attorney-client privilege in New York

2025However, "the attorney-client privilege constitutes an obstacle to the truth-finding process, [and its] invocation . . . should be cautiously observed to ensure that its application is consistent with its purpose" ( id. at 68 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2025However, "the attorney-client privilege constitutes an obstacle to the truth-finding process, [and its] invocation . . . should be cautiously observed to ensure that its application is consistent with its purpose" ( id. at 68 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2026The attorney-client privilege applies to communications from a client to an attorney “made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and directed to an attorney who has been consulted for that purpose” (Rossi v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, 73 NY2d 588, 593 [1989]).

2025OCA relies on Public Officers Law § 87 (2) (a), which exempts records "specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute," and CPLR 4503 (a) (1), which exempts confidential attorney-client communications ( see also CPLR 3101 [b] ["Upon objection by a person entitled to assert the privilege, privileged matter shall not be obtainable."]). [FN2] The attorney-client privilege "foster[s] uninhibited dialogue between lawyers and clients in their professional engagements, thereby ultimately promoting the administration of justice" ( Rossi v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New Yo

2026"The oldest among the common-law evidentiary privileges, the attorney-client privilege 'fosters the open dialogue between lawyer and client that is deemed essential to effective representation'" ( id. , quoting Spectrum Sys.

2026"The oldest among the common-law evidentiary privileges, the attorney-client privilege 'fosters the open dialogue between lawyer and client that is deemed essential to effective representation'" ( id. , quoting Spectrum Sys.

2011Moreover, respondent’s counsel, who is currently representing respondent in the pending litigation, can also be compelled to disclose his client’s address, if it is known by him, without implicating the attorney-client privilege, since “disclosure is necessary for the proper administration of justice” (see Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215, 221 [1979]).

2010Since the attorney-client privilege “ ‘constitutes an “obstacle” to the truth-finding process’ ” (Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62, 68 [1980], quoting Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215, 219 [1979]), however, the “protection claimed must be narrowly construed” (Spectrum Sys.

2019According to the Plaintiffs' unsworn account, the Court never addressed "at issue" waiver in 2016, but rather: In 2016, Plaintiffs, in a conference call with the Court, requested that the Court allow Plaintiffs to submit a motion to compel disclosure of facts revealed in Christie's investigation because [Christie's] Cobden was wrongly directed at her deposition by Defendant Christie's counsel not to disclose any "facts" revealed in Christie's investigation if they were learned by counsel hired to conduct an investigation, despite the clear case law which holds that the attorney-client privileg

2019Privileged Communications "The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law" ( Upjohn Co. v United States , 449 US 383, 389 ; see Spectrum Sys.

2024"A client who voluntarily testifies to a privileged matter, who publicly discloses such matter or who permits his [or her] attorney to testify regarding the matter is deemed to have impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege" ( Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn , 97 AD2d 834, 835 [citations omitted]). "'Moreover, a waiver may be found where a party engages in selective disclosure, as a party may not rely on the protection of the privilege regarding damaging communications while disclosing other self-serving communications'" ( Siegel v Snyder , 202 AD3d 125, 132 , quoting Soussis v Lazer,

2023See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2327, at 637-38 (Rev. ed. 1961); 1 McCormick on Evidence § 93 (8th ed. 2020); Jakobleff v. Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn , 97 AD2d 834, 835 (2d Dep't 1983) ("client ... who permits his attorney to testify regarding the matter ... is deemed to have impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege"); MBIA Ins.

2026Further, plaintiffs may have waived the attorney-client privilege as to successor counsel's advice that is "at issue" in this action by disclosing three email exchanges with successor counsel during discovery ( see Orco Bank v Proteinas Del Pacifico , 179 AD2d 390, 390 [1st Dept 1992]).

2025Defendant's affidavit previously filed in support of her motion to dismiss, and her inclusion of texts describing communications she had had with plaintiffs during the course of their attorney-client relationship, "waived the attorney-client privilege by placing the subject matter of counsel's advice in issue and by making selective disclosure of such advi c e" ( Orco Bank v Proteinas Del Pacifico , 179 AD2d 390, 390 [1st Dept 1992]).

2019Respondent had jurisdiction over the criminal action against Mercer ( see Matter of Jacobs v Altman , 69 NY2d 733, 735 [1987]; Matter of Brown v Blumenfeld , 103 AD3d 45 , 55 [2012]) and was empowered to preclude Doyle from testifying about matters protected by the attorney-client privilege ( see People v Osorio , 75 NY2d 80, 84-85 [1989]; People v Harris , 57 NY2d 335, 343 [1982], cert denied 460 US 1047 [1983]).

2018Section 4503 of the CPLR protects from disclosure "confidential communication[s] made between the attorney . . . and the client in the course of professional employment." In order to be protected by the attorney-client privilege, the document in question must (i) reflect a communication between the attorney and the client, (ii) be made and retained in confidence, and (iii) be made principally to assist in obtaining or providing legal advice or services for the client ( see People v Osorio , 75 NY2d 80, 84 [1989]; Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena [Bekins Record Stor.

