55 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lexington Public Library v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2005See also Lexington Public Library v. Clark, 90 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Ky.2002) for a discussion of Kentucky's rejection, pursuant to KRE 503, of the "control group” definition of "representative of the client” and the adoption of the federal standard wherein a communication made by an employee acting within the scope of employment is also protected by the attorney-client privilege. 15 . 90 S.W.3d at 59 . 16 . 2005See also Lexington Public Library v. Clark, 90 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Ky.2002) for a discussion of Kentucky's rejection, pursuant to KRE 503, of the "control group” definition of "representative of the client” and the adoption of the federal standard wherein a communication made by an employee acting within the scope of employment is also protected by the attorney-client privilege. 15 . 90 S.W.3d at 59 . 16 . | 5 | 5 |
Stidham v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2023(Emphasis added.)” Stidham, 74 S.W.3d at 723-24 . 2017Library v. Clark, 90 S.W.3d 53, 60 (Ky. 2002). 6 Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Ky. 2012). 7 Stidham v. Clark, 74 S.W.3d 719, 725 (Ky. 2002). s See id. at 722-23 . 9 See Lexi.ngton Public Library, 90 S.W.3d at 62 . 10 See Collins, 384 S.W.3d at 161 . 5 Reynolds failed to present for in camera review any of his privileged information in any of the courts below. | 4 | 5 |
Baker v. Shaperogreen2 sentences2017See Baker v. Shapero, 203 S.W.3d 697 [Ky. 2006). 2017See Baker v. Shapero, 203 S.W.3d 697 (Ky. 2006). | 4 | 4 |
Upjohn Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (holding the attorney-client privilege protects the disclosure of communications but does not protect the client from disclosing the underlying facts.) The expectation of confidentiality is critical to the employee-union representative privilege. 2021See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (holding the attorney-client privilege protects the disclosure of communications but does not protect the client from disclosing the underlying facts.) The expectation of confidentiality is critical to the employee-union representative privilege. | 3 | 7 |
The St. Luke Hospitals, Inc. v. Kopowskigreen2 sentences2023In fact CR 26, which codifies the work-product doctrine, specifically exempts communications protected by the attorney-client privilege from its disclosure provisions.” Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d at 777 (internal citation omitted). 2022Luke Hospitals, Inc. v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d 771, 777 (Ky. 2005), the Kentucky Supreme Court explained that the attorney-client privilege could not be cast aside based on a lack of alternative sources for the information, because such an exception was not written into the rule: KRE 503 specifically delineates the circumstances in which the privilege gives way to other considerations. | 3 | 6 |
Collins v. Bradengreen2 sentences2023All further proceedings on the issue of privilege shall be consistent with this Opinion.” Collins, 384 S.W.3d at 165 . 2017Library v. Clark, 90 S.W.3d 53, 60 (Ky. 2002). 6 Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Ky. 2012). 7 stidham v. clark, 74 s.W.3d 719, 725 (Ky. 2002). 8 See id. at 722-23. 9 See Lexington Public Library, 90 S.W.3d at 62 . 10 See Collins, 384 S.W.3d at 161 . | 3 | 5 |
Haney v. Yatesgreen2 sentences2007The attorney-client privilege applies to a confidential communication "made to facilitate the client in his/her legal dilemma and made between two of the four parties listed in [KRE 503]: the client, the client's representatives, the lawyer, or the lawyer's representatives." Haney v. Yates, 40 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Ky.2000). 2007The attorney-client privilege applies to a confidential communication “made to facilitate the client in his/her legal dilemma and made between two of the four parties listed in [KRE 503]: the client, the client’s representatives, the lawyer, or the lawyer’s representatives.” Haney v. Yates, 40 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Ky.2000). | 3 | 3 |
Fisher v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016But it makes sense because the attorney-client privilege "protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have been made absent the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (emphasis added). 2016But it makes sense because the attorney-client privilege "protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have been made absent the privilege." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
United States Ex Rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLCgreen2 sentences2016Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556-57 (E.D. 2016Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556-57 (E.D. | 2 | 2 |
Bruce v. Christiangreen2 sentences2016Pa. 2004) (noting that "privilege applies when ...the employees were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice"); Bruce v. Christian, 113 F.R.D. 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Attorney-client privilege extends to any employee communicating on matters within the scope of his employment when that employee is aware that he is being questioned in confidence in order for his employer to obtain legal advice."). 26 advice. 2016Pa. 2004) (noting that "privilege applies when ...the employees were sufficiently aware that they were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice"); Bruce v. Christian, 113 F.R.D. 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Attorney-client privilege extends to any employee communicating on matters within the scope of his employment when that employee is aware that he is being questioned in confidence in order for his employer to obtain legal advice."). 26 advice. | 2 | 2 |
