70 California opinions name it 5 courts 1984–2026 23 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Turnagegreen2 sentences2024(Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 195 .) Under this highly deferential standard, “equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).) To raise a successful rational basis challenge, a party must negate “ ‘ “every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 .) “It is both the prerogative and the duty of the Legislature to define degree 2024(Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 195 .) Under this highly deferential standard, “equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).) To raise a successful rational basis challenge, a party must negate “ ‘ “every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 .) “It is both the prerogative and the duty of the Legislature to define degree | 5 | 6 |
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasegreen2 sentences2022The arbitrator’s decision should be the end, not the beginning, of the dispute.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Moncharsh).) As such, “arbitration awards are subject to an extremely narrow judicial review. [Courts] cannot review the merits of the controversy, the validity of the 1 Starr and Hunt filed a motion to augment the record with certain documents concerning Mayhew’s request for clarification or, in the alternative, for judicial notice of those documents. 2022The arbitrator’s decision should be the end, not the beginning, of the dispute.” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 10 (Moncharsh).) As such, “arbitration awards are subject to an extremely narrow judicial review. [Courts] cannot review the merits of the controversy, the validity of the 1 Starr and Hunt filed a motion to augment the record with certain documents concerning Mayhew’s request for clarification or, in the alternative, for judicial notice of those documents. | 2 | 5 |
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp.green2 sentences2014(Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9 (Advanced Micro Devices).) We apply a highly deferential standard of review to the award itself, insofar as our inquiry encompasses the arbitrators’ resolution of questions of law or fact. 2014(Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 581 , 885 P.2d 994 ] (Advanced Micro Devices).) We apply a highly deferential standard of review to the award itself, insofar as our inquiry encompasses the arbitrator’s resolution of questions of law or fact. | 2 | 3 |
Carrancho v. California Air Resources Boardgreen2 sentences2026This is a highly deferential test.” (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1265 (Carrancho).) “Our ‘inquiry is whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of the legislative body, and if the reasonableness of the decision is fairly debatable, the legislative determination will not be disturbed.’ ” (Weinstein v. County of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 944, 965 (Weinstein).) In general, “ ‘ “[a] public entity’s ‘ “award of a contract, and all of the acts leading up to the award, are legislative in character.” ’ ” ’ ” (Michael Leslie Producti 2025This is a highly deferential test.” (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1265 (Carrancho).) “Our ‘inquiry is whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of the legislative body, and if the reasonableness of the decision is fairly debatable, the legislative determination will not be disturbed.’ ” (Weinstein v. County of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 944, 965 (Weinstein).) In general, “ ‘ “[a] public entity’s ‘ “award of a contract, and all of the acts leading up to the award, are legislative in character.” ’ ” ’ ” (Michael Leslie Producti | 2 | 2 |
Weinstein v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2026This is a highly deferential test.” (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1265 (Carrancho).) “Our ‘inquiry is whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of the legislative body, and if the reasonableness of the decision is fairly debatable, the legislative determination will not be disturbed.’ ” (Weinstein v. County of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 944, 965 (Weinstein).) In general, “ ‘ “[a] public entity’s ‘ “award of a contract, and all of the acts leading up to the award, are legislative in character.” ’ ” ’ ” (Michael Leslie Producti 2025This is a highly deferential test.” (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1265 (Carrancho).) “Our ‘inquiry is whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of the legislative body, and if the reasonableness of the decision is fairly debatable, the legislative determination will not be disturbed.’ ” (Weinstein v. County of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 944, 965 (Weinstein).) In general, “ ‘ “[a] public entity’s ‘ “award of a contract, and all of the acts leading up to the award, are legislative in character.” ’ ” ’ ” (Michael Leslie Producti | 2 | 2 |
People v. Contrerasgreen2 sentences2019It is immaterial for rational basis review 'whether or not' any such speculation has 'a foundation in the record.' " ( Id. at pp. 74-75, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 , 281 P.3d 464 .) To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must " 'negative every conceivable basis' " that might support the disputed statutory disparity. ( Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312 , 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 ; see Turnage, at p. 75, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 , 281 P.3d 464 .) If a plausible *196 basis exists for the disparity, "[e]qual protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the w 2019It is immaterial for rational basis review 'whether or not' any such speculation has 'a foundation in the record.' " ( Id. at pp. 74-75, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 , 281 P.3d 464 .) To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must " 'negative every conceivable basis' " that might support the disputed statutory disparity. ( Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312 , 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 ; see Turnage, at p. 75, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 , 281 P.3d 464 .) If a plausible *196 basis exists for the disparity, "[e]qual protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the w | 2 | 2 |
