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11 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Beauvaisgreen1 sentence2025See People v. Beauvais, 2017 CO 34, ¶ 31 (“As with any other finding of fact, a highly deferential standard of review precludes an appellate court from substituting its reading of a cold record for the trial court’s in- the-moment and better-informed determination.”). ¶ 42 We recognize that the district court didn’t articulate the proper standard in determining whether a mistrial was appropriate. | 1 | 1 |
Gebhardt v. Gebhardtgreen2 sentences2017Cf., e.g., Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 198 Colo. 28 , 595 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1979) (“It is axiomatic that an appellate court cannot substitute itself as a finder of fact.... ”). ¶32 In Batson step-three rulings, the determination that trial courts must make is whether the objecting party proved by a preponderance of the evidence that discriminatory animus drove the striking party’s use of peremptory challenges. 2017Cf., e.g., Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 595 P.2d 1048, 1050 (“It is axiomatic that an appellate court cannot substitute itself as a finder of fact . . . .”). ¶32 In Batson step-three rulings, the determination that trial courts must make is whether the objecting party proved by a preponderance of the evidence that discriminatory animus drove the striking party’s use of peremptory challenges. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2017O'Shaughnessy v. People, 2012 CO 9, ¶ 1 , 269 P.3d 1233, 1234 ; People v. Robinson, 187 P.3d 1166, 1174 (Colo. App. 2008). 16 ¶31 The reasoning underlying these cases is largely driven by the highly deferential standard of review that appellate courts apply in evaluating step-three determinations. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Unocal Corp.green1 sentence2014Under this highly deferential standard, "so long as the trial court rigorously analyzes the evidence, it retains discretion to find to its satisfaction whether the evidence supports each C.R.C.P. 28 requirement." Jackson v. Unocal Corp., 262 P.3d 874, 884 (Colo.2011). | 1 | 1 |
Edgar v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Id. ¶ 20 Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that "[a] venireperson's silence may constitute an unequivocal assurance of impartiality sufficient for the purpose of rehabilitation." State v. Garrison, 276 S.W.3d 372 , 377 (Mo.Ct.App.2009) ; see also Edgar v. State, 145 S.W.3d 458 (Mo.Ct.App.2004) ; State v. Clark, 55 S.W.3d 398 (Mo.Ct.App.2001) ; State v. Bebermeyer, 743 S.W.2d 516 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Bainbridge v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RSgreen1 sentence2011Comm'rs, 53 P.3d 646, 649 (Colo.App. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Carrillo v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2007See Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 485-86 (Colo.1999) (emphasizing that the abuse of discretion standard is a "very high standard of review"). 2007See Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 485-86 (Colo.1999) (emphasizing that the abuse of discretion standard is a "very high standard of review"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited
green
2 sentences2010Id. 2010Id. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Day v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2025Id. ¶ 118 To be sure, abuse of discretion is a highly deferential standard. 2025Id. (“A trial court’s ruling on jury instructions is an 56 abuse of discretion only when the ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” (quoting Day, 255 P.3d at 1067 )). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
O'Shaughnessy v. People
green
2 sentences2017O'Shaughnessy v. People, 2012 CO 9, ¶ 1 , 269 P.3d 1233, 1234 ; People v. Robinson, 187 P.3d 1166, 1174 (Colo. App. 2008). 16 ¶31 The reasoning underlying these cases is largely driven by the highly deferential standard of review that appellate courts apply in evaluating step-three determinations. 2017O'Shaughnessy v. People, 2012 CO 9, ¶ 1 , 269 P.3d 1233, 1234 ; People v. Robinson, 187 P.3d 1166, 1174 (Colo. App. 2008). 16 ¶31 The reasoning underlying these cases is largely driven by the highly deferential standard of review that appellate courts apply in evaluating step-three determinations. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Clark
green
1 sentence2013Id. ¶ 20 Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that "[a] venireperson's silence may constitute an unequivocal assurance of impartiality sufficient for the purpose of rehabilitation." State v. Garrison, 276 S.W.3d 372 , 377 (Mo.Ct.App.2009) ; see also Edgar v. State, 145 S.W.3d 458 (Mo.Ct.App.2004) ; State v. Clark, 55 S.W.3d 398 (Mo.Ct.App.2001) ; State v. Bebermeyer, 743 S.W.2d 516 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jacobs v. Jacobs
green
1 sentence2013Id. ¶ 20 Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that "[a] venireperson's silence may constitute an unequivocal assurance of impartiality sufficient for the purpose of rehabilitation." State v. Garrison, 276 S.W.3d 372 , 377 (Mo.Ct.App.2009) ; see also Edgar v. State, 145 S.W.3d 458 (Mo.Ct.App.2004) ; State v. Clark, 55 S.W.3d 398 (Mo.Ct.App.2001) ; State v. Bebermeyer, 743 S.W.2d 516 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Roberto Martinez-Martinez
green
1 sentence2013Id. ¶ 20 Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that "[a] venireperson's silence may constitute an unequivocal assurance of impartiality sufficient for the purpose of rehabilitation." State v. Garrison, 276 S.W.3d 372 , 377 (Mo.Ct.App.2009) ; see also Edgar v. State, 145 S.W.3d 458 (Mo.Ct.App.2004) ; State v. Clark, 55 S.W.3d 398 (Mo.Ct.App.2001) ; State v. Bebermeyer, 743 S.W.2d 516 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Garrison
green
1 sentence2013Id. ¶ 20 Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that "[a] venireperson's silence may constitute an unequivocal assurance of impartiality sufficient for the purpose of rehabilitation." State v. Garrison, 276 S.W.3d 372 , 377 (Mo.Ct.App.2009) ; see also Edgar v. State, 145 S.W.3d 458 (Mo.Ct.App.2004) ; State v. Clark, 55 S.W.3d 398 (Mo.Ct.App.2001) ; State v. Bebermeyer, 743 S.W.2d 516 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co.
green
1 sentence2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.