11 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp.green2 sentences1997Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259-60 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 609 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), and Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 421-22 , 276 S.E.2d 422, 434-35 (1981), that the "presence of a severability clause is not conclusive but provides some guidance to the courts as to legislative intent." They say we must look at all relevant parts of the statute to discern legislative intent. 1997Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259-60 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 609 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), and Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 421-22 , 276 S.E.2d 422, 434-35 (1981), that the "presence of a severability clause is not conclusive but provides some guidance to the courts as to legislative intent." They say we must look at all relevant parts of the statute to discern legislative intent. | 3 | 3 |
Fulton Corp. v. Faulknergreen2 sentences2019If the parts are independent, or separable, but not otherwise, the invalid part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, provided it is complete in itself and capable of enforcement." State v. Smith , 265 N.C. 173 , 179, 143 S.E.2d 293 , 298 (1965) (quoting *572 Constantian v. Anson County , 244 N.C. 221 , 228, 93 S.E.2d 163 , 168 (1956) ); see also Pope v. Easley , 354 N.C. 544 , 548, 556 S.E.2d 265 , 268 (2001) (per curiam) ("[T]he inclusion of a severability clause within legislation will be interpreted as a clear statement of legislative intent to strike an unconstitutional provision 2019If the parts are independent, or separable, but not otherwise, the invalid part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, provided it is complete in itself and capable of enforcement." State v. Smith , 265 N.C. 173 , 179, 143 S.E.2d 293 , 298 (1965) (quoting *572 Constantian v. Anson County , 244 N.C. 221 , 228, 93 S.E.2d 163 , 168 (1956) ); see also Pope v. Easley , 354 N.C. 544 , 548, 556 S.E.2d 265 , 268 (2001) (per curiam) ("[T]he inclusion of a severability clause within legislation will be interpreted as a clear statement of legislative intent to strike an unconstitutional provision | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc.green2 sentences1997Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259-60 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 609 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), and Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 421-22 , 276 S.E.2d 422, 434-35 (1981), that the "presence of a severability clause is not conclusive but provides some guidance to the courts as to legislative intent." They say we must look at all relevant parts of the statute to discern legislative intent. 1997Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259-60 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 609 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), and Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 421-22 , 276 S.E.2d 422, 434-35 (1981), that the "presence of a severability clause is not conclusive but provides some guidance to the courts as to legislative intent." They say we must look at all relevant parts of the statute to discern legislative intent. | 2 | 2 |
Pope v. Easleygreen2 sentences2019If the parts are independent, or separable, but not otherwise, the invalid part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, provided it is complete in itself and capable of enforcement." State v. Smith , 265 N.C. 173 , 179, 143 S.E.2d 293 , 298 (1965) (quoting *572 Constantian v. Anson County , 244 N.C. 221 , 228, 93 S.E.2d 163 , 168 (1956) ); see also Pope v. Easley , 354 N.C. 544 , 548, 556 S.E.2d 265 , 268 (2001) (per curiam) ("[T]he inclusion of a severability clause within legislation will be interpreted as a clear statement of legislative intent to strike an unconstitutional provision 2019If the parts are independent, or separable, but not otherwise, the invalid part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, provided it is complete in itself and capable of enforcement." State v. Smith , 265 N.C. 173 , 179, 143 S.E.2d 293 , 298 (1965) (quoting *572 Constantian v. Anson County , 244 N.C. 221 , 228, 93 S.E.2d 163 , 168 (1956) ); see also Pope v. Easley , 354 N.C. 544 , 548, 556 S.E.2d 265 , 268 (2001) (per curiam) ("[T]he inclusion of a severability clause within legislation will be interpreted as a clear statement of legislative intent to strike an unconstitutional provision | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2019If the parts are independent, or separable, but not otherwise, the invalid part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, provided it is complete in itself and capable of enforcement." State v. Smith , 265 N.C. 173 , 179, 143 S.E.2d 293 , 298 (1965) (quoting *572 Constantian v. Anson County , 244 N.C. 221 , 228, 93 S.E.2d 163 , 168 (1956) ); see also Pope v. Easley , 354 N.C. 544 , 548, 556 S.E.2d 265 , 268 (2001) (per curiam) ("[T]he inclusion of a severability clause within legislation will be interpreted as a clear statement of legislative intent to strike an unconstitutional provision 2019If the parts are independent, or separable, but not otherwise, the invalid part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, provided it is complete in itself and capable of enforcement." State v. Smith , 265 N.C. 173 , 179, 143 S.E.2d 293 , 298 (1965) (quoting *572 Constantian v. Anson County , 244 N.C. 221 , 228, 93 S.E.2d 163 , 168 (1956) ); see also Pope v. Easley , 354 N.C. 544 , 548, 556 S.E.2d 265 , 268 (2001) (per curiam) ("[T]he inclusion of a severability clause within legislation will be interpreted as a clear statement of legislative intent to strike an unconstitutional provision | 1 | 1 |
