375 Texas opinions name it 6 courts 1972–2026 27 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Huie v. DeShazogreen2 sentences2026P. 193.3(c); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (“The attorney-client privilege, however, attaches to the complete communication between attorney and client, including both legal advice and factual information.” (citing Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 923 )); see also Harlandale Indep. 2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m | 24 | 34 |
Carmona v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Additionally "[t]he Rules of Criminal Evidence make it clear the attorney-client privilege is held by the client, not the attorney... [a]nd only the client, or an attorney acting with the client's consent, may waive the attorney-client privilege." Carmona, 941 S.W.2d at 956 . 2015See Johnson, 414 S.W.3d at 192 never represented appellant in a criminal matter. (evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to And Storer acknowledged that when he called 9–1–1 trial court's ruling); Carmona, 941 S.W.2d at 953 and later made his statement to police, it did not (attorney-client privilege is designed to guarantee occur to him to assert the attorney-client privilege on confidentiality to promote forthright communication appellant's behalf. between lawyers and client); see also DeAngelis, 116 S.W.3d at 404 (attorney-client privilege applies to communications “made by a clien | 16 | 22 |
West v. Solitogreen2 sentences2024CODE § 132.001(c). 3 matter has been disclosed, it cannot be retracted or otherwise protected.” West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1978); see id. at 245-46 (holding the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production before considering application of the attorney-client privilege). 2024CODE § 132.001(c). 3 matter has been disclosed, it cannot be retracted or otherwise protected.” West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1978); see id. at 245-46 (holding the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production before considering application of the attorney-client privilege). | 14 | 35 |
Walker v. Packergreen2 sentences2021“This occurs when the trial court erroneously orders the disclosure of privileged information which will materially affect the rights of the aggrieved party, such as documents covered by the attorney-client privilege[.]” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). 2021This may occur, for example, when the trial court orders the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege, or “compels the production of patently irrelevant or duplicative documents,” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (citations omitted), or when a trial court refuses to compel over 3,000 plaintiffs in a mass tort lawsuit with 294 defendants “to provide a medical link between a particular plaintiff and a particular product” after eight years of discovery, Able Supply, 898 S.W.2d at 771 . | 14 | 25 |
Austin v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The application of the attorney-client privilege depends on whether the communication sought to be protected is “confidential.” Austin v. State, 934 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. Crim. 2021Finley also provided the court with authority holding that “an attorney’s communication to the client of a trial setting is not subject to the attorney-client privilege.” Austin v. State, 934 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. Crim. | 14 | 16 |
Upjohn Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W .2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993). 74 U.S. v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2002). 75 U.S. v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504 , 510 (9th Cir. 1997). 76 Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 77 Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981). 78 Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 79 See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390 . 80 Id. at 389 . 19 In the governmental context, the attorney-client privilege applies with “special force.”81 “[P]ublic officials are duty-bound to understand and respect constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their authority; thus, their access 2017Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W .2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993). 74 U.S. v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2002). 75 U.S. v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504 , 510 (9th Cir. 1997). 76 Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 77 Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981). 78 Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 79 See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390 . 80 Id. at 389 . 19 In the governmental context, the attorney-client privilege applies with “special force.”81 “[P]ublic officials are duty-bound to understand and respect constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their authority; thus, their access | 10 | 16 |
Republic Insurance Co. v. Davisgreen2 sentences2017Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (holding a party may waive the attorney-client privilege through offensive use); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (observing a party may waive the work-product privilege through offensive use); see also TEX. 2016Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex.1998) (orig.proceeding) (the attorney-client privilege); Owen s-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.1991) (orig.proceeding) (the work-product privilege); Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (the physician-patient privilege). | 9 | 17 |
In Re the City of Georgetowngreen2 sentences2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m 2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m | 8 | 10 |
Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co.green2 sentences2021“Therefore, the attorney-client privilege does not encompass such nonconfidential matters as the terms and conditions of an attorney’s employment, the purpose for which an attorney has been engaged, or any of the other external trappings of the relationship between the parties.” Id. 2018Other matters may exist which are not privileged and which an attorney may be called upon to answer … [f]or instance, the attorney-client privilege certainly does not encompass such nonconfidential matters as the terms and conditions of an attorney's employment and the purpose for which an attorney has been engaged.” Id. citing Duval County Ranch v. Alamo Lumber Co., 663 S.W.2d 627, 634 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) and Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Foster, 593 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.. App. -- Eastland 1979, no writ). | 8 | 10 |
In Re Valero Energy Corp.green2 sentences2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m 2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m | 7 | 8 |
cluster 664169green2 sentences2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds , 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. 2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. | 7 | 7 |
Crane v. Tunksgreen2 sentences2005As we noted in Crane [ v. Tunks , 160 Tex. 182, 190 , 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959)]: "After the [privileged documents] had been inspected, examined and reproduced . . . a holding that the court had erroneously issued the order would be of small comfort to relators in protecting their papers." Walker , 827 S.W.2d at 843 (citations omitted). 2004As we noted in Crane [v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182 , 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959)]: “After the [privileged documents] had been inspected, examined and reproduced ... a holding that the *893 court had erroneously issued the order would be of small comfort to relators in protecting their papers.” Id. at 843 (some citations omitted). | 7 | 7 |
Burton v. Craveygreen2 sentences2015The trustee must therefore disclose the that the attorney-client privilege did not apply in light of the fact (assuming no other privilege applies), even though owners' unqualified right of inspection. 759 S.W.2d at 162 . the trustee confidentially conveyed the fact to the attorney. 2015A lawyer whose Prudence–Bonds Corp., 76 F.Supp. 643, 647 (E.D.N.Y.1948) assignment is to provide assistance (concluding that, without the privilege, “the experience in to the fiduciary during administration management and best judgment by [the trustee] is put aside ... is also working, in tandem with which, in the end may result in harm to the [beneficiaries]”). the fiduciary, for the benefit of the beneficiaries, and the lawyer Chenault relies on Burton v. Cravey, 759 S.W.2d 160 has the discretion to reveal such (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ), for the information to the benefici | 6 | 6 |
Burnett v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See McCann, 422 S.W.3d at 704-705 ; Burnett, 642 S.W.2d at 769 (holding a tape recording of the defendant's pre-hypnotic interview was the defendant's property and subject to the attorney-client privilege). 1987"A. Yes." [7] All emphasis throughout this opinion is supplied by the author unless otherwise noted. [8] The attorney-client privilege was recodified in the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence Rule 503. [9] Burnett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982). [10] In Franklin, supra, we held that the trial court properly excluded testimony that a man the defendant claimed had borrowed his car on the night in question had later been arrested and charged with a similar offense; Florio, supra, held that it was proper to exclude evidence that 19 days prior to the offense someone other than the defend | 5 | 10 |
Strong v. Stategreen2 sentences2001One result of the attorney-client privilege is that it excludes evidence, and arguably "impedes [the] full and free discovery of the truth...." Strong v. State, 773 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). 2001One result of the attorney-client privilege is that it excludes evidence, and arguably “impedes [the] full and free discovery of the truth.... ” Strong v. State, 773 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). | 5 | 8 |
Shell Western E & P, Inc. v. Olivergreen2 sentences2023Compare Shell Western E & P, Inc. v. Oliver, 751 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ) (finding prima facie claim of privilege where affidavit stated that “documents . . . were written by a lawyer to a client” and “consist[ed] of communications from a client to a Shell . . . .lawyer . . . .”) with In re Temple–Inland, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2000, orig. proceeding) (finding no prima facie claim of privilege where affidavit merely stated that production “would violate the attorney-client privilege”). 2006DuPont de Nemours and Co., 136 S.W.3d at 222 (stating that Dupont served a privilege log describing the documents withheld); Shell Western E & P, Inc., 751 S.W.2d at 196 (stating that “there is no dispute that Shell specifically pleaded the attorney-client privilege for each of the documents it wished to withhold”). | 5 | 5 |
| Granada Corp. v. Honorable First Court of Appealsgreen | 5 | 5 |
| Killam Ranch Properties, Ltd. v. Webb County, Texasgreen | 5 | 5 |
| Carmona v. Stategreen | 5 | 5 |
| Henderson v. Stategreen | 5 | 5 |
In Re EI DuPont De Nemours and Co.green2 sentences2017“As such, the attorney-client privilege may apply to communications between attorneys and employees who are not executives or supervisors.” Id. 2015DuPont de Nemours and Co., 136 S.W.3d 218 , 226 n.3 (Tex. 2004); accord Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-97 (rejecting the “control group test” and applying the attorney- client privilege to interviews between employees and company lawyers in the course of an internal investigation into illegal payments to foreign governments). “[T]he privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (citations omitted). 10 In Texas, “[t]he subject ma | 4 | 7 |