Big Oak Flat-Groveland Unified Sch. Dist. v. S.C.green2 sentences2019It is immaterial for rational basis review 'whether or not' any such speculation has 'a foundation in the record.' " ( Id. at pp. 74-75, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 , 281 P.3d 464 .) To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must " 'negative every conceivable basis' " that might support the disputed statutory disparity. ( Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312 , 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 ; see Turnage, at p. 75, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 , 281 P.3d 464 .) If a plausible *196 basis exists for the disparity, "[e]qual protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the w 2019It is immaterial for rational basis review 'whether or not' any such speculation has 'a foundation in the record.' " ( Id. at pp. 74-75, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 , 281 P.3d 464 .) To mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party must " 'negative every conceivable basis' " that might support the disputed statutory disparity. ( Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312 , 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637 , 125 L.Ed.2d 257 ; see Turnage, at p. 75, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 489 , 281 P.3d 464 .) If a plausible *196 basis exists for the disparity, "[e]qual protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the w | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Bellgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hillgreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015“An appellate tribunal is 1 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 4 neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978 .) In attempting to overcome this highly deferential standard of review, appellant contends there were two mitigating factors attendant to the robbery that the trial court overlooked, namely that appellant played a minor role in the crime, and the victim was not harmed. 2001“An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 928 P.2d 1171 ].) In summary, we conclude that the probationary terms requiring the $200 payment and attendance at domestic violence counseling were mandatory. | 1 | 3 |
| Ojai Unified School District v. Bion Jacksongreen | 1 | 2 |
JG v. Douglas County School Districtgreen2 sentences2019DISCUSSION Judicial review in IDEA cases "differs substantially from judicial review of other agency actions, in which courts are generally confined to the administrative record and are held to a highly deferential standard of review." ( Jackson, supra, 4 F.3d at p. 1471 ; JG v. Douglas County School Dist . (9th Cir. 2008) 552 F.3d 786 , 793 ["In IDEA cases, unlike other cases reviewing administrative action, [courts] do not employ a highly deferential standard of review"] ( JG ).) Questions of law are reviewed de novo, as are mixed questions of law and fact. ( *582 N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary 2019DISCUSSION Judicial review in IDEA cases "differs substantially from judicial review of other agency actions, in which courts are generally confined to the administrative record and are held to a highly deferential standard of review." ( Jackson, supra, 4 F.3d at p. 1471 ; JG v. Douglas County School Dist . (9th Cir. 2008) 552 F.3d 786 , 793 ["In IDEA cases, unlike other cases reviewing administrative action, [courts] do not employ a highly deferential standard of review"] ( JG ).) Questions of law are reviewed de novo, as are mixed questions of law and fact. ( *582 N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary | 1 | 2 |
Anna Hood Lynn Hood Richard Hood v. Encinitas Union School District and Does 1-10green2 sentences2019(N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary School Dist. (9th Cir. 2008) 541 F.3d 1202, 1207 ; Hood v. Encinitas Union School Dist. (9th Cir. 2007) 486 F.3d 1099, 1104, fn. 4 (Hood).) “Nevertheless, complete de novo review ‘is inappropriate’” and courts give “‘due weight’ to state administrative proceedings.” (JG, supra, 552 F.3d at p. 793 .) We may accord deference to an ALJ’s factual findings if those findings are thorough and careful, but “‘the extent of deference to be given is within our discretion.’” (M.C. ex rel. 2019DISCUSSION Judicial review in IDEA cases "differs substantially from judicial review of other agency actions, in which courts are generally confined to the administrative record and are held to a highly deferential standard of review." ( Jackson, supra, 4 F.3d at p. 1471 ; JG v. Douglas County School Dist . (9th Cir. 2008) 552 F.3d 786 , 793 ["In IDEA cases, unlike other cases reviewing administrative action, [courts] do not employ a highly deferential standard of review"] ( JG ).) Questions of law are reviewed de novo, as are mixed questions of law and fact. ( *582 N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary | 1 | 2 |
| Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Rivcom Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen | 1 | 2 |
| California High-Speed Rail Authority v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Welchgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchangegreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Milesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Orange County Social Services Agency v. Remberto C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fajota v. Fajotagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Burgessgreen | 1 | 1 |
| California Faculty Ass'n. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greenspan v. LADT, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kennedygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. Offenberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cooper v. Lavely & Singer Professional Corp.
