highly deferential standard in Virginia

2018“This highly deferential standard of review ‘necessarily implies that, for some -4- decisions, conscientious jurists could reach different conclusions based on exactly the same facts—yet still remain entirely reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Hamad v. Hamad, 61 Va. App. 593, 607 , 739 S.E.2d 232, 239 (2013)).

2018“This highly deferential standard of review ‘necessarily implies that, for some -4- decisions, conscientious jurists could reach different conclusions based on exactly the same facts—yet still remain entirely reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Hamad v. Hamad, 61 Va. App. 593, 607 , 739 S.E.2d 232, 239 (2013)).

2024Ctr., LLC v. Remley, 63 Va. App. 755, 764-65 (2014) (first quoting Brandau v. Brandau, 52 Va. App. 632, 641 (2008); then quoting Hamad v. Hamad, 61 Va. App. 593, 607 (2013); and then quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187 , 212-13 (2013)).

2018“This highly deferential standard of review ‘necessarily implies that, for some -4- decisions, conscientious jurists could reach different conclusions based on exactly the same facts—yet still remain entirely reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Hamad v. Hamad, 61 Va. App. 593, 607 , 739 S.E.2d 232, 239 (2013)).

2022Although we review the sufficiency of the evidence with a highly deferential standard, we must still examine whether any “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009) (emphasis added).

2016In doing so, this Court “does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 , 677 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)).

2017“Therefore, under this highly deferential standard of review on appeal, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”’” Ervin v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 495, 503 , 704 S.E.2d 135, 139 (2011) (quoting Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299 , 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005)). -3- B.

2017“Therefore, under this highly deferential standard of review on appeal, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”’” Ervin v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 495, 503 , 704 S.E.2d 135, 139 (2011) (quoting Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299 , 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005)). -3- B.

2016Under this highly deferential standard of review, we “presume the judgment of the trial court [is] correct, and will not set it aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 459, 465 , 749 S.E.2d 212, 215 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99 , 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002)).

2016Under this highly deferential standard of review, we “presume the judgment of the trial court [is] correct, and will not set it aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 459, 465 , 749 S.E.2d 212, 215 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99 , 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002)).

2016Under this highly deferential standard of review, we “presume the judgment of the trial court [is] correct, and will not set it aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 459, 465 , 749 S.E.2d 212, 215 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99 , 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002)).

2016Under this highly deferential standard of review, we “presume the judgment of the trial court [is] correct, and will not set it aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 459, 465 , 749 S.E.2d 212, 215 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99 , 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002)).

2016In doing so, this Court “does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 , 677 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)).

2016In doing so, this Court “does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 , 677 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)).

2025“This highly deferential standard of review, of course, does not ‘simply mean that a circuit court may do whatever pleases it.’” Id. (quoting Shebelskie v. Brown, 287 Va. 18 , 26 (2014)).

2025“This highly deferential standard of review, of course, does not ‘simply mean that a circuit court may do whatever pleases it.’” Id. (quoting Shebelskie v. Brown, 287 Va. 18 , 26 (2014)).

2017“Therefore, under this highly deferential standard of review on appeal, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”’” Ervin v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 495, 503 , 704 S.E.2d 135, 139 (2011) (quoting Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299 , 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005)). -3- B.

2017“Therefore, under this highly deferential standard of review on appeal, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”’” Ervin v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 495, 503 , 704 S.E.2d 135, 139 (2011) (quoting Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299 , 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005)). -3- B.

2026Attorney Fees In addition, husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding $30,000 in additional attorney fees to wife “as the circumstances and equities do not justify such award.” He argues, “The circumstances and equities do not justify award of $30,000 in fees to [wife].” “Circuit courts have broad statutory authority to award attorney fees in a domestic relations matter.” Yazdani v. Sazegar, 76 Va. App. 261 , 272 (2022); see also Code § 20-99. “[A]n award of attorney’s fees is a matter submitted to the trial court’s sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of d

2026Attorney Fees In addition, husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding $30,000 in additional attorney fees to wife “as the circumstances and equities do not justify such award.” He argues, “The circumstances and equities do not justify award of $30,000 in fees to [wife].” “Circuit courts have broad statutory authority to award attorney fees in a domestic relations matter.” Yazdani v. Sazegar, 76 Va. App. 261 , 272 (2022); see also Code § 20-99. “[A]n award of attorney’s fees is a matter submitted to the trial court’s sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of d

2026Attorney Fees In addition, husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding $30,000 in additional attorney fees to wife “as the circumstances and equities do not justify such award.” He argues, “The circumstances and equities do not justify award of $30,000 in fees to [wife].” “Circuit courts have broad statutory authority to award attorney fees in a domestic relations matter.” Yazdani v. Sazegar, 76 Va. App. 261 , 272 (2022); see also Code § 20-99. “[A]n award of attorney’s fees is a matter submitted to the trial court’s sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of d

2024See Durham v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ n.2 (Aug. 1, 2024) (recognizing that deciding a case on the merits rather than on waiver principles can provide “the best and narrowest ground[]” for resolution (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015))). -5- Applying this highly deferential standard, “[i]f there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Ba

2024See Durham v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ n.2 (Aug. 1, 2024) (recognizing that deciding a case on the merits rather than on waiver principles can provide “the best and narrowest ground[]” for resolution (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015))). -5- Applying this highly deferential standard, “[i]f there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Ba

2024See Durham v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ n.2 (Aug. 1, 2024) (recognizing that deciding a case on the merits rather than on waiver principles can provide “the best and narrowest ground[]” for resolution (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015))). -5- Applying this highly deferential standard, “[i]f there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Ba

2022“Circumstances of suspicion, no matter how grave or strong, are not proof of guilt sufficient to support a verdict of guilty.” Crisman v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 17, 21 (1955).

