highly deferential standard in Connecticut

2008“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defi

2008“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defi

2022On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred by failing to conclude that the arbitrator’s calcula- tion of damages constituted a manifest disregard of the law because the arbitrator ‘‘should have based [that calculation] on the written records [presented by the defendants] not [on] a verbal estimate of the plaintiffs.2 We disagree. ‘‘[T]he manifest disregard of the law ground for vacat- ing an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator’s extraordi- nary lack of fidelity to established legal principles.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted

2020Because whether a respondent has established a defense to a disciplinary order by clear and convincing evidence presents a question of fact for the trier, it follows that our review of a court’s finding that a respon- dent has failed to meet that high burden of persuasion is limited to whether that finding is clearly erroneous.11 See, e.g., Melillo v. New Haven, 249 Conn. 138, 150 , 732 A.2d 133 (1999) (reviewing under clearly erroneous standard court’s finding that appellant failed to meet burden of proof); Jazlowiecki v. Cyr, 4 Conn. App. 76, 77 , 492 A.2d 516 (1985) (same); Ruggiero v. East

2020Because whether a respondent has established a defense to a disciplinary order by clear and convincing evidence presents a question of fact for the trier, it follows that our review of a court’s finding that a respon- dent has failed to meet that high burden of persuasion is limited to whether that finding is clearly erroneous.11 See, e.g., Melillo v. New Haven, 249 Conn. 138, 150 , 732 A.2d 133 (1999) (reviewing under clearly erroneous standard court’s finding that appellant failed to meet burden of proof); Jazlowiecki v. Cyr, 4 Conn. App. 76, 77 , 492 A.2d 516 (1985) (same); Ruggiero v. East

2020Because whether a respondent has established a defense to a disciplinary order by clear and convincing evidence presents a question of fact for the trier, it follows that our review of a court’s finding that a respon- dent has failed to meet that high burden of persuasion is limited to whether that finding is clearly erroneous.11 See, e.g., Melillo v. New Haven, 249 Conn. 138, 150 , 732 A.2d 133 (1999) (reviewing under clearly erroneous standard court’s finding that appellant failed to meet burden of proof); Jazlowiecki v. Cyr, 4 Conn. App. 76, 77 , 492 A.2d 516 (1985) (same); Ruggiero v. East

2020Because whether a respondent has established a defense to a disciplinary order by clear and convincing evidence presents a question of fact for the trier, it follows that our review of a court’s finding that a respon- dent has failed to meet that high burden of persuasion is limited to whether that finding is clearly erroneous.11 See, e.g., Melillo v. New Haven, 249 Conn. 138, 150 , 732 A.2d 133 (1999) (reviewing under clearly erroneous standard court’s finding that appellant failed to meet burden of proof); Jazlowiecki v. Cyr, 4 Conn. App. 76, 77 , 492 A.2d 516 (1985) (same); Ruggiero v. East

2020Because whether a respondent has established a defense to a disciplinary order by clear and convincing evidence presents a question of fact for the trier, it follows that our review of a court’s finding that a respon- dent has failed to meet that high burden of persuasion is limited to whether that finding is clearly erroneous.11 See, e.g., Melillo v. New Haven, 249 Conn. 138, 150 , 732 A.2d 133 (1999) (reviewing under clearly erroneous standard court’s finding that appellant failed to meet burden of proof); Jazlowiecki v. Cyr, 4 Conn. App. 76, 77 , 492 A.2d 516 (1985) (same); Ruggiero v. East

2020Because whether a respondent has established a defense to a disciplinary order by clear and convincing evidence presents a question of fact for the trier, it follows that our review of a court’s finding that a respon- dent has failed to meet that high burden of persuasion is limited to whether that finding is clearly erroneous.11 See, e.g., Melillo v. New Haven, 249 Conn. 138, 150 , 732 A.2d 133 (1999) (reviewing under clearly erroneous standard court’s finding that appellant failed to meet burden of proof); Jazlowiecki v. Cyr, 4 Conn. App. 76, 77 , 492 A.2d 516 (1985) (same); Ruggiero v. East

2017Applying a highly deferential standard of review, the majority concluded that the facts of the case "demonstrate[d] sufficient disregard for the court's order and deliberate disregard of the authority of the court to warrant the trial court's imposition of a sanction for noncompliance." Id., at 40 , 501 A.2d 747 .

2016In the present case, to prevail on their equal protection claim, the plaintiffs must overcome a highly deferential standard of review. ‘‘If the statute does not [affect] either a fundamental right or a suspect class, its classification need only be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2016This rational basis review test ‘‘is satisfied [as] long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification . . . the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based ratio- nally may have been considered to be true by the gov- ernment decisionmaker . . . and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 876 . ‘‘It is undisputed that the constitutionality of the taxa- tion scheme at issue . . . must be analyzed under rat

2015I begin by setting forth the highly deferential standard of review, which the majority mentions only briefly in its opinion. ‘‘The trial court is vested with wide discre- tion in determining the competency of jurors to serve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Popeleski, 291 Conn. 769 , 772–73, 970 A.2d 108 (2009). ‘‘[A] ruling of the trial judge in the course of a voir dire examination is held to be reversible error only [if] the judge has clearly abused his discretion or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zie

