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18 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1948–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegnagreen2 sentences2015Almost forty years later, in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), the Court applied the severability rule to contracts that may be void as well as voidable. 546 U.S. at 447-78 . 2015Almost forty years later, in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), the Court applied the severability rule to contracts that may be void as well as voidable. 546 U.S. at 447-78 . | 2 | 2 |
Penske Truck Leasing Co. v. Huddlestongreen2 sentences2014The enforcement of the remaining terms of the contract comports with the parties’ intent as expressed in the severability clause of the contract, which provides that “any provision . . . deemed to be invalid or unenforceable . . . shall be severable from the remainder of [the contract],” and “shall not cause the remainder to be invalid or unenforceable.” See Penske Truck Leasing Co. v. Huddleston, 795 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tenn. 1990) (explaining that courts should consider the intent of the parties, as reflected in the terms of the contract, in determining whether a portion of a contract is severa 2014The enforcement of the remaining terms of the contract comports with the parties’ intent as expressed in the severability clause of the contract, which provides that “any provision ... deemed to be invalid or unenforceable ... shall be severable from the remainder of [the contract],” and “shall not cause the remainder to be invalid or unenforceable.” See Penske Truck Leasing Co. v. Huddleston, 795 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tenn.1990) (explaining that courts should consider the intent of the parties, as reflected in the terms of the contract, in determining whether a portion of a contract is severable f | 2 | 2 |
cluster 775878green2 sentences2004Deja Vu, 274 F.3d at 401, 402-03 (footnotes omitted). 2004Deja Vu, 274 F.3d at 401, 402-03 (footnotes omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2015In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), the Court applied the severability rule to arbitration agreements with delegation provisions. 561 U.S. at 72 . 2015In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), the Court applied the severability rule to arbitration agreements with delegation provisions. 561 U.S. at 72 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Testergreen1 sentence2020However, “the General Assembly has approved the practice of elision through the enactment of a general severability statute.” State v. Crank, 468 S.W.3d 15, 28 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-110 ).10 “[T]he legislature’s endorsement of elision does not automatically make it applicable to every situation; however, when a conclusion can be reached that the legislature would have enacted the act in question with the unconstitutional portion omitted, then elision of the unconstitutional portion is appropriate.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 189 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Tester, 879 | 1 | 1 |
Baugh v. Novakgreen1 sentence2020Indeed, the arbitration agreement stated as follows on this issue: “If any provision of this Agreement is held to be unenforceable by reason of law, the provision will be modified to reflect the parties’ intention to arbitrate their claims, and all remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect.” In a previous decision where an arbitration agreement contained a severability clause, this Court ruled that arbitration should proceed notwithstanding an offensive provision, see Knaffl v. Douglas Co., No. 03A01-9901-CH-00006, 1999 WL 894203 , at *1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1999) (noti | 1 | 1 |
In Re Swansongreen1 sentence2020However, “the General Assembly has approved the practice of elision through the enactment of a general severability statute.” State v. Crank, 468 S.W.3d 15, 28 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-110 ).10 “[T]he legislature’s endorsement of elision does not automatically make it applicable to every situation; however, when a conclusion can be reached that the legislature would have enacted the act in question with the unconstitutional portion omitted, then elision of the unconstitutional portion is appropriate.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 189 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Tester, 879 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Babygreen1 sentence2020Indeed, the arbitration agreement stated as follows on this issue: “If any provision of this Agreement is held to be unenforceable by reason of law, the provision will be modified to reflect the parties’ intention to arbitrate their claims, and all remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect.” In a previous decision where an arbitration agreement contained a severability clause, this Court ruled that arbitration should proceed notwithstanding an offensive provision, see Knaffl v. Douglas Co., No. 03A01-9901-CH-00006, 1999 WL 894203 , at *1, 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1999) (noti | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. Jacqueline Crankgreen1 sentence2020However, “the General Assembly has approved the practice of elision through the enactment of a general severability statute.” State v. Crank, 468 S.W.3d 15, 28 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-110 ).10 “[T]he legislature’s endorsement of elision does not automatically make it applicable to every situation; however, when a conclusion can be reached that the legislature would have enacted the act in question with the unconstitutional portion omitted, then elision of the unconstitutional portion is appropriate.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 189 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Tester, 879 | 1 | 1 |
Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamstersgreen2 sentences2015See Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 298, n.6 . 2015Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 299-301 . | 1 | 1 |
Hart v. City of Johnson Citygreen1 sentence1994We are convinced, however, that the general severability clause is not sufficient to justify eliding the constitutionally impermissible classification that excludes 92 of the 95 counties. ‘Where a clause is so interwoven with other portions of an act that we cannot suppose that the legislature would have passed the act with that clause omitted, then if such clause is declared void, it renders the whole act null.” Hart v. City of Johnson City, 801 S.W,2d 512, 517 (Tenn.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Anthony v. Cartergreen1 sentence1984See generally, Anthony v. Carter, 541 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn.1976); 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction ch. 44 (C.D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. State
green
2 sentences1999Miller, 584 S.W.2d at 765 . 1997It also h eld that because the 1919 Act did not have a severability clause, all of the senten cing prov isions of the 1919 A ct were u ncons titutional, not ju st the dea th penalty provision. 584 S.W.2d at 765 . | 2 | 1997–1999 |
State v. Murray
green
1 sentence2020However, “the General Assembly has approved the practice of elision through the enactment of a general severability statute.” State v. Crank, 468 S.W.3d 15, 28 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-110 ).10 “[T]he legislature’s endorsement of elision does not automatically make it applicable to every situation; however, when a conclusion can be reached that the legislature would have enacted the act in question with the unconstitutional portion omitted, then elision of the unconstitutional portion is appropriate.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 189 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Tester, 879 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Gaskin v. Collins
green
1 sentence1997In Gaskin v. Collins, supra, at 866 , the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and said: By judgment entered March 16, 1983, the Chancellor held that "Section 8 of Chapter 345 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1981, as codified at T.C.A. § 2-2- 139(d) and § 2-19-143(4), is declared to be unconstitutional in that it violates Article I, § 5 of the Tennessee Constitution." The Chancellor found that the remaining sections of Chapter 345 were not affected because of the severability clause found in Section 9 of the Act. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Taylor Theater, Inc. v. Town of Mountain City
neutral
1 sentence1994In Taylor Theater v. Town of Mountain City, for example, the Court found that a public act’s single population bracket excluding only Johnson County from a statute giving all other counties the option to prohibit the operation of movie theaters on Sundays for private gain violated Article 11, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. 227 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn.1950). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Knoxville's Community Development Corp. v. Knox County
green
1 sentence1994Id. at 705 ; see also Chapter 906 of the Public Acts of 1982. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Menefee Crushed Stone Co. v. Taylor
green
1 sentence1994Did the Chancellor err in basing his elision of the population exclusions of T.C.A § 67-7-211 on a severability clause found in Section 12, Chapter 953 of the Public Acts of 1984 in view of Menefee Crushed Stone Co. v. Taylor, 760 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn.App.1988), which states that “Chapter 953, Public Acts of 1984, was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority” and “null and void”? b. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State Ex Rel. Scandlyn v. Trotter
green
2 sentences1994We again review the population exclusion brackets with the thought in mind that such brackets must have a rational basis to be constitutional, see Estrin and State v. Trotter, 153 Tenn. 30 , 281 S.W. 925 (1926), or else must be of such modest importance that the legislature would certainly have passed the Act without them. 1994We again review the population exclusion brackets with the thought in mind that such brackets must have a rational basis to be constitutional, see Estrin and State v. Trotter, 153 Tenn. 30 , 281 S.W. 925 (1926), or else must be of such modest importance that the legislature would certainly have passed the Act without them. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Maury County v. Porter
neutral
2 sentences1979Maury County v. Porter, 195 Tenn. 116 , 257 S.W.2d 16 (1953). 1979Maury County v. Porter, 195 Tenn. 116 , 257 S.W.2d 16 (1953). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
DAVIDSON COUNTY v. Elrod
green
2 sentences1951Davidson County v. Elrod, 191 Tenn. 109 , 232 S. W. (2d) 1 . 1951Davidson County v. Elrod, 191 Tenn. 109 , 232 S. W. (2d) 1 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Gates v. Long
green
2 sentences1948The severability clause of Chapter 346 is much more liberal than the severability' clause set out in Gates v. Long, 172 Tenn. 471 , at page 480, 113 S. W. 2d 388, 392 . 1948The severability clause of Chapter 346 is much more liberal than the severability' clause set out in Gates v. Long, 172 Tenn. 471 , at page 480, 113 S. W. 2d 388, 392 . | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.