severability clause in West Virginia

2015“Because the parties are the masters of their collective fate, they can agree to arbitrate almost any dispute — even a dispute over whether the underlying dispute is subject to arbitration.” Bruni v. Didion, 160 Cal. App.4th 1272, 1286 , 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 395, 407 (2008). 8 The United States Supreme Court extended the severability doctrine to a delegation provision within an arbitration agreement in Rent-A-Center.

2015“Because the parties are the masters of their collective fate, they can agree to arbitrate almost any dispute — even a dispute over whether the underlying dispute is subject to arbitration.” Bruni v. Didion, 160 Cal. App.4th 1272, 1286 , 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 395, 407 (2008). 8 The United States Supreme Court extended the severability doctrine to a delegation provision within an arbitration agreement in Rent-A-Center.

2021Va. 125 , 717 S.E.2d 909 (2011): Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 , and the doctrine of severability, only if a party to a contract explicitly challenges the enforceability of an arbitration clause within the contract, as opposed to generally challenging the contract as a whole, is a trial court permitted to consider the challenge to the arbitration clause. . . .

2020Va. 125, 129 , 717 S.E.2d 909, 913 (2011), we said in part: Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 , and the doctrine of severability, only if a party to a contract explicitly challenges the enforceability of an arbitration clause within the contract, as opposed to generally challenging the contract as a whole, is a trial court permitted to consider the challenge to the arbitration clause.

2023See McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1289 (“Notwithstanding the provision which defines each named insured as a ‘separate insured’ under the policy, the policy specifically provides that Millville will not pay for loss resulting from neglect by ‘any insured’ or from the intentional acts of ‘an insured.’”) (emphasis added)); Stahley, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 875 (“A severability 23 clause . . . does not modify a policy’s exclusion when the exclusion provision applies to ‘any insured[]’ . . . . [and] does not override the clear and unambiguous language of the intentional act exclusion[.]”); Markel Ins., 2012 W

2023Landauer v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 271 F. App’x 224, 226 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting invocation of “Separation of Insureds” provision to create ambiguity and stating “[t]he abuse or molestation does not have to have been committed by ‘the insured’ or even ‘an insured,’ but by ‘anyone.’ Invoking the separation of insureds provision does not narrow the broad reach of the exclusion.”); Brown & Root Braun, 54 F. App’x at 548 (“We conclude that the severability clause does not exclude [the non-employer insured seeking coverage] from the employee injury exclusion provision.”).

2023Landauer v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 271 F. App’x 224, 226 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting invocation of “Separation of Insureds” provision to create ambiguity and stating “[t]he abuse or molestation does not have to have been committed by ‘the insured’ or even ‘an insured,’ but by ‘anyone.’ Invoking the separation of insureds provision does not narrow the broad reach of the exclusion.”); Brown & Root Braun, 54 F. App’x at 548 (“We conclude that the severability clause does not exclude [the non-employer insured seeking coverage] from the employee injury exclusion provision.”).

2023See McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1289 (“Notwithstanding the provision which defines each named insured as a ‘separate insured’ under the policy, the policy specifically provides that Millville will not pay for loss resulting from neglect by ‘any insured’ or from the intentional acts of ‘an insured.’”) (emphasis added)); Stahley, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 875 (“A severability 23 clause . . . does not modify a policy’s exclusion when the exclusion provision applies to ‘any insured[]’ . . . . [and] does not override the clear and unambiguous language of the intentional act exclusion[.]”); Markel Ins., 2012 W

2023However, this reasoning has been soundly rejected by a majority of courts and dismissed by one commentator as “not justifiable.” 10 At best, the “Separation of 10 As the commentator explained: (continued . . .) 20 Insureds” provision has largely been found to alter or create ambiguities in exclusionary language only when it refers to “the insured.” See Maxey, 110 S.W.3d at 214 (“If the exclusion clause uses the term ‘the insured,’ application of the separation of insureds clause requires that the term be interpreted as referring only to the insured against whom a claim is being made under the

2023Landauer v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 271 F. App’x 224, 226 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting invocation of “Separation of Insureds” provision to create ambiguity and stating “[t]he abuse or molestation does not have to have been committed by ‘the insured’ or even ‘an insured,’ but by ‘anyone.’ Invoking the separation of insureds provision does not narrow the broad reach of the exclusion.”); Brown & Root Braun, 54 F. App’x at 548 (“We conclude that the severability clause does not exclude [the non-employer insured seeking coverage] from the employee injury exclusion provision.”).

2023Landauer v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 271 F. App’x 224, 226 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting invocation of “Separation of Insureds” provision to create ambiguity and stating “[t]he abuse or molestation does not have to have been committed by ‘the insured’ or even ‘an insured,’ but by ‘anyone.’ Invoking the separation of insureds provision does not narrow the broad reach of the exclusion.”); Brown & Root Braun, 54 F. App’x at 548 (“We conclude that the severability clause does not exclude [the non-employer insured seeking coverage] from the employee injury exclusion provision.”).

