attorney-client privilege in Georgia

2024Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga. 419, 421 (1) (746 SE2d 98) (2013) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (II) (101 SCt 677) (1981)).6 “The privilege generally attaches when legal advice is sought from an attorney, and operates to protect from compelled disclosure any communications, made in confidence, relating to the matter on ————————————————————— 6 I agree with the Court that the question of whether communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege is a question of state law.

2024Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga. 419, 421 (1) (746 SE2d 98) (2013) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (II) (101 SCt 677) (1981)).6 “The privilege generally attaches when legal advice is sought from an attorney, and operates to protect from compelled disclosure any communications, made in confidence, relating to the matter on ————————————————————— 6 I agree with the Court that the question of whether communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege is a question of state law.

2024Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga. 419, 421 (1) (746 SE2d 98) (2013) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (II) (101 SCt 677) (1981)).6 “The privilege generally attaches when legal advice is sought from an attorney, and operates to protect from compelled disclosure any communications, made in confidence, relating to the matter on ————————————————————— 6 I agree with the Court that the question of whether communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege is a question of state law.

2024Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga. 419, 421 (1) (746 SE2d 98) (2013) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (II) (101 SCt 677) (1981)).6 “The privilege generally attaches when legal advice is sought from an attorney, and operates to protect from compelled disclosure any communications, made in confidence, relating to the matter on ————————————————————— 6 I agree with the Court that the question of whether communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege is a question of state law.

2015In order that the attorney may properly prepare his or her case, “[i]t has long been the law of Georgia, in keeping with that of other United States jurisdictions, that the attorney-client privilege ‘includes, by necessity, the network of agents and employees of both the attorney and client, acting under the direction of their respective principals, to facilitate the legal representation.’” Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 350 ( 676 SE2d 215 ) (2009) (Sears, C.J., concurring); see Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 692-693 ( 177 SE 582 ) (1934); Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia, 78 Ga. at 738 ; Milich, § 21

2012See Upjohn, 449 U. S. at 395 (II) (“Consistent with the underlying purposes of the attorney-client privilege, these communications must be protected against compelled disclosure.”); see also Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia v. Fleming, 78 Ga. 733, 737 (3) ( 3 SE 420 ) (1887) (holding that it was error to force production of letter between attorney and corporate client); S. Guar.

2024Forum Corp., 273 Ga. 206, 208 (1) (538 SE2d 441) (2000). 4 Given this narrow construction and application of the attorney- client privilege, the trial court’s findings and conclusions regarding the jail calls at issue are sufficiently supported by the record in this case.

2024Forum Corp., 273 Ga. 206, 208 (1) (538 SE2d 441) (2000). 4 Given this narrow construction and application of the attorney- client privilege, the trial court’s findings and conclusions regarding the jail calls at issue are sufficiently supported by the record in this case.

2013Where effective relief would be available on appeal from a final judgment, therefore, Georgia’s appellate courts have “ ‘routinely require [d] litigants to wait until after final judgment to vindicate’ ” even those rights that are “ ‘central to our adversarial system.’ ” Expedia v. City of Columbus, 305 Ga. App. 450, 453 (1) ( 699 SE2d 600 ) (2010) (holding that orders adverse to claims of privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, are subject to effective appellate review and are therefore not collateral orders), quoting Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 108-109 (II) (B) ( 1

2013Where effective relief would be available on appeal from a final judgment, therefore, Georgia’s appellate courts have “ ‘routinely require [d] litigants to wait until after final judgment to vindicate’ ” even those rights that are “ ‘central to our adversarial system.’ ” Expedia v. City of Columbus, 305 Ga. App. 450, 453 (1) ( 699 SE2d 600 ) (2010) (holding that orders adverse to claims of privilege, including the attorney-client privilege, are subject to effective appellate review and are therefore not collateral orders), quoting Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 108-109 (II) (B) ( 1

2019This Court reversed, concluding that "the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications, related to the matters on which legal advice is being sought, between the attorneys, their agents, or their client, and an expert engaged by the attorney to aid in the client's representation " and, further, that the privilege remains intact so long as "the expert will neither serve as a witness at trial nor provide any basis for the formulation of other experts' trial testimony." *733 (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 504 , 773 S.E.2d 716 .

