49 Nevada opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Upjohn Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 ((> 1947A Federal courts "have recognized the attorney-client privilege under federal law as the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law." Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 ). 2022Supreme Court OF NeEvapa (Oy 997A eR Federal courts “have recognized the attorney-client privilege under federal law as ‘the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.” Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 ). | 5 | 8 |
Medinol Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp.green2 sentences2017Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Unlike the attorney-client privilege, . . . work product protection is not necessarily waived by disclosures to third persons."). 2017Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Unlike the attorney-client privilege, . . . work product protection is not necessarily waived by disclosures to third persons."). | 4 | 4 |
Hickman v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2017Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). 2017Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). | 4 | 4 |
WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.green2 sentences2017See WLR Foods, 857 F. Supp. at 494. 2017See WLR Foods, 857 F. Supp. at 494. | 4 | 4 |
Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First National Bankgreen2 sentences2017This court "cannot consider matters not properly appearing in the record on appeal." Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981). 2017This court "cannot consider matters not properly appearing in the record on appeal." Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981). | 4 | 4 |
Minnesota Invco of RSA 7, Inc. v. Midwest Wireless Holdings LLCgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Minn. Inuco of RSA # 7, Inc. v. Midwest Wireless Holdings LLC, 903 A.2d 786, 797-98 (Del. 2017See, e.g., Minn. Invco of RSA # 7, Inc. v. Midwest Wireless Holdings LLC, 903 A.2d 786, 797-98 (Del. | 4 | 4 |
Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp.green2 sentences2017"The business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 ni 1947: ■ informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621, 632, 137 P.3d 1171, 1178-79 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2017"The business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 ni 1947: ■ informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621, 632, 137 P.3d 1171, 1178-79 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Wardleigh v. Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. County of Washoegreen2 sentences2014Court, 111 Nev. 345, 352 , 891 P.2d 1180 , 1184-85 (1995) (observing that an employer's attorney-client privilege protects an employee's communications with the employer's attorneys); see also NRS 49.095(1) (codifying the attorney-client privilege). 2004NRS 34.735(6) expressly limits the waiver of the attorney-client privilege to “the proceeding in which you claim your counsel was ineffective.” See, e.g., Cazanas v. State, 508 S.E.2d 412, 413 (Ga. 1998) (trial court properly admitted defendant’s attorney’s testimony when defendant asserted he did not enter his plea with knowledge and understanding of the plea); Com. v. Woodberry, 530 N.E.2d 1260, 1261-62 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (trial court properly admitted the testimony of a defendant’s “plea attorney” regarding communications between the defendant and the attorney relating to why the attorne | 3 | 4 |
Wardleigh v. 2ND JUD. DIST. CT. OF STATEgreen2 sentences2014Court, 111 Nev. 345, 352 , 891 P.2d 1180 , 1184-85 (1995) (observing that an employer's attorney-client privilege protects an employee's communications with the employer's attorneys); see also NRS 49.095(1) (codifying the attorney-client privilege). 2004NRS 34.735(6) expressly limits the waiver of the attorney-client privilege to “the proceeding in which you claim your counsel was ineffective.” See, e.g., Cazanas v. State, 508 S.E.2d 412, 413 (Ga. 1998) (trial court properly admitted defendant’s attorney’s testimony when defendant asserted he did not enter his plea with knowledge and understanding of the plea); Com. v. Woodberry, 530 N.E.2d 1260, 1261-62 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (trial court properly admitted the testimony of a defendant’s “plea attorney” regarding communications between the defendant and the attorney relating to why the attorne | 3 | 4 |
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraubgreen2 sentences2014"The entity is the client" approach Sands primarily cites two cases for its proposition that the corporation's current management is the sole holder of the attorney-client privilege: Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, and Montgomery, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1175. 2014In Weintraub, the Supreme Court considered whether managers of a bankrupt corporation could assert the attorney-client privilege on behalf of the corporation or if, instead, the right to assert and waive the privilege passed to the bankruptcy trustee. 471 U.S. at 349. | 3 | 3 |
