highly deferential standard in New Jersey

2026State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014).

2026State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014).

2022See State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 , 364–65 (1984) (holding that an appellate court may not overturn a sentence unless "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.").

2022See State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984) (holding that an appellate court may not overturn a sentence unless "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes A-4132-18 15 the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience").

2024A-1813-22 5 We apply "a highly deferential standard of review" to decisions of a Tax Court, Brown v. Borough of Glen Rock, 19 N.J.

2024A-1813-22 5 We apply "a highly deferential standard of review" to decisions of a Tax Court, Brown v. Borough of Glen Rock, 19 N.J.

2022See Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 327 (1998).

2022See Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 327 (1998).

2021State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016) (citing State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)).

2021State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016).

2025"Rather, courts must 'view the prosecutor's decision through the filter of the highly deferential standard of A-1626-23 8 review.'" Id. at 237-38 (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 589 (1996)).

2017"Rather, courts must 'view the prosecutor's decision through the filter of the highly deferential standard of review.'" Id. at 237-38 (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 589 (1996)).

2024Tax 366, 375 (App. Div. 2001), because "judges presiding in the Tax Court have special expertise," Glenpointe Assocs. v. Twp. of Teaneck, 241 N.J.

2024Tax 366, 375 (App. Div. 2001), because "judges presiding in the Tax Court have special expertise," Glenpointe Assocs. v. Twp. of Teaneck, 241 N.J.

2026Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013).

2020Like the trial court, we apply a highly deferential standard of review to the Board's decisions, which "enjoy a presumption of validity, and a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the board unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion." Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013) (citing Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of W.

2022In that regard, "courts must 'view the prosecutor's decision through the filter of the highly deferential standard of review.'" State v. Waters, 439 N.J.

2021A-3586-19T4 27 A court reviewing a prosecutor's rejection of a request for a Graves Act waiver, as with the review of a prosecutor's rejection of a PTI application, must "view the prosecutor's decision through the filter of the highly deferential standard of review." State v. Waters, 439 N.J.

2021Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194-95 .

2020In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194-95 (2011).

2022Emps.' Health Benefits Comm'ns' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).

2022Emps.' Health Benefits Comm'ns' Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018).

2017See, e.g., United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Rueben, 974 31 A-2415-16T7 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 940 , 113 S. Ct. 1336 , 122 L.

2017See, e.g., United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Rueben, 974 31 A-2415-16T7 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 940 , 113 S. Ct. 1336 , 122 L.

1999The presumption of validity and reasonableness accorded by law to the regulations is not overcome. "[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever-changing and more technical problems," the Legislature "simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 , 109 *1078 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed. 2d 714, 731 (1989) (Blackmun, J., on the federal sentencing guidelines).

1999The presumption of validity and reasonableness accorded by law to the regulations is not overcome. "[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever-changing and more technical problems," the Legislature "simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 , 109 *1078 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed. 2d 714, 731 (1989) (Blackmun, J., on the federal sentencing guidelines).

2026"Generally, appellate courts apply a highly deferential standard of review when considering the factual findings and decisions of Tax Court judges. " Presbyterian Home at Pennington, Inc. v. Borough of Pennington, 409 N.J.

2025Overall, on judicial review "[o]ur function is to determine whether the administrative action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Burris v. Police Dep't, 338 N.J.

2023L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 421 N.J.

2022See State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 , 364–65 (1984) (holding that an appellate court may not overturn a sentence unless "the application of the guidelines to the facts 6 State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 633 (1985).

2021See State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984) (holding that an appellate court may not overturn a sentence unless "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.") Our review is therefore limited to considering: (1) whether guidelines for sentencing established by the Legislature or by the courts were violated; (2) whether the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were based on competent credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether the sentence was nevertheless "clearly

2021Specifically, we must ask (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. [In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (citing Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).] This highly deferential standard reflects

2021Specifically, we must ask (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. [In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (citing Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).] This highly deferential standard reflects

2021"Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the decision of an administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious, or A-4653-18T2 6 unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).

2021Benjamin, 228 N.J. at 364 (a defendant may "appeal the denial of [the Graves Act] waiver to the assignment judge upon a showing of patent and gross abuse of discretion by the prosecutor.").

2021State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016) (citing State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)).

2020State v. Harris, 148 N.J. 89, 157 (1997).

2020Windsor Twp., 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002)).