severability clause in Kansas

1993The severability clause is found in K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-3806, which provides: “If any provision or clause of this act or application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.” In Felten Truck Line v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 183 Kan. 287, 300 , 327 P.2d 836 (1958), the court stated the test to be applied: “Whether the court may sever an unconstitutional prov

1993The severability clause is found in K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 60-3806, which provides: “If any provision or clause of this act or application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.” In Felten Truck Line v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 183 Kan. 287, 300 , 327 P.2d 836 (1958), the court stated the test to be applied: “Whether the court may sever an unconstitutional prov

2024As stated in State v. Limon, 280 Kan. 275, 304 , 122 P.3d 22 (2005): '"[T]he enactment of a severability clause in a statute or series of statutes evidences the intent of the legislature that if some portion or phrase in the statute is unconstitutional, the balance shall be deemed valid." [Citation omitted.]' Here, the Legislature unequivocally expressed its intent that if a portion of the Kansas implied consent law was found to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute survive.

2024As stated in State v. Limon, 280 Kan. 275, 304 , 122 P.3d 22 (2005): '"[T]he enactment of a severability clause in a statute or series of statutes evidences the intent of the legislature that if some portion or phrase in the statute is unconstitutional, the balance shall be deemed valid." [Citation omitted.]' Here, the Legislature unequivocally expressed its intent that if a portion of the Kansas implied consent law was found to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute survive.

2024The State urges us to reverse the district court's severability decision, sever any unconstitutional provision, and let the rest of the Challenged Laws stand. 47 The touchstone for severability is legislative intent. "[F]or determining legislative intent, the severability clause 'is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.'" Gannon v. State, 304 Kan. 490, 520 , 372 P.3d 1181 (2016) (citing Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S. Ct. 323 , 68 L.

2024The State urges us to reverse the district court's severability decision, sever any unconstitutional provision, and let the rest of the Challenged Laws stand. 47 The touchstone for severability is legislative intent. "[F]or determining legislative intent, the severability clause 'is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.'" Gannon v. State, 304 Kan. 490, 520 , 372 P.3d 1181 (2016) (citing Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S. Ct. 323 , 68 L.

1998This court will assume severability if the unconstitutional part can be severed without doing violence to legislative intent.” ’ (Quoting Felten Truck Line v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 183 Kan. 287, 300 , 327 P.2d 836 [1958]). ‘We further quoted State, ex rel., v. Consumers Warehouse Market, 185 Kan. 363, 372 , 343 P.2d 234 (1959): ‘The rule is stated very clearly in the early case of Central Branch U.P.R.

1998This court will assume severability if the unconstitutional part can be severed without doing violence to legislative intent.” ’ (Quoting Felten Truck Line v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 183 Kan. 287, 300 , 327 P.2d 836 [1958]). ‘We further quoted State, ex rel., v. Consumers Warehouse Market, 185 Kan. 363, 372 , 343 P.2d 234 (1959): ‘The rule is stated very clearly in the early case of Central Branch U.P.R.

2024The State urges us to reverse the district court's severability decision, sever any unconstitutional provision, and let the rest of the Challenged Laws stand. 47 The touchstone for severability is legislative intent. "[F]or determining legislative intent, the severability clause 'is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.'" Gannon v. State, 304 Kan. 490, 520 , 372 P.3d 1181 (2016) (citing Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S. Ct. 323 , 68 L.

2024The State urges us to reverse the district court's severability decision, sever any unconstitutional provision, and let the rest of the Challenged Laws stand. 47 The touchstone for severability is legislative intent. "[F]or determining legislative intent, the severability clause 'is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.'" Gannon v. State, 304 Kan. 490, 520 , 372 P.3d 1181 (2016) (citing Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S. Ct. 323 , 68 L.

1998It is also confusing and allows coverage beyond that anticipated in the policy." Recognizing that Upland lives, I address the majority's conclusion flowing from its observation that because of Upland, "one looks to the underlying theory of liability alleged to determine whether there was coverage." The Brumleys, emphasizing the severability clause of the Safeco policy, rely on Catholic Diocese of Dodge City v. Raymer, 251 Kan. 689 , 840 P.2d 456 (1992), as their primary authority.

