attorney-client privilege in Connecticut

2017Co. , 273 Conn. 33 , 38, 867 A.2d 1 (2005) ("[w]hether the trial court properly concluded that there is an exception to the attorney-client privilege when an insured has made an allegation of bad faith against an insurer ... and, if so, whether it properly delineated the scope and contours of such an exception, are questions of law"); see also Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp. , 254 Conn. 145 , 169, 757 A.2d 14 (2000) (whether court should recognize civil fraud exception to attorney-client privilege and limitations on exception are questions of law).

2017Co. , 273 Conn. 33 , 38, 867 A.2d 1 (2005) ("[w]hether the trial court properly concluded that there is an exception to the attorney-client privilege when an insured has made an allegation of bad faith against an insurer ... and, if so, whether it properly delineated the scope and contours of such an exception, are questions of law"); see also Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp. , 254 Conn. 145 , 169, 757 A.2d 14 (2000) (whether court should recognize civil fraud exception to attorney-client privilege and limitations on exception are questions of law).

2022See Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 712 , 647 A.2d 324 (1994) (‘‘the mere fact that a meeting took place between [an attorney] and his client did not constitute a communication and such information is not privileged for that reason’’); New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 4 Conn. App. 216, 220 , 493 A.2d 283 (1985) (affirming commission’s order com- pelling disclosure of number of billing hours and general subject matter designations on billing invoices and stat- ing that ‘‘[q]uestions as to where and when a client had conversations with his attorney have been found not to be withi

2022See Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 712 , 647 A.2d 324 (1994) (‘‘the mere fact that a meeting took place between [an attorney] and his client did not constitute a communication and such information is not privileged for that reason’’); New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 4 Conn. App. 216, 220 , 493 A.2d 283 (1985) (affirming commission’s order com- pelling disclosure of number of billing hours and general subject matter designations on billing invoices and stat- ing that ‘‘[q]uestions as to where and when a client had conversations with his attorney have been found not to be withi

2000Appropriately, the attorney-client privilege “extends to interpreters, and to clerks and agents employed by the attorney ... in the business committed to his [or her] charge . . . .” Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859); see id., 175-76 (while recognizing privilege extends to certain court personnel and agents of attorney, court refused to extend privilege to protect communication overheard by attorney’s son, where son was “in no way connected with the case or with the parties” and had “no interest in, or connection with, the professional business of the attorney”); see also Pagano v.

2000Appropriately, the attorney-client privilege “extends to interpreters, and to clerks and agents employed by the attorney ... in the business committed to his [or her] charge . . . .” Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859); see id., 175-76 (while recognizing privilege extends to certain court personnel and agents of attorney, court refused to extend privilege to protect communication overheard by attorney’s son, where son was “in no way connected with the case or with the parties” and had “no interest in, or connection with, the professional business of the attorney”); see also Pagano v.

2004In support of his argument that the admission of the videotapes violated the psychiatrist-patient privilege, the defendant points out that “[t]he people of this state enjoy a broad privilege in the confidentiality of their psychiatric communications and records . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Falco v. Institute of Liv ing, 254 Conn. 321, 328 , 757 A.2d 571 (2000); see also General Statutes § 52-146e. 47 Moreover, “[wjhere a psychiatric expert ... is retained by a criminal defendant or by his counsel for the sole purpose of aiding the accused and his counsel in the preparation of h

2004In support of his argument that the admission of the videotapes violated the psychiatrist-patient privilege, the defendant points out that “[t]he people of this state enjoy a broad privilege in the confidentiality of their psychiatric communications and records . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Falco v. Institute of Liv ing, 254 Conn. 321, 328 , 757 A.2d 571 (2000); see also General Statutes § 52-146e. 47 Moreover, “[wjhere a psychiatric expert ... is retained by a criminal defendant or by his counsel for the sole purpose of aiding the accused and his counsel in the preparation of h

2000Appropriately, the attorney-client privilege “extends to interpreters, and to clerks and agents employed by the attorney ... in the business committed to his [or her] charge . . . .” Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859); see id., 175-76 (while recognizing privilege extends to certain court personnel and agents of attorney, court refused to extend privilege to protect communication overheard by attorney’s son, where son was “in no way connected with the case or with the parties” and had “no interest in, or connection with, the professional business of the attorney”); see also Pagano v.