2019This Court reversed, concluding that "the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications, related to the matters on which legal advice is being sought, between the attorneys, their agents, or their client, and an expert engaged by the attorney to aid in the client's representation " and, further, that the privilege remains intact so long as "the expert will neither serve as a witness at trial nor provide any basis for the formulation of other experts' trial testimony." *733 (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 504 , 773 S.E.2d 716 .

2012See Both v. Frantz, 278 Ga. App. 556, 563 (5) ( 629 SE2d 427 ) (2006) (“[I]t is clear that the attorney-client privilege does not cover communications with respect to proposed or ongoing infractions of the law in the commission of a crime, or the perpetration of a fraud.”); In re Fulton County Grand Jury Proceedings, 244 Ga. App. 380, 382 ( 535 SE2d 340 ) (2000) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications which occur before perpetration of a fraud or commission of a crime and which relate thereto.”); see also Rose, 262 Ga. App. at 529 (holding that applicability of crim

2012See Both v. Frantz, 278 Ga. App. 556, 563 (5) ( 629 SE2d 427 ) (2006) (“[I]t is clear that the attorney-client privilege does not cover communications with respect to proposed or ongoing infractions of the law in the commission of a crime, or the perpetration of a fraud.”); In re Fulton County Grand Jury Proceedings, 244 Ga. App. 380, 382 ( 535 SE2d 340 ) (2000) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications which occur before perpetration of a fraud or commission of a crime and which relate thereto.”); see also Rose, 262 Ga. App. at 529 (holding that applicability of crim

2022See Schaffer, 303 Ga. App. at 587 (2) (an executor stands in the place of a deceased testator and may, in that capacity, invoke the attorney-client privilege to prevent testimony from the deceased’s attorney regarding the preparation of wills).

2022See Schaffer, 303 Ga. App. at 587 (2) (an executor stands in the place of a deceased testator and may, in that capacity, invoke the attorney-client privilege to prevent testimony from the deceased’s attorney regarding the preparation of wills).

2016The court reviewed the case law, under which the attorney-client privilege may be waived if a prima facie case is made that the communication was made to plan or further illegal or fraudulent activity, citing Rose v. Commercial Factors of Atlanta, 262 Ga. App. 528 ( 586 SE2d 41 ) (2003).

2016The court reviewed the case law, under which the attorney-client privilege may be waived if a prima facie case is made that the communication was made to plan or further illegal or fraudulent activity, citing Rose v. Commercial Factors of Atlanta, 262 Ga. App. 528 ( 586 SE2d 41 ) (2003).

2011See Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 281, 285 (5)(c), 368 S.E.2d 742 (1988) (applying harmless error analysis where testimony violated a defendant's attorney-client privilege).

2011See Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 281, 285 (5)(c), 368 S.E.2d 742 (1988) (applying harmless error analysis where testimony violated a defendant's attorney-client privilege).

2024See also Rogers, 290 Ga. at 20 (2) (quoting Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) 19 (2007)) (“Indeed, the statutes outlining the attorney-client privilege are not broadly construed; the attorney-client privilege . . . has been confined to its narrowest permissible limits,” and “[i]nasmuch as the exercise of the privilege results in the exclusion of evidence, a narrow construction of the privilege comports with the view that the ascertainment of as many facts as possible leads to the truth, the discovery of which is the object of all legal investigation.”) Accord Davis v. State,

2024See also Rogers, 290 Ga. at 20 (2) (quoting Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) 19 (2007)) (“Indeed, the statutes outlining the attorney-client privilege are not broadly construed; the attorney-client privilege . . . has been confined to its narrowest permissible limits,” and “[i]nasmuch as the exercise of the privilege results in the exclusion of evidence, a narrow construction of the privilege comports with the view that the ascertainment of as many facts as possible leads to the truth, the discovery of which is the object of all legal investigation.”) Accord Davis v. State,

2024See also Rogers, 290 Ga. at 20 (2) (quoting Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) 19 (2007)) (“Indeed, the statutes outlining the attorney-client privilege are not broadly construed; the attorney-client privilege . . . has been confined to its narrowest permissible limits,” and “[i]nasmuch as the exercise of the privilege results in the exclusion of evidence, a narrow construction of the privilege comports with the view that the ascertainment of as many facts as possible leads to the truth, the discovery of which is the object of all legal investigation.”) Accord Davis v. State,

