62 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Upjohn Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000The attorney-client privilege “only protects disclosure of confidential communications between the client and attorney; it does not protect disclosure of underlying facts.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). 2000The attorney-client privilege “only protects disclosure of confidential communications between the client and attorney; it does not protect disclosure of underlying facts.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). | 5 | 9 |
Succession of Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talleygreen2 sentences2016Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So.2d 1138, 1147 (La. 1987) (client who chooses to use communications with attorney at trial waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to those communications); Robinson v. Abraham, 582 So.2d 1341, 1344 (La. 2014In Succession of Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So.2d 1138 (La.1987), the supreme court addressed what constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. | 2 | 5 |
Holloway v. Arkansasgreen2 sentences2022See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 484 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).4 Therefore, the district court denied Mr. Gravois’ motion to quash the entire subpoena duces tecum. (2) Whether the retainer agreements between Mr. Gravois and Mr. Chester, the Firm, and Kerry Miller are privileged: The district court determined that any contracts or engagement letters responsive to numbers 1-4 in the State’s subpoena duces tecum5 are relevant to the State’s conflict motion regarding Mr. Gravois’ Sixth Amendment rights, and are excepted from the attorney-client privilege under La. 2022See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 484 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).4 Therefore, the district court denied Mr. Gravois’ motion to quash the entire subpoena duces tecum. (2) Whether the retainer agreements between Mr. Gravois and Mr. Chester, the Firm, and Kerry Miller are privileged: The district court determined that any contracts or engagement letters responsive to numbers 1-4 in the State’s subpoena duces tecum5 are relevant to the State’s conflict motion regarding Mr. Gravois’ Sixth Amendment rights, and are excepted from the attorney-client privilege under La. | 2 | 2 |
cluster 381845green2 sentences2003In Re Berkley & Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 548, 554 (8th Cir.1980). 1987In Re Berkley & Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 548, 554 (8th Cir.1980). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. T. Windle Dyergreen2 sentences1987United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir.1983), and cases cited therein. 1986See U.S. v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174 (5th Cir.1983); In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, supra; In Re Grand Jury Proceedings in the Matter of Fine, supra. At the hearing, both the attorney and client may be called to testify if necessary and the attorney-client privilege may not be interposed as an obstacle to examination. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Greengreen2 sentences2024C.E. art. 506 as “a person having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice so obtained, on behalf of the client.” 3 24-K-358 In Green, 493 So.2d 1178 , the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth three elements for creation of the attorney-client privilege. 2003In Green, supra, there was no question that the attorney involved represented that defendant; thus, an attorney-client privilege existed which prevented the attorney from disclosing the client’s confidences. | 1 | 9 |
State v. Hayesgreen2 sentences1986The state may subpoena the attorney to produce evidence of the commission of a crime by a client or third party which is in his possession without fearing the attorney may successfully invoke the attorneyclient privilege. [5] Although as a general rule the identity of the client is a matter of public record and thus not covered by the attorney-client privilege, see Pike, supra ; Hayes, supra, in cases such as this the attorney may not be called to the stand and asked to disclose the identity of his client. 1985The trial court erred when it imposed an excessive sentence. [2] LSA-R.S. 15:475 provides: No legal adviser is permitted, whether during or after the termination of his employment as such, unless with his client's express consent, to disclose any communication made to him as such legal adviser by or on behalf of his client, or any advice given by him to his client, or any information that he may have gotten by reason of his being such legal adviser. [3] In State v. Hayes, 324 So.2d 421, 423 (La. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 962 , 96 S.Ct. 1747 , 48 L.Ed.2d 207 (1976), the Louisiana Supreme Cou | 1 | 5 |