In Re Grand Jury January 246green2 sentences2004See Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 701 , 941 P.2d 459, 473 (1997) (when client voluntarily reveals a significant portion of communication with attorney, “ ‘those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter’ ” (quoting In re Grand Jury Jan. 246, 651 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ill. 1999Where a client “voluntarily reveals portions of the communications with the attorney, ‘those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter.’ ” Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 701 , 941 P.2d 459, 473 (1997) (quoting In re Grand Jury Jan. 246, 651 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ill. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Terry Christensengreen2 sentences2024See NRS 49.055 (recognizing that confidential communications include disclosures to parties necessary to render legal services); NRS 49.085 (“Representative of the lawyer’ means a Supreme Court OF NeEvADA (0) MTA aE 4 person employed by the lawyer to assist in the rendition of professional legal services.”); United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 802 (9th Cir. 2015) (protecting communications with third party acting as counsel’s agent when communications were necessary for advising and defending client), abrogated on other grounds by Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017). 2024See NRS 49.055 (recognizing that confidential communications include disclosures to parties necessary to render legal services); NR.S 49.085 ("Representative of the lawyer' means a SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) 1947A person employed by the lawyer to assist in the rendition of professional legal services."); United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 802 (9th Cir. 2015) (protecting communications with third party acting as counsel's agent when communications were necessary for advising and defending client), abrogated on other grounds by Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017). | 2 | 2 |
Public Employees' Retirement System v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.green2 sentences2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 OM 1947A e. As the attorney-client privilege protects certain records by statute, see NRS 49.095, the district court was not obligated to conduct a balancing test for those records withheld or redacted pursuant that privilege. 3 See PERS, 129 Nev. at 837, 313 P.3d at 224 ; see also NRS 239.010(1). 2019SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 OM 1947A e. As the attorney-client privilege protects certain records by statute, see NRS 49.095, the district court was not obligated to conduct a balancing test for those records withheld or redacted pursuant that privilege. 3 See PERS, 129 Nev. at 837, 313 P.3d at 224 ; see also NRS 239.010(1). | 2 | 2 |
Aiello v. City Of Wilmingtongreen2 sentences2015See Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 623 F.2d 845 , 858-59 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that plaintiff and counsel could not communicate during breaks in cross-examination during trial); see also NRCP 30(c) (requiring that witness examination and cross-examination during a deposition proceed as permitted at trial). 2015See Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 623 F.2d 845, 858-59 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that plaintiff and counsel could not communicate during breaks in cross-examination during trial); see also NRCP 30(c) (requiring that witness examination and cross-examination during a deposition proceed as permitted at trial). | 2 | 2 |
Sipsas v. Stategreen2 sentences2014LVDA primarily relies on Sipsas v. State, 102 Nev. 119, 123 , 716 P.2d 231, 233 (1986), in which this court determined that the district court abused its discretion in admitting a photograph pursuant to NRS 50.125(1)(d) when that photograph was not used to refresh the memory of the witness in question. 2014LVDA primarily relies on Sipsas v. State, 102 Nev. 119, 123 , 716 P.2d 231, 233 (1986), in which this court determined that the district court abused its discretion in admitting a photograph pursuant to NRS 50.125(1)(d) when that photograph was not used to refresh the memory of the witness in question. | 2 | 2 |
Lisle v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 701 , 941 P.2d 459, 473 (1997) (when client voluntarily reveals a significant portion of communication with attorney, “ ‘those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter’ ” (quoting In re Grand Jury Jan. 246, 651 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ill. 2004See Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 701 , 941 P.2d 459, 473 (1997) (when client voluntarily reveals a significant portion of communication with attorney, “ ‘those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter’ ” (quoting In re Grand Jury Jan. 246, 651 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Mitchell v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1997If a client voluntarily reveals portions of the communications with the attorney, "those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter." In re Grand Jury Jan. 246, 272 Ill.App.3d 991 , 209 Ill.Dec. 518, 522 , 651 N.E.2d 696, 700 (1995), appeal denied, 163 Ill.2d 558 , 212 Ill.Dec. 421 , 657 N.E.2d 622 (1995); see also Wardleigh v. Second Judicial District Court, 111 Nev. 345, 354 , 891 P.2d 1180 , 1186 (1995). *474 However, "mere disclosure of the fact that a communication between client an 1997If a client voluntarily reveals portions of the communications with the attorney, "those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter." In re Grand Jury Jan. 246, 272 Ill.App.3d 991 , 209 Ill.Dec. 518, 522 , 651 N.E.2d 696, 700 (1995), appeal denied, 163 Ill.2d 558 , 212 Ill.Dec. 421 , 657 N.E.2d 622 (1995); see also Wardleigh v. Second Judicial District Court, 111 Nev. 345, 354 , 891 P.2d 1180 , 1186 (1995). *474 However, "mere disclosure of the fact that a communication between client an | 2 | 2 |
