highly deferential standard in Utah

2025E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 15 (“We review determinations of fact with a highly deferential standard, overturning the lower court only when 11 STATE v. HUNT Opinion of the Court clearly erroneous.” (cleaned up)); Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶¶ 44, 49 (explaining that law-like mixed questions are “reviewed de novo” and fact-like mixed questions are reviewed deferentially and overturned only when they are “clearly erroneous”); Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 26 , 299 P.3d 1079 (“The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the pa

2025E.R., 2021 UT 36, ¶ 15 (“We review determinations of fact with a highly deferential standard, overturning the lower court only when 11 STATE v. HUNT Opinion of the Court clearly erroneous.” (cleaned up)); Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶¶ 44, 49 (explaining that law-like mixed questions are “reviewed de novo” and fact-like mixed questions are reviewed deferentially and overturned only when they are “clearly erroneous”); Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 26 , 299 P.3d 1079 (“The trial court in a divorce action is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the pa

2018"In determining whether substantial evidence supports the [land use authority's] decision we will consider all the evidence in the record, both favorable and contrary[,] and determine whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the [land use authority]." Id. (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶19 Upon applying this highly deferential standard, we have no trouble concluding that the district court was correct in upholding the Appeal Authority's decision that the Checkettses' business was never a permissible use of the Business Lot.

2016The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Awarded Deposition Costs to Rocky Mountain. ¶36 Plaintiffs contend that the district court “erred when it determined that Rocky Mountain was entitled to the deposition costs in the amount of $2,577.32, together with post-judgment interest, when the same evidence could have been obtained through less expensive means.” “In reviewing a district court’s denial or award of costs, we apply a highly deferential standard.” Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ¶ 84 , 201 P.3d 966 .

2016The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Awarded Deposition Costs to Rocky Mountain. ¶36 Plaintiffs contend that the district court “erred when it determined that Rocky Mountain was entitled to the deposition costs in the amount of $2,577.32, together with post-judgment interest, when the same evidence could have been obtained through less expensive means.” “In reviewing a district court’s denial or award of costs, we apply a highly deferential standard.” Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ¶ 84 , 201 P.3d 966 .

2014It is to ask instead the more specific question whether the precise interest at stake is fun- damental in the sense of being justified not by the mere ―abstract formula[]‖ informed by a judge‘s instincts of fairness, but by a clear indication that that interest is ―deeply rooted in this Nation‘s history and tradition and in the history and culture of Western civilization.‖ In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1374–75 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (statute prohi- biting assisted suicide constitutional because assisted suicide is not a fundamental right deeply roote

2013Given this highly deferential standard, fact findings should 1See, e.g., Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ¶ 13 , 112 P.3d 495 ; In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 16 , 1 P.3d 1074 . 6 Cite as: 2013 UT 5 Opinion of the Court be ―overturned only when clearly erroneous.‖ Id. ¶ 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶18 Conclusions of law, by contrast, involve ―abstract legal questions.‖ Id. ¶ 41.

2013Given this highly deferential standard, fact findings should 1See, e.g., Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ¶ 13 , 112 P.3d 495 ; In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 16 , 1 P.3d 1074 . 6 Cite as: 2013 UT 5 Opinion of the Court be ―overturned only when clearly erroneous.‖ Id. ¶ 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶18 Conclusions of law, by contrast, involve ―abstract legal questions.‖ Id. ¶ 41.

2013Given this highly deferential standard, fact findings should be "overturned only when clearly erroneous." Id.

2013Given this highly deferential standard, fact findings should 1See, e.g., Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ¶ 13 , 112 P.3d 495 ; In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 16 , 1 P.3d 1074 . 6 Cite as: 2013 UT 5 Opinion of the Court be ―overturned only when clearly erroneous.‖ Id. ¶ 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶18 Conclusions of law, by contrast, involve ―abstract legal questions.‖ Id. ¶ 41.

2013Given this highly deferential standard, fact findings should 1See, e.g., Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ¶ 13 , 112 P.3d 495 ; In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 16 , 1 P.3d 1074 . 6 Cite as: 2013 UT 5 Opinion of the Court be ―overturned only when clearly erroneous.‖ Id. ¶ 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶18 Conclusions of law, by contrast, involve ―abstract legal questions.‖ Id. ¶ 41.

2013Given this highly deferential standard, fact findings should 1See, e.g., Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ¶ 13 , 112 P.3d 495 ; In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 16 , 1 P.3d 1074 . 6 Cite as: 2013 UT 5 Opinion of the Court be ―overturned only when clearly erroneous.‖ Id. ¶ 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶18 Conclusions of law, by contrast, involve ―abstract legal questions.‖ Id. ¶ 41.

2008Given all of these cireum-stances, as well as the highly deferential standard applied to trial courts' determinations of discriminatory intent, see Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1206 , we determine that the trial court did not commit clear error in sustaining the peremptory strikes.

2008Because of the highly deferential standard of review on this issue, we affirm the trial court's ruling. ¶ 14 "`[T]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.'" State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)).

2008Because of the highly deferential standard of review on this issue, we affirm the trial court's ruling. ¶ 14 "`[T]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.'" State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)).

2008NOTES [1] Because Clopten's arguments on appeal do not concern the statutory language, we cite to the current code as a convenience to the reader. [2] "When reviewing a jury verdict, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to that verdict." State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, ¶ 3 , 144 P.3d 1152 . [3] Because Hamby was unavailable at the time of trial, his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. [4] Clopten does contend the jury "instruction lack[ed] several important aspects" but limits any claimed error to the trial court's refusal to allow Dr. Dodd "to cover what was otherwise

2008NOTES [1] Because Clopten's arguments on appeal do not concern the statutory language, we cite to the current code as a convenience to the reader. [2] "When reviewing a jury verdict, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to that verdict." State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, ¶ 3 , 144 P.3d 1152 . [3] Because Hamby was unavailable at the time of trial, his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. [4] Clopten does contend the jury "instruction lack[ed] several important aspects" but limits any claimed error to the trial court's refusal to allow Dr. Dodd "to cover what was otherwise

2008However, after oral argument, the Utah Supreme Court issued Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Clerk, 2007 UT 97 (Better Dental Health II), changing the standard of review in private attorney general cases to de novo: “Today we recognize that the highly deferential standard of review utilized for other equitable awards of attorney fees is unsuitable for private attorney general doctrine cases and conclude instead that de novo review should be applied.” 1 Id. ¶ 6.

2007Today we recognize that the highly deferential standard of review utilized for other equitable awards of attorney fees is unsuitable for private attorney general doctrine cases and conclude instead that de novo review should be applied. [4] ¶ 7 In Hughes, 2004 UT 22 , ¶ 24 n. 2, 89 P.3d 148 , our determination to apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to equitable awards of attorney fees was based largely upon our discussion in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), of the opportunities for trial courts to "assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proce

2007Today we recognize that the highly deferential standard of review utilized for other equitable awards of attorney fees is unsuitable for private attorney general doctrine cases and conclude instead that de novo review should be applied. [4] ¶ 7 In Hughes, 2004 UT 22 , ¶ 24 n. 2, 89 P.3d 148 , our determination to apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to equitable awards of attorney fees was based largely upon our discussion in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), of the opportunities for trial courts to "assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proce