severability clause in Iowa

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 261-62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 896-97 , 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 8-9 , 82 N.W. 445 , 447-48 (1900). 8 *609 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 35-36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 261-62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 896-97 , 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 8-9 , 82 N.W. 445 , 447-48 (1900). 8 *609 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 35-36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 261-62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 896-97 , 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 8-9 , 82 N.W. 445 , 447-48 (1900). 8 *609 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 35-36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 261-62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 896-97 , 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 8-9 , 82 N.W. 445 , 447-48 (1900). 8 *609 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 35-36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 261-62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 896-97 , 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 8-9 , 82 N.W. 445 , 447-48 (1900). 8 *609 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 35-36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250 , 261–62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888 , 896–97, 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1 , 8–9, 82 N.W. 445 , 447–48 (1900). 8 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24 , 35–36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2007Cf. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Iowa 2004) (in the context of statutory severance, this court has held that severance “is appropriate if it does not substantially impair legislative purpose, the enactment remains capable of fulfilling the apparent legislative intent, and the remaining portion of the enactment can be given effect without the invalid provision” (citations omitted)).

2007Cf. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 174 (Iowa 2004) (in the context of statutory severance, this court has held that severance “is 29 appropriate if it does not substantially impair legislative purpose, the enactment remains capable of fulfilling the apparent legislative intent, and the remaining portion of the enactment can be given effect without the invalid provision” (citations omitted)).

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 261-62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 896-97 , 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 8-9 , 82 N.W. 445 , 447-48 (1900). 8 *609 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 35-36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250 , 261–62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888 , 896–97, 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1 , 8–9, 82 N.W. 445 , 447–48 (1900). 8 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24 , 35–36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250, 261-62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 896-97 , 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1, 8-9 , 82 N.W. 445 , 447-48 (1900). 8 *609 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 35-36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2016Dog Owners, 469 N.W.2d at 418 ; State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250 , 261–62 (Iowa 1975); Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 586 (Iowa 1969); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888 , 896–97, 258 N.W. 190, 195 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 939 , 23 N.W.2d 883, 897 (Iowa 1946); State v. Santee, 111 Iowa 1 , 8–9, 82 N.W. 445 , 447–48 (1900). 8 We thoroughly reviewed the severability doctrine in State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24 , 35–36 (Iowa 1975) (en banc).

2012Co. v. Proctor, 286 F.Supp.2d 567, 574-75 (D.Md.2003) (indicating that "any” is not ambiguous under Maryland law and exclusion is collective, regardless of severability clause); Allstate Ins.

2012Co. v. Cross, 103 Wash.App. 52 , 10 P.3d 440, 445 (2000) (establishing that a severability clause does not affect the meaning of "an insured” as used in an intentional acts exclusion); J.G. v. Wangard, 313 Wis.2d 329 , 753 N.W.2d 475, 488 (2008) (denying coverage to all coin-sureds under the intentional acts exclusion referring to "any” insured, despite the sever-ability clause). 8 .

2012Co. v. Cross, 103 Wash.App. 52 , 10 P.3d 440, 445 (2000) (establishing that a severability clause does not affect the meaning of "an insured” as used in an intentional acts exclusion); J.G. v. Wangard, 313 Wis.2d 329 , 753 N.W.2d 475, 488 (2008) (denying coverage to all coin-sureds under the intentional acts exclusion referring to "any” insured, despite the sever-ability clause). 8 .

2012Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562 , 913 N.E.2d 426, 441-42 (2009) (holding that a severability clause does not affect the plain meaning and application of "an insured” or "any insured” in the exclusions denying coverage to innocent coinsureds); McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1289 (finding joint obligations under the exclusion even though the policy defined each named insured as a "separate insured”); Great Cent.

2012Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562 , 913 N.E.2d 426, 441-42 (2009) (holding that a severability clause does not affect the plain meaning and application of "an insured” or "any insured” in the exclusions denying coverage to innocent coinsureds); McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1289 (finding joint obligations under the exclusion even though the policy defined each named insured as a "separate insured”); Great Cent.

2012Co. v. Copeland-Williams, 941 S.W.2d 625, 627-29 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (holding that "any insured” in the exclusionary clause is unambiguously collective rather than several, despite severability clause); Villa v. Short, 195 N.J. 15 , 947 A.2d 1217, 1224-25 (2008) (finding that a severability clause does not inject ambiguity or remove the joint obligation imposed by intentional and criminal acts exclusions referring to either "an insured” or "any insured”); Safeco Ins.

2012Co. v. Copeland-Williams, 941 S.W.2d 625, 627-29 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (holding that "any insured” in the exclusionary clause is unambiguously collective rather than several, despite severability clause); Villa v. Short, 195 N.J. 15 , 947 A.2d 1217, 1224-25 (2008) (finding that a severability clause does not inject ambiguity or remove the joint obligation imposed by intentional and criminal acts exclusions referring to either "an insured” or "any insured”); Safeco Ins.

2012Co., 687 A.2d 642, 644-45 (Me.1997) (finding severability clauses do not change the collective effect of an intentional acts exclusion referring to "an insured”); SECURA Supreme Ins.

2012Co. v. Roemmich, 291 N.W.2d 772, 774-75 (S.D.1980) (establishing that an exclusion applying to "any insured” is unambiguous and unaffected by a severability clause); Mut. of Enumclaw Ins.