In Re Murphygreen2 sentences1991If Ms. Pitard meant for the contents to be confidential so as to avoid truthful answers, hiding the truth, then this anticipates fraud, and the attorney client privilege does not protect communications "where the desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoing, but to future wrongdoing." In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 337 (8th Cir.1977). 1986Co., 433 So.2d 125 (La.1983) as follows: "This so-called `opinion work product' rule is derived from Federal Rule 26(b)(3).11 The rule is `distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 , 238 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 2160 , 2170 n. 11, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.1977). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Vasselgreen2 sentences1986La.R.S. 15:478 (1981); State v. Vassel, 285 So.2d 221 (La. 1973) (The attorney-client privilege was inapplicable where the client rather than the attorney testified.); State v. Johns, 209 La. 244 , 24 So.2d 462 (1946). 1981In State v. Vassel, 285 So.2d 221 (La.1973), this Court noted that the La.R.S. 15:475 attorney client privilege did not bar any of the defendant's answers where he readily answered questions without objection. *259 Since defendant never affirmatively invoked this privilege, the state withdrew its question and defense counsel does not even request what relief he seeks from this alleged infringment of the attorney-client privilege during a post-conviction proceeding, this assignment lacks merit. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Rankingreen2 sentences1986See Rankin, supra . 1986New Orleans Saints v. Griesedieck, 612 F.Supp. 59 (E.D.La. 1985), affirmed, 790 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986); State v. Rankin, 465 So.2d 679 (La. 1985); Succession of Norton, 351 So.2d 107 (La.1977). | 1 | 2 |
In Re January 1976 Grand Jury. Edward M. Genson, Attorney at Law, Witness-Appellant v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1986See In Re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir.1976); Anderson v. State, 297 So.2d 871 (Fla.App. 2d Dist.1974); In Re Ryder, supra ; State v. Olwell, 64 Wash.2d 828 , 394 P.2d 681 (1964). *1183 Our holding is strengthened by the fact the gun, as an instrumentality of a crime, could have been seized from the defendant were it still in his possession. 1986The lawyer also argued, as defendant here argues, that the attorney-client privilege protects against producing the money because the transferring of the money from the client to the lawyer was a “substantive communication.” The court answered: ... [W]e are not persuaded that the transfer of such monies represents a communication for which the clients could legitimately anticipate confidentiality. 534 F.2d at p. 728 . | 1 | 2 |
Porter v. Baton Rouge Police Departmentgreen1 sentence2023That is an issue to be decided at an Article 508 hearing. 2 Citing federal jurisprudence, Mr. Kinney argues Article 508 does not require a contradictory hearing prior to issuing a subpoena to an attorney because consideration of the matter at the 4 See Porter, 218 So. 3d at 157 ( finding a district court abused its discretion in finding the failure to hold a contradictory hearing before issuing a subpoena to an attorney was not grounds to quash the subpoena); Renton Properties, LLC v. 213 Upland, LLC, 21- 734 ( La. | 1 | 1 |
| Clivens v. Abrahamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Schmittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Shell Oil Refinerygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Edwin Edwards Stephen Edwards Cecil Brown Andrew Martin Bobby Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cappelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taxation With Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Servicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bank One, NA v. Paytongreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York Times Co. v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grant Thornton v. Syracuse Savings Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cinelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Radiant Burners, Inc., an Illinois Corporation v. American Gas Association, Peoples Gas Light and Coke Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Taylor.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Harrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Marshgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Walter J. Sawyer. Walter J. Sawyer v. Max A. Barczak, Sheriff of Milwaukee Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hearn v. Rhaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Connell v. Bernstein-Macaulay, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| League v. Vanicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Swanson v. Domninggreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lynchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2003In State v. Taylor, 502 So.2d 537 (La.1987), the supreme court explained the crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. 2003Acknowledging the burden of proof set forth in La.R.S. 15:455, as well as federal court cases that had applied the prima facie burden of proof, the court in Taylor found "[n]evertheless, ... the prima facie standard of proof does not afford adequate protection to the attorney-client privilege in criminal cases." Taylor, 502 So.2d at 541 . | 6 | 1996–2017 |
EAGLE INDUSTRIAL ASSO., INC. v. Universal Oil Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1986See In Re Kohn, 357 So.2d 279 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978); Eagle Industrial Assoc., Inc. v. Universal Oil Corp., 277 So.2d 720 (La.App. 2d Cir.1973). 1985However, upon reconsideration, the trial judge conducted an in camera hearing, based on the rationale of Eagle Industrial Associates, Inc. v. Universal Oil Corporation, 277 So.2d 720 (La.App.2nd Cir.1973), writ den. 281 So.2d 740 (La.1973). | 4 | 1978–1986 |
