attorney-client privilege in Ohio

2025Thus, “[d]ocuments and records whose existence preceded a factual investigation or were created independent of such investigation, i.e., independent of any communication between attorney and client, would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Id. {¶26} “The protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege extends to ‘not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.’” Jacobs v. PAGE 9 OF 15 Case No. 2025-L-003 Equity Trust Co., 2020-Ohio-6882, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.),

2024Such a determination depends on whether he was asserting the privilege in the best interests of BWR and BWRRE or on his own behalf. {¶19} The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Grace, 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942 , 912 N.E.2d 608, at ¶ 18 , quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981).

2025“A de novo review requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of the evidence before the trial court without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Peer v. Sayers, 2011- Ohio-5439, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.). {¶25} “Under the attorney-client privilege, ‘(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection is wa

2025Agency, 2005-Ohio-1508 , ¶ 21, quoting Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 355-356 (6th Cir. 1998). {¶ 20} R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) exempts from disclosure records “the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.” The attorney-client privilege is a state law prohibiting release of otherwise public records.

2014“The determination whether a communication should be afforded the cloak of the privilege depends on the circumstances of each case, and the privilege must yield when justice so requires.” Id. at ¶ 10, citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 264 , 452 N.E.2d 1304 (1983). {¶14} “In Ohio, the attorney-client privilege is governed both by statute, R.C. 2317.02(A), which provides a testimonial privilege, and by common law, which broadly protects against any dissemination of information obtained in the confidential attorney-client relationship.” State ex rel.

2014“The determination whether a communication should be afforded the cloak of the privilege depends on the circumstances of each case, and the privilege must yield when justice so requires.” Id. at ¶ 10, citing Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St.3d 258, 264 , 452 N.E.2d 1304 (1983). {¶14} “In Ohio, the attorney-client privilege is governed both by statute, R.C. 2317.02(A), which provides a testimonial privilege, and by common law, which broadly protects against any dissemination of information obtained in the confidential attorney-client relationship.” State ex rel.

2024Yost at ¶ 23 citing Roe [Cite as Rehm v. Eckinger, 2024-Ohio-1860 .] v. Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region, 2009-Ohio-2973, ¶ 29 ; Schlotterer at ¶ 13 . {¶19} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained the importance of the attorney- client privilege: “The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications.” Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998), 524 U.S. 399, 403 , 118 S.Ct. 2081 , 141 L.Ed.2d 379 .

2024Yost at ¶ 23 citing Roe [Cite as Rehm v. Eckinger, 2024-Ohio-1860 .] v. Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region, 2009-Ohio-2973, ¶ 29 ; Schlotterer at ¶ 13 . {¶19} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained the importance of the attorney- client privilege: “The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications.” Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998), 524 U.S. 399, 403 , 118 S.Ct. 2081 , 141 L.Ed.2d 379 .

2024Discovery of claims file is not precluded in bad-faith actions {¶19} In Ohio, it is well established that “documents and other things showing the lack of a good faith effort to settle by a party or the attorneys acting on his or her behalf are wholly unworthy of the protections afforded by any claimed privilege.” Moskovitz, 69 Ohio St.3d at 661 , 635 N.E.2d 331 ; see Givaudan Flavors, 127 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2010-Ohio-4469 , 937 N.E.2d 533, at ¶ 30 (identifying exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and explaining that the “privilege does not apply when the client seeks to abuse the attorney

2024Discovery of claims file is not precluded in bad-faith actions {¶19} In Ohio, it is well established that “documents and other things showing the lack of a good faith effort to settle by a party or the attorneys acting on his or her behalf are wholly unworthy of the protections afforded by any claimed privilege.” Moskovitz, 69 Ohio St.3d at 661 , 635 N.E.2d 331 ; see Givaudan Flavors, 127 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2010-Ohio-4469 , 937 N.E.2d 533, at ¶ 30 (identifying exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and explaining that the “privilege does not apply when the client seeks to abuse the attorney

2024Discovery of claims file is not precluded in bad-faith actions {¶19} In Ohio, it is well established that “documents and other things showing the lack of a good faith effort to settle by a party or the attorneys acting on his or her behalf are wholly unworthy of the protections afforded by any claimed privilege.” Moskovitz, 69 Ohio St.3d at 661 , 635 N.E.2d 331 ; see Givaudan Flavors, 127 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2010-Ohio-4469 , 937 N.E.2d 533, at ¶ 30 (identifying exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and explaining that the “privilege does not apply when the client seeks to abuse the attorney

2024Discovery of claims file is not precluded in bad-faith actions {¶19} In Ohio, it is well established that “documents and other things showing the lack of a good faith effort to settle by a party or the attorneys acting on his or her behalf are wholly unworthy of the protections afforded by any claimed privilege.” Moskovitz, 69 Ohio St.3d at 661 , 635 N.E.2d 331 ; see Givaudan Flavors, 127 Ohio St.3d 161 , 2010-Ohio-4469 , 937 N.E.2d 533, at ¶ 30 (identifying exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and explaining that the “privilege does not apply when the client seeks to abuse the attorney

2022Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 384 , 700 N.E.2d 12 (1998) (the privilege shields communications about crimes already committed but cannot be used to enable a person to carry out contemplated crimes). {¶ 55} Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed whether a defendant’s constitutional right to cross-examination may trump a witness’s statutory and common-law right to the attorney-client privilege.