Bender v. Eatongreen2 sentences2005See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson, 29 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Ky.2000) (noting that deposing an attorney or paralegal involved in the case would normally fall under the “certain special cases” exception because of the attorney-client privilege); id. at 801-02 (noting that a judge’s failure to include findings of fact as required by CR 34.01 in a premises inspection order met the exception); Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 803 (holding that a judge’s order for production of a doctor’s report was a violation of the then recently enacted Civil Rules and thus fell under the exception). 2004See id. at 801-02 (noting that a judge’s failure to include findings of fact as required by CR 34.01 in a premises inspection order met the exception); Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 803 (holding that a judge’s order for production of a doctor’s report was a violation of the then recently enacted Civil Rules and thus fell under the exception). 11 . | 2 | 2 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinsongreen2 sentences2005See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson, 29 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Ky.2000) (noting that deposing an attorney or paralegal involved in the case would normally fall under the “certain special cases” exception because of the attorney-client privilege); id. at 801-02 (noting that a judge’s failure to include findings of fact as required by CR 34.01 in a premises inspection order met the exception); Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 803 (holding that a judge’s order for production of a doctor’s report was a violation of the then recently enacted Civil Rules and thus fell under the exception). 2005See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson, 29 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Ky.2000) (noting that deposing an attorney or paralegal involved in the case would normally fall under the “certain special cases” exception because of the attorney-client privilege); id. at 801-02 (noting that a judge’s failure to include findings of fact as required by CR 34.01 in a premises inspection order met the exception); Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 803 (holding that a judge’s order for production of a doctor’s report was a violation of the then recently enacted Civil Rules and thus fell under the exception). | 2 | 2 |
Hughes v. Meadegreen2 sentences1991See, Hughes v. Meade, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 538 (1970); Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Smithhart, 183 Ky. 679 , 211 S.W. 441 (1919). 1981See Hughes v. Meade, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 538 (1970). | 2 | 2 |
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.green2 sentences2025Id. 2010KRE 503(d)(1), Furtherance of Crime or Fraud, provides in pertinent part as follows: There is no privilege under this rule: (1) If the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud[.] “The attorney-client privilege is generally considered to be absolute as to communications made by or to a person advising with an attorney as to past transactions and offenses.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc. 807 S.W.2d 476, 487 (Ky.1991). | 1 | 4 |
Wilhoit v. Wilhoitgreen1 sentence2026Builder maintains that it is not obligated to provide additional details regarding its billing pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. -31- As stated, an award of attorneys’ fees is “within the sound discretion of the trial court and [its] decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Giacalone v. Giacalone, 876 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Ky. App. 1994) (citing Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990)); see also Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
Giacalone v. Giacalonegreen1 sentence2026Builder maintains that it is not obligated to provide additional details regarding its billing pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. -31- As stated, an award of attorneys’ fees is “within the sound discretion of the trial court and [its] decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Giacalone v. Giacalone, 876 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Ky. App. 1994) (citing Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990)); see also Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Burdengreen1 sentence2025In such a proceeding, the attorney-client privilege would not prevent the attorney from testifying as to the client’s instructions regarding settlement.” Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Ky. 1996) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Stinnett v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025Attorney-client privilege is governed by Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 503, which provides: “[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client . . . .” KRE 503(b); Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 70, 86 (Ky. 2011). 2025Attorney-client privilege is governed by Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 503, which provides: “[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client . . . .” KRE 503(b); Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 70, 86 (Ky. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025KRE 503(d)(3) specifically provides there is no privilege “[a]s to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by a lawyer to the client or by a client to the lawyer[.]” However, “the waiver applies only as to matters put in issue by the client’s motion.” Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 11 (Ky. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Sanborn v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024As to a testifying expert witness and the attorney-client privilege, the Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized that “confidentiality implies that the information will not be used to form the basis of expert testimony at trial; this is because expert testimony must be cross-examinable.” Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 542, 550 (Ky. 1995). 2024A party ought not to be permitted to thwart effective cross- examination of a material witness whom he will call at trial merely by invoking the attorney-client privilege to prohibit pretrial discovery. [Footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted.] -13- Sanborn, 892 S.W.2d at 550 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Dunn v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2022Similarly, in Dunn v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Ky. 1961), which interpreted a previous version of the rule, the Court was unwilling to let the privilege be violated, even when there was no alternative basis to impeach the prosecution witness. | 1 | 1 |