1998It is also confusing and allows coverage beyond that anticipated in the policy." Recognizing that Upland lives, I address the majority's conclusion flowing from its observation that because of Upland, "one looks to the underlying theory of liability alleged to determine whether there was coverage." The Brumleys, emphasizing the severability clause of the Safeco policy, rely on Catholic Diocese of Dodge City v. Raymer, 251 Kan. 689 , 840 P.2d 456 (1992), as their primary authority.

2024State v. Robison, 314 Kan. 245 , 248, 496 P.3d 892 (2021).

2024"Substantial Compliance "Because K.S.A. 8-1001 et seq. is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed, '"it is generally recognized that substantial compliance with statutory notice provisions will usually be sufficient" when advising a driver of his or her rights under the Kansas implied consent law, provided that the notice in question "conveyed the essentials of the statute and did not mislead the appellant." [Citation omitted.]' Hoeffner v Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 50 Kan.

2016The severability clause Brennan quoted Felten to state that "'[w]hether the legislature had provided for a severability clause is of no importance.'" (Emphasis added.) 293 Kan. at 463 .

2016The severability clause Brennan quoted Felten to state that ‘“[wjhether the legislature had provided for a severability clause is of no importance.’” (Emphasis added.) 293 Kan. at 463 .

2016This court will assume severability if the unconstitutional part can be severed without 35 doing violence to legislative intent.'" (Emphasis added.) Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 293 Kan. 446, 463 , 264 P.3d 102 (2011) (quoting Felten Truck Line v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 183 Kan. 287, 300 , 327 P.2d 836 ([1958]).

2016This court will assume severability if the unconstitutional part can be severed without doing violence to legislative intent.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Brennan v. Kansas Insurance Guaranty Ass’n, 293 Kan. 446, 463 , 264 P.3d 102 (2011) (quoting Felten Truck Line v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 183 Kan. 287, 300 , 327 P.2d 836 ([1958]).

1998Safeco cites the following cases from other jurisdictions in which liability coverage was denied because the injury was not the result of an accident: Allstate Insurance Company v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419 , 454 S.E.2d 616 (1995); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4 , 843 P.2d 154 (1992); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693 , 946 P.2d 1333 (1997); and MBPIA v. Wasarovich, 214 Mich. App. 319 , 542 N.W.2d 367 (1995).

1998Safeco cites the following cases from other jurisdictions in which liability coverage was denied because the injury was not the result of an accident: Allstate Insurance Company v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419 , 454 S.E.2d 616 (1995); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4 , 843 P.2d 154 (1992); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693 , 946 P.2d 1333 (1997); and MBPIA v. Wasarovich, 214 Mich. App. 319 , 542 N.W.2d 367 (1995).

1998Safeco cites the following cases from other jurisdictions in which liability coverage was denied because the injury was not the result of an accident: Allstate Insurance Company v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419 , 454 S.E.2d 616 (1995); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4 , 843 P.2d 154 (1992); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693 , 946 P.2d 1333 (1997); and MBPIA v. Wasarovich, 214 Mich. App. 319 , 542 N.W.2d 367 (1995).

1998Safeco cites the following cases from other jurisdictions in which liability coverage was denied because the injury was not the result of an accident: Allstate Insurance Company v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419 , 454 S.E.2d 616 (1995); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4 , 843 P.2d 154 (1992); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693 , 946 P.2d 1333 (1997); and MBPIA v. Wasarovich, 214 Mich. App. 319 , 542 N.W.2d 367 (1995).

1998E.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 , 131 L.

1998E.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 , 131 L.

1998The policy defined "occurrence" as an accident, contained an exclusion for injury "expected or intended by the insured," and also contained a severability clause. 147 N.J. at 325 .

1998The policy defined “occurrence” as an accident, contained an exclusion for injury “expected or intended by the insured,” and also contained a severability clause. 147 N.J. at 325 .

1998Safeco cites the following cases from other jurisdictions in which liability coverage was denied because the injury was not the result of an accident: Allstate Insurance Company v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419 , 454 S.E.2d 616 (1995); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4 , 843 P.2d 154 (1992); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693 , 946 P.2d 1333 (1997); and MBPIA v. Wasarovich, 214 Mich. App. 319 , 542 N.W.2d 367 (1995).