2012Co. v. Copeland-Williams, 941 S.W.2d 625, 627-29 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (holding that "any insured” in the exclusionary clause is unambiguously collective rather than several, despite severability clause); Villa v. Short, 195 N.J. 15 , 947 A.2d 1217, 1224-25 (2008) (finding that a severability clause does not inject ambiguity or remove the joint obligation imposed by intentional and criminal acts exclusions referring to either "an insured” or "any insured”); Safeco Ins.

2012Co. v. Diedrich, 394 F.3d 1091, 1097-98 (8th Cir.2005) (imposing joint obligations under South Dakota law for an intentional acts exclusion referring to "one or more insureds,” despite the severability clause); Standard Fire Ins.

2012Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 328-29 (Minn.Ct.App.2008) (holding that the severability clause did not make the criminal acts exclusion referring to "any” insured ambiguous); Am.

2012Co., 262 N.W.2d 588, 589-92 (Iowa 1978) (finding on first impression that the severability clause was inserted to clarify that only “the insured,” namely the employer, was liable under the “bodily injury to any employee” exclusion when the phrase “the insured” was used).

2012Co. v. Cross, 103 Wash.App. 52 , 10 P.3d 440, 445 (2000) (establishing that a severability clause does not affect the meaning of "an insured” as used in an intentional acts exclusion); J.G. v. Wangard, 313 Wis.2d 329 , 753 N.W.2d 475, 488 (2008) (denying coverage to all coin-sureds under the intentional acts exclusion referring to "any” insured, despite the sever-ability clause). 8 .

2012Co. v. Cross, 103 Wash.App. 52 , 10 P.3d 440, 445 (2000) (establishing that a severability clause does not affect the meaning of "an insured” as used in an intentional acts exclusion); J.G. v. Wangard, 313 Wis.2d 329 , 753 N.W.2d 475, 488 (2008) (denying coverage to all coin-sureds under the intentional acts exclusion referring to "any” insured, despite the sever-ability clause). 8 .

2012Co. v. Kim, 121 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1308 (D.Hawai’i 2000) (finding "an insured” is unambiguous, applies to innocent coinsureds, and is not affected by the severability clause); Chacon, 788 P.2d at 752 (preferring to give full effect to exclusions referring to "any insured,” despite a severability clause, in order to respect the party’s contractual expectations and enforce the court’s contractual analysis); Johnson v. Allstate Ins.

2012Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562 , 913 N.E.2d 426, 441-42 (2009) (holding that a severability clause does not affect the plain meaning and application of "an insured” or "any insured” in the exclusions denying coverage to innocent coinsureds); McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1289 (finding joint obligations under the exclusion even though the policy defined each named insured as a "separate insured”); Great Cent.

2012Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562 , 913 N.E.2d 426, 441-42 (2009) (holding that a severability clause does not affect the plain meaning and application of "an insured” or "any insured” in the exclusions denying coverage to innocent coinsureds); McAllister, 640 A.2d at 1289 (finding joint obligations under the exclusion even though the policy defined each named insured as a "separate insured”); Great Cent.

2012Co. v. Kim, 121 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1308 (D.Hawai’i 2000) (finding "an insured” is unambiguous, applies to innocent coinsureds, and is not affected by the severability clause); Chacon, 788 P.2d at 752 (preferring to give full effect to exclusions referring to "any insured,” despite a severability clause, in order to respect the party’s contractual expectations and enforce the court’s contractual analysis); Johnson v. Allstate Ins.

2005See generally Grinnell Mut., 494 N.W.2d at 692 (“An insurance policy is construed as a whole, not by its separate provisions.”).

2005Co., 937 F.Supp. 413, 418 (E.D.Pa.1996) (stating “the vast majority of jurisdictions ... hold that ... a separation of insureds clause modifies the meaning of an exclusion phrased in terms of ‘the insured’ ”). *116 Thus, the severability clause was pertinent in United-Fire because the policy at issue in that case excluded coverage for bodily injury “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” 642 N.W.2d at 663 (emphasis added).

2005Co., 937 F.Supp. 413, 418 (E.D.Pa.1996) (stating “the vast majority of jurisdictions ... hold that ... a separation of insureds clause modifies the meaning of an exclusion phrased in terms of ‘the insured’ ”). *116 Thus, the severability clause was pertinent in United-Fire because the policy at issue in that case excluded coverage for bodily injury “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” 642 N.W.2d at 663 (emphasis added).

2005See Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis.2d 719 , 505 N.W.2d 418, 420, 422 (Ct.App.1993); accord Michael Carbone, 937 F.Supp. at 420 ; Cal. Cas.

2005See Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis.2d 719 , 505 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Ct.App.1993) (holding severability clause did not render *117 exclusion of “any damages ... attributable to ... any outrageous conduct on the part of any ‘insured’ ” ambiguous); see also Nat’l Ins.

2005See Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis.2d 719 , 505 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Ct.App.1993) (holding severability clause did not render *117 exclusion of “any damages ... attributable to ... any outrageous conduct on the part of any ‘insured’ ” ambiguous); see also Nat’l Ins.

2005Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179, 183-84 (N.D.1994) (holding exclusion of bodily injury arising out of sexual molestation by any person involved in day care operation clearly placed such risks outside the policy and consequently there was no coverage for claim of negligent supervision despite existence of severability-of-interests clause: “To construe the severability clause to provide coverage in these circumstances is repugnant to the plainly-worded exclusion.”).