Hodges v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences1986Co., 433 So.2d 125 (La. 1983), at 131-132, our Supreme Court said: “Whereas the attorney-client privilege protects only confidential communications, the opinion work product doctrine may encompass any writing prepared in anticipation of litigation, (citations omitted) The purpose of the work product doctrine is not merely to assist the client in obtaining complete legal advice, but also to afford the attorney a ‘zone of privacy’ within which he is free to evaluate and prepare his case without adversarial scrutiny.” (citations omitted) We hold that the trial court was in error in using the date 1986Co., 433 So.2d 125 (La.1983) as follows: "This so-called `opinion work product' rule is derived from Federal Rule 26(b)(3).11 The rule is `distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 , 238 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 2160 , 2170 n. 11, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.1977). | 3 | 1986–1994 |
In re Lavie
neutral
2 sentences2022In its opposition to Mr. Gravois’ motion to quash, the State averred the billing records related to Mr. Gravois’ criminal defense are not subject to the attorney-client privilege citing In re Lavie, 00-2753 (La. 10/5/00), 772 So.2d 77 . 2022In its opposition to Mr. Gravois’ motion to quash, the State averred the billing records related to Mr. Gravois’ criminal defense are not subject to the attorney-client privilege citing In re Lavie, 00-2753 (La. 10/5/00), 772 So.2d 77 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,019 Mary Margaret Ward, Cross-Appellants v. Succession of Richard W. Freeman, Cross-Appellees
green
2 sentences2017Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1988), applied the principles expressed in Gamer and concluded that the shareholders had failed to show good cause to prevent management from invoking the corporation’s attorney-client privilege. 1994Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780 (5th Cir.1988), applied the principles expressed in Garner and concluded that the shareholders had failed to show good cause to prevent management from invoking the corporation’s attorney-client privilege. | 2 | 1994–2017 |
cluster 291747
green
2 sentences2017The Louisiana Supreme Court stated: In Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.1970), the Court of Appeals held that the management of a corporation is not barred from asserting the corporation’s attorney-client privilege merely because stockholders demand access to the confidential information, but that where the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockhold 1994In Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.1970), the Court of Appeals held that the management of a corporation is not barred from asserting the corporation’s attorney-client privilege merely because stockholders demand access to the confidential information, but that where the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to show that there is good cause | 2 | 1994–2017 |
Cacamo v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2014In re Shell Oil Refinery, 812 F.Supp. 658, 661 (E.D.La.1993); Cacamo, 798 So.2d at 1216 . 2013Id. (noting that “[t]he party asserting privilege must adequately substantiate the claim and cannot rely on a blanket assertion of privilege.”) Mr. Brown failed to make a showing that the attorney-client privilege applies. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
State v. James
green
2 sentences2012In the current case, in brief, Defendant encourages this court to decline to follow Dominguez and points to State v. James, 99-1047 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/25/00) , 751 So.2d 419 (James II), which Defendant “suggests that specific inquiry of the trial attorney would be improper” in the case of determining whether the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial. 2010To the extent the court in State v. James, 99-1047 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1/25/00), 751 So.2d 419 , implied that testimony by an attorney about the substance of a specific conversation he had with the defendant regarding the waiver of trial by jury would violate the attorney-client privilege, this Court declines to follow that approach. | 2 | 2010–2012 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2003The court reasoned that "physical evidence connected to the commission of a crime which has been received or recovered by an attorney on account of his representation of a client is not excluded by virtue of the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 539 . 2003The supreme court found, however, that if the communications between the attorney and Taylor were "made in pursuit of a criminal or fraudulent act yet to be performed (such as conspiracy to secrete relevant evidence), then those communications are not protected by the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 540 . | 2 | 1987–2003 |
Hickman v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1986Co., 433 So.2d 125 (La.1983) as follows: "This so-called `opinion work product' rule is derived from Federal Rule 26(b)(3).11 The rule is `distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 , 238 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 2160 , 2170 n. 11, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.1977). 1986Co., 433 So.2d 125 (La.1983) as follows: "This so-called `opinion work product' rule is derived from Federal Rule 26(b)(3).11 The rule is `distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 , 238 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 2160 , 2170 n. 11, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.1977). | 2 | 1983–1986 |