2022Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 384 , 700 N.E.2d 12 (1998) (the privilege shields communications about crimes already committed but cannot be used to enable a person to carry out contemplated crimes). {¶ 55} Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed whether a defendant’s constitutional right to cross-examination may trump a witness’s statutory and common-law right to the attorney-client privilege.

2023The Court affirmed that Ohio “recognizes the common-law self-protection exception to the attorney-client privilege * * *.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶20} Boone also acknowledged Section 2317.02 but explained that allegations of bad faith present an exception to attorney-client privilege because “claims file materials that show an insurer’s lack of good faith in denying coverage are unworthy of protection.” Boone, 91 Ohio St.3d at 213 .

2013Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 209 , 744 N.E.2d 154 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court recognized an exception to the attorney-client privilege with regard to communications showing an insurance company’s lack of good faith in denying coverage.

2025“A de novo review requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of the evidence before the trial court without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Peer v. Sayers, 2011- Ohio-5439, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.). {¶25} “Under the attorney-client privilege, ‘(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection is wa

2025Thus, “[d]ocuments and records whose existence preceded a factual investigation or were created independent of such investigation, i.e., independent of any communication between attorney and client, would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Id. {¶26} “The protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege extends to ‘not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.’” Jacobs v. PAGE 9 OF 15 Case No. 2025-L-003 Equity Trust Co., 2020-Ohio-6882, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.),

2004State v. Today's Bookstore, Inc. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 810 , 818 , 621 N.E.2d 1283 . {¶ 29} Moreover, it is axiomatic only the client can waive the attorney-client privilege.

2004State v. Today's Bookstore, Inc. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 810 , 818 , 621 N.E.2d 1283 . {¶ 29} Moreover, it is axiomatic only the client can waive the attorney-client privilege.

2026Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist., 2011-Ohio-6009, ¶ 27 . "[T]he narrative portions of itemized attorney-fee billing statements containing descriptions of legal services performed by counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege." Pietrangelo at ¶ 10 .

2023No. 22AP-100 5 Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10 , 2011-Ohio-6009, ¶ 27 ("In Ohio, the attorney-client privilege is governed both by statue, R.C. 2317.02(A), which provides a testimonial privilege, and by common law, which broadly protects against any dissemination of information obtained in the confidential attorney-client relationship."). {¶ 16} Under the common law, as expressed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Leslie, the attorney-client privilege protects certain communications from disclosure as follows: "(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from

2023The Court affirmed that Ohio “recognizes the common-law self-protection exception to the attorney-client privilege * * *.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶20} Boone also acknowledged Section 2317.02 but explained that allegations of bad faith present an exception to attorney-client privilege because “claims file materials that show an insurer’s lack of good faith in denying coverage are unworthy of protection.” Boone, 91 Ohio St.3d at 213 .

2023The Ohio Supreme Court noted that Section 8 2317.02(A) had codified the attorney-client privilege and explained that it applied not only to testimony at trial, “but also to protect the sought-after communications during the discovery process.” Id. at ¶ 18, quoting Jackson at ¶ 7, fn. 1 .

2022See Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St.2d 176, 178 , 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976) (the party who seeks to exclude testimony based on the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that the privilege was not waived).

2022See Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St.2d 176, 178 , 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976) (the party who seeks to exclude testimony based on the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that the privilege was not waived).

2026Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 316 (1951), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. McDermott, 1995-Ohio-80 , syllabus; State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 385 (1987); see also McDermott at ¶ 11 (the attorney-client privilege can be waived either expressly or by conduct implying waiver).

2004In State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380 , 386 , the Ohio Supreme Court held "that a client's disclosure to a third party of communications made pursuant to the attorney-client privilege breaches the confidentiality underlying the privilege, and constitutes a waiver thereof." Here, appellant approached Baer to review the documents and discussed his version of the events with Baer.

