Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
402 Texas opinions name it 6 courts 1972–2026 30 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Huie v. DeShazogreen2 sentences2026P. 193.3(c); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (“The attorney-client privilege, however, attaches to the complete communication between attorney and client, including both legal advice and factual information.” (citing Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 923 )); see also Harlandale Indep. 2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m | 27 | 37 |
Carmona v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Carmona v. State, 941 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (Baird, J., concurring) (“only the client, or an attorney acting with the client’s consent, may waive the attorney-client privilege [and] Texas law does not authorize attorneys to unilaterally waive the attorney-client privilege for their clients; only the client may relinquish the privilege”). 2015Additionally "[t]he Rules of Criminal Evidence make it clear the attorney-client privilege is held by the client, not the attorney... [a]nd only the client, or an attorney acting with the client's consent, may waive the attorney-client privilege." Carmona, 941 S.W.2d at 956 . | 18 | 23 |
Austin v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The application of the attorney-client privilege depends on whether the communication sought to be protected is “confidential.” Austin v. State, 934 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. Crim. 2021Finley also provided the court with authority holding that “an attorney’s communication to the client of a trial setting is not subject to the attorney-client privilege.” Austin v. State, 934 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (affirming bail-jumping conviction). | 17 | 19 |
West v. Solitogreen2 sentences2024CODE § 132.001(c). 3 matter has been disclosed, it cannot be retracted or otherwise protected.” West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1978); see id. at 245-46 (holding the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production before considering application of the attorney-client privilege). 2024CODE § 132.001(c). 3 matter has been disclosed, it cannot be retracted or otherwise protected.” West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1978); see id. at 245-46 (holding the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production before considering application of the attorney-client privilege). | 16 | 38 |
Walker v. Packergreen2 sentences2021This may occur, for example, when the trial court orders the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege, or “compels the production of patently irrelevant or duplicative documents,” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (citations omitted), or when a trial court refuses to compel over 3,000 plaintiffs in a mass tort lawsuit with 294 defendants “to provide a medical link between a particular plaintiff and a particular product” after eight years of discovery, Able Supply, 898 S.W.2d at 771 . 2021“This occurs when the trial court erroneously orders the disclosure of privileged information which will materially affect the rights of the aggrieved party, such as documents covered by the attorney-client privilege[.]” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). | 14 | 25 |
Upjohn Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W .2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993). 74 U.S. v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2002). 75 U.S. v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504 , 510 (9th Cir. 1997). 76 Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 77 Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981). 78 Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 79 See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390 . 80 Id. at 389 . 19 In the governmental context, the attorney-client privilege applies with “special force.”81 “[P]ublic officials are duty-bound to understand and respect constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their authority; thus, their access 2017Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W .2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993). 74 U.S. v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2002). 75 U.S. v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504 , 510 (9th Cir. 1997). 76 Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 77 Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981). 78 Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 79 See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390 . 80 Id. at 389 . 19 In the governmental context, the attorney-client privilege applies with “special force.”81 “[P]ublic officials are duty-bound to understand and respect constitutional, judicial and statutory limitations on their authority; thus, their access | 11 | 17 |
Republic Insurance Co. v. Davisgreen2 sentences2017Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (holding a party may waive the attorney-client privilege through offensive use); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (observing a party may waive the work-product privilege through offensive use); see also TEX. 2016Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 164 (Tex.1998) (orig.proceeding) (the attorney-client privilege); Owen s-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.1991) (orig.proceeding) (the work-product privilege); Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tex.1985) (orig.proceeding) (the physician-patient privilege). | 9 | 17 |
In Re the City of Georgetowngreen2 sentences2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m 2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m | 8 | 10 |
Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co.green2 sentences2021“Therefore, the attorney-client privilege does not encompass such nonconfidential matters as the terms and conditions of an attorney’s employment, the purpose for which an attorney has been engaged, or any of the other external trappings of the relationship between the parties.” Id. 2018Other matters may exist which are not privileged and which an attorney may be called upon to answer … [f]or instance, the attorney-client privilege certainly does not encompass such nonconfidential matters as the terms and conditions of an attorney's employment and the purpose for which an attorney has been engaged.” Id. citing Duval County Ranch v. Alamo Lumber Co., 663 S.W.2d 627, 634 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) and Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Foster, 593 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.. App. -- Eastland 1979, no writ). | 8 | 10 |
Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegiegreen2 sentences2008Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir. 1994). 2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds , 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. | 8 | 8 |
In Re Valero Energy Corp.green2 sentences2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m 2025P. 192.5. 321 In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 333-34, 337 (Tex. 2001). 322 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein); In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (privilege attaches to complete communication, including factual information). 2024 Public Information Handbook • Office of the Attorney General 67 Exceptions to Disclosure contains or consists of an attorney-client communication. 323 Rather, information in an attorney fee bill m | 7 | 8 |
Ford Motor Co. v. Leggatgreen2 sentences2006The attorney-client privilege has been recognized as "the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law." Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643 , 647 (Tex. 1995) (quoting United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 , 562 (1989)). 2000The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest privileges recognized by the common law, see Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex.1995), and we believe that if the Texas Supreme Court had intended to eliminate the attorney-client privilege as it applies to witness statements it would have expressly done so. | 7 | 8 |
Crane v. Tunksred2 sentences2005As we noted in Crane [ v. Tunks , 160 Tex. 182, 190 , 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959)]: "After the [privileged documents] had been inspected, examined and reproduced . . . a holding that the court had erroneously issued the order would be of small comfort to relators in protecting their papers." Walker , 827 S.W.2d at 843 (citations omitted). 2005As we noted in Crane [ v. Tunks , 160 Tex. 182, 190 , 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959)]: "After the [privileged documents] had been inspected, examined and reproduced . . . a holding that the court had erroneously issued the order would be of small comfort to relators in protecting their papers." Walker , 827 S.W.2d at 843 (citations omitted). | 7 | 7 |
In Re EI DuPont De Nemours and Co.green2 sentences2017“As such, the attorney-client privilege may apply to communications between attorneys and employees who are not executives or supervisors.” Id. 2015DuPont de Nemours and Co., 136 S.W.3d 218 , 226 n.3 (Tex. 2004); accord Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-97 (rejecting the “control group test” and applying the attorney- client privilege to interviews between employees and company lawyers in the course of an internal investigation into illegal payments to foreign governments). “[T]he privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (citations omitted). 10 In Texas, “[t]he subject ma | 6 | 9 |
Henderson v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Further, the attorney-client privilege sometimes yields to accommodate public policy: "There may be circumstances so grave ... that the privilege must yield to the most fundamental values of our justice system.” Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 556 (Tex. Crim.App.1997). 3 . 2005Such communication is “arguably” not for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services, so the privilege presents “no bar to disclosure.” Id. at 555 .2 In the instant case, appellant threatened to commit homicide, which the interpreter, who in nine years of experience had never heard a defendant utter such a threat, took 2 Further, the attorney-client privilege sometimes yields to accommodate public policy: “There may be circumstances so grave . . . that the privilege must yield to the most fundamental values of our justice system.” Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544 | 6 | 7 |
Shell Western E & P, Inc. v. Olivergreen2 sentences2023Compare Shell Western E & P, Inc. v. Oliver, 751 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ) (finding prima facie claim of privilege where affidavit stated that “documents . . . were written by a lawyer to a client” and “consist[ed] of communications from a client to a Shell . . . .lawyer . . . .”) with In re Temple–Inland, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Tex. App.— Beaumont 2000, orig. proceeding) (finding no prima facie claim of privilege where affidavit merely stated that production “would violate the attorney-client privilege”). 2006DuPont de Nemours and Co., 136 S.W.3d at 222 (stating that Dupont served a privilege log describing the documents withheld); Shell Western E & P, Inc., 751 S.W.2d at 196 (stating that “there is no dispute that Shell specifically pleaded the attorney-client privilege for each of the documents it wished to withhold”). | 6 | 6 |
Granada Corp. v. Honorable First Court of Appealsgreen2 sentences2017First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223, 227-28 (Tex. 1992) (recognizing that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applies only if a prima facie case of contemplated fraud is made by the party seeking discovery); In re Park Cities Bank, 409 S.W.3d 859, 868-69 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, orig, proceeding) ("Once the party resisting discovery establishes a prima facie case that the documents are privileged [trader the attorney-client privilege], the burden shifts to the discovering party to refute the privilege claim”); Coats v. Ruiz, 198 S.W.3d 863, 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, n 2010See id .; see also Granada Corp. v. First Court of Appeals , 844 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). | 6 | 6 |