In Re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (Ii). Appeal of United States of America
green
2 sentences1986In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980); Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.1977). 1983In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980); Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.1977). | 2 | 1983–1986 |
United States v. Nobles
green
2 sentences1986Co., 433 So.2d 125 (La.1983) as follows: "This so-called `opinion work product' rule is derived from Federal Rule 26(b)(3).11 The rule is `distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 , 238 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 2160 , 2170 n. 11, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.1977). 1986Co., 433 So.2d 125 (La.1983) as follows: "This so-called `opinion work product' rule is derived from Federal Rule 26(b)(3).11 The rule is `distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.' United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 , 238 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 2160 , 2170 n. 11, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 , 67 S.Ct. 385 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.1977). | 2 | 1983–1986 |
In Re Ryder
green
2 sentences1986See In Re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir.1976); Anderson v. State, 297 So.2d 871 (Fla.App. 2d Dist.1974); In Re Ryder, supra ; State v. Olwell, 64 Wash.2d 828 , 394 P.2d 681 (1964). *1183 Our holding is strengthened by the fact the gun, as an instrumentality of a crime, could have been seized from the defendant were it still in his possession. 1985In re Ryder, 263 F.Supp. 360 (E.D.Va.1967). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. The Honorable James H. Meredith, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
green
2 sentences1986In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980); Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.1977). 1983In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980); Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.1977). | 2 | 1983–1986 |
Wollerson v. Wollerson
green
1 sentence2026“An appellate court must balance the information sought in light of the factual issues involved and the hardships that would be caused by the court’s order when determining whether the trial court erred in ruling on a discovery order.” Id. at 358 (quoting Wollerson v. Wollerson, 29,183, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/22/97), 687 So.2d 663, 665 ). 3 Attorney-Client Privilege In his first assignment of error, Mr. Zaunbrecher argues that his attorney’s invoices are not discoverable because they are protected by the attorney-client privilege, as provided in La.Code Evid. art. 506(B)(1). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Wiedemann v. Wiedemann
neutral
1 sentence2026Mr. Zaunbrecher cites Wiedemann v. Wiedemann, 08-90 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/27/08) , 984 So.2d 235 , to support his argument that an attorney’s invoices are subject to the attorney-client privilege and undiscoverable. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Alliance for Affordable Energy v. Frick
green
1 sentence2023App. 0 Cir. 5/ 28/ 97), 695 So.2d 1126 , 1134- 1135 ( absent an allegation that the records at issue contained the " mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories of an attorney or an expert, obtained or prepared in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial," there was no basis to hold that the records requested were exempt from disclosure by the attorney- client privilege). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Louisiana Department of Insurance Donelon v. Theroit
neutral
1 sentence2021Id. at 861- 62. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In Re Walker neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Garcia green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Walker v. STATE, DOTD green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Kyle v. Louisiana Public Service Com'n neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| United States v. Edwards green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Potter v. Commissioner of Insurance neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Potier v. Commissioner of Ins. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Adams v. Deaton, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Bright green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Tanner green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Washington v. Texas green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Cinel green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| District of Columbia v. Kattan green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Amundson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Spell green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Montgomery green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection & Indemnity Ass'n v. Trinidad Corp. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Landeros v. New Jersey green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| McHugh v. United States green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.