Hearn v. Rhaygreen2 sentences1995Conkling v. Turner, 833 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. 1995Conkling v. Turner, 833 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. | 2 | 2 |
In Re United Statesgreen2 sentences1995United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982). 1995United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir.1982). | 2 | 2 |
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Barry Gourary, Hanna Gourary, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellantgreen2 sentences1995Conkling v. Turner, 833 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. 1995Conkling v. Turner, 833 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. | 2 | 2 |
Manley v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Manley v. State, 115 Nev. 114, 123 , 979 P.2d 703, 708-09 (1999) (applying harmless-error review to a claim that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by prosecutorial questions abridging the attorney-client privilege because the defendant was “represented by counsel at all times” and such an error “did not affect the framework within which the trial proceeded”). 2013Manley v. State, 115 Nev. 114, 123 , 979 P.2d 703, 708-09 (1999) (applying harmless-error review to a claim that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by prosecutorial questions abridging the attorney-client privilege because the defendant was “represented by counsel at all times” and such an error “did not affect the framework within which the trial proceeded”). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Hillikergreen2 sentences2016Ct. App. 1995) ("When a psychotherapist is employed by counsel for a SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 (0) 194M 4(geta defendant to assist him in preparing a defense for his client and not to treat the defendant, the state may not depose the expert or call him as a witness; this witness is subject to the attorney-client privilege."); People v. Hilliker, 185 N.W.2d 831, 834 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (concluding that communications to psychiatrist retained by counsel to assist the defense in preparing for trial were privileged "under the veil of attorney-client privilege"). 1987United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979); State v. Pratt, 398 So.2d 421 (Md.App. 1979); Pouncy v. State, 353 So.2d 640 (Fla.App. 1977); People v. Lines, 531 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1975); People v. Hilliker, 185 N.W.2d 831 (Mich.App. 1971); cf. State v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1957). | 1 | 2 |
In re Stratosphere Corp. Securities Litigationgreen2 sentences2015Cf. In re Stratosphere, 182 F.R.D. at 621 . 2015Cf. In re Stratosphere, 182 F.R.D. at 621. | 1 | 2 |
| Foster v. Hillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Murphy v. Gormangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ashokan v. State, Department of Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Molina v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Flores v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Swidler & Berlin v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Robinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Adamsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Grand Jury Proceedings David R. Damore. Appeal of Robert Twist, Sr., Intervenor-Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Richeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| International Game Technology, Inc. v. Second Judicial District Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Livingston v. Wagnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Marshall v. United States Postal Servicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leven v. Freygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Milroy v. Hansongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Montgomery v. eTreppid Technologies, LLcgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitehead v. Nevada Commission on Judicial Disciplinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Honeycutt v. United States
green
2 sentences2024See NRS 49.055 (recognizing that confidential communications include disclosures to parties necessary to render legal services); NRS 49.085 (“Representative of the lawyer’ means a Supreme Court OF NeEvADA (0) MTA aE 4 person employed by the lawyer to assist in the rendition of professional legal services.”); United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 802 (9th Cir. 2015) (protecting communications with third party acting as counsel’s agent when communications were necessary for advising and defending client), abrogated on other grounds by Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017). 2024See NRS 49.055 (recognizing that confidential communications include disclosures to parties necessary to render legal services); NR.S 49.085 ("Representative of the lawyer' means a SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) 1947A person employed by the lawyer to assist in the rendition of professional legal services."); United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 802 (9th Cir. 2015) (protecting communications with third party acting as counsel's agent when communications were necessary for advising and defending client), abrogated on other grounds by Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023SDI Future Health, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 n.4 (holding that once the defendants are granted access to the seized property, they should "supplementH their privilege claims by more specifically describing the documents that they allege were protected by the attorney-client privilege"). 2023SDI Future Health, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 n.4 (holding that once the defendants are granted access to the seized property, they should "supplementH their privilege claims by more specifically describing the documents that they allege were protected by the attorney-client privilege"). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Zolin