2015I begin by setting forth the highly deferential standard of review, which the majority mentions only briefly in its opinion. ‘‘The trial court is vested with wide discre- tion in determining the competency of jurors to serve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Popeleski, 291 Conn. 769 , 772–73, 970 A.2d 108 (2009). ‘‘[A] ruling of the trial judge in the course of a voir dire examination is held to be reversible error only [if] the judge has clearly abused his discretion or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zie

2015I begin by setting forth the highly deferential standard of review, which the majority mentions only briefly in its opinion. ‘‘The trial court is vested with wide discre- tion in determining the competency of jurors to serve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Popeleski, 291 Conn. 769 , 772–73, 970 A.2d 108 (2009). ‘‘[A] ruling of the trial judge in the course of a voir dire examination is held to be reversible error only [if] the judge has clearly abused his discretion or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zie

2015I begin by setting forth the highly deferential standard of review, which the majority mentions only briefly in its opinion. ‘‘The trial court is vested with wide discre- tion in determining the competency of jurors to serve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Popeleski, 291 Conn. 769 , 772–73, 970 A.2d 108 (2009). ‘‘[A] ruling of the trial judge in the course of a voir dire examination is held to be reversible error only [if] the judge has clearly abused his discretion or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zie

2015I begin by setting forth the highly deferential standard of review, which the majority mentions only briefly in its opinion. ‘‘The trial court is vested with wide discre- tion in determining the competency of jurors to serve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Popeleski, 291 Conn. 769 , 772–73, 970 A.2d 108 (2009). ‘‘[A] ruling of the trial judge in the course of a voir dire examination is held to be reversible error only [if] the judge has clearly abused his discretion or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zie

2015I begin by setting forth the highly deferential standard of review, which the majority mentions only briefly in its opinion. ‘‘The trial court is vested with wide discre- tion in determining the competency of jurors to serve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Popeleski, 291 Conn. 769 , 772–73, 970 A.2d 108 (2009). ‘‘[A] ruling of the trial judge in the course of a voir dire examination is held to be reversible error only [if] the judge has clearly abused his discretion or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zie

2015I begin by setting forth the highly deferential standard of review, which the majority mentions only briefly in its opinion. ‘‘The trial court is vested with wide discre- tion in determining the competency of jurors to serve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Popeleski, 291 Conn. 769 , 772–73, 970 A.2d 108 (2009). ‘‘[A] ruling of the trial judge in the course of a voir dire examination is held to be reversible error only [if] the judge has clearly abused his discretion or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zie

2015I begin by setting forth the highly deferential standard of review, which the majority mentions only briefly in its opinion. ‘‘The trial court is vested with wide discre- tion in determining the competency of jurors to serve.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Popeleski, 291 Conn. 769 , 772–73, 970 A.2d 108 (2009). ‘‘[A] ruling of the trial judge in the course of a voir dire examination is held to be reversible error only [if] the judge has clearly abused his discretion or harmful prejudice appears to have resulted.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Zie

2013“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the [arbitrator] manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit,

2013“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the [arbitrator] manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit,

2013“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the [arbitrator] manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit,

2013“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the [arbitrator] manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit,

2011"Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defi

2011"Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defi

2009The jury reasonably could have found that a loss of vision in both his eyes, albeit temporarily, constituted a loss or serious impairment of the function of any bodily organ [Section] 53a-3(4) does not require that the impairment of an organ be permanent." [13] Id., at 689, 915 A.2d 926 ( Rogers, J., dissenting).

2006Despite this highly deferential standard, however, “[t]he conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found [will not] stand [if] they result lfom an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 Conn. 219, 227 , 875 A.2d 485 (2005).

2006Despite this highly deferential standard, however, "[t]he conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found [will not] stand [if] they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 274 *624 Conn. 219, 227, 875 A.2d 485 (2005).

2006The highly deferential standard we afford to a trial court’s decision to dismiss a juror for bias was made evident by our Supreme Court in Rokus v. Bridgeport, 191 Conn. 62, 71 , 463 A.2d 252 (1983).

2006The highly deferential standard we afford to a trial court’s decision to dismiss a juror for bias was made evident by our Supreme Court in Rokus v. Bridgeport, 191 Conn. 62, 71 , 463 A.2d 252 (1983).

2005It is well settled that “[w]e will overturn ... a finding of fact only if it is clearly erroneous in light of the evidence in the whole record.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 705 , 741 A.2d 873 (1999).

1999Adams v. New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 555 , 41 A.2d 111 [1945]; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 596 , 131 A. 432 [1925].” (Citation omitted.) Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 441-42 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977).

1999Adams v. New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 555 , 41 A.2d 111 [1945]; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 596 , 131 A. 432 [1925].” (Citation omitted.) Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 441-42 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977).

1999Adams v. New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 555 , 41 A.2d 111 [1945]; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 596 , 131 A. 432 [1925].” (Citation omitted.) Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 441-42 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977).

1999Adams v. New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 555 , 41 A.2d 111 [1945]; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 596 , 131 A. 432 [1925].” (Citation omitted.) Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 441-42 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977).

1999Adams v. New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 555 , 41 A.2d 111 [1945]; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 596 , 131 A. 432 [1925].” (Citation omitted.) Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 441-42 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977).

1999Adams v. New Haven, 131 Conn. 552, 555 , 41 A.2d 111 [1945]; Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 596 , 131 A. 432 [1925].” (Citation omitted.) Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 441-42 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977).