63 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2026 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Frease v. Glazergreen2 sentences2023By pro- tecting communications between people within those rela- tionships, the privileges “encourage open communication between the persons in the protected relationship, which theoretically, in turn, strengthens that relationship and encourages participation in such relationships.” Id.; see also Frease v. Glazer, 330 Or 364, 370 , 4 P3d 56 (2000) (explain- ing that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege “is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public inter- ests in the observance of law and administration of justice” 2023By pro- tecting communications between people within those rela- tionships, the privileges “encourage open communication between the persons in the protected relationship, which theoretically, in turn, strengthens that relationship and encourages participation in such relationships.” Id.; see also Frease v. Glazer, 330 Or 364, 370 , 4 P3d 56 (2000) (explain- ing that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege “is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public inter- ests in the observance of law and administration of justice” | 3 | 6 |
State v. Jancsekgreen2 sentences2022The attorney- client privilege is rooted in the common law, see State v. Jancsek, 302 Or 270, 274 , 730 P2d 14 (1986), but it has been the subject of Oregon statutes since 1862, see General Laws of Oregon, Civ Code, ch VIII, title III, § 702(2), p 325 ( Deady 1845 -1864). 2022The attorney- client privilege is rooted in the common law, see State v. Jancsek, 302 Or 270, 274 , 730 P2d 14 (1986), but it has been the subject of Oregon statutes since 1862, see General Laws of Oregon, Civ Code, ch VIII, title III, § 702(2), p 325 ( Deady 1845 -1864). | 3 | 6 |
State v. Russumgreen2 sentences2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc 2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc | 3 | 3 |
Shillinger v. Haworthgreen2 sentences2025The content of the protected communication is not rele- vant.”); Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir 1995) (“Because we believe that a prosecutor’s intentional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes a direct interference with the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant, * * * absent a countervailing state interest, such an intrusion must constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.”); defendant contends that the state’s actions were a deliberate intrusion into the attorney-client relation- ship that are presumed to be prejudicial and that, therefore, 2025Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 The content of the protected communication is not rele- vant.”); Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir 1995) (“Because we believe that a prosecutor’s intentional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes a direct interference with the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant, * * * absent a countervailing state interest, such an intrusion must constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.”); defendant contends that the state’s actions were a deliberate intrusion into the attorney-client relation- ship that are presumed to be | 2 | 2 |
Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc.green2 sentences2023See, e.g., In re Reserve Fund Sec. and Derivative Litig., 275 FRD 154, 158-59 (SDNY 2011) (concluding that email messages sent to and from the hus- band’s work email address were not protected by the marital communications privilege where employees were regularly reminded that the email account was for business purposes only and email messages contained there were subject to disclosure); Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F Supp 2d 1083, 1108 (WD Wash 2011) (finding that the attorney-client privilege did not attach to employee’s email messages and communications created and sent or receiv 2023See, e.g., In re Reserve Fund Sec. and Derivative Litig., 275 FRD 154, 158-59 (SDNY 2011) (concluding that email messages sent to and from the hus- band’s work email address were not protected by the marital communications privilege where employees were regularly reminded that the email account was for business purposes only and email messages contained there were subject to disclosure); Aventa Learning, Inc. v. K12, Inc., 830 F Supp 2d 1083, 1108 (WD Wash 2011) (finding that the attorney-client privilege did not attach to employee’s email messages and communications created and sent or receiv | 2 | 2 |
