highly deferential standard in Michigan

2015Thus, “[t]o prevail under this highly deferential standard of review, a challenger must show that the legislation is arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute.” Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 7 ; 664 NW2d 767 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2015Thus, “[t]o prevail under this highly deferential standard of review, a challenger must show that the legislation is arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute.” Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 7 ; 664 NW2d 767 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2015“Specifically, ‘[t]o prevail under this highly deferential standard of review, a challenger must show that the legislation is arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute.’ ” In re Parole of Hill, 298 Mich App at 422 , quoting Idziak, 484 Mich at 570-571 .

2015“Specifically, ‘[t]o prevail under this highly deferential standard of review, a challenger must show that the legislation is arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute.’ ” Parole of Hill, 298 Mich App at 422 , quoting Idziak, 484 Mich at 570-571 .

2015Rational-basis review “is a paradigm of judicial restraint” and “is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” Fed Communications Comm v Beach Communications, Inc, 508 US 307, 313 ; 113 S Ct 2096 ; 124 L Ed 2d 211 (1993).

2015Rational-basis review “is a paradigm of judicial restraint” and “is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” Fed Communications Comm v Beach Communications, Inc, 508 US 307, 313 ; 113 S Ct 2096 ; 124 L Ed 2d 211 (1993).

2005This is a highly deferential standard of review requiring a challenger to show that the legislation is “ ‘arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute.’ ” Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 259 ; 615 NW2d 218 (2000), quoting Smith v Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 271 ; 301 NW2d 285 (1981). *661 The United States Supreme Court has set forth standards this Court uses to determine if a law is arbitrary 1 or capricious. 2 Wysocki v Felt, 248 Mich App 346, 359 ; 639 NW2d 572 (2001).

2005This is a highly deferential standard of review requiring a challenger to show that the legislation is “ ‘arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute.’ ” Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 259 ; 615 NW2d 218 (2000), quoting Smith v Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 271 ; 301 NW2d 285 (1981). *661 The United States Supreme Court has set forth standards this Court uses to determine if a law is arbitrary 1 or capricious. 2 Wysocki v Felt, 248 Mich App 346, 359 ; 639 NW2d 572 (2001).

2026Rational-basis review does not test the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation, or whether the classification is made with mathematical nicety, or even whether it results in some inequity when put into practice. [Id. at 571-572 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] To demonstrate an equal-protection violation, a defendant must show that “(1) he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated, and (2) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” James, 326 Mich App at 106 .

2020I write separately to highlight the highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the MCAC. “[J]udicial review of a decision by the MCAC is limited . . . .” Arbuckle v Gen Motors LLC, 499 Mich 521, 531 ; 885 NW2d 232 (2016).

2020I write separately to highlight the highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the MCAC. “[J]udicial review of a decision by the MCAC is limited . . . .” Arbuckle v Gen Motors LLC, 499 Mich 521, 531 ; 885 NW2d 232 (2016).

2020This Court’s “review begins with the [commission’s] decision, not the magistrate’s.” Omian v Chrysler Group LLC, 309 Mich App 297, 306 ; 869 NW2d 625 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

2020This Court’s “review begins with the [commission’s] decision, not the magistrate’s.” Omian v Chrysler Group LLC, 309 Mich App 297, 306 ; 869 NW2d 625 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

2019If a trial court can refuse to address the superintendent’s reasons because it finds the reasons are “not genuine,” then the trial court’s review of these cases effectively becomes de novo: if a trial court simply disagrees with the superintendent’s decision, it can dismiss the superintendent’s reasons as “not genuine,” conclude that the lack of “genuine” reasons for the superintendent’s decision makes the decision arbitrary and capricious, and then reverse.6 This is in stark contrast to the highly deferential standard that trial courts are supposed to afford the superintendent’s decision to d

2019This is a highly deferential standard—“ ‘To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish.’ ” People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1 , 30 n 23; 551 NW2d 355 (1996), quoting Parts & Electric Motors, Inc v Sterling Electric, Inc, 866 F2d 228, 233 (CA 7, 1988).

2019This is a highly deferential standard—“ ‘To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish.’ ” People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1 , 30 n 23; 551 NW2d 355 (1996), quoting Parts & Electric Motors, Inc v Sterling Electric, Inc, 866 F2d 228, 233 (CA 7, 1988).

2015“A rational basis exists for the legislation when any set of facts, either known or that can be reasonably conceived, justifies the discrimination.” Morales v Parole Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 51 ; 676 NW2d 221 (2003).

2015“A rational basis exists for the legislation when any set of facts, either known or that can be reasonably conceived, justifies the discrimination.” Morales v Parole Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 51 ; 676 NW2d 221 (2003).

2007"This highly deferential standard of review requires a challenger to show that the legislation is '"arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute."'" Id. (citation omitted).