2024See also Rogers, 290 Ga. at 20 (2) (quoting Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 636 (4) (651 SE2d 718) 19 (2007)) (“Indeed, the statutes outlining the attorney-client privilege are not broadly construed; the attorney-client privilege . . . has been confined to its narrowest permissible limits,” and “[i]nasmuch as the exercise of the privilege results in the exclusion of evidence, a narrow construction of the privilege comports with the view that the ascertainment of as many facts as possible leads to the truth, the discovery of which is the object of all legal investigation.”) Accord Davis v. State,

2024See Moclaire, 215 Ga. App. at 363 (“The mere fact that the attorney discussed the communications with others, without evidence that [the client] authorized those discussions, does not prove that [the client] waived the attorney- client privilege.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); McKie v. State, 165 Ga. 210, 210 ( 140 SE 625 ) (1927) (“Communications between client and attorney are excluded from public policy, and are incompetent as evidence against the client upon her trial for the homicide of her husband; and this is so whether such letters [written by the client to her attorney] were vo

2024See Moclaire, 215 Ga. App. at 363 (“The mere fact that the attorney discussed the communications with others, without evidence that [the client] authorized those discussions, does not prove that [the client] waived the attorney- client privilege.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); McKie v. State, 165 Ga. 210, 210 (140 SE 625) (1927) (“Communications between client and attorney are excluded from public policy and are incompetent as evidence against the client upon her trial for the homicide of her husband; and this is so, whether such letters [written by the client to her attorney] were volu

2015In order that the attorney may properly prepare his or her case, “[i]t has long been the law of Georgia, in keeping with that of other United States jurisdictions, that the attorney-client privilege ‘includes, by necessity, the network of agents and employees of both the attorney and client, acting under the direction of their respective principals, to facilitate the legal representation.’” Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 350 ( 676 SE2d 215 ) (2009) (Sears, C.J., concurring); see Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 692-693 ( 177 SE 582 ) (1934); Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia, 78 Ga. at 738 ; Milich, § 21

2015In order that the attorney may properly prepare his or her case, “[i]t has long been the law of Georgia, in keeping with that of other United States jurisdictions, that the attorney-client privilege ‘includes, by necessity, the network of agents and employees of both the attorney and client, acting under the direction of their respective principals, to facilitate the legal representation.’” Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 350 ( 676 SE2d 215 ) (2009) (Sears, C.J., concurring); see Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 692-693 ( 177 SE 582 ) (1934); Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia, 78 Ga. at 738 ; Milich, § 21

2014To begin with, Sullivan is correct that conversations with a private investigator who is employed to assist in a client’s defense may be protected by the attorney-client privilege.4 However, the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications “which occur before perpetration of a fraud or commission of a crime and which 3 See OCGA § 24-5-501 (a) (2) (“There are certain admissions and communications excluded from evidence on grounds of public policy, including, but not limited to . . . [c]ommunications between attorney and client . . . .”). 4 See In re Fulton County Grand Jury Proce

2014To begin with, Sullivan is correct that conversations with a private investigator who is employed to assist in a client’s defense may be protected by the attorney-client privilege.4 However, the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications “which occur before perpetration of a fraud or commission of a crime and which 3 See OCGA § 24-5-501 (a) (2) (“There are certain admissions and communications excluded from evidence on grounds of public policy, including, but not limited to . . . [c]ommunications between attorney and client . . . .”). 4 See In re Fulton County Grand Jury Proce

2014See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 202 Ga. 391, 403 (7) ( 43 SE2d 329 ) (1947) (applying “testamentary exception” to attorney-client privilege to sanction disclosure of attorney’s communications with client regarding execution of will “to the end that full and complete justice may be done”); Both v. Frantz, 278 Ga. App. 556 (5) ( 629 SE2d 427 ) (2006) (applying 8 “crime/fraud exception” to attorney-client privilege to allow attorney testimony regarding communications in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activities); Peterson v. Baumwell, 202 Ga. App. 283 (2) ( 414 SE2d 278 ) (1991) (applyi

2014See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 202 Ga. 391, 403 (7) ( 43 SE2d 329 ) (1947) (applying “testamentary exception” to attorney-client privilege to sanction disclosure of attorney’s communications with client regarding execution of will “to the end that full and complete justice may be done”); Both v. Frantz, 278 Ga. App. 556 (5) ( 629 SE2d 427 ) (2006) (applying 8 “crime/fraud exception” to attorney-client privilege to allow attorney testimony regarding communications in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent activities); Peterson v. Baumwell, 202 Ga. App. 283 (2) ( 414 SE2d 278 ) (1991) (applyi

1989Appellee asserts that the scope of protection provided by the attorney-client privilege to an attorney’s advice to his client is controlled by Marriott Corp. v. American Academy &c., 157 Ga. App. 497 ( 277 SE2d 785 ).