Reynolds v. Schrockgreen2 sentences2016See Reynolds v. Schrock, 341 Or 338, 351 , 142 P3d 1062 (2006) (discussing similar principles based on the litigation privilege). 2016See Reynolds v. Schrock, 341 Or 338, 351 , 142 P3d 1062 (2006) (discussing similar principles based on the litigation privilege). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Illidgegreen2 sentences2014In support, Crimson relies on legislature commentary to OEC 503(4), which, after describing the five enumerated exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, adds: “Oregon law recognizes two other exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege — an exception for assets left with the attorney, State ex rel Hardy v. Gleason, 19 Or 159 , 23 P 817 (1890), and an exception for the fact of employment and name and address of the client, Cole v. Johnson, 103 Or 319 , 205 P 282 (1922); In re Illidge, 162 Or 393 , 91 P2d 1100 (1939). 2014In support, Crimson relies on legislature commentary to OEC 503(4), which, after describing the five enumerated exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, adds: “Oregon law recognizes two other exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege — an exception for assets left with the attorney, State ex rel Hardy v. Gleason, 19 Or 159 , 23 P 817 (1890), and an exception for the fact of employment and name and address of the client, Cole v. Johnson, 103 Or 319 , 205 P 282 (1922); In re Illidge, 162 Or 393 , 91 P2d 1100 (1939). | 2 | 2 |
Klamath County School District v. Teameygreen2 sentences2010See Klamath County School Dist. v. Teamey, 207 Or App 250, 260 , 140 P3d 1152 , rev den, 342 Or 46 (2006). 5 In support of their argument, plaintiffs cite other jurisdictions that have similarly limited the common-interest component of the attorney-client privilege. 2010See Klamath County School Dist. v. Teamey, 207 Or App 250, 260 , 140 P3d 1152 , rev den, 342 Or 46 (2006). 5 In support of their argument, plaintiffs cite other jurisdictions that have similarly limited the common-interest component of the attorney-client privilege. | 2 | 2 |
City of Portland v. Bartlettgreen2 sentences2022Cite as 369 Or 606 (2022) 609 notwithstanding the attorney-client privilege. 2022Cite as 369 Or 606 (2022) 619 The city is correct that the attorney-client privilege in OEC 503 is not solely an evidentiary privilege. | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Zolingreen2 sentences2016That step derives from United States v. Zolin, 491 US 554, 572 , 109 S Ct 2619 , 105 L Ed 2d 469 (1989), where the Court examined in camera review of material that was potentially within the attorney-client privilege but also potentially within an exception to that privilege. 2016That step derives from United States v. Zolin, 491 US 554, 572 , 109 S Ct 2619 , 105 L Ed 2d 469 (1989), where the Court examined in camera review of material that was potentially within the attorney-client privilege but also potentially within an exception to that privilege. | 1 | 3 |
State Ex Rel. North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Unisgreen2 sentences2003The court then stated: “Consistent with the recognition * * * that [ORS 44.040(l)(b)] is merely declaratory of the common law attorney-client privilege, and with our practice of construing the statute in light of the underlying policies which it is intended to serve, we hold, as an exception to the attorney-client privilege, that an attorney may, under appropriate circumstances, be required to testify about a client’s communications which relate to future wrongdoing.” Unis, 282 Or at 462-63 (emphasis added). 2000A party seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege “must show that the client, when consulting the attorney, knew or should have known that the intended conduct was unlawful.” State ex rel N. Pacific Lbr. v. Unis, 282 Or 457, 464 , 579 P2d 1291 (1978). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Riddlegreen2 sentences1998However, its opinion moves between the two concepts in a way that is difficult to follow. 155 Or.App. at 531 , 964 P.2d at 1059 (states conclusion concerning scope of attorney-client privilege in one paragraph, in next paragraph supports conclusion by cases based on work product doctrine); id. at 535-36, 964 P.2d at 1061-62 (paragraph begins by referring to the work product doctrine, moves to a case that discusses the attorney-client privilege, and closes with an article and a case on the work product doctrine). [1] It appears to rely on an amorphous "privilege" that seems to combine elements 1998However, its opinion moves between the two concepts in a way that is difficult to follow. 155 Or.App. at 531 , 964 P.2d at 1059 (states conclusion concerning scope of attorney-client privilege in one paragraph, in next paragraph supports conclusion by cases based on work product doctrine); id. at 535-36, 964 P.2d at 1061-62 (paragraph begins by referring to the work product doctrine, moves to a case that discusses the attorney-client privilege, and closes with an article and a case on the work product doctrine). [1] It appears to rely on an amorphous "privilege" that seems to combine elements | 1 | 3 |
