the attorneys hired to represent their insureds.).

2023Sup. Ct. 42, Ethical Rule (“ER”) 1.6(d)(4).” 3 Likewise, our precedent provides that a party who asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has waived the attorney-client privilege as “to the particular contentions asserted.” Cuffle, 171 Ariz. at 51-52 (holding “an attorney should be allowed to defend himself, at least with regard to the particular contentions asserted, by revealing ‘at least that much of what was previously privileged as is necessary’” (quoting Moreno, 128 Ariz. at 260 )); State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509 , 515-16 (1982) (stating an “attack on counsel’s competency[] has w

2023Sup. Ct. 42, Ethical Rule (“ER”) 1.6(d)(4).” 3 Likewise, our precedent provides that a party who asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has waived the attorney-client privilege as “to the particular contentions asserted.” Cuffle, 171 Ariz. at 51-52 (holding “an attorney should be allowed to defend himself, at least with regard to the particular contentions asserted, by revealing ‘at least that much of what was previously privileged as is necessary’” (quoting Moreno, 128 Ariz. at 260 )); State v. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 509 , 515-16 (1982) (stating an “attack on counsel’s competency[] has w

2019"To rule otherwise would make a premium out of [n]ot taking verbatim statements in order to avoid the disclosure required by the rules." Id. ; see also Austin v. Alfred , 163 Ariz. 397 , 403, 788 P.2d 130 , 136 (App. 1990) (stating that it "would be incongruous to allow a party" to use the attorney-client privilege as a strategic tool to "deny access of the opposing party to relevant information"). ¶87 Johnson cites Hickman v. Taylor , 329 U.S. 495 , 508-14, 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), and Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 , 399-401, 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), to s

2019"To rule otherwise would make a premium out of [n]ot taking verbatim statements in order to avoid the disclosure required by the rules." Id. ; see also Austin v. Alfred , 163 Ariz. 397 , 403, 788 P.2d 130 , 136 (App. 1990) (stating that it "would be incongruous to allow a party" to use the attorney-client privilege as a strategic tool to "deny access of the opposing party to relevant information"). ¶87 Johnson cites Hickman v. Taylor , 329 U.S. 495 , 508-14, 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), and Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 , 399-401, 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), to s

2025See 234 Ariz. at 173, ¶ 15 . ¶15 Because nothing in the record suggests that Kerr met his burden of overcoming the presumption that Cristina reasonably understood that communications between her lawyer and her mother were privileged, we hold that Cristina did not waive the attorney-client privilege by authorizing communications between her mother and her lawyer in accordance with Accomazzo.

2025When the husband sought to depose Cohen, the wife objected, asserting that the attorney-client privilege applied both to her meetings with Cohen that her parents attended and to communications that occurred directly between Cohen and her parents, who were acting “as [her] representatives.” Id.