2000Appropriately, the attorney-client privilege “extends to interpreters, and to clerks and agents employed by the attorney ... in the business committed to his [or her] charge . . . .” Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859); see id., 175-76 (while recognizing privilege extends to certain court personnel and agents of attorney, court refused to extend privilege to protect communication overheard by attorney’s son, where son was “in no way connected with the case or with the parties” and had “no interest in, or connection with, the professional business of the attorney”); see also Pagano v.

1987In State v. Cascone, 195 Conn. 183 , 487 A.2d 186 (1985), Chief Justice Peters discussed the factors to be considered in determining the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to communications of an accomplice who testifies at trial.

1987In State v. Cascone, 195 Conn. 183 , 487 A.2d 186 (1985), Chief Justice Peters discussed the factors to be considered in determining the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to communications of an accomplice who testifies at trial.

2024In Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission, 245 Conn. 149 , 714 A.2d 664 (1998), our Supreme Court considered the issue of ‘‘whether the attorney-client privilege protects communications in circumstances where the client is a corporate or municipal entity, rather than an individual . . . .’’ Id., 158 .

2024In Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission, 245 Conn. 149 , 714 A.2d 664 (1998), our Supreme Court considered the issue of ‘‘whether the attorney-client privilege protects communications in circumstances where the client is a corporate or municipal entity, rather than an individual . . . .’’ Id., 158 .

2005The principal issue on appeal is whether, in the context of a will contest, the exception to the attorney-client privilege, as recognized by this court in Doyle v. Reeves, 112 Conn. 521 , 152 A. 882 (1931), that communications between a decedent and the attorney who drafted the executed will may be disclosed, applies when the communications do not result in an executed will.

2005The principal issue on appeal is whether, in the context of a will contest, the exception to the attorney-client privilege, as recognized by this court in Doyle v. Reeves, 112 Conn. 521 , 152 A. 882 (1931), that communications between a decedent and the attorney who drafted the executed will may be disclosed, applies when the communications do not result in an executed will.

1999Practice Book § 13-2 provides in relevant part: "[i]n any civil action . . . where the judicial authority finds it reasonably probable that evidence outside the record will be required, a party may obtain . . . discovery of information or disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books or documents material to the subject matter involved in the pending case, which are not privileged. . . ." "The attorney-client privilege protects communications between client and attorney when made in confidence for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice." Ullmann v. State , 230 Conn. 698 , 711 ,

1999Practice Book § 13-2 provides in relevant part: "[i]n any civil action . . . where the judicial authority finds it reasonably probable that evidence outside the record will be required, a party may obtain . . . discovery of information or disclosure, production and inspection of papers, books or documents material to the subject matter involved in the pending case, which are not privileged. . . ." "The attorney-client privilege protects communications between client and attorney when made in confidence for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice." Ullmann v. State , 230 Conn. 698 , 711 ,

2006Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52 , 730 A.2d 51 (1999), [the Supreme Court] recognized that the attorney-client privilege was created to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observation of law and administration of justice. . . .

2006Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52 , 730 A.2d 51 (1999), [the Supreme Court] recognized that the attorney-client privilege was created to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observation of law and administration of justice. . . .

2011It is true, of course, that “the essence of the [s]ixth [ajmendment right is . . . privacy of communication with counsel”; United States v. Rosner, supra, 485 F.2d 1224 ; and that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege “is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients . . . .” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 , 101 S. Ct. 677 , 66 L.

2011It is true, of course, that “the essence of the [s]ixth [ajmendment right is . . . privacy of communication with counsel”; United States v. Rosner, supra, 485 F.2d 1224 ; and that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege “is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients . . . .” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 , 101 S. Ct. 677 , 66 L.

1999State v. Hanna , 150 Conn. 457 , 466 (1963); Turner's Appeal , 72 Conn. 305 , 317 (1899).