2022Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 348 , 575 N.E.2d 116 . {¶ 29} Though R.C. 2317.02(A) expressly covers when an attorney may testify about attorney-client-privileged statements, we have held that the statute “provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications directly between an attorney and a client can be waived.” Jackson, 110 Ohio St.3d 488 , 2006-Ohio-4968 , 854 N.E.2d 487 , at paragraph one of the syllabus (following McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570 , 651 N.E.2d 985 ); see also Jackson at ¶ 21-26 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only) (noting that the plain la

2022Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 348 , 575 N.E.2d 116 . {¶ 29} Though R.C. 2317.02(A) expressly covers when an attorney may testify about attorney-client-privileged statements, we have held that the statute “provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications directly between an attorney and a client can be waived.” Jackson, 110 Ohio St.3d 488 , 2006-Ohio-4968 , 854 N.E.2d 487 , at paragraph one of the syllabus (following McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570 , 651 N.E.2d 985 ); see also Jackson at ¶ 21-26 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only) (noting that the plain la

2024Such a determination depends on whether he was asserting the privilege in the best interests of BWR and BWRRE or on his own behalf. {¶19} The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Grace, 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942 , 912 N.E.2d 608, at ¶ 18 , quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981).

2024Such a determination depends on whether he was asserting the privilege in the best interests of BWR and BWRRE or on his own behalf. {¶19} The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Grace, 182 Ohio App.3d 243 , 2007-Ohio-3942 , 912 N.E.2d 608, at ¶ 18 , quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 , 101 S.Ct. 677 , 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981).

2022Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 348 , 575 N.E.2d 116 . {¶ 29} Though R.C. 2317.02(A) expressly covers when an attorney may testify about attorney-client-privileged statements, we have held that the statute “provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications directly between an attorney and a client can be waived.” Jackson, 110 Ohio St.3d 488 , 2006-Ohio-4968 , 854 N.E.2d 487 , at paragraph one of the syllabus (following McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570 , 651 N.E.2d 985 ); see also Jackson at ¶ 21-26 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only) (noting that the plain la

2022Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 348 , 575 N.E.2d 116 . {¶ 29} Though R.C. 2317.02(A) expressly covers when an attorney may testify about attorney-client-privileged statements, we have held that the statute “provides the exclusive means by which privileged communications directly between an attorney and a client can be waived.” Jackson, 110 Ohio St.3d 488 , 2006-Ohio-4968 , 854 N.E.2d 487 , at paragraph one of the syllabus (following McDermott, 72 Ohio St.3d 570 , 651 N.E.2d 985 ); see also Jackson at ¶ 21-26 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in judgment only) (noting that the plain la

2024An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment “in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35 . {¶44} “The main purpose behind the attorney-client privilege is to promote “‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.’” Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 2016-Ohio-8000, ¶ 16 , quoting Boone v. Vanliner Ins.

2024As the Ohio Supreme Court clearly held in Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 151 Ohio St.3d 356 , 2016-Ohio-8000 , 89 N.E.3d 536 , ¶ 30, “[a]n order compelling the production of materials alleged to be protected by the attorney-client privilege is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).” This is so because violations of attorney-client confidentiality give rise to immediate prejudice that an appeal following final judgment simply cannot remedy.

2022Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261 , 2005-Ohio-1508 , 824 N.E.2d 990 , ¶ 18 (“[i]n Ohio, the attorney-client privilege is governed by statute, R.C. 2317.02(A), and in cases that are not addressed in R.C. 2317.02(A), by common law”).

2022Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261 , 2005-Ohio-1508 , 824 N.E.2d 990 , ¶ 21, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: “Under the attorney-client privilege, ‘(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection is waived.’ Reed v. Baxter (C.A.6, 1998), 134 F.3d 351 , 355-356; Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 153 Ohio App. 3d 28 , 2

2018Waldmann v. Waldmann , 48 Ohio St.2d 176 , 178, 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976) ; Ex parte Martin , 141 Ohio St. 87 , 103, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943). {¶ 235} We need not decide whether Tench sustained his burden of showing that the attorney-client privilege applied to the communications repeated in Verespej's trial testimony.

2018Waldmann v. Waldmann , 48 Ohio St.2d 176 , 178, 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976) ; Ex parte Martin , 141 Ohio St. 87 , 103, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943). {¶ 235} We need not decide whether Tench sustained his burden of showing that the attorney-client privilege applied to the communications repeated in Verespej's trial testimony.

2022Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261 , 2005-Ohio-1508 , 824 N.E.2d 990 , ¶ 21, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: “Under the attorney-client privilege, ‘(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection is waived.’ Reed v. Baxter (C.A.6, 1998), 134 F.3d 351 , 355-356; Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 153 Ohio App. 3d 28 , 2

2022Agency, 105 Ohio St.3d 261 , 2005-Ohio-1508 , 824 N.E.2d 990 , ¶ 21, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: “Under the attorney-client privilege, ‘(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) unless the protection is waived.’ Reed v. Baxter (C.A.6, 1998), 134 F.3d 351 , 355-356; Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., 153 Ohio App. 3d 28 , 2

2020Peyko v. Frederick, 25 Ohio St.3d 164, 166 (1986), quoting Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St.2d 176, 178 (1976). {¶12} It is widely recognized that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between corporations and their attorneys.