Burton v. Craveygreen2 sentences2015A lawyer whose Prudence–Bonds Corp., 76 F.Supp. 643, 647 (E.D.N.Y.1948) assignment is to provide assistance (concluding that, without the privilege, “the experience in to the fiduciary during administration management and best judgment by [the trustee] is put aside ... is also working, in tandem with which, in the end may result in harm to the [beneficiaries]”). the fiduciary, for the benefit of the beneficiaries, and the lawyer Chenault relies on Burton v. Cravey, 759 S.W.2d 160 has the discretion to reveal such (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ), for the information to the benefici 2015The trustee must therefore disclose the that the attorney-client privilege did not apply in light of the fact (assuming no other privilege applies), even though owners' unqualified right of inspection. 759 S.W.2d at 162 . the trustee confidentially conveyed the fact to the attorney. | 6 | 6 |
Burnett v. Stategreen2 sentences1997But see Burnett, 642 S.W.2d at 768 (defendant provided relevant testimony); Cruz, 586 S.W.2d at 864 (same). [6] We also note these authorities support the proposition that the party claiming a privilege has the burden to prove the existence of the privilege, and that appellant produced no evidence he intended for his communications to Barton to be confidential. 1997But see Burnett, 642 S.W.2d at 768 (defendant provided relevant testimony); Cruz, 586 S.W.2d at 864 (same). . | 5 | 10 |
Strong v. Stategreen2 sentences2001One result of the attorney-client privilege is that it excludes evidence, and arguably “impedes [the] full and free discovery of the truth.... ” Strong v. State, 773 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). 2001One result of the attorney-client privilege is that it excludes evidence, and arguably "impedes [the] full and free discovery of the truth...." Strong v. State, 773 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). | 5 | 8 |
In Re ExxonMobil Corp.green2 sentences2026P. 193.3(c); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (“The attorney-client privilege, however, attaches to the complete communication between attorney and client, including both legal advice and factual information.” (citing Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 923 )); see also Harlandale Indep. 2013See In re Venus Ford of Cudahy, Inc., No. 14-11-00904-CV, 2011 WL 5553789 , *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 15, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing Boring & Tunneling Co. of Am., Inc. v. Salazar, 782 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding)) (if conflicting evidence is presented on whether the attorney-client privilege applies, the trial court’s decision must be deemed conclusive on mandamus review); see also In re ExxonMobil Corp., 97 S.W.3d 353, 363 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (finding no abuse of discretion where the t | 5 | 6 |
| Carmona v. Stategreen | 5 | 5 |
| Killam Ranch Properties, Ltd. v. Webb County, Texasgreen | 5 | 5 |
State of Texas v. Thomas, Jeremygreen2 sentences2015Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we affirm disadvantage is not to be disclosed unless the client consents.” Nevertheless, O’Neal does not raise the issue of attorney-client privilege on appeal, and we note that the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that “when counsel faces an ineffective-assistance claim, the attorney-client privilege is waived, and trial counsel has the opportunity to explain his actions.” State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Tex. Crim. 2015Viewing the record in a light most favorab le to the trial court's ruling, we affirm disadvantage is not to be disclosed unless the client consents." Nevertheless, O'Neal does not raise the issue of attorney-client privilege on appeal, and we note that the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that "when counsel faces an ineffective-assistance claim, the attorney-client privilege is waived, and tri al counsel has the opportunity to explain his actions." State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Tex. Crirn. | 4 | 6 |
| In re XL Specialty Insurance Co.green | 4 | 5 |
| Fuller v. Stategreen | 4 | 5 |
| Cruz v. Stategreen | 4 | 5 |
| Boring & Tunneling Co. of America, Inc. v. Salazargreen | 4 | 4 |
| Pondrum v. Graygreen | 4 | 4 |
| Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. Caldwellgreen | 4 | 4 |
| Bearden v. Boonegreen | 4 | 4 |
| In Re Texas Farmers Insurance Exchangegreen | 3 | 5 |
| CIGANA CORP. v. Spearsgreen | 3 | 5 |
| In Re General Agents Insurance Co. of Americagreen | 3 | 5 |
| in Re National Lloyds Insurance Company, Wardlaw Claims Service, Inc. and Ideal Adjusting, Inc.green | 3 | 4 |
| Sanford v. Stateyellow | 3 | 4 |
| Manning v. Stategreen | 3 | 4 |
| Marathon Oil Co. v. Moyegreen | 3 | 4 |
| Jordan v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Fourth Supreme Judicial Districtgreen | 3 | 4 |
| In Re Monsanto Co.green | 3 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burnett v. Stategreen2 sentences1997But see Burnett, 642 S.W.2d at 768 (defendant provided relevant testimony); Cruz, 586 S.W.2d at 864 (same). [6] We also note these authorities support the proposition that the party claiming a privilege has the burden to prove the existence of the privilege, and that appellant produced no evidence he intended for his communications to Barton to be confidential. 1997But see Burnett, 642 S.W.2d at 768 (defendant provided relevant testimony); Cruz, 586 S.W.2d at 864 (same). . | 1 | 10 |
| Cruz v. Stategreen | 1 | 5 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
American Bankers Ass'n v. Kelley
green
2 sentences2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds , 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. 2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. | 7 | 1997–2005 |
El Dorado Palm Springs, Ltd. v. Rent Review Commission
green
2 sentences2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds , 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. 2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. | 7 | 1997–2005 |
Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie
green
2 sentences2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie , 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds , 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. 2005Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1413 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115 S. Ct. 900 , 130 L. | 7 | 1997–2005 |
| Cameron County v. Hinojosa green | 5 | 1989–2002 |
| Troy Williams II v. State green | 3 | 2015–2023 |
| In Re Seigel green | 3 | 2009–2009 |
| El Centro Del Barrio, Inc. v. Barlow green | 3 | 1999–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.