green
2 sentences2022SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 ((> 1947A Federal courts "have recognized the attorney-client privilege under federal law as the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law." Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 ). 2022Supreme Court OF NeEvapa (Oy 997A eR Federal courts “have recognized the attorney-client privilege under federal law as ‘the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.” Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 ). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Gibbons
green
2 sentences2019As we cautioned in Gibbons, "in this log, the state entity withholding the records need not specify its objections in such detail as to compromise the secrecy of the information." 127 Nev. at 883 n.3, 266 P.3d at 629 n.3 (internal quotation omitted). 2019As we cautioned in Gibbons, "in this log, the state entity withholding the records need not specify its objections in such detail as to compromise the secrecy of the information." 127 Nev. at 883 n.3, 266 P.3d at 629 n.3 (internal quotation omitted). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Byers v. Burleson
green
2 sentences1995The trial court rejected the claim of privilege, stating that “the plaintiff has waived the privilege because the information which the defendant seeks is necessary to resolve the precise statute of limitations issue which the plaintiff has interjected into the case.” Id. at 440 . 1995The trial court rejected the claim of privilege, stating that "the plaintiff has waived the privilege because the information which the defendant seeks is necessary to resolve the precise statute of limitations issue which the plaintiff has interjected into the case." Id. at 440 . | 2 | 1995–1995 |
Clark v. Second Judicial District Court
green
2 sentences1991Cf. Clark v. District Court, 101 Nev. 58 , 692 P.2d 512 (1985) (extraordinary writ issued to prevent the district court from requiring the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege). 1991Cf. Clark v. District Court, 101 Nev. 58 , 692 P.2d 512 (1985) (extraordinary writ issued to prevent the district court from requiring the disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client privilege). | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Laman v. McCord
green
2 sentences1987As clearly as it possibly could, the legislature has expressed its will: Meetings of public bodies shall be "open and public," unless the legislature subsequently enacts *126 a statute specifically providing an exception to the rule of publicity. [3] This court's position is squarely supported by Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401 , 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968), in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected a city's argument that an attorney-client privilege should be judicially imposed so that the public body could prepare its case without having to disclose its strategy and possible weaknesses to adve 1987As clearly as it possibly could, the legislature has expressed its will: Meetings of public bodies shall be “open and public,” unless the legislature subsequently enacts a statute specifically providing an exception to the rule of publicity. 3 This court’s position is squarely supported by Laman v. McCord, 432 S.W.2d 753 (Ark. 1968), in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected a city’s argument that an attorney-client privilege should be judicially imposed so that the public body could prepare its case without having to disclose its strategy and possible weaknesses to adversaries. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Van Asdale v. International Game Technology green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Means v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Rosequist v. International Ass'n of Firefighters Local 1908 green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Holland v. Mississippi green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Strahan v. Coxe green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Lisle v. Nevada green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Doughty v. Maxwell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Walter Tull v. Louie L. Wainwright green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Hartsfield v. Wainwright green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Weatherford v. Bursey green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Safecard Services, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Bean v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Lines green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Fox v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Criswell v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Houston v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.