highly deferential standard in Pennsylvania

2026The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 .

2026The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the -4- J-A28013-25 court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 .

2026The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 .

2026The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the -4- J-A28013-25 court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 .

2024The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 . -6- J-S13033-24 Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761

2024The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 . -4- J-S26031-24 Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761

2024The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 . -6- J-S13033-24 Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761

2024The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 . -4- J-S26031-24 Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761

2026Furthermore, the “trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

2026Furthermore, the “trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

2025The abuse of discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 477 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

2017In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 477 (Pa.Super. 2010).

2023Under this highly deferential standard of review, an appellate court does not inquire into the merits of the 11 controversy, but examines the record “to determine if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the court below.” Id. (quoting Roberts v. [Bd.] of Dirs. of Sch.

2022Under this highly deferential standard of review, an appellate court does not inquire into the merits of the controversy but examines the record “to determine if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the court below.” Id. [quoting Roberts v. Bd. of Dirs. of Sch.

2025Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007).

2024“However, given this Court’s highly deferential standard of review, such relief should be afforded only in rare cases.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. Burgos-Semidey, 256 A.3d 10 , at *3 (non-precedential decision) (Pa. Super. filed May 6, 2021) (distinguishing disproportionate punishments in Williams and Parlante from appropriate revocation sentence of incarceration imposed on probationer Burgos-Semidey for multiple PWID, retail theft, and conspiracy convictions -7- J-S24036-24 where sentence for technical violations made him parole-eligible in ten months

2023Dist., . . . 341 A.2d 475, 478 ([Pa.] 1975)).

2023Dist., . . . 341 A.2d 475, 478 ([Pa.] 1975)).

2023Cf. Foster v. Chatman, ––– U.S. –––, 136 S.Ct. 1737 , 1747–1755, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) (even under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (“AEDPA’s”) double deferential standard of review, the trial court’s factual finding with respect to discriminatory intent was clearly erroneous); Commonwealth v. Monahan, 860 A.2d 180, 185 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 688 , 878 A.2d 863 (Pa. 2005) (In the context of a discretionary aspect of sentencing claim, in which we employ a highly deferential standard of review, we do not act as a rubber stamp.).

2018Although we must exercise great deference in reviewing the trial court’s factual finding with respect to discriminatory intent, we do not function as a rubber stamp, Cf. Foster v. Chatman, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1747-1755 , 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) (even under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (“AEDPA’s’’) double deferential standard of review, the trial court’s factual finding with respect to discriminatory intent was clearly erroneous); Commonwealth v. Monahan, 860 A.2d 180, 185 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 688 , 878 A.2d 863 (Pa. 2005) (In the context of a

2014“We choose this highly deferential standard because ‘the court that finds the facts will know them better than the reviewing court will, and so its application of the law to the facts is likely to be more accurate.’ ” Id. (quoting Thomas v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307-08 (7th Cir.2002)).

2014“We choose this highly deferential standard because ‘the court that finds the facts will know them better than the reviewing court will, and so its application of the law to the facts is likely to be more accurate.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305 , 307–08 (7th Cir. 2002)).

2019This highly deferential standard of review states that in reviewing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, an appellate court is directed to examine the record to determine if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the court below.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Longue Vue Club, 63 A.3d 270, 275 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2018This highly deferential standard of review states that in reviewing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, an appellate court is directed to examine the record to determine if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the court below.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Longue Vue Club, 63 A.3d 270, 275 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2019Commonwealth v. Hackett , 626 Pa. 567 , 99 A.3d 11 , 26 (2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams , 619 Pa. 219 , 61 A.3d 979 , 981 (2013) ).

2015Commonwealth v. Hackett, 626 Pa. 567 , 99 A.3d 11, 26 (2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 619 Pa. 219 , 61 A.3d 979, 981 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2020Our review of a trial court’s order denying or granting a preliminary injunction is “highly deferential.” “This highly deferential standard of review states that in reviewing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, an appellate court is directed to examine the record to determine if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the court below.” Warehime v. Warehime, 860 A.2d 41, 46 (Pa. 2004) (citation, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted).