2019Tr. , 43 AD3d 56, 64 [1st Dept 2007]; Orco Bank v Proteinas Del Pacifico , 179 AD2d 390, 390 [1st Dept 1992] [the plaintiff "waived the attorney-client privilege by placing the subject matter of counsel's advice in issue and by making selective disclosure of such advice"]).

2014Trust, 43 AD3d 56, 63-64 [1st Dept 2007].) A client can also waive the attorney-client privilege “by placing the subject matter of counsel’s advice in issue and by making selective disclosure of such advice.” (Orco Bank v Proteinas Del Pacifico, 179 AD2d 390, 390 [1st Dept 1992].) Such a waiver “reflects the principle that privilege is a shield and must not be used as a sword.” (American Reinsurance Co. v United States Fid. & Guar.

2007Co. v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 176 Misc 2d 605, 610 [Sup Ct, NY County 1998].) However, “[c]ommunications made to a person serving as a translator or interpreter in order to facilitate communications between the lawyer and the client are a commonly recognized exception to the third-party disclosure rule, and do not waive the attorney-client privilege.” (Delta I, 13 Misc 3d at 445 ; see also People v Osorio, 75 NY2d 80, 84 [1989] [“communications made to counsel through a hired interpreter, or one serving as an agent of either attorney or client to facilitate communication, gene

2006Co. v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, supra at 612.) Accordingly, business-oriented or personal communications are not covered by the “common interest” exception to the attorney-client privilege.

2025Second, while the majority is correct that a blanket assertion of an attorney-client privilege is generally inappropriate because determining whether a particular document is "protected is necessarily a fact-specific determination," (majority at 9, citing Spectrum , 78 NY2d at 378), here, OCA's assertion fails categorically.

2025Second, while the majority is correct that a blanket assertion of an attorney-client privilege is generally inappropriate because determining whether a particular document is "protected is necessarily a fact-specific determination," (majority at 9, citing Spectrum , 78 NY2d at 378), here, OCA's assertion fails categorically.

2026He must, however, respond by identifying payments made to his counsel, which information is not protected by the attorney-client privilege ( see Matter of Nassau County Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated June 24, 2003 , 4 NY3d 665, 678-679 [2005]).

2026He must, however, respond by identifying payments made to his counsel, which information is not protected by the attorney-client privilege ( see Matter of Nassau County Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated June 24, 2003 , 4 NY3d 665, 678-679 [2005]).

2012Since plaintiffs do not “need the privileged documents to sustain [their] cause of action,” they have not “waived the attorney-client privilege by injecting privileged materials into the lawsuit” (Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Servotronics, Inc., 132 AD2d 392, 397 [1987]).

2007The record establishes that plaintiffs’ attorneys took reasonable precautions to prevent the disclosure and that plaintiff did not waive the attorney-client privilege when the document was inadvertently disclosed (see Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Servotronics, Inc., 132 AD2d 392, 399 [1987]).

2026The attorney-client privilege “applies to confidential communications between clients and their attorneys made ‘in the course of professional employment’’ (New York Times Newspaper Div. of New York Times Co. v Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 300 AD2d 169, 171 [1st Dept 2002], quoting CPLR § 4503 [a]).

2005Times Co. v Lehrer McGovern Bovis, 300 AD2d at 171 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62, 69 [1980]; CPLR 4503 [a].) An attorney’s observations of a client’s demeanor, physical characteristics and mental capacity are not protected by the attorney-client privilege, however, because any member of the public could make these observations.

2025Despite the foregoing, it is well settled that the attorney-client privilege will not shield communications between a client and his/her attorney "when [the communications] involve[] client communications that may have been in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, an alleged breach of fiduciary duty or an accusation of some other wrongful conduct" ( Art Capital Group LLC v Rose , 54 AD3d 276, 277 [1st Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see In re New York City Asbestos Litig. , 109 AD3d 7 , 10 [1st Dept 2013]; Ulico Cas.

2025Despite the foregoing, it is well settled that the attorney-client privilege will not shield communications between a client and his/her attorney "when [the communications] involve[] client communications that may have been in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, an alleged breach of fiduciary duty or an accusation of some other wrongful conduct" ( Art Capital Group LLC v Rose , 54 AD3d 276, 277 [1st Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see In re New York City Asbestos Litig. , 109 AD3d 7, 10 [1st Dept 2013]; Ulico Cas.

2008In support of his motion, defendant contended that the entries in the notebook fell within the scope of the attorney-client privilege, but defendant failed to establish that the attorney-client relationship existed at the time the entries were made or that the entries were made at the direction of defense counsel (see generally People v Mitchell, 58 NY2d 368, 373 [1983]).

2004The burden of proving every element of the attorney-client privilege rests upon the party asserting it (see People v Mitchell, 58 NY2d 368, 373 [1983]).

2025Despite the foregoing, it is well settled that the attorney-client privilege will not shield communications between a client and his/her attorney "when [the communications] involve[] client communications that may have been in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, an alleged breach of fiduciary duty or an accusation of some other wrongful conduct" ( Art Capital Group LLC v Rose , 54 AD3d 276, 277 [1st Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see In re New York City Asbestos Litig. , 109 AD3d 7 , 10 [1st Dept 2013]; Ulico Cas.