1989Appellee asserts that the scope of protection provided by the attorney-client privilege to an attorney’s advice to his client is controlled by Marriott Corp. v. American Academy &c., 157 Ga. App. 497 ( 277 SE2d 785 ).

2024The Court of Appeals further determined that, because the attorney- client privilege “‘does not extend to those situations in which third parties are present for attorney-client discussions’” and because Burns and Daugherty “knew they were being recorded and knew the State would be able to listen,” the calls were not “confidential or ever 15 reasonably intended to be such.” Id. at 645-646 (1) (a) (quoting Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20-21 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011)).

2024The Court of Appeals further determined that, because the attorney- client privilege “‘does not extend to those situations in which third parties are present for attorney-client discussions’” and because Burns and Daugherty “knew they were being recorded and knew the State would be able to listen,” the calls were not “confidential or ever 15 reasonably intended to be such.” Id. at 645-646 (1) (a) (quoting Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20-21 (2) (717 SE2d 629) (2011)).

2024See also e.g., Adams v. State, 260 Ga. 298, 300 (2) (392 SE2d 866) (1990) (holding that a trial court’s decision concerning the marital privilege is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Etowah Environment Group, LLC v. Walsh, 333 Ga. App. 464, 475 (3) (774 SE2d 220) (2015) (noting that appellate courts review a trial court’s decision as to the application of the attorney- client privilege for abuse of discretion).

2024See also e.g., Adams v. State, 260 Ga. 298, 300 (2) (392 SE2d 866) (1990) (holding that a trial court’s decision concerning the marital privilege is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Etowah Environment Group, LLC v. Walsh, 333 Ga. App. 464, 475 (3) (774 SE2d 220) (2015) (noting that appellate courts review a trial court’s decision as to the application of the attorney- client privilege for abuse of discretion).

2021Here, the trial court concluded that Appellants had waived any right to make a claim of attorney-work product by filing the instant legal malpractice action, seemingly equating the waiver of attorney-work product with the waiver of the attorney-client privilege; this, however, was erroneous. “[T]he attorney-client privilege is intended to protect the attorney-client relationship by protecting communications between clients and attorneys, [while] the work-product doctrine directly protects the adversarial system by allowing attorneys to prepare cases without concern that their work will be used

2021Here, the trial court concluded that Appellants had waived any right to make a claim of attorney-work product by filing the instant legal malpractice action, seemingly equating the waiver of attorney-work product with the waiver of the attorney-client privilege; this, however, was erroneous. “[T]he attorney-client privilege is intended to protect the attorney-client relationship by protecting communications between clients and attorneys, [while] the work-product doctrine directly protects the adversarial system by allowing attorneys to prepare cases without concern that their work will be used

2020However, the Court of Appeals expressed doubt that the implied waiver extends to other attorneys who represented the client in the same underlying matter, stating that this Court has “indicated” that implied waivers of the attorney-client privilege should be narrowly drawn, citing Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 578-579 ( 532 SE2d 380 ) (2000) (holding that habeas petitioner who asserts claim of ineffective assistance of counsel waives attorney-client privilege and work product protection only to extent necessary for attorney to defend against specific charges of misconduct), overruled on other

2020However, the Court of Appeals expressed doubt that the implied waiver extends to other attorneys who represented the client in the same underlying matter, stating that this Court has “indicated” that implied waivers of the attorney-client privilege should be narrowly drawn, citing Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 578-579 ( 532 SE2d 380 ) (2000) (holding that habeas petitioner who asserts claim of ineffective assistance of counsel waives attorney-client privilege and work product protection only to extent necessary for attorney to defend against specific charges of misconduct), overruled on other

2018See id. at 504 (2), 773 S.E.2d 716 (holding that the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications about matters on which legal advice is being sought between counsel, their agents, or their client and an expert retained by counsel to aid in representation and that the privilege is not waived if the expert will not testify or provide any basis for other experts' trial testimony); Muhammad v. State , 282 Ga. 247 , 249 (2), 647 S.E.2d 560 (2007) (stating that nothing in the discovery *316 statutes requires a defendant to provide the prosecution with evidence from witnesses who