Guard Publishing Co. v. Lane County School District No. 4Jgreen2 sentences2020See Guard Publishing Co. v. Lane County School Dist., 310 Or 32 , 37-38 & n 6, 791 P2d 854 (1990) (“If the public body is satisfied that a claimed exemption from disclosure is justified, it may, but is not required to, withhold disclosure of the information.” (emphasis and foot- note omitted)); Freaze v. Glazer, 330 Or 364, 370 , 4 P3d 56 (2000) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege is not absolute and that a client may waive it voluntarily). 606 City of Portland v. Bartlett • ORS 314.835(1)—information in state tax returns; • ORS 342.850(8)—teacher personnel files where a district sc 2020See Guard Publishing Co. v. Lane County School Dist., 310 Or 32 , 37-38 & n 6, 791 P2d 854 (1990) (“If the public body is satisfied that a claimed exemption from disclosure is justified, it may, but is not required to, withhold disclosure of the information.” (emphasis and foot- note omitted)); Freaze v. Glazer, 330 Or 364, 370 , 4 P3d 56 (2000) (explaining that the attorney-client privilege is not absolute and that a client may waive it voluntarily). 606 City of Portland v. Bartlett • ORS 314.835(1)—information in state tax returns; • ORS 342.850(8)—teacher personnel files where a district sc | 1 | 2 |
| Checkley v. Boydgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Adamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Steelman v. Coloradogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allred v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Woodruffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Linda Jean Freeman, AKA Laurie Dieciduegreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 348794green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Biltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLPgreen2 sentences2022The city also argues that ORS 192.390 cannot require the disclosure of attorney-client communications because “the exceptions codified in OEC 503(4) were ‘intended [by the legislature] as a complete enumeration of the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.’ Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 355 Or 476, 501 , 326 P3d 1181 (2014).” The city reads too much into the quoted sentence. 2016But see Crimson Trace Corp., 355 Or at 488 (“[T]here is no reason to believe that the existence of [an attorney-client] relationship for purposes of OEC 503 [the attorney-client privilege] would be determined by the same analysis that applies in the disciplinary context”). | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Longo v. Premo
green
2 sentences2024Longo v. Premo, 355 Or 525, 539 , 355 P3d 1152 (2014) (interpreting OEC 503(4)(c)). 2024Longo v. Premo, 355 Or 525, 539 , 355 P3d 1152 (2014) (interpreting OEC 503(4)(c)). | 6 | 2020–2024 |
State Ex Rel. Oregon Health Sciences University v. Haas
green
2 sentences2000The person who was the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.” Although the attorney-client privilege belongs exclusively to the client, State ex rel OHSU v. Haas, 325 Or 492, 505 , 942 P2d 261 (1997), the client’s attorney may claim the privilege on the client’s behalf, OEC 503(3). 2000The person who was the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.” Although the attorney-client privilege belongs exclusively to the client, State ex rel OHSU v. Haas, 325 Or 492, 505 , 942 P2d 261 (1997), the client’s attorney may claim the privilege on the client’s behalf, OEC 503(3). | 5 | 2000–2023 |
BRINK ET UX v. Multnomah County
green
2 sentences2023In Brink v. Multnomah County, 224 Or 507, 517 , 356 P2d 536 (1960), the Supreme Court held, in the context of a condemnation proceeding, that an appraisal report having been prepared at the time a lawsuit was threatened or already existed “was sufficient to bring the report [and testimony relating to it] within the [attorney-client] privilege.” Cf. City of Portland v. Nudelman, 45 Or App 425, 433 , 608 P2d 1190 (1980) rev den 289 Or 275 (1980) (holding that, in the context of a condemnation proceeding, an appraisal report prepared “long before any steps toward preparing litigation were made” w 2023In Brink v. Multnomah County, 224 Or 507, 517 , 356 P2d 536 (1960), the Supreme Court held, in the context of a condemnation proceeding, that an appraisal report having been prepared at the time a lawsuit was threatened or already existed “was sufficient to bring the report [and testimony relating to it] within the [attorney-client] privilege.” Cf. City of Portland v. Nudelman, 45 Or App 425, 433 , 608 P2d 1190 (1980) rev den 289 Or 275 (1980) (holding that, in the context of a condemnation proceeding, an appraisal report prepared “long before any steps toward preparing litigation were made” w | 5 | 1974–2023 |
Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2023OEC 104(1) (preliminary questions concerning, among other things, the existence of a privilege, shall be determined by the trial court); Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 314 Or 336, 342 , 838 P2d 1069 (1992) (whether waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurred is a preliminary question of fact for the trial court under OEC 104). 2023OEC 104(1) (preliminary questions concerning, among other things, the existence of a privilege, shall be determined by the trial court); Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 314 Or 336, 342 , 838 P2d 1069 (1992) (whether waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurred is a preliminary question of fact for the trial court under OEC 104). | 4 | 1995–2023 |
Bichindaritz v. Univ. of Wash.