2025Despite the foregoing, it is well settled that the attorney-client privilege will not shield communications between a client and his/her attorney "when [the communications] involve[] client communications that may have been in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, an alleged breach of fiduciary duty or an accusation of some other wrongful conduct" ( Art Capital Group LLC v Rose , 54 AD3d 276, 277 [1st Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see In re New York City Asbestos Litig. , 109 AD3d 7, 10 [1st Dept 2013]; Ulico Cas.

2025Whether a party standing in the shoes of the owner acquires the entity's attorney-client privilege "turns on the practical consequences rather than the formalities of the particular transaction" ( Tekni-Plex, Inc. v Meyner and Landis , 89 NY2d 123, 133 [1996]).

2025Dated Feb. 3, 2004, 138 A.D.3d 1223, 1224 (3rd Dept., 2016); see also Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 89 N.Y.2d 123, 133 (1996)(successor management stands in the shoes of prior management and controls the attorney-client privilege under such circumstances, the prior attorney-client relationship continues with the newly formed entity); Kheel v. Cont'l Baking Co., 219 A.D.2d 846 (1995)(irrebuttable presumption of disqualification prevented attorney from further representing tenant in breach of lease dispute; attorney had previously represented part owners of building and currently represen

1996The courts have held that a client who voluntarily testifies to a privileged matter, who publicly discloses such matter, or who permits the attorney to testify regarding the matter is deemed to have impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege (see, Jakobleff v Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 AD2d 834 , supra, citing People v Shapiro, 308 NY 453 [1955]; People v O’Connor, 85 AD2d 92 [1982]; Kitz v Buckmaster, 45 App Div 283 [1899]).

1992Thus, the Court held: "The attorney-client privilege, recognized by statute, is to be accorded a broad and liberal construction, expressing as it does, 'a longstanding public policy to encourage uninhibited communica tian between persons standing in a relation of confidence and trust’ (People v. Shapiro, 308 N. Y. 453, 458 ; CPLR 4503).” (People v Moore, supra, 42 AD2d, at 271 .) Wilkins (supra), Moore (supra) and other reported cases (e.g., People v Glenn, 52 NY2d 880 ; People v Shapiro, supra) do not deal with the protection to be accorded where the attorney-client privilege conflicts with o

2024"Where a party asserts as an affirmative defense the reliance upon the advice of counsel, the party waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to all communications to or from counsel concerning the transactions for which counsel's advice was sought" ( Village Bd. of Vil. of Pleasantville v Rattner , 130 AD2d 654, 655 ).

1992In these circumstances, Supreme Court properly found plaintiff had waived the attorney-client privilege by placing the subject matter of counsel’s advice in issue and by making selective disclosure of such advice (Village Bd. v Rattner, 130 AD2d 654 ; Paruch v Paruch, 140 AD2d 418 ).

2021The record establishes that the 485 defendants' attorney took reasonable precautions to prevent the disclosure ( see Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Servotronics, Inc. , 132 AD2d 392, 398-400 [4th Dept 1987]; accord John Blair Communications v Reliance Capital Group , 182 AD2d 578 , 579 [1st Dept 1992]).

1992The burden of satisfying each element of the attorney-client privilege rests on the party asserting it (Blair Communications v Reliance Capital Group, 182 AD2d 578 ).

2003Defendant’s contention that the informant’s testimony should have been precluded based on the attorney-client privilege is not preserved for our review (see CPL 470.05 [2]) and, in any event, lacks merit (see People v Beige, 59 AD2d 307, 309 [1977]).

1984It is important to note, however, that in order to invoke the attorney-client privilege, the communication sought to be suppressed must have been made for the purpose of securing legal advice or services (Matter of Priest v Hennessy, 51 NY2d 62, 68-69 ; People v Belge, 59 AD2d 307, 309 ).

1995The attorney-client privilege was born, and has continued to exist, in order to "encourage persons needing professional advice to disclose freely the facts in reference to which they seek advice, without fear that such facts will be made public to their disgrace or detriment by their attorney” (Hurlburt v Hurlburt, 128 NY 420, 424 [1891]; Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215, 218 [1979]).

1991A century ago this Court referred to the attorney-client privilege statute as a "mere re-enactment of the common-law rule” (Hurlburt v Hurlburt, 128 NY 420, 424 ); reliance on the common law continues to this day.

2025Since a privilege "applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose" (i.e. to facilitate the provision of informed legal advice) ( Fisher v United States , 425 US 391, 403 [1976]), the attorney-client privilege does not apply to guidance that OCA Counsel's Office issued to judges in their adjudicatory capacity.

2025Since a privilege "applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose" (i.e. to facilitate the provision of informed legal advice) ( Fisher v United States , 425 US 391, 403 [1976]), the attorney-client privilege does not apply to guidance that OCA Counsel's Office issued to judges in their adjudicatory capacity.