State of Texas v. Thomas, Jeremygreen2 sentences2015Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we affirm disadvantage is not to be disclosed unless the client consents.” Nevertheless, O’Neal does not raise the issue of attorney-client privilege on appeal, and we note that the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that “when counsel faces an ineffective-assistance claim, the attorney-client privilege is waived, and trial counsel has the opportunity to explain his actions.” State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Tex. Crim. 2015Viewing the record in a light most favorab le to the trial court's ruling, we affirm disadvantage is not to be disclosed unless the client consents." Nevertheless, O'Neal does not raise the issue of attorney-client privilege on appeal, and we note that the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that "when counsel faces an ineffective-assistance claim, the attorney-client privilege is waived, and tri al counsel has the opportunity to explain his actions." State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Tex. Crirn. | 4 | 6 |
In Re ExxonMobil Corp.green2 sentences2026P. 193.3(c); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (“The attorney-client privilege, however, attaches to the complete communication between attorney and client, including both legal advice and factual information.” (citing Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 923 )); see also Harlandale Indep. 2013See In re Venus Ford of Cudahy, Inc., No. 14-11-00904-CV, 2011 WL 5553789 , *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 15, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing Boring & Tunneling Co. of Am., Inc. v. Salazar, 782 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding)) (if conflicting evidence is presented on whether the attorney-client privilege applies, the trial court’s decision must be deemed conclusive on mandamus review); see also In re ExxonMobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d 353, 363 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (finding no abuse of discretion where the t | 4 | 5 |
In re XL Specialty Insurance Co.green2 sentences2020Id.; In re XL Specialty Ins., 373 S.W.3d 46, 49-50 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding). 2015Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that “[c]onfidential communications between client and counsel made to facilitate legal services are generally insulated from disclosure” and that “the attorney-client privilege promotes free discourse between attorney and client, which advances the effective administration of justice”). | 4 | 5 |
| Fuller v. Stategreen | 4 | 5 |
| Cruz v. Stategreen | 4 | 5 |
| Ford Motor Co. v. Leggatgreen | 4 | 5 |
| Boring & Tunneling Co. of America, Inc. v. Salazargreen | 4 | 4 |
| Bearden v. Boonegreen | 4 | 4 |
| CIGANA CORP. v. Spearsgreen | 3 | 5 |
| In Re General Agents Insurance Co. of Americagreen | 3 | 5 |
| in Re National Lloyds Insurance Company, Wardlaw Claims Service, Inc. and Ideal Adjusting, Inc.green | 3 | 4 |
| In Re Texas Farmers Insurance Exchangegreen | 3 | 4 |
| Sanford v. Stategreen | 3 | 4 |
| Manning v. Stategreen | 3 | 4 |
| In Re JDN Real Estate-McKinney L.P.green | 3 | 3 |
| Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Fostergreen | 3 | 3 |
| Pope v. Stategreen | 3 | 3 |
| State v. DeAngelisgreen | 3 | 3 |
| Arkla, Inc. v. Harrisgreen | 3 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burnett v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See McCann, 422 S.W.3d at 704-705 ; Burnett, 642 S.W.2d at 769 (holding a tape recording of the defendant's pre-hypnotic interview was the defendant's property and subject to the attorney-client privilege). 1987"A. Yes." [7] All emphasis throughout this opinion is supplied by the author unless otherwise noted. [8] The attorney-client privilege was recodified in the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence Rule 503. [9] Burnett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982). [10] In Franklin, supra, we held that the trial court properly excluded testimony that a man the defendant claimed had borrowed his car on the night in question had later been arrested and charged with a similar offense; Florio, supra, held that it was proper to exclude evidence that 19 days prior to the offense someone other than the defend | 1 | 10 |
| Edward E. Colton and Lillian Kaltman v. United States of America, United States of America v. Edward E. Coltongreen | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 675244
green
2 sentences2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds , 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. 2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. | 7 | 1997–2005 |
Rodriguez v. Travis Life Insurance
green
2 sentences2005As we noted in Crane [ v. Tunks , 160 Tex. 182, 190 , 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959)]: "After the [privileged documents] had been inspected, examined and reproduced . . . a holding that the court had erroneously issued the order would be of small comfort to relators in protecting their papers." Walker , 827 S.W.2d at 843 (citations omitted). 2004As we noted in Crane [v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182 , 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959)]: “After the [privileged documents] had been inspected, examined and reproduced ... a holding that the *893 court had erroneously issued the order would be of small comfort to relators in protecting their papers.” Id. at 843 (some citations omitted). | 7 | 2001–2005 |
Aispuro v. Longoria
green
2 sentences2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds , 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. 2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. | 7 | 1997–2005 |
American Bankers Ass'n v. Kelley
green
2 sentences2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds , 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. 2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. | 7 | 1997–2005 |
El Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd. v. Rent Review Commission
green
2 sentences2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds , 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. 2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. | 7 | 1997–2005 |
| Cameron County v. Hinojosa green | 4 | 1989–2002 |
| Troy Williams II v. State green | 3 | 2015–2023 |
| In Re Seigel green | 3 | 2009–2009 |
| Sacramento Newspaper Guild, Local 92 v. Sacramento County Board of Supervisors green | 3 | 1972–1984 |
| In Re Bexar County Criminal District Attorney's Office green | 2 | 2012–2020 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.