2015“This highly deferential standard of review states that in reviewing the grant … of a preliminary injunction, an appellate court is directed to examine the record to determine if there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the court below.” Id. -4- J-A29043-15 (citation, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted).

2014“We choose this highly deferential standard because ‘the court that finds the facts will know them better than the reviewing court will, and so its application of the law to the facts is likely to be more accurate.’ ” Id. (quoting Thomas v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307-08 (7th Cir.2002)).

2014“We choose this highly deferential standard because ‘the court that finds the facts will know them better than the reviewing court will, and so its application of the law to the facts is likely to be more accurate.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305 , 307–08 (7th Cir. 2002)).

2023Cf. Foster v. Chatman, ––– U.S. –––, 136 S.Ct. 1737 , 1747–1755, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) (even under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (“AEDPA’s”) double deferential standard of review, the trial court’s factual finding with respect to discriminatory intent was clearly erroneous); Commonwealth v. Monahan, 860 A.2d 180, 185 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 688 , 878 A.2d 863 (Pa. 2005) (In the context of a discretionary aspect of sentencing claim, in which we employ a highly deferential standard of review, we do not act as a rubber stamp.).

2023Cf. Foster v. Chatman, ––– U.S. –––, 136 S.Ct. 1737 , 1747–1755, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) (even under Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (“AEDPA’s”) double deferential standard of review, the trial court’s factual finding with respect to discriminatory intent was clearly erroneous); Commonwealth v. Monahan, 860 A.2d 180, 185 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 688 , 878 A.2d 863 (Pa. 2005) (In the context of a discretionary aspect of sentencing claim, in which we employ a highly deferential standard of review, we do not act as a rubber stamp.).

2019Commonwealth v. Hackett , 626 Pa. 567 , 99 A.3d 11 , 26 (2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams , 619 Pa. 219 , 61 A.3d 979 , 981 (2013) ).

2019Commonwealth v. Hackett , 626 Pa. 567 , 99 A.3d 11 , 26 (2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams , 619 Pa. 219 , 61 A.3d 979 , 981 (2013) ).

2014The “public policy” exception requires the court to consider whether the arbitrator’s award “contravenes a well-defined, dominant public policy that is ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from mere general considerations of supposed public interests.” Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7, 939 A.2d at 866 .

2010Id. at 862.

2026Interest of K.T., 324 A.3d 49, 56 (Pa. Super. 2024) (brackets omitted; emphasis added) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012)); see also In re Adoption of C.P.D., 324 A.3d 11, 24 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“[T]he trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by the finder of fact.” (citation and brackets omitted)); In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (observing that, in termination cases, an abuse of discretion “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the

2026Interest of K.T., 324 A.3d 49, 56 (Pa. Super. 2024) (brackets omitted; emphasis added) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012)); see also In re Adoption of C.P.D., 324 A.3d 11, 24 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“[T]he trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by the finder of fact.” (citation and brackets omitted)); In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (observing that, in termination cases, an abuse of discretion “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the

2026Interest of K.T., 324 A.3d 49, 56 (Pa. Super. 2024) (brackets omitted; emphasis added) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012)); see also In re Adoption of C.P.D., 324 A.3d 11, 24 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“[T]he trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by the finder of fact.” (citation and brackets omitted)); In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (observing that, in termination cases, an abuse of discretion “is a highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the

2023“Not only are our trial judges observing the parties during the hearing, but usually, as in this case, they have presided over several other hearings with the same parties and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best interests of the individual child involved[.]” Id. (quoting R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)).

2022“An injunction can be either preventative or mandatory in nature.” Shepherd v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 25 A.3d 1233, 1241 (Pa. Super. 2011).