2023Va. at 263 , 793 S.E.2d at 913 (agreeing that “[t]he majority of courts across the country addressing the impact of severability clauses on exclusionary language utilizing ‘an insured’ or ‘any insured’ have concluded that the severability clause has no bearing on the application of the exclusionary language.”); see also J & J Holdings, 420 F. Supp. 3d at 1011-12 (“[M]any other states follow the rule that ‘the use of “any” clearly conveys that the excluded activity of one insured will bar coverage for all others, regardless of a severability clause.’ Indeed, this approach represents the majorit

2023In fact, in the absence of Pennsylvania authority finding ambiguity as to these specific provisions, we would be hard-pressed to suddenly find them unclear where we have previously declined to do so in nearly identical circumstances: “[W]e conclude that with respect to the two insurance policies at issue in this case, the severability clause’s command to apply the insurance separately to each insured does not alter the intentional/criminal act exclusions’ plain meaning or create ambiguity in its application.” Clendenen, 238 W.

2023The argument is typically presented in one of two ways: [T]hese courts find either that a severability clause unambiguously modifies the entirety of a policy, including its coverage and exclusion provisions, as if the insured claiming coverage was the only insured; or, then again, that the existence of the severability clause renders an exclusion applicable to “any insured” ambiguous, which requires a construction in favor of coverage Strouss, 2005 WL 418036 , at *5; see also Nautilus Ins., 725 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (“Under the minority [view], the two phrases are treated indistinguishably—that

2016In Standard Fire Insurance Company v. Proctor, 286 F.Supp.2d 567 (D.

2016After dispensing with the question of whether the Plaintiff properly pleaded a negligence claim, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held that the insurer, Standard Fire Insurance Company (“Standard Fire”) properly excluded coverage: This Court, however, agrees with the majority of jurisdictions who have taken the alternative approach and interpreted “any insured” as unambiguously expressing “a contractual intent to create joint obligations and to prohibit recovery by an innocent co-insured.” In Chacon , the homeowner’s policy indicated that personal liability coverage did not

2016Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562 , 913 N.E.2d 426, 440 (2009) (collecting cases with majority view); Pos-tell, 823 N.W.2d at 46-47 ("We have already considered the question of what effect severability-of-interest clauses have on insurance policy exclusions.

2016The purpose is not to negate bargained-for exclusions which are plainly worded.”); Villa v. Short, 947 A.2d at 1224-25 (finding that a severability clause does not inject ambiguity or remove the joint obligation imposed by intentional and criminal acts exclusions referring to either "an insured" or "any insured”); McAllister [v. Millville Mut.

2016Co. v. Roemmich, 291 N.W.2d 772, 774-75 (S.D. 1980) (establishing that an exclusion applying to "any insured” is unambiguous and unaffected by a severability clause). 13 .

2016Co. v. Bloomington Steel & Supply Co., 718 N.W.2d 888, 895 (Minn. 2006)).

2016Co. v. Diedrich, 394 F.3d at 1097-98 (imposing joint obligations under South Dakota law for an intentional acts exclusion referring to “one or more insureds,” despite the severability clause); Allstate Ins.

2016Co. v. Diedrich, 394 F.3d at 1097-98 (imposing joint obligations under South Dakota law for an intentional acts exclusion referring to “one or more insureds,” despite the severability clause); Allstate Ins.

2016Co., 788 P.2d 748 , the insureds, Reyes and Sarah Chacon, sought coverage from American Family Mutual Insurance Company (“American Family”) based on the severability clause of their insurance policy.

2016The Chacons, like Tara Clendenen and Patricia Shoaf, argued that the severability clause, which provided that “each person described above is a separate insured under this policy,” created coverage in the face of an intentional or expected acts exclusion that excluded coverage for the intentional or expected acts of “any insured.” The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the Chacons’ argument, holding that American Family had properly excluded coverage for the Chacons based on the intentional acts of the son, an insured under the policy, Significantly, in its decision, the Chacon Court distinguishe

2016See also Co-operative Insurance Cos. v. Woodward, 45 A.3d 89 (rejecting Minkler and hold that "assuming without deciding, that the provision at issue is a severability clause, we conclude that this clause has no effect on—and cannot override—the intentional-acts exclusion for certain acts committed by 'an.insured.’....

2016See also Co-operative Insurance Cos. v. Woodward, 45 A.3d 89 (rejecting Minkler and hold that "assuming without deciding, that the provision at issue is a severability clause, we conclude that this clause has no effect on—and cannot override—the intentional-acts exclusion for certain acts committed by 'an.insured.’....

2016Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562 , 913 N.E.2d 426, 440 (2009) (collecting cases with majority view); Pos-tell, 823 N.W.2d at 46-47 ("We have already considered the question of what effect severability-of-interest clauses have on insurance policy exclusions.

2016Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562 , 913 N.E.2d 426, 440 (2009) (collecting cases with majority view); Pos-tell, 823 N.W.2d at 46-47 ("We have already considered the question of what effect severability-of-interest clauses have on insurance policy exclusions.

2016Co. v. Kim, 121 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1308 (D.