2020In Peyko v. Frederick, 25 Ohio St.3d 164 (1986), the case in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that an insured who makes a bad faith claim against an insurer may be entitled to access to certain portions of the claims -29- file, that court established a procedure by which the trial court in such a case is to examine the claims filed on an in camera basis to determine “which portions of the file, if any,” are protected by the attorney-client privilege and to permit the insured to review the balance of the file.

2026Lanham v. DeWine, 2013-Ohio-199 , when they withheld one of the emails Platt had requested on the basis of the attorney-client privilege.

2024See Lanham at ¶ 26. {¶ 14} To be covered by the attorney-client privilege, a communication does not have to contain purely legal advice; communications between a lawyer and a client that facilitate the rendition of legal services or advice are privileged.

2010Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (1986) 308, Section 6.7.8; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure (1997, Supp.2010), Section 5503; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, Section 83, Comment b. {¶ 43} Thus, courts apply the exception because “[i]t would be a manifest injustice to allow the client to take advantage of [the attorney-client privilege] to the prejudice of his attorney * * * [or] to the extent of depriving the attorney of the means of obtaining or defending his own rights.” Mitchell v. Bromberger, 2 Nev. 345 ; see also Doe v. A Corp. (C.A.5, 1983), 709 F.2d 1043, 1048

2010The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that R.C. 2317.02(A) provides the exclusive means for a client to waive the attorney-client privilege for testimonial statements and that the implied waiver test articulated in Hearn v. Rhay (E.D.Wash.1975), 68 F.R.D. 574 , applies to nontestimonial statements.

2026The Work-Product Doctrine {¶ 33} The work-product doctrine is of more recent vintage than the attorney-client privilege, having been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1947 in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).

2024Discovery, the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product doctrine {¶15} Under Civ.R. 26, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” Discovery is deliberately broad to facilitate “the free flow of information between the parties,” because “ ‘[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.’ ” Weckel v. Cole + Russell Architects, 2013- Ohio-2718, 994 N.E.2d 885 , ¶ 24 (1st Dist.), quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 , 67 S.Ct.

2007Garfield Mitchell Agency, Inc. (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 322 , 331 , 612 N.E.2d 442 ; Ward v. Graydon, Head Ritchey (2001), 147 Ohio App.3d 325 , 330 , 770 N.E.2d 613 ; McMahon v. Shumaker, Loop Kendrick, LLP , 162 Ohio App.3d 739 , 744 , 2005-Ohio-4436 , 834 N.E.2d 894 . {¶ 15} "Under Hearn , a party impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege through its own affirmative conduct if (1) assertion of the privilege is the result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party, (2) through the affirmative act, the asserting party has placed the protected information at issue

2007Garfield Mitchell Agency, Inc. (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 322 , 331 , 612 N.E.2d 442 ; Ward v. Graydon, Head Ritchey (2001), 147 Ohio App.3d 325 , 330 , 770 N.E.2d 613 ; McMahon v. Shumaker, Loop Kendrick, LLP , 162 Ohio App.3d 739 , 744 , 2005-Ohio-4436 , 834 N.E.2d 894 . {¶ 15} "Under Hearn , a party impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege through its own affirmative conduct if (1) assertion of the privilege is the result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party, (2) through the affirmative act, the asserting party has placed the protected information at issue

1983“This section shall be construed as in addition to, and not in limitation of, other laws affording protection to communications under the attorney-client privilege.” This court’s holding in Waldmann, supra, at 177-178 , was much narrower than the holding in the appellate decision in In re Heile (1939), 65 Ohio App. 45 [ 18 O.O. 274 ], where the appellate court stated at 49: “* * * where the [attorney-client] privilege exists, it includes the protection of the name and address of the client.” Waldmann v. Waldmann (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 176 [ 2 O.O.3d 373 ], distinguished.

1983“This section shall be construed as in addition to, and not in limitation of, other laws affording protection to communications under the attorney-client privilege.” This court’s holding in Waldmann, supra, at 177-178 , was much narrower than the holding in the appellate decision in In re Heile (1939), 65 Ohio App. 45 [ 18 O.O. 274 ], where the appellate court stated at 49: “* * * where the [attorney-client] privilege exists, it includes the protection of the name and address of the client.” Waldmann v. Waldmann (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 176 [ 2 O.O.3d 373 ], distinguished.