Constantian v. Anson Countygreen2 sentences2019If the parts are independent, or separable, but not otherwise, the invalid part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, provided it is complete in itself and capable of enforcement." State v. Smith , 265 N.C. 173 , 179, 143 S.E.2d 293 , 298 (1965) (quoting *572 Constantian v. Anson County , 244 N.C. 221 , 228, 93 S.E.2d 163 , 168 (1956) ); see also Pope v. Easley , 354 N.C. 544 , 548, 556 S.E.2d 265 , 268 (2001) (per curiam) ("[T]he inclusion of a severability clause within legislation will be interpreted as a clear statement of legislative intent to strike an unconstitutional provision 2019If the parts are independent, or separable, but not otherwise, the invalid part may be rejected and the valid part may stand, provided it is complete in itself and capable of enforcement." State v. Smith , 265 N.C. 173 , 179, 143 S.E.2d 293 , 298 (1965) (quoting *572 Constantian v. Anson County , 244 N.C. 221 , 228, 93 S.E.2d 163 , 168 (1956) ); see also Pope v. Easley , 354 N.C. 544 , 548, 556 S.E.2d 265 , 268 (2001) (per curiam) ("[T]he inclusion of a severability clause within legislation will be interpreted as a clear statement of legislative intent to strike an unconstitutional provision | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Vulcan Materials Companygreen2 sentences2005"When a contract contains provisions which are severable from an illegal provision and are in no way dependent upon the enforcement *736 of the illegal provision for their validity, such provisions may be enforced." Rose v. Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 658 , 194 S.E.2d 521, 531-32 (1973). 2005"When a contract contains provisions which are severable from an illegal provision and are in no way dependent upon the enforcement *736 of the illegal provision for their validity, such provisions may be enforced." Rose v. Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 658 , 194 S.E.2d 521, 531-32 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.green2 sentences2004See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 , 18 L. 2004See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 , 18 L. | 1 | 1 |
Sessions v. . Columbus Countygreen2 sentences2002In Sessions v. Columbus Cty., 214 N.C. 634, 638 , 200 S.E. 418, 420 (1939), this Court stated that "[r]econciliation is a postulate of constitutional as well as of statutory construction." Thus, reconciliation is a fundamental goal, be it in constitutional or statutory interpretation, and North Carolina courts should make every effort to determine whether State provisions, as interpreted under State law, are inconsistent with controlling federal law before applying a severability analysis to strike State provisions as wholly unenforceable. 2002In Sessions v. Columbus Cty., 214 N.C. 634, 638 , 200 S.E. 418, 420 (1939), this Court stated that "[r]econciliation is a postulate of constitutional as well as of statutory construction." Thus, reconciliation is a fundamental goal, be it in constitutional or statutory interpretation, and North Carolina courts should make every effort to determine whether State provisions, as interpreted under State law, are inconsistent with controlling federal law before applying a severability analysis to strike State provisions as wholly unenforceable. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dacey v. Naruk
green
2 sentences2002Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 608 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), as follows: To determine whether the portions [of a statute] are in fact divisible, the courts first see if the portions remaining are capable of being enforced on their own. 1997Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259-60 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 609 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), and Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 421-22 , 276 S.E.2d 422, 434-35 (1981), that the "presence of a severability clause is not conclusive but provides some guidance to the courts as to legislative intent." They say we must look at all relevant parts of the statute to discern legislative intent. | 2 | 1997–2002 |
Chateau X, Inc. v. Andrews
green
2 sentences2002Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 608 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), as follows: To determine whether the portions [of a statute] are in fact divisible, the courts first see if the portions remaining are capable of being enforced on their own. 1997Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259-60 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 609 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), and Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 421-22 , 276 S.E.2d 422, 434-35 (1981), that the "presence of a severability clause is not conclusive but provides some guidance to the courts as to legislative intent." They say we must look at all relevant parts of the statute to discern legislative intent. | 2 | 1997–2002 |
Hutto v. Davis
green
2 sentences2002Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 608 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), as follows: To determine whether the portions [of a statute] are in fact divisible, the courts first see if the portions remaining are capable of being enforced on their own. 1997Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 259-60 , 250 S.E.2d 603, 609 (1979), judgment vacated on other grounds, 445 U.S. 947 , 100 S.Ct. 1593 , 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980), and Sheffield v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 421-22 , 276 S.E.2d 422, 434-35 (1981), that the "presence of a severability clause is not conclusive but provides some guidance to the courts as to legislative intent." They say we must look at all relevant parts of the statute to discern legislative intent. | 2 | 1997–2002 |
BP America, Inc. v. State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2014BP America, 148 P.3d at 833 . 2014Lexis 29482 *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that “the Employee Exclusion, read in conjunction with the Separation of Insureds Clause, does not relieve National of its obligation to -33- indemnify Shelby for the Personal Injury Action”),6 on the theory that “most courts addressing the issue of whether a severability clause will render a clear and unambiguous exclusionary provision doubtful determine that the clear language of the exclusion must prevail.”7 148 P.3d at 841 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher
green
1 sentence2007Ct. 2003), http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2003%20NCBC%203.htm (declining to enforce an agreement to agree that contained language indicating a lack of intent to be bound and expressly left its own terms subject to a later agreement); Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc., v. Scumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1981) (declining to enforce an agreement with open material terms as doing so would require the court to determine a term (price) that was material to the agreement); F & K Supply, Inc., 288 A.D.2d 713 (declining to enforce an agreement with open material terms that lacked a severa | 1 | 2007–2007 |
F & K Supply, Inc. v. Willowbrook Development Co.
