severability clause in Texas

2024See id.

2020In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d at 313 (“The doctrine of severability is an exception that applies in circumstances in which the original consideration for the contract is legal, but incidental promises within the contract are found to be illegal.”); see also Seligman-Hargis v. Hargis, 186 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (same); Montgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (same).

2018See In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d at 359 (“The arbitration agreement in this case contains a severability clause . . . .”); Sanders, 264 S.W.3d at 301 (“SSFCU sought enforcement of the entire general arbitration agreement, which specifically includes the above-quoted severability clause.”); Bray, 499 S.W.3d at 101 (noting presence of a severability clause).

2015In her Response, Bazan-Garcia contends that the three challenged provisions are “integral” to the parties’ arbitration agreements because (1) the agreements do not contain a severability clause, see Resp. at 40 (citing Poly-America, 262 S.W.3d at 360 ), and (2) WRPS did not request severance from the trial court, see Resp. at 40–41.

2016And unlike in Patrizi, where the very face of the contract reflected that the illegal provisions “were a vital part thereof,” see 269 S.W.2d at 347–48, the PNA here contains a severability clause expressing the parties’ intent that if any provision of the PNA is not valid, such invalidity does not affect other provisions which can be given effect without the 6 invalid provision.

1996Since the primary purpose of the Agreement was the covenant not to compete, it cannot be severed without adversely affecting the issuance of stock given in consideration therefor. “[The severability clause] does not have the effect of making an otherwise dependent contract into one whose provisions are independent and divisible.” Id.

2023In the supreme court’s words, “[n]evertheless, the [o]rdinance contains a severability clause, and ‘[w]hen an ordinance contains an express severability clause, the severability clause prevails when interpreting the ordinance.’” Id. (quoting City of Houston v. Bates, 406 S.W.3d 539, 549 (Tex. 2013)).

2023For example, when dealing with a City of Houston ordinance, the supreme court noted that the ordinance contained a severability clause and held that “[b]ased on the severability clause, the invalidity of provisions that limit the availability of premium pay when calculating termination pay do not affect the validity of any of the remaining portions of the ordinances or any other ordinances.” Bates, 406 S.W.3d at 549 .

1975Delorme v. State, supra, 488 S.W.2d, at 811-812 . [8] Even without this severability clause, it would be necessary to determine whether the invalidity of the subsection (b)(2) renders all of Article 37.071 invalid.

1973The severability clause (Sec. 6.04) of the Texas Controlled Substances Act reads: "If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable." See also Delorme v. State, 488 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); 12 Tex.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, Sec. 47, p. 392.

2023Nor does the fact that Total E&P challenges the scope, as opposed to the validity, of the arbitration agreement affect the analysis because “[a]pplication of the severability rule does not depend on the substance of the remainder of the contract.” Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 72.

2023Nor does the fact that Total E&P challenges the scope, as opposed to the validity, of the arbitration agreement affect the analysis because “[a]pplication of the severability rule does not depend on the substance of the remainder of the contract.” Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 72.

2023See Oracle, 724 F.3d at 1076 ; Ally Align, 574 S.W.3d at 758 ; WasteCare, 822 F. App’x at 896 (quoting Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 531 ). 43 arbitrated to those “arising out of” the Agreement.

2023See Oracle, 724 F.3d at 1076 ; Ally Align, 574 S.W.3d at 758 ; WasteCare, 822 F. App’x at 896 (quoting Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 531 ). 42 Here, the delegation provision is the clause that incorporates the AAA rules, and nothing in that provision or in those rules limits the scope of the delegation.

2023But the Court did not give conclusive effect to the clause and stated that its presence only prompted a more involved analysis applying the Court’s long-standing rules for determining severability: The goal of this severability clause, to retain valid portions and applications of the statute whenever possible, reflects the case law’s reminder that “[i]n the construction of statutes, if it can be lawfully done, it is the duty of the court to construe a statute so as to render it valid.” Sharber v. Florence, . . . 115 S.W.2d 604, 606 ([Tex.] 1938).

1990The goal of this severability clause, to retain valid portions and applications of the statute whenever possible, reflects the case law's reminder that "[i]n the construction of statutes, if it can be lawfully done, it is the duty of the court to construe a statute so as to render it valid." Sharber v. Florence, 131 Tex. 341, 345 , 115 S.W.2d 604, 606 (1938).

2015See Tanglewood Homes Ass'n v. Henke, 728 S.W.2d 39 , 41–42 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2000See Tanglewood Homes Ass’n v. Henke, 728 S.W.2d 39, 41-42 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ refd n.r.e.).

2014Accordingly, unless Jackson Buckeye, 546 U.S., at 445 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 ; see also id., at 447 , challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must 126 S.Ct. 1204 (the severability rule is based on § 2). treat it as valid under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as [4] But that agreements to arbitrate are severable does not a whole for the arbitrator. mean that they are unassailable.

2014Accordingly, unless Jackson Buckeye, 546 U.S., at 445 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 ; see also id., at 447 , challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must 126 S.Ct. 1204 (the severability rule is based on § 2). treat it as valid under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as [4] But that agreements to arbitrate are severable does not a whole for the arbitrator. mean that they are unassailable.