neutral
2 sentences2024Longo v. Premo, 355 Or 525, 539 , 355 P3d 1152 (2014) (interpreting OEC 503(4)(c)). 2024Longo v. Premo, 355 Or 525, 539 , 355 P3d 1152 (2014) (interpreting OEC 503(4)(c)). | 3 | 2024–2024 |
Upjohn Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences2023The priv- ilege, codified at OEC 503,2 seeks to “ ‘encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the obser- vance of law and administration of justice.’ ” Haas, 325 Or at 500 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 389 , 101 S Ct 677 , 66 L Ed 2d 584 (1981)). 2023The priv- ilege, codified at OEC 503,2 seeks to “ ‘encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the obser- vance of law and administration of justice.’ ” Haas, 325 Or at 500 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383, 389 , 101 S Ct 677 , 66 L Ed 2d 584 (1981)). | 3 | 2014–2023 |
State v. Riddle
green
2 sentences2020The city also argues that OEC 503, which is the “statutory embodiment of the attorney-client privilege in this state,” State v. Riddle, 330 Or 471, 476 , 8 P3d 980 (2000), is more specific and therefore controls over the more general provision in ORS 192.390. 2020The city also argues that OEC 503, which is the “statutory embodiment of the attorney-client privilege in this state,” State v. Riddle, 330 Or 471, 476 , 8 P3d 980 (2000), is more specific and therefore controls over the more general provision in ORS 192.390. | 3 | 2006–2020 |
State v. De Witt Simons
green
2 sentences2026OEC 503(2) describes the attorney-client privilege and is codified at ORS 40.225: “A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communica- tions made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client[.]” (Emphasis added.) OEC 503(1)(b), in turn, defines “confiden- tial communication” as: Cite as 375 Or 70 (2026) 87 “a communication not intended to be disclosed to third per- sons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the clien 2026OEC 503(2) describes the attorney-client privilege and is codified at ORS 40.225: “A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communica- tions made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client[.]” (Emphasis added.) OEC 503(1)(b), in turn, defines “confiden- tial communication” as: Cite as 375 Or 70 (2026) 87 “a communication not intended to be disclosed to third per- sons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the clien | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Cloud
green
2 sentences2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc 2025Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 The content of the protected communication is not rele- vant.”); Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir 1995) (“Because we believe that a prosecutor’s intentional intrusion into the attorney-client relationship constitutes a direct interference with the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant, * * * absent a countervailing state interest, such an intrusion must constitute a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.”); defendant contends that the state’s actions were a deliberate intrusion into the attorney-client relation- ship that are presumed to be | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Quattlebaum
green
2 sentences2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc 2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial misconduct raises an irrebuttable presumpti | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Greenwood
neutral
2 sentences2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc 2025Citing State v. Greenwood, 332 Or App 166, 177 , 548 P3d 831 (2024) (a pur- poseful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege results in a rebuttable presumption of prejudice); State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103 , 333 P3d 1191 , rev den, 356 Or 575 (2014) (“[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi- dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of attorney-client communications to the prosecution.”); and a South Carolina and federal case, State v. Quattlebaum, 338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105 (2000) (“Deliberate prosecutorial Cite as 339 Or App 405 (2025) 415 misconduc | 2 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2023Id. at 256-58 . 2023Id. at 256-58 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
City of Portland v. Bartlett
green