green
2 sentences2024To the extent the trial court made findings of fact in confirming the award, we 7 affirm the findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] To the extent the trial court resolved questions of law on undisputed facts, we review the trial court’s rulings de novo.” ( Cooper, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11–12.) “We apply a highly deferential standard of review to the award itself, insofar as our inquiry encompasses the arbitrator’s resolution of questions of law or fact. 2022(Cooper v. Lavely & Singer Professional Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, 11-12 .) But “[w]e apply a highly deferential standard of review to the [arbitrator’s] award itself . . . .” (Id. at p. 12.) An “expectation of finality strongly informs the parties’ choice of an arbitral forum over a judicial one. | 6 | 2018–2024 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2016Analysis Applying a highly deferential standard of scrutiny and indulging a strong presumption that Resnick's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, as we must (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689 ), we reject Moreno's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because Resnick's decision not to renew in limine Moreno's motion to suppress the evidence of Tostado's pretrial identification of her was a reasonable tactical decision this court will not second-guess. 2016Applying a highly deferential standard of scrutiny and indulging in a strong presumption that the conduct of Dugan's and Morgan's trial counsel fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, as we must (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689 ), we reject Dugan's and Morgan's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because their trial counsels' decisions not to hire a medical expert and challenge the victim's cause of death were reasonable tactical decisions that we will not second guess. | 5 | 2014–2016 |
People v. Edwards
green
2 sentences2024(Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 195 .) Under this highly deferential standard, “equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).) To raise a successful rational basis challenge, a party must negate “ ‘ “every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 .) “It is both the prerogative and the duty of the Legislature to define degree 2022(People v. Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 195 .) Under this highly deferential standard, 82 “equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).) To raise a successful rational basis challenge, a party must negate “‘“every conceivable basis”’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 .) “It is both the prerogative and the duty of the Legislature to defi | 4 | 2021–2024 |
Johnson v. Department of Justice
green
2 sentences2024(Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 195 .) Under this highly deferential standard, “equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).) To raise a successful rational basis challenge, a party must negate “ ‘ “every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 .) “It is both the prerogative and the duty of the Legislature to define degree 2022(People v. Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 195 .) Under this highly deferential standard, 82 “equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no ‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 (Turnage).) To raise a successful rational basis challenge, a party must negate “‘“every conceivable basis”’ that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 .) “It is both the prerogative and the duty of the Legislature to defi | 4 | 2021–2024 |
People v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2016(See Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 520 .) Counsel is not ineffective for failing to bring a motion where such action would be futile. 2016(See People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 520 .) Likewise, we find Westly's claim of ineffective representation no more persuasive. | 4 | 2014–2016 |
Harris v. Civil Service Commission
green
2 sentences2015It contended that these actions could only be overturned if Great Oaks demonstrated that they were "so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to indicate that [the District] abused its discretion as a matter of law." It asserted that the matter was governed by the principles applicable to "judicial review of a legislative or quasi-legislative action," which is to be conducted "under ordinary mandamus, and ... limite[d to] an examination of the proceeding to determine whether the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether the agency has fai 2015It contended that these actions could only be overturned if Great Oaks demonstrated that they were "so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to indicate that [the District] abused its discretion as a matter of law." It asserted that the matter was governed by the principles applicable to "judicial review of a legislative or quasi-legislative action," which is to be conducted "under ordinary mandamus, and ... limite[d to] an examination of the proceeding to determine whether the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether the agency has fai | 4 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Green
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 .) “‘Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301 , 1328–1329.) This is a highly deferential standard of review, “‘discretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances 4 being considered.’” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165 , 182– 2024(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 .) “‘Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301 , 1328–1329.) This is a highly deferential standard of review, “‘discretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165 , 182–18 | 3 | 2023–2025 |
People v. Kipp
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 .) “‘Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301 , 1328–1329.) This is a highly deferential standard of review, “‘discretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances 4 being considered.’” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165 , 182– 2024(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 .) “‘Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301 , 1328–1329.) This is a highly deferential standard of review, “‘discretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165 , 182–18 | 3 | 2023–2025 |
People v. Foster
