12 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Irving Sterngreen2 sentences2025See also United States v. Stern, 511 F.2d 1364, 1367 (2d Cir. 1975) (party asserting attorney-client privilege has burden of establishing that the communication was protected); V.R.C.P. 45(c)(2)(B) (party objecting to subpoenas seeking documents and other things is “[s]ubject to paragraph (d)(2) of this rule”). 1987Defendant asserts that the court committed error when it refused to compel an answer from the public defender without first requiring him to meet his burden of establishing the existence of *648 the attorney-client privilege. 7 Since this Court has not addressed this specific issue, we are guided by the rule applied by the Second Circuit in United States v. Stern, 511 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975). | 1 | 2 |
Upjohn Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025Plaintiff correctly points out that the attorney-client privilege “extends only to communications and not to facts.” Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (quotations and citations omitted). 2025In other words, a client “cannot be compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C.green1 sentence2024Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, 746 S.E.2d 98, 106 (Ga. 2013) (conflict of interest does not abrogate privilege); Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523, 538 (Ill. 2012) (violation of ethics rules “has no relevance to the issue of whether the documents in question are protected by the attorney-client privilege”). | 1 | 1 |
Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLPgreen1 sentence2024Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, 746 S.E.2d 98, 106 (Ga. 2013) (conflict of interest does not abrogate privilege); Garvy v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523, 538 (Ill. 2012) (violation of ethics rules “has no relevance to the issue of whether the documents in question are protected by the attorney-client privilege”). | 1 | 1 |
Stowell v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2023Stowell v. Bennett, 169 Vt. 630, 632 , 739 A.2d 1210, 1211 (1999) (mem.); N.Y. 2023Stowell v. Bennett, 169 Vt. 630, 632 , 739 A.2d 1210, 1211 (1999) (mem.); N.Y. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. Appeal of the Corporationgreen1 sentence2019This may be done by presenting prima facie evidence that “ ‘gives color to the charge’ by showing ‘some foundation in fact’” (United States v. Al-Shahin, 474 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Clark v. U.S., 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)); or providing grounds to find “reasonable cause to believe that the attorney‘s services were utilized in furtherance of an unlawful scheme (In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 382 (9th. | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2019This may be done by presenting prima facie evidence that “ ‘gives color to the charge’ by showing ‘some foundation in fact’” (United States v. Al-Shahin, 474 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Clark v. U.S., 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)); or providing grounds to find “reasonable cause to believe that the attorney‘s services were utilized in furtherance of an unlawful scheme (In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 382 (9th. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hayfa Khther Al-Shahin and Riyadh L. Al-Shahingreen1 sentence2019This may be done by presenting prima facie evidence that “ ‘gives color to the charge’ by showing ‘some foundation in fact’” (United States v. Al-Shahin, 474 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Clark v. U.S., 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)); or providing grounds to find “reasonable cause to believe that the attorney‘s services were utilized in furtherance of an unlawful scheme (In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 382 (9th. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 784246green1 sentence2004In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Himmelgreen1 sentence2001See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 794 (Ill. 1988) (information disclosed to attorney by client in presence of third parties not protected by attorney-client privilege). | 1 | 1 |
City of Orlando v. Desjardinsgreen1 sentence1990Very few jurisdictions have considered this question and arrived at a contrary conclusion. 12 Following successive holdings by the Florida Supreme Court that public entities lacked protection either under the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine, 13 the Florida Legislature granted a statutory exemption covering, inter alia, an attorney’s work product. 14 *646 Prior to the legislative change, the Florida courts considered themselves bound by their legislation, albeit noting “the imbalanced posture and the disadvantaged status of public entities involved in litigation under the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Energy Policy Advocates v. Attorney General's Office
green
2 sentences2025“Like the attorney-client privilege, the work-product protection can be waived where the party claiming the privilege had previously disclosed the document in a way which substantially increases the possibility of its adversary obtaining it.” Id. 2025“Like the attorney-client privilege, the work-product protection can be waived where the party claiming the privilege had previously disclosed the document in a way which substantially increases the possibility of its adversary obtaining it.” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ag Gro Services Co. v. Sophia Land Co., Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2024Md. 1997), where the district court found that an attorney had “deliberately invaded an adverse party’s attorney-client privilege.” 8 F.Supp.2d at 498 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Roy Banks v. Office of Senate Sergeant-At-Arms
green
1 sentence2019Haw. 5/11/10); Banks v. Office of Senate Sargent-at-Arms, 228 F.R.D. 24 (D.D.C. 2005)( materials that did not, on their face, disclose that the client sought or an attorney rendered specific legal advice privileged as the communications were intended to be confidential and were part of the process by which the client sought legal advice from counsel); Amcast Industries, Inc. v. Dextrex Corp., Docket No, S88–620(RLM), 1991 WL 441904 (N.D. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
James J. Kevlik v. David B. Goldstein, Town of Derry
green
1 sentence2019In Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.1984), involving a civil-rights action based on allegedly false arrest, the court held that although the defendant's father was present when he consulted with an attorney about the criminal charges, this did not destroy the attorney-client privilege. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Reynolds
green
2 sentences1991Speaking of the attorney-client privilege, the Court said: A blanket rule allowing in camera review as a tool for determining the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, as [ United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 , 73 S.Ct. 528 , 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953)] suggests, would place the policy of protecting open and legitimate dislosure between attorneys and clients at undue risk.... 1991Speaking of the attorney-client privilege, the Court said: A blanket rule allowing in camera review as a tool for determining the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, as [United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)] suggests, would place the policy of protecting open and legitimate dislosure between attorneys and clients at undue risk. . . . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Wright v. United States
green
1 sentence1987Defendant asserts that the court committed error when it refused to compel an answer from the public defender without first requiring him to meet his burden of establishing the existence of *648 the attorney-client privilege. 7 Since this Court has not addressed this specific issue, we are guided by the rule applied by the Second Circuit in United States v. Stern, 511 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Peters v. Wallach
green
1 sentence1986Peters v. Wallach, supra, 366 Mass, at 627, 321 N.E.2d at 809 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.