2 sentences2021As we view the dispositive question on appeal, contrary to 5 We recently addressed the interplay of the Public Records Law and the attorney-client privilege in a slightly different context in City of Portland v. Bartlett, 304 Or App 580 , 468 P3d 980 (2020). 2021As we view the dispositive question on appeal, contrary to 5 We recently addressed the interplay of the Public Records Law and the attorney-client privilege in a slightly different context in City of Portland v. Bartlett, 304 Or App 580 , 468 P3d 980 (2020). | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Cole v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2014In support, Crimson relies on legislature commentary to OEC 503(4), which, after describing the five enumerated exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, adds: “Oregon law recognizes two other exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege — an exception for assets left with the attorney, State ex rel Hardy v. Gleason, 19 Or 159 , 23 P 817 (1890), and an exception for the fact of employment and name and address of the client, Cole v. Johnson, 103 Or 319 , 205 P 282 (1922); In re Illidge, 162 Or 393 , 91 P2d 1100 (1939). 2014In support, Crimson relies on legislature commentary to OEC 503(4), which, after describing the five enumerated exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, adds: “Oregon law recognizes two other exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege — an exception for assets left with the attorney, State ex rel Hardy v. Gleason, 19 Or 159 , 23 P 817 (1890), and an exception for the fact of employment and name and address of the client, Cole v. Johnson, 103 Or 319 , 205 P 282 (1922); In re Illidge, 162 Or 393 , 91 P2d 1100 (1939). | 2 | 1994–2014 |
State ex rel. Hardy v. Gleason
green
2 sentences2014In support, Crimson relies on legislature commentary to OEC 503(4), which, after describing the five enumerated exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, adds: “Oregon law recognizes two other exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege — an exception for assets left with the attorney, State ex rel Hardy v. Gleason, 19 Or 159 , 23 P 817 (1890), and an exception for the fact of employment and name and address of the client, Cole v. Johnson, 103 Or 319 , 205 P 282 (1922); In re Illidge, 162 Or 393 , 91 P2d 1100 (1939). 2014In support, Crimson relies on legislature commentary to OEC 503(4), which, after describing the five enumerated exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, adds: “Oregon law recognizes two other exceptions to the lawyer-client privilege — an exception for assets left with the attorney, State ex rel Hardy v. Gleason, 19 Or 159 , 23 P 817 (1890), and an exception for the fact of employment and name and address of the client, Cole v. Johnson, 103 Or 319 , 205 P 282 (1922); In re Illidge, 162 Or 393 , 91 P2d 1100 (1939). | 2 | 1978–2014 |
Portland General Electric Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences2006Finally, defendant argues that Zagar’s primary function was investigation, not rendition of legal services, so the attorney-client privilege does not apply in this case. 3 Defendant’s legal arguments present a question of statutory interpretation that we analyze according to the framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993). 2006Finally, defendant argues that Zagar’s primary function was investigation, not rendition of legal services, so the attorney-client privilege does not apply in this case. 3 Defendant’s legal arguments present a question of statutory interpretation that we analyze according to the framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993). | 2 | 2006–2010 |
| Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Portland School District No. 1J green | 2 | 2006–2008 |
| State v. Brown green | 2 | 1998–2000 |
| State v. Taylor green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Prieto-Rubio green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Hill v. Johnson green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Garlinghouse green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| City of Portland v. Nudelman green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. McGinnis green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Chaimov v. Dept. of Admin. Services neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| City of Damascus v. State of Oregon green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In re Conry green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Fisher v. United States green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Johnson v. Premo green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Gaines green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Brumwell v. Premo green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Robertson green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Miller green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| VersusLaw, Inc. v. Stoel Rives, L.L.P. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Lenarz green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Port of Portland v. Oregon Center for Environmental Health green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Equitable Life Assurance Society v. McKay green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Anderson green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Jordan v. Motor Vehicles Division green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Spencer green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.