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 .) “‘Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301 , 1328–1329.) This is a highly deferential standard of review, “‘discretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances 4 being considered.’” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165 , 182– 2024(People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 .) “‘Under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal . . . is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301 , 1328–1329.) This is a highly deferential standard of review, “‘discretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’” (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165 , 182–18 | 3 | 2023–2025 |
IT Corp. v. County of Imperial
green
2 sentences2026(AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701 .) “This question [of 19 statutory interpretation] is generally subject to de novo review on appeal ..., a question of law for the court.” (Carrancho, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 .) C Preliminary Injunction “In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (i) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and (ii) the balance of harm presented, i.e., the comparative c 2025(AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701 .) “This question [of 19 statutory interpretation] is generally subject to de novo review on appeal ..., a question of law for the court.” (Carrancho, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 .) C Preliminary Injunction “In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (i) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and (ii) the balance of harm presented, i.e., the comparative c | 2 | 2025–2026 |
Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2026(AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701 .) “This question [of 19 statutory interpretation] is generally subject to de novo review on appeal ..., a question of law for the court.” (Carrancho, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 .) C Preliminary Injunction “In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (i) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and (ii) the balance of harm presented, i.e., the comparative c 2025(AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701 .) “This question [of 19 statutory interpretation] is generally subject to de novo review on appeal ..., a question of law for the court.” (Carrancho, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 .) C Preliminary Injunction “In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (i) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and (ii) the balance of harm presented, i.e., the comparative c | 2 | 2025–2026 |
Aids Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Department of Public Health
green
2 sentences2026(AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701 .) “This question [of 19 statutory interpretation] is generally subject to de novo review on appeal ..., a question of law for the court.” (Carrancho, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 .) C Preliminary Injunction “In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (i) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and (ii) the balance of harm presented, i.e., the comparative c 2025(AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701 .) “This question [of 19 statutory interpretation] is generally subject to de novo review on appeal ..., a question of law for the court.” (Carrancho, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266 .) C Preliminary Injunction “In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (i) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will ultimately prevail on the merits of his claim, and (ii) the balance of harm presented, i.e., the comparative c | 2 | 2025–2026 |
Michael Leslie Productions, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2026This is a highly deferential test.” (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1265 (Carrancho).) “Our ‘inquiry is whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of the legislative body, and if the reasonableness of the decision is fairly debatable, the legislative determination will not be disturbed.’ ” (Weinstein v. County of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 944, 965 (Weinstein).) In general, “ ‘ “[a] public entity’s ‘ “award of a contract, and all of the acts leading up to the award, are legislative in character.” ’ ” ’ ” (Michael Leslie Producti 2025This is a highly deferential test.” (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1265 (Carrancho).) “Our ‘inquiry is whether the record shows a reasonable basis for the action of the legislative body, and if the reasonableness of the decision is fairly debatable, the legislative determination will not be disturbed.’ ” (Weinstein v. County of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 944, 965 (Weinstein).) In general, “ ‘ “[a] public entity’s ‘ “award of a contract, and all of the acts leading up to the award, are legislative in character.” ’ ” ’ ” (Michael Leslie Producti | 2 | 2025–2026 |
People v. Carmony
green
2 sentences2024Under the highly deferential standard of review governing Romero motions, I agree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that we cannot say the decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 .) I therefore join my colleagues in voting to deny review. 2020(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376 .) The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to show it was an irrational or arbitrary decision. | 2 | 2020–2024 |
Friends of Eel River v. Sonoma County Water Agency
green
2 sentences2021(Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 482, 486.) The appellate court did not treat this as a CEQA “informational” issue; rather, it applied the standard of judicial review applicable in ordinary mandamus to review an agency’s consistency determination and concluded, “in light of the highly deferential standard of review,” the trial court had erred in ruling the Climate Action Plan was “inconsistent” with County’s general plan.28 (Id. at p. 501.) 28 At oral argument, SSE cited to Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 903 (Pocket Protectors) and Friends of the Ee 2021(Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 482, 486.) The appellate court did not treat this as a CEQA “informational” issue; rather, it applied the standard of judicial review applicable in ordinary mandamus to review an agency’s consistency determination and concluded, “in light of the highly deferential standard of review,” the trial court had erred in ruling the Climate Action Plan was “inconsistent” with County’s general plan.28 (Id. at p. 501.) 28 At oral argument, SSE cited to Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 903 (Pocket Protectors) and Friends of the Ee | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Flippin v. Los Angeles City Board of Civil Service Commisioners