2007The rational basis test considers whether the "`classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.'" But the rational basis test does not test "the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation. . . ." We examine the purpose with which the legislation was enacted, not its effects: "That the accommodation struck may have profound and far-reaching consequences . . . provides all the more reason for this Court to defer to the congressional judgment unless it is demonstrably arbitrary or irrational." In discerning the purpose, we look to "any set of facts, eit

2005We note in passing that such an "alternative" would likely have defeated the purpose of relocating the access road, because it would have done nothing to eliminate the "critical traffic problem" posed by the exit onto Grand River Ave. [11] In Vanderkloot, supra at 172-173 , 220 N.W.2d 416 , we identified numerous factors that might play a role in determining the routing of a road, including "comparative costs of construction, directness, comparative costs of maintenance, safety, probable amount of travel, convenience, topography, aesthetics, etc." That is why these legislative determinations a

2005We note in passing that such an "alternative" would likely have defeated the purpose of relocating the access road, because it would have done nothing to eliminate the "critical traffic problem" posed by the exit onto Grand River Ave. [11] In Vanderkloot, supra at 172-173 , 220 N.W.2d 416 , we identified numerous factors that might play a role in determining the routing of a road, including "comparative costs of construction, directness, comparative costs of maintenance, safety, probable amount of travel, convenience, topography, aesthetics, etc." That is why these legislative determinations a

2005This is a highly deferential standard of review requiring a challenger to show that the legislation is “ ‘arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute.’ ” Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 259 ; 615 NW2d 218 (2000), quoting Smith v Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 271 ; 301 NW2d 285 (1981). *661 The United States Supreme Court has set forth standards this Court uses to determine if a law is arbitrary 1 or capricious. 2 Wysocki v Felt, 248 Mich App 346, 359 ; 639 NW2d 572 (2001).

2005This is a highly deferential standard of review requiring a challenger to show that the legislation is “ ‘arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to the objective of the statute.’ ” Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 259 ; 615 NW2d 218 (2000), quoting Smith v Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 271 ; 301 NW2d 285 (1981). *661 The United States Supreme Court has set forth standards this Court uses to determine if a law is arbitrary 1 or capricious. 2 Wysocki v Felt, 248 Mich App 346, 359 ; 639 NW2d 572 (2001).

2005We note in passing that such an "alternative" would likely have defeated the purpose of relocating the access road, because it would have done nothing to eliminate the "critical traffic problem" posed by the exit onto Grand River Ave. [11] In Vanderkloot, supra at 172-173 , 220 N.W.2d 416 , we identified numerous factors that might play a role in determining the routing of a road, including "comparative costs of construction, directness, comparative costs of maintenance, safety, probable amount of travel, convenience, topography, aesthetics, etc." That is why these legislative determinations a

2005We note in passing that such an "alternative" would likely have defeated the purpose of relocating the access road, because it would have done nothing to eliminate the "critical traffic problem" posed by the exit onto Grand River Ave. [11] In Vanderkloot, supra at 172-173 , 220 N.W.2d 416 , we identified numerous factors that might play a role in determining the routing of a road, including "comparative costs of construction, directness, comparative costs of maintenance, safety, probable amount of travel, convenience, topography, aesthetics, etc." That is why these legislative determinations a

2005In Vanderkloot, supra at 172-173 , we identified numerous factors that might play a role in determining the routing of a road, including “comparative costs of construction, directness, comparative costs of maintenance, safety, probable amount of travel, convenience, topography, aesthetics, etc.” That is why these legislative determinations are entitled to a highly deferential standard of judicial review, and will not be disturbed except where there is evidence of fraud, error of law, or an abuse of discretion.

2005We note in passing that such an "alternative" would likely have defeated the purpose of relocating the access road, because it would have done nothing to eliminate the "critical traffic problem" posed by the exit onto Grand River Ave. [11] In Vanderkloot, supra at 172-173 , 220 N.W.2d 416 , we identified numerous factors that might play a role in determining the routing of a road, including "comparative costs of construction, directness, comparative costs of maintenance, safety, probable amount of travel, convenience, topography, aesthetics, etc." That is why these legislative determinations a

2005We note in passing that such an "alternative" would likely have defeated the purpose of relocating the access road, because it would have done nothing to eliminate the "critical traffic problem" posed by the exit onto Grand River Ave. [11] In Vanderkloot, supra at 172-173 , 220 N.W.2d 416 , we identified numerous factors that might play a role in determining the routing of a road, including "comparative costs of construction, directness, comparative costs of maintenance, safety, probable amount of travel, convenience, topography, aesthetics, etc." That is why these legislative determinations a

2005We note in passing that such an "alternative" would likely have defeated the purpose of relocating the access road, because it would have done nothing to eliminate the "critical traffic problem" posed by the exit onto Grand River Ave. [11] In Vanderkloot, supra at 172-173 , 220 N.W.2d 416 , we identified numerous factors that might play a role in determining the routing of a road, including "comparative costs of construction, directness, comparative costs of maintenance, safety, probable amount of travel, convenience, topography, aesthetics, etc." That is why these legislative determinations a

2005Because "`[t]he judicial power ... is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,'" Anway v. Grand Rapids R Co, 211 Mich. 592, 616 , 179 N.W. 350 (1920) (citation omitted), a court hearing a case in which mootness has become apparent would lack the power to hear the suit.

2005Because "`[t]he judicial power ... is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,'" Anway v. Grand Rapids R Co, 211 Mich. 592, 616 , 179 N.W. 350 (1920) (citation omitted), a court hearing a case in which mootness has become apparent would lack the power to hear the suit.