1998Safeco cites the following cases from other jurisdictions in which liability coverage was denied because the injury was not the result of an accident: Allstate Insurance Company v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419 , 454 S.E.2d 616 (1995); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4 , 843 P.2d 154 (1992); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693 , 946 P.2d 1333 (1997); and MBPIA v. Wasarovich, 214 Mich. App. 319 , 542 N.W.2d 367 (1995).

1998Co. v. Gravatt, 231 Kan. 196 , 642 P.2d 569 (1982).

1998Co. v. Gravatt, 231 Kan. 196 , 642 P.2d 569 (1982).

1998Copeland-Williams involved a homeowner's policy with a severability clause and an exclusion for injuries "expected or intended from the standpoint of any insured." 941 S.W.2d at 627 .

1998Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1994), to be persuasive, holding: "The use of the phrase `any insured' makes the exclusionary clause unambiguous even in light of the severability clause." 941 S.W.2d at 629 .

1998Safeco cites the following cases from other jurisdictions in which liability coverage was denied because the injury was not the result of an accident: Allstate Insurance Company v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419 , 454 S.E.2d 616 (1995); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4 , 843 P.2d 154 (1992); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693 , 946 P.2d 1333 (1997); and MBPIA v. Wasarovich, 214 Mich. App. 319 , 542 N.W.2d 367 (1995).

1998Safeco cites the following cases from other jurisdictions in which liability coverage was denied because the injury was not the result of an accident: Allstate Insurance Company v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419 , 454 S.E.2d 616 (1995); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4 , 843 P.2d 154 (1992); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693 , 946 P.2d 1333 (1997); and MBPIA v. Wasarovich, 214 Mich. App. 319 , 542 N.W.2d 367 (1995).

1998The absence of causation here is endorsed by our disposition of the claims of negligent entrustment in Davey v. Hedden, 260 Kan. 413 , 920 P.2d 420 (1996).

1998The absence of causation here is endorsed by our disposition of the claims of negligent entrustment in Davey v. Hedden, 260 Kan. 413 , 920 P.2d 420 (1996).

1998Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1994), to be persuasive, holding: "The use of the phrase `any insured' makes the exclusionary clause unambiguous even in light of the severability clause." 941 S.W.2d at 629 .

1998Co. v. Norgarid, 518 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1994), to be persuasive, holding: “The use of the phrase ‘any insured’ makes the exclusionary clause unambiguous even in light of the severability clause.” 941 S.W.2d at 629 .

1998The purpose of the severability clause is not to negate the plainly worded meaning of the business exclusion clause." 912 S.W.2d at 534-35 .

1998The purpose of the severability clause is not to negate the plainly worded meaning of the business exclusion clause.” 912 S.W.2d at 534-35 .

1992While the Michigan Supreme Court in Freeman, 432 Mich. 656 , did not consider any severability of interest clause in the insurance policy under consideration in that case, the court did consider the insured’s argument that the insurer had “a separate and distinct duty to cover each insured under the policy,” the virtual equivalent of a severability clause. 432 Mich, at 690 .

1992While the Michigan Supreme Court in Freeman, 432 Mich. 656 , did not consider any severability of interest clause in the insurance policy under consideration in that case, the court did consider the insured’s argument that the insurer had “a separate and distinct duty to cover each insured under the policy,” the virtual equivalent of a severability clause. 432 Mich, at 690 .

1992The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, observing that the insurance contract contained a severability clause purporting to separate the insureds’ interests while the exclusion clause, “we do not cover . . . damage . . . expected or intended by an insured,” attempted to join the insureds’ obligations. 135 Wis. 2d at 256 .

1974In Voran v. Wright, 129 Kan. 601 , 284 Pac. 807 , we stated: “Where parts of a statute or section thereof can be readily separated, that part which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected.” (Syl. f 6.) The rule is qualified by the principle that where the void and the valid parts of a statute are so interconnected that they cannot be separated without doing violence to the legislative intent, the statute as a whole must fall.

1974In Voran v. Wright, 129 Kan. 601 , 284 Pac. 807 , we stated: “Where parts of a statute or section thereof can be readily separated, that part which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected.” (Syl. f 6.) The rule is qualified by the principle that where the void and the valid parts of a statute are so interconnected that they cannot be separated without doing violence to the legislative intent, the statute as a whole must fall.