green
2 sentences2021“Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. [Citation.]” (Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 404 .) “Judicial review of an agency’s assessment of a penalty is limited, and the agency’s determination will not be disturbed in mandamus proceedings unless there is an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion by the agency. [Citation.]” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 .) 1 I 2021“Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. [Citation.]” (Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 404 .) “Judicial review of an agency’s assessment of a penalty is limited, and the agency’s determination will not be disturbed in mandamus proceedings unless there is an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion by the agency. [Citation.]” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 .) 1 I | 2 | 2021–2021 |
The Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento
green
2 sentences2021(Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 482, 486.) The appellate court did not treat this as a CEQA “informational” issue; rather, it applied the standard of judicial review applicable in ordinary mandamus to review an agency’s consistency determination and concluded, “in light of the highly deferential standard of review,” the trial court had erred in ruling the Climate Action Plan was “inconsistent” with County’s general plan.28 (Id. at p. 501.) 28 At oral argument, SSE cited to Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 903 (Pocket Protectors) and Friends of the Ee 2021(Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 482, 486.) The appellate court did not treat this as a CEQA “informational” issue; rather, it applied the standard of judicial review applicable in ordinary mandamus to review an agency’s consistency determination and concluded, “in light of the highly deferential standard of review,” the trial court had erred in ruling the Climate Action Plan was “inconsistent” with County’s general plan.28 (Id. at p. 501.) 28 At oral argument, SSE cited to Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 903 (Pocket Protectors) and Friends of the Ee | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Barber v. State Personnel Board
green
2 sentences2021“Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. [Citation.]” (Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 404 .) “Judicial review of an agency’s assessment of a penalty is limited, and the agency’s determination will not be disturbed in mandamus proceedings unless there is an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion by the agency. [Citation.]” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 .) 1 I 2021“Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. [Citation.]” (Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 404 .) “Judicial review of an agency’s assessment of a penalty is limited, and the agency’s determination will not be disturbed in mandamus proceedings unless there is an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion by the agency. [Citation.]” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 .) 1 I | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Landau v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2021“Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. [Citation.]” (Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 404 .) “Judicial review of an agency’s assessment of a penalty is limited, and the agency’s determination will not be disturbed in mandamus proceedings unless there is an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion by the agency. [Citation.]” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 .) 1 I 2021“Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. [Citation.]” (Barber v. State Personnel Board (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 404 .) “Judicial review of an agency’s assessment of a penalty is limited, and the agency’s determination will not be disturbed in mandamus proceedings unless there is an arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive exercise of discretion by the agency. [Citation.]” (Flippin v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 .) 1 I | 2 | 2021–2021 |
| Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doe green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Nb v. Hellgate Elementary School Dist. Ex Rel. Board of Directors
green
2 sentences2019(N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary School Dist. (9th Cir. 2008) 541 F.3d 1202, 1207 ; Hood v. Encinitas Union School Dist. (9th Cir. 2007) 486 F.3d 1099, 1104, fn. 4 (Hood).) “Nevertheless, complete de novo review ‘is inappropriate’” and courts give “‘due weight’ to state administrative proceedings.” (JG, supra, 552 F.3d at p. 793 .) We may accord deference to an ALJ’s factual findings if those findings are thorough and careful, but “‘the extent of deference to be given is within our discretion.’” (M.C. ex rel. 2019DISCUSSION Judicial review in IDEA cases "differs substantially from judicial review of other agency actions, in which courts are generally confined to the administrative record and are held to a highly deferential standard of review." ( Jackson, supra, 4 F.3d at p. 1471 ; JG v. Douglas County School Dist . (9th Cir. 2008) 552 F.3d 786 , 793 ["In IDEA cases, unlike other cases reviewing administrative action, [courts] do not employ a highly deferential standard of review"] ( JG ).) Questions of law are reviewed de novo, as are mixed questions of law and fact. ( *582 N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Johnson green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Clements v. County of Nassau green | 2 | 1995–2007 |
| Jones v. Citrus Motors Ontario, Inc. green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| Meister v. Regents of University of California green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| California Ass'n of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Hernandez v. City of Hanford green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Morales green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Watson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Goldsmith green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Nicolas green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| M.C. Ex Rel. M.N. v. Antelope Valley Union High School District green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Richey v. Autonation, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Carl Joseph Maggio, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Montenegro v. Diaz green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Cardinal Distributing Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.