2021Rusty’s Welding Serv., Inc. v. Gibson, 29 Va. App. 119, 131 (1999) (en banc). -4- “The phrase arising ‘in the course of’ refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred.” Va. Emp.

2016This highly deferential standard of review, of course, does not “simply mean that a circuit court may do whatever pleases it.” It does mean that, for some decisions, “conscientious jurists could reach different conclusions based on exactly the same facts — yet still remain entirely reasonable.” The trial court “has a range of choice, and its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.” We apply this “bell-shaped curve of reasonability” based on our “venerable belief that the judge closest to the contest is the judge best abl

2016This highly deferential standard of review, of course, does not “simply mean that a circuit court may do whatever pleases it.” It does mean that, for some decisions, “conscientious jurists could reach different conclusions based on exactly the same facts — yet still remain entirely reasonable.” The trial court “has a range of choice, and its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.” We apply this “bell-shaped curve of reasonability” based on our “venerable belief that the judge closest to the contest is the judge best abl

2015"The Commission is charged with the responsibility of finding the facts and making a judgment," Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm'n, 277 Va. 509, 516 , 675 S.E.2d 458, 461 (2009) (quoting Northern Virginia Elec.

2015"The Commission is charged with the responsibility of finding the facts and making a judgment," Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm'n, 277 Va. 509, 516 , 675 S.E.2d 458, 461 (2009) (quoting Northern Virginia Elec.

2014This deferential standard also applies “to any reasonable and justified inferences the fact-finder may have drawn from the facts proved.” Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 , 701 S.E.2d 61, 63-64 (2010) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 295 , 163 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1968)).

2014This deferential standard also applies “to any reasonable and justified inferences the fact-finder may have drawn from the facts proved.” Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 , 701 S.E.2d 61, 63-64 (2010) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 295 , 163 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1968)).

2014This deferential standard also applies “to any reasonable and justified inferences the fact-finder may have drawn from the facts proved.” Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 , 701 S.E.2d 61, 63-64 (2010) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 295 , 163 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1968)).

2014This deferential standard also applies “to any reasonable and justified inferences the fact-finder may have drawn from the facts proved.” Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 , 701 S.E.2d 61, 63-64 (2010) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 295 , 163 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1968)).

2014Analysis At the outset, we note that the issue in this appeal is not one that stands in a neutral posture; it is a sufficiency of the evidence issue, subject to a highly deferential standard of review.2 On appeal, an appellate court is required to “‘consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 578 , 701 S.E.2d 431, 435 (2010) (quoting Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475 , 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000)).

2014Analysis At the outset, we note that the issue in this appeal is not one that stands in a neutral posture; it is a sufficiency of the evidence issue, subject to a highly deferential standard of review.2 On appeal, an appellate court is required to “‘consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 578 , 701 S.E.2d 431, 435 (2010) (quoting Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475 , 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000)).

2014Analysis At the outset, we note that the issue in this appeal is not one that stands in a neutral posture; it is a sufficiency of the evidence issue, subject to a highly deferential standard of review.2 On appeal, an appellate court is required to “‘consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 578 , 701 S.E.2d 431, 435 (2010) (quoting Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475 , 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000)).

2014Analysis At the outset, we note that the issue in this appeal is not one that stands in a neutral posture; it is a sufficiency of the evidence issue, subject to a highly deferential standard of review.2 On appeal, an appellate court is required to “‘consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 578 , 701 S.E.2d 431, 435 (2010) (quoting Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475 , 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000)).

2011“Practically speaking, this means [the trial court’s] decision cannot be disturbed on appeal unless no ‘rational trier of fact’ could have come to the conclusion it did.” Seaton v. Commonwealth, 42 Va.App. 739, 746 , 595 S.E.2d 9, 12-13 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 ).

2011“Practically speaking, this means [the trial court’s] decision cannot be disturbed on appeal unless no ‘rational trier of fact’ could have come to the conclusion it did.” Seaton v. Commonwealth, 42 Va.App. 739, 746 , 595 S.E.2d 9, 12-13 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing Kelly, 41 Va.App. at 257 , 584 S.E.2d at 447 ).

2011Therefore, under this highly deferential standard of review on appeal, “[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’ ” Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299 , 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005) (quoting Code § 8.01-680); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (stating that appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence “will be confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear”).

2011Therefore, under this highly deferential standard of review on appeal, “[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and will be reversed only upon a showing that it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’ ” Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299 , 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005) (quoting Code § 8.01-680); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (stating that appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence “will be confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear”).