highly deferential standard in West Virginia

1997Under this highly deferential standard, economic legislation will be affirmed “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Federal Communications Comm’n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 , 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211, 221 (1993).

1997Under this highly deferential standard, economic legislation will be affirmed “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Federal Communications Comm’n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 , 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101 , 124 L.Ed.2d 211, 221 (1993).

2025In SSAC, the court declared that courts “must independently consider whether there is any conceivable rational basis for the classification, regardless of whether the reason ultimately relied on is provided by the parties or the court.” Id. at 334 n.6, 880 S.E.2d at 56 n.6 (citing Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); and Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d 137, 146 (1st Cir. 2001) (recognizing that even if the government's stated justification for enforcing a regulation is insufficient to uphold the rationality of the regulation, a court has the obligation to seek out o

2025In SSAC, the court declared that courts “must independently consider whether there is any conceivable rational basis for the classification, regardless of whether the reason ultimately relied on is provided by the parties or the court.” Id. at 334 n.6, 880 S.E.2d at 56 n.6 (citing Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); and Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d 137, 146 (1st Cir. 2001) (recognizing that even if the government's stated justification for enforcing a regulation is insufficient to uphold the rationality of the regulation, a court has the obligation to seek out o

2025In SSAC, the court declared that courts “must independently consider whether there is any conceivable rational basis for the classification, regardless of whether the reason ultimately relied on is provided by the parties or the court.” Id. at 334 n.6, 880 S.E.2d at 56 n.6 (citing Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); and Starlight Sugar, Inc. v. Soto, 253 F.3d 137, 146 (1st Cir. 2001) (recognizing that even if the government's stated justification for enforcing a regulation is insufficient to uphold the rationality of the regulation, a court has the obligation to seek out o

2025Va. 629, 644 , 827 S.E.2d 417, 432 (2019) stating that “the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification.” Finally, the language used in the SSAC case makes clear that the highly deferential standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court should be utilized when 4 a court in West Virginia applies the rational basis test.

2018Petitioner believes that additional services coupled with probation would have been sufficient to address his problems, and that the circuit court did not employ the least restrictive alternative. “[T]he standard of review with regard to a circuit court’s sentencing order or disposition . . . is whether the circuit court’s ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.” State v. Kenneth Y., 217 W.Va. 167, 170 , 617 S.E.2d 517, 520 (2005) (citations omitted). “[D]iscretionary, dispositional decisions of the trial courts should only be reversed where they are not supported by the evidence or are wro

2018Petitioner believes that additional services coupled with probation would have been sufficient to address his problems, and that the circuit court did not employ the least restrictive alternative. “[T]he standard of review with regard to a circuit court’s sentencing order or disposition . . . is whether the circuit court’s ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.” State v. Kenneth Y., 217 W.Va. 167, 170 , 617 S.E.2d 517, 520 (2005) (citations omitted). “[D]iscretionary, dispositional decisions of the trial courts should only be reversed where they are not supported by the evidence or are wro

2018Petitioner believes that additional services coupled with probation would have been sufficient to address his problems, and that the circuit court did not employ the least restrictive alternative. “[T]he standard of review with regard to a circuit court’s sentencing order or disposition . . . is whether the circuit court’s ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.” State v. Kenneth Y., 217 W.Va. 167, 170 , 617 S.E.2d 517, 520 (2005) (citations omitted). “[D]iscretionary, dispositional decisions of the trial courts should only be reversed where they are not supported by the evidence or are wro

2018Petitioner believes that additional services coupled with probation would have been sufficient to address his problems, and that the circuit court did not employ the least restrictive alternative. “[T]he standard of review with regard to a circuit court’s sentencing order or disposition . . . is whether the circuit court’s ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.” State v. Kenneth Y., 217 W.Va. 167, 170 , 617 S.E.2d 517, 520 (2005) (citations omitted). “[D]iscretionary, dispositional decisions of the trial courts should only be reversed where they are not supported by the evidence or are wro

1995Haden v. Calco Awning & Window Corp., 153 W.Va. 524 , 170 S.E.2d 362 (1969) (“every reasonable construction of the statute must be resorted to by a court in order to sustain constitutionality”).

1995Haden v. Calco Awning & Window Corp., 153 W.Va. 524 , 170 S.E.2d 362 (1969) (“every reasonable construction of the statute must be resorted to by a court in order to sustain constitutionality”).