2023The supreme court conducted a severability analysis and first noted that the MLA contained a severability clause stating “in part that if the application of the statute to any person or circumstance is held unconstitutional, then the effect of the invalidation shall be confined to the portion of the statute adjudged to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 844 .

2000See id. (construing the statute’s severability clause, found in Act of Aug. 29, 1977, ch. 817, § 41.04). “[I]f, when we strike the statute’s application to the common law claims, we are left with something which ‘remains complete in itself, and capable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must stand.’ ” Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845 (quoting Western Union Tel.

2018See In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d at 359 (“The arbitration agreement in this case contains a severability clause . . . .”); Sanders, 264 S.W.3d at 301 (“SSFCU sought enforcement of the entire general arbitration agreement, which specifically includes the above-quoted severability clause.”); Bray, 499 S.W.3d at 101 (noting presence of a severability clause).

2013However, neither in appellant’s motion to compel arbitration nor at the hearing did they argue that the trial court should enforce the severability clause of the contract. *277 Appellants contend that in Sanders the Fourth Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred when it failed to enforce the severability clause even when the party did not move for severance in the trial court. 264 S.W.3d at 301 .

2018Double Eagle also directs our attention to the petitioners’ reply brief in Venture Cotton, which mentions the fact that “[a]ll of the agreements also included a severability clause[.]” See Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at *3, Venture Cotton, 435 S.W.3d at 222 .

2015Second, and contrary to Bazan-Garcia’s suggestion, the Texas Supreme Court has never held that the absence of a severability clause proves that all of the agreement’s terms constitute its “essential purpose.” Instead, the Supreme Court expressly held in Venture Cotton that a court of appeals is required to sever an unconscionable provision from an arbitration agreement even when the agreement has no severability clause, and even when that remedy was not requested from the trial court. 435 S.W.3d at 230 (discussed in Opening Br. at 32).

2025Koy II, 221 S.W. at 882, 888; Koy I, 218 S.W. at 483. 44 Although the TMFPA does not contain a severability clause, it is not necessary to support severance.

2025Koy II, 221 S.W. at 882, 888; Koy I, 218 S.W. at 483. 44 Although the TMFPA does not contain a severability clause, it is not necessary to support severance.

2024P. 166a(c) (requiring movant to establish that it is entitled to judgment as matter of law).11 And the 2021 Trust Agreement contains a severability clause, such that “[i]f 11 See, e.g., In re Estate of Jung, 109 P.3d 97, 102 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“Issues of reasonableness are generally questions of fact.”). 24 any wording, sentence, or article of the Trust is determined to be invalid [or] unenforceable,” “the remaining portions of the Trust remain legally valid and enforceable.” Conclusions as to Probate Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling Based on the above analysis of the relevant provisions of

2024See Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. 143 (2024) (recognizing that “[p]arties can form multiple levels of agreements concerning arbitration, and thus can have different kinds of disputes” resolved in different manners).

2023Because arbitration is a matter of contract, parties can agree that arbitrators, rather than courts, must resolve disputes over 4 See Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17 , 20–21 (2012); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 , 445–46 (2006); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.

2020In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d at 313 (“The doctrine of severability is an exception that applies in circumstances in which the original consideration for the contract is legal, but incidental promises within the contract are found to be illegal.”); see also Seligman-Hargis v. Hargis, 186 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (same); Montgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (same).

2020In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d at 313 (“The doctrine of severability is an exception that applies in circumstances in which the original consideration for the contract is legal, but incidental promises within the contract are found to be illegal.”); see also Seligman-Hargis v. Hargis, 186 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (same); Montgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (same).

2020See EWB-I, 527 S.W.3d at 466 (citing Musgrove, 2009 WL 976010 , at *3); Cox v. Melson-Fulsom, 956 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.). 4 This is a different standard than the standard used when a severability clause is not at issue and when a violating party asserts that a specific restrictive covenant was abandoned or waived.

2020EWB-I, LLC v. PlazAmericas Mall Tex., LLC, 527 S.W.3d 447 , 467–68 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Vance v. Popkowski, 534 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); see Shields Ltd.

2020See EWB-I, 527 S.W.3d at 466 (citing Musgrove, 2009 WL 976010 , at *3); Cox v. Melson-Fulsom, 956 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.). 4 This is a different standard than the standard used when a severability clause is not at issue and when a violating party asserts that a specific restrictive covenant was abandoned or waived.

2020EWB-I, LLC v. PlazAmericas Mall Tex., LLC, 527 S.W.3d 447 , 467–68 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Vance v. Popkowski, 534 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); see Shields Ltd.

2020See Vance, 534 S.W.3d at 480 .

2020In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d at 313 (“The doctrine of severability is an exception that applies in circumstances in which the original consideration for the contract is legal, but incidental promises within the contract are found to be illegal.”); see also Seligman-Hargis v. Hargis, 186 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (same); Montgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (same).

2020In re Kasschau, 11 S.W.3d at 313 (“The doctrine of severability is an exception that applies in circumstances in which the original consideration for the contract is legal, but incidental promises within the contract are found to be illegal.”); see also Seligman-Hargis v. Hargis, 186 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (same); Montgomery v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (same).