green
1 sentence2007Ct. 2003), http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2003%20NCBC%203.htm (declining to enforce an agreement to agree that contained language indicating a lack of intent to be bound and expressly left its own terms subject to a later agreement); Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc., v. Scumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1981) (declining to enforce an agreement with open material terms as doing so would require the court to determine a term (price) that was material to the agreement); F & K Supply, Inc., 288 A.D.2d 713 (declining to enforce an agreement with open material terms that lacked a severa | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Perry v. Stancil
green
2 sentences2002As part of our constitutional interpretation, it is fundamental "to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it." Perry, 237 N.C. at 444 , 75 S.E.2d at 514 . 2002As part of our constitutional interpretation, it is fundamental "to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it." Perry, 237 N.C. at 444 , 75 S.E.2d at 514 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jones v. County Board of Education
green
2 sentences1997The Court concluded that "[w]e will not apply the severability clause to vary and to contradict the express terms of a statute, for we cannot believe the Legislature intended such a result." Id. at 422 , 276 S.E.2d at 434 . 1997The Court concluded that “[w]e will not apply the severability clause to vary and to contradict the express terms of a statute, for we cannot believe the Legislature intended such a result.” Id. at 422 , 276 S.E.2d at 434 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences1980Accordingly, I would discard these sections under the severability clause while preserving the sound sections of the Act as discussed above. *745 In effect, the majority's interpretation of the Religion Clauses seems to accord with the interpretation of the United States District Court in Christian Echoes National Ministry Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 , 94 S.Ct. 41 , 38 L.Ed.2d 84 (1973). 1980Accordingly, I would discard these sections under the severability clause while preserving the sound sections of the Act as discussed above. *745 In effect, the majority's interpretation of the Religion Clauses seems to accord with the interpretation of the United States District Court in Christian Echoes National Ministry Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 , 94 S.Ct. 41 , 38 L.Ed.2d 84 (1973). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
100 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Marin County v. United States
green
2 sentences1980Accordingly, I would discard these sections under the severability clause while preserving the sound sections of the Act as discussed above. *745 In effect, the majority's interpretation of the Religion Clauses seems to accord with the interpretation of the United States District Court in Christian Echoes National Ministry Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 , 94 S.Ct. 41 , 38 L.Ed.2d 84 (1973). 1980Accordingly, I would discard these sections under the severability clause while preserving the sound sections of the Act as discussed above. *745 In effect, the majority's interpretation of the Religion Clauses seems to accord with the interpretation of the United States District Court in Christian Echoes National Ministry Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 , 94 S.Ct. 41 , 38 L.Ed.2d 84 (1973). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
In re Baker
green
2 sentences1980Accordingly, I would discard these sections under the severability clause while preserving the sound sections of the Act as discussed above. *745 In effect, the majority's interpretation of the Religion Clauses seems to accord with the interpretation of the United States District Court in Christian Echoes National Ministry Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 , 94 S.Ct. 41 , 38 L.Ed.2d 84 (1973). 1980Accordingly, I would discard these sections under the severability clause while preserving the sound sections of the Act as discussed above. *745 In effect, the majority's interpretation of the Religion Clauses seems to accord with the interpretation of the United States District Court in Christian Echoes National Ministry Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 , 94 S.Ct. 41 , 38 L.Ed.2d 84 (1973). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.