highly deferential standard in Florida

2010We apply the "relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny" mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 26 , 109 S.Ct. 1591 ; apply the presumption of constitutionality afforded statutes and ordinances; recognize that the ordinances must be upheld unless they clearly can be shown to be an arbitrary exercise of the City's police power bearing no relation to any legitimate public purpose; and apply the highly deferential standard requiring that the ordinances be upheld where reasonable persons could differ as to their propriety.

2010We apply the "relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny" mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 26 , 109 S.Ct. 1591 ; apply the presumption of constitutionality afforded statutes and ordinances; recognize that the ordinances must be upheld unless they clearly can be shown to be an arbitrary exercise of the City's police power bearing no relation to any legitimate public purpose; and apply the highly deferential standard requiring that the ordinances be upheld where reasonable persons could differ as to their propriety.

2018N.L. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. , 843 So.2d 996 , 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

2016N.L., 843 So.2d at 999 .

2001In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), the United States Supreme Court held that `[i]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.' This Court expressly adopted the fairly debatable principle in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480 , 3 So.2d 364 (1941)." [c.o.] 627 So.2d at 472.

2001In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), the United States Supreme Court held that `[i]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.' This Court expressly adopted the fairly debatable principle in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480 , 3 So.2d 364 (1941)." [c.o.] 627 So.2d at 472.

2020Id.

2017"This court reviews the trial court's application of the fairly debatable standard de novo." Island, 884 So. 2d at 108 .

2016Although we apply a highly deferential standard of review of this type of an attorney’s fee award because of the trial court’s “first-hand knowledge of the case,” “superior understanding of the litigation,” and “extensive contact with the parties and their counsel,” Alvarez, 175 So.3d at 355 (quoting Centex-Rooney Const. Co. v. Martin Cty., 725 So.2d 1255,1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)), as appellate judges, when we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, “we are not required to abandon what we learned as lawyers ... in evaluating the reasonableness of an award.” Trumbull Ins.

2016Although we apply a highly deferential standard of review of this type of an attorney’s fee award because of the trial court’s “first- hand knowledge of the case,” “superior understanding of the litigation,” and “extensive contact with the parties and their counsel,” Alvarez, 175 So. 3d at 355 (quoting Centex- Rooney Const. Co. v. Martin Cty., 725 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)), as appellate judges, when we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, “we are not required to abandon what we learned as lawyers . . . in evaluating the reasonableness of an award.” Trumbul

2013Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So.2d 490 (Fla.1999).

2011Given this highly deferential standard, we acknowledge that “a reversal for failure to grant a motion for continuance would be justified only in very rare situations.” Id.

2011Courts also recognize, however, “cases in which the appellate court will have no alternative but to reverse, because the injustice caused by the denial of the motion outweighs the judicial policy of deferring to the trial judge.” Id.; Silverman v. Millner, 514 So.2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (acknowledging that “[sjpecial circumstances sometimes exist ... in which the denial of a motion for continuance creates an injustice for the movant”).

2011In Ex parte Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 987 So.2d 1090 (Ala.2007), also cited by Alvarez for support, Cooper filed a petition for mandamus in the Alabama Supreme Court seeking to limit a trial court’s order requiring production of documents involving tires with GTS numbers different from the subject tire in litigation.

2005Because of this highly deferential standard, in a case such as that before us, where the evidence is in conflict, “ ‘an appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s custody decision unless there is no substantial competent evidence to support that decision.’ ” Id. (quoting Adair v. Adair, 720 So.2d 316, 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)).

2004In Coastal Development, 788 So.2d at 205 , the Florida Supreme Court held that "the small-scale development amendment decisions made pursuant to section 163.3187(1)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), are decisions which are legislative in nature and subject to the `fairly debatable' standard of review." The court further defined "fairly debatable standard of review" as a highly deferential standard requiring approval of a planning action if reasonable persons could differ as to its propriety.

2001In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), the United States Supreme Court held that `[i]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.' This Court expressly adopted the fairly debatable principle in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480 , 3 So.2d 364 (1941)." [c.o.] 627 So.2d at 472.

2001In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), the United States Supreme Court held that `[i]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.' This Court expressly adopted the fairly debatable principle in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480 , 3 So.2d 364 (1941)." [c.o.] 627 So.2d at 472.

2001More troublesome, but not vulnerable to reversal under the highly deferential standard of Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980), is the lower court's ruling that wife had no entitlement to alimony because the standard of living provided by husband during the marriage was so low.