American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc. And Howmedica, Inc., and Biomet, Inc.green1 sentence2021Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745 (Fed. | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Investigation of the Death of Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sowders v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| York v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Federal Trade Commission v. GlaxoSmithKlinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Federal Trade Commission v. Trw, Inc. And Its Unincorporated Division, Trw Credit Datagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bulow v. Bulowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trude
green
2 sentences2023Trude, 151 S.W.3d at 818 . 2019Concerning the issue of the proper standard of review of the lower courts’ rulings in writ cases, be it de novo, abuse of discretion, or clear error, we addressed this issue in Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803 , as follows: [T]he proper standard actually depends on the class, or category, of writ case. | 3 | 2010–2023 |
United States v. Zolin
green
2 sentences2018An implicit waiver of the attorney-client privilege is not triggered by whether or not the communications are relevant to the issue asserted, United States v. Zollin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), for the implicit waiver rule to become applicable, a party must affirmatively use privileged communications to defend itself or attack its opponent in the action. 2018An implicit waiver of the attorney-client privilege is not triggered by whether or not the communications are relevant to the issue asserted, United States v. Zollin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-63 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), for the implicit waiver rule to become applicable, a party must affirmatively use privileged communications to defend itself or attack its opponent in the action. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Christenbury v. Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP
green
2 sentences2018Second, rather than disfavoring waiver of the attorney-client privilege, Georgia law “confinefs] the attorney-client privilege to its narrowest permissible limit.” Id. at 683 . 2018Second, rather than disfavoring waiver of the attorney-client privilege, Georgia law “confine[s] the attorney-client privilege to its narrowest permissible limit.” Id. at 683 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Asbury v. Beerbower
green
2 sentences2000Yates argues that his statement either falls within the attorney-client privilege or is “work product.” Relying on Asbury v. Beerbower, Ky., 589 S.W.2d 216 (1979), the Court of Appeals held that the statement fell within the insured-insurer extension of the attorney-client privilege. 2000In Asbury v. Beerbower, supra, we extended the scope of the attorney-client privilege, then defined in KRS 421.210(4), 1 to include communications between an insured and a representative of his insurer. | 2 | 1982–2000 |
Gentry v. Gentry
green
1 sentence2026Builder maintains that it is not obligated to provide additional details regarding its billing pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. -31- As stated, an award of attorneys’ fees is “within the sound discretion of the trial court and [its] decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Giacalone v. Giacalone, 876 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Ky. App. 1994) (citing Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990)); see also Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1975). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hahn v. University of Louisville
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 774 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Dawson v. New York Life Insurance
green
1 sentence2018Dawson v. New York Life Insurance Co., 901 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wesp v. Everson
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g., In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 2003) (client's communications with his criminal defense attorney remained privileged,after his death and not subject to waiver by his '· wife-executrix for use in a criminal prosecution involving- th<? deceased client's paramour); Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191 (Colo. 2001) (sexual abuse defendant's statements to his defense attorney remained privileged after his suic:ide and could not be revealed using a f'manifest injustice" exception to the attorney-client privilege in civil suit by the step-daughter victim). 2018See, e.g., In re Miller, 584 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 2003) (client's communications with his criminal defense attorney remained privileged,after his death and not subject to waiver by his '· wife-executrix for use in a criminal prosecution involving- th<? deceased client's paramour); Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191 (Colo. 2001) (sexual abuse defendant's statements to his defense attorney remained privileged after his suic:ide and could not be revealed using a f'manifest injustice" exception to the attorney-client privilege in civil suit by the step-daughter victim). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Atwood v. Atwood green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| 3M Co. v. Engle green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Swidler & Berlin v. United States green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Gall v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Simpsonville Wrecker Service, Inc. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| cluster 291747 green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Securities & Exchange Commission v. Medical Committee for Human Rights green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Garner v. First American Life Insurance green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Parkin v. Florida green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Standard Fire Insurance v. Smithhart neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Brakhage Ex Rel. Brakhage v. Graff green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| The People v. Ryan green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Hollien v. Kaye green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.