2018See id. at 504 (2), 773 S.E.2d 716 (holding that the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications about matters on which legal advice is being sought between counsel, their agents, or their client and an expert retained by counsel to aid in representation and that the privilege is not waived if the expert will not testify or provide any basis for other experts' trial testimony); Muhammad v. State , 282 Ga. 247 , 249 (2), 647 S.E.2d 560 (2007) (stating that nothing in the discovery *316 statutes requires a defendant to provide the prosecution with evidence from witnesses who

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist's notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts' trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist’s notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts’ trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist's notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts' trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist’s notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts’ trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist's notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts' trial testimony”); Sta

2015See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F2d 1036, 1045-1047 (3d Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege applies to a defendant’s communications with a non-testifying psychiatric expert); People v. Knuckles, 650 NE2d 974, 981 (II) (Ill. 1995) (attorney-client privilege “protects communications between a defendant who raises an insanity defense and a psychiatrist employed by defense counsel to aid in the preparation of the defense, if the psychiatrist will not testify and the psychiatrist’s notes and opinions will not be used in the formulation of the other defense experts’ trial testimony”); Sta

1994The mere fact that the attorney discussed the communications with others, without evidence that McKenna authorized those discussions, does not prove that McKenna waived the attorney-client privilege. “[I]t is axiomatic that the privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney [cit.].” Peterson v. Baumwell, 202 Ga. App. 283, 285 (2) ( 414 SE2d 278 ) (1991).

1994The mere fact that the attorney discussed the communications with others, without evidence that McKenna authorized those discussions, does not prove that McKenna waived the attorney-client privilege. “[I]t is axiomatic that the privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney [cit.].” Peterson v. Baumwell, 202 Ga. App. 283, 285 (2) ( 414 SE2d 278 ) (1991).

2022The attorney-client privilege belongs to the principal, as the client, see Spence v. Hamm, 226 Ga. App. 357, 358 (1) ( 487 SE2d 9 ) (1997) (physical precedent) (citing Moclaire v. State, 215 Ga. App. 360, 363 (5) ( 451 SE2d 68 ) (1994)), and the petitioner argues that the agent cannot invoke it.

2022The attorney-client privilege belongs to the principal, as the client, see Spence v. Hamm, 226 Ga. App. 357, 358 (1) ( 487 SE2d 9 ) (1997) (physical precedent) (citing Moclaire v. State, 215 Ga. App. 360, 363 (5) ( 451 SE2d 68 ) (1994)), and the petitioner argues that the agent cannot invoke it.

2018See id. at 504 (2), 773 S.E.2d 716 (holding that the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications about matters on which legal advice is being sought between counsel, their agents, or their client and an expert retained by counsel to aid in representation and that the privilege is not waived if the expert will not testify or provide any basis for other experts' trial testimony); Muhammad v. State , 282 Ga. 247 , 249 (2), 647 S.E.2d 560 (2007) (stating that nothing in the discovery *316 statutes requires a defendant to provide the prosecution with evidence from witnesses who

2018See id. at 504 (2), 773 S.E.2d 716 (holding that the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications about matters on which legal advice is being sought between counsel, their agents, or their client and an expert retained by counsel to aid in representation and that the privilege is not waived if the expert will not testify or provide any basis for other experts' trial testimony); Muhammad v. State , 282 Ga. 247 , 249 (2), 647 S.E.2d 560 (2007) (stating that nothing in the discovery *316 statutes requires a defendant to provide the prosecution with evidence from witnesses who

2017The court further explicitly stated that it was not determining “whether or not [Brindle] has committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt or whether the State could disprove any defenses she may assert” in the future, made “no findings as to Cohen’s and Butter’s [sic] involvement” in making the recording, and decided only that “discovery may be had on that issue.” Cohen v. Rogers, 338 Ga. App. 156, 161-162 (1) ( 789 SE2d 352 ) (2016).

2017The court further explicitly stated that it was not determining “whether or not [Brindle] has committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt or whether the State could disprove any defenses she may assert” in the future, made “no findings as to Cohen’s and Butter’s [sic] involvement” in making the recording, and decided only that “discovery may be had on that issue.” Cohen v. Rogers, 338 Ga. App. 156, 161-162 (1) ( 789 SE2d 352 ) (2016).