1995The question asks "for Mr. Clayman's experience in working with his clients." The defendants go on to argue that even if the questions are viewed as seeking the disclosure of communications in which legal advice is sought the plaintiff has waived the privilege. (1) The general principles as to the attorney-client privilege are set out in State v. Hayes, 150 Conn. 457 , 466 (1967); Reinzo v. Santangelo, 160 Conn. 391 , 395 (1971); also see Colten v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (ed. 2, 1962).

1993A. The Attorney-Client Privilege In Connecticut, the general rule for the attorney-client privilege is: "Communications between the client and his attorney are privileged when made in confidence for the purpose of seeking legal advice." State v. Burak, 201 Conn. 517 , 526 , 518 A.2d 639 (1986), citing, inter alia, Doyle v. Reeves, 112 Conn. 521 , 523 , 152 A. 882 (1931).

1993A. The Attorney-Client Privilege In Connecticut, the general rule for the attorney-client privilege is: "Communications between the client and his attorney are privileged when made in confidence for the purpose of seeking legal advice." State v. Burak, 201 Conn. 517 , 526 , 518 A.2d 639 (1986), citing, inter alia, Doyle v. Reeves, 112 Conn. 521 , 523 , 152 A. 882 (1931).

2024See id.; Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission, 300 Conn. 511 , 515–16, 14 A.3d 998 (2011). 9 We note, however, that the commission cited to both the common-law definition of the attorney-client privilege, as set forth in Maxwell v. Freedom of Information Commission, 260 Conn. 143, 149 , 794 A.2d 535 (2002), and the statutory definition in General Statutes § 52-146r.

2024See id.; Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission, 300 Conn. 511 , 515–16, 14 A.3d 998 (2011). 9 We note, however, that the commission cited to both the common-law definition of the attorney-client privilege, as set forth in Maxwell v. Freedom of Information Commission, 260 Conn. 143, 149 , 794 A.2d 535 (2002), and the statutory definition in General Statutes § 52-146r.

2013See State v. Egan, 37 Conn. App. 213, 216-17 , 655 A.2d 802 (defendant failed to maintain justified expectation of confidentiality when he released social worker’s report to victim’s mother with no restrictions on its use), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 905 , 659 A.2d 1206 (1995).

2003Ed. 2d 86 (1973); cf. State v. Egan, 37 Conn. App. 213, 217 , 655 A.2d 802 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 905 , 659 A.2d 1206 (1995).

2013See State v. Egan, 37 Conn. App. 213, 216-17 , 655 A.2d 802 (defendant failed to maintain justified expectation of confidentiality when he released social worker’s report to victim’s mother with no restrictions on its use), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 905 , 659 A.2d 1206 (1995).

2003Ed. 2d 86 (1973); cf. State v. Egan, 37 Conn. App. 213, 217 , 655 A.2d 802 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 905 , 659 A.2d 1206 (1995).

2013See State v. Egan, 37 Conn. App. 213, 216-17 , 655 A.2d 802 (defendant failed to maintain justified expectation of confidentiality when he released social worker’s report to victim’s mother with no restrictions on its use), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 905 , 659 A.2d 1206 (1995).

2013See State v. Egan, 37 Conn. App. 213, 216-17 , 655 A.2d 802 (defendant failed to maintain justified expectation of confidentiality when he released social worker’s report to victim’s mother with no restrictions on its use), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 905 , 659 A.2d 1206 (1995).

1994In State v. Manning, 162 Conn. 112, 120 , 291 A.2d 750 (1971), we concluded that the attorney-client privilege had not been violated when the defendant’s previous attorney was asked whether he had had “certain conversations with [the defendant]” and “[w]here were those conversations held.” Similarly, the attorney-client privilege was not violated in the present case when the state’s attorney sought information as to whether the plaintiff had met with his client on a particular date.

1994In State v. Manning, 162 Conn. 112, 120 , 291 A.2d 750 (1971), we concluded that the attorney-client privilege had not been violated when the defendant’s previous attorney was asked whether he had had “certain conversations with [the defendant]” and “[w]here were those conversations held.” Similarly, the attorney-client privilege was not violated in the present case when the state’s attorney sought information as to whether the plaintiff had met with his client on a particular date.

2020See State v. Perrow, 156 Wn.

2011The Court of Appeals of Washington addressed a similar claim in State v. Perrow, 156 Wn.