8 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bradbury & Stamm Construction Co. v. Bureau of Revenuegreen2 sentences2012Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 70 N.M. 226, 230-31 , 372 P.2d 808, 811 (1962)). {49} FATA contains a severability clause that allows the remainder of the statute to remain in effect if any part of the law is invalidated. 2012Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 70 N.M. 226, 230-31 , 372 P.2d 808, 811 (1962)). {49} FATA contains a severability clause that allows the remainder of the statute to remain in effect if any part of the law is invalidated. | 2 | 3 |
Barber's Super Markets, Inc. v. City of Grantsgreen2 sentences2003In Chapman, our Supreme Court explained that “a severability clause raises a presumption that the legislating body would have enacted the rest of the ordinance without the void section.” Id. (citing Barber’s Super Markets, Inc. v. City of Grants, 80 N.M. 533, 536 , 458 P.2d 785, 788 (1969)). 2003In Chapman, our Supreme Court explained that “a severability clause raises a presumption that the legislating body would have enacted the rest of the ordinance without the void section.” Id. (citing Barber’s Super Markets, Inc. v. City of Grants, 80 N.M. 533, 536 , 458 P.2d 785, 788 (1969)). | 1 | 2 |
PROTECTION & ADVOCACY SYSTEM v. City of Albuquerquegreen2 sentences2012See Prot. & Advocacy Sys. v. City of Albuquerque, 2008-NMCA-149, ¶ 73 , 145 N.M. 156 , 195 P.3d 1 (stating that “a severability clause raises a presumption that the legislating body would have enacted the rest of the ordinance without the void section” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {51} We therefore conclude that the retroactivity provision of FATA may be severed from 21 FATA, which shall otherwise remain in full force and effect as it is applied prospectively. 2012See Prot. & Advocacy Sys. v. City of Albuquerque, 2008-NMCA-149, ¶ 73 , 145 N.M. 156 , 195 P.3d 1 (stating that “a severability clause raises a presumption that the legislating body would have enacted the rest of the ordinance without the void section” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {51} We therefore conclude that the retroactivity provision of FATA may be severed from 21 FATA, which shall otherwise remain in full force and effect as it is applied prospectively. | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P.green1 sentence2011See Stewart, 9 A.3d at 221 (concluding “that the severability clause cannot ... override the fact that the NAF and the NAF Code were an integral part of the Agreement”); John R. | 1 | 1 |
John R. Ray & Sons, Inc. v. Stromangreen2 sentences2011Ray & Sons, Inc. v. Stroman, 923 S.W.2d 80, 87 (Tex.App.1996) (“[W]hen the severed portion is integral to the entire contract, a severability clause, standing alone, cannot save the contract.”). {38} The pervasive references to the NAF in the contract compel our conclusion that the parties intended for the NAF to be the exclusive arbitrator in any out-of-court dispute resolution. 2011Ray & Sons, Inc. v. Stroman, 923 S.W.2d 80, 87 (Tex.App.1996) (“[W]hen the severed portion is integral to the entire contract, a severability clause, standing alone, cannot save the contract.”). {38} The pervasive references to the NAF in the contract compel our conclusion that the parties intended for the NAF to be the exclusive arbitrator in any out-of-court dispute resolution. | 1 | 1 |
Burch v. Foygreen2 sentences1969See Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219 , 308 P.2d 199 (1957), where there was a sever-ability clause, and Bradbury & Stamm Construction Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 70 N.M. 226 , 372 P.2d 808 (1962), where there was none. 1969See Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219 , 308 P.2d 199 (1957), where there was a sever-ability clause, and Bradbury & Stamm Construction Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 70 N.M. 226 , 372 P.2d 808 (1962), where there was none. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Luna
green
2 sentences2008While, as in Chapman, the severability clause in this case is “emphatic in its statement that the ordinanee[] would have been enacted even if the invalid provision[ ] were not included,” id., here the invalidation of the relief available in the Ordinance in effect guts the entire Ordinance. 2003In Chapman, our Supreme Court explained that “a severability clause raises a presumption that the legislating body would have enacted the rest of the ordinance without the void section.” Id. (citing Barber’s Super Markets, Inc. v. City of Grants, 80 N.M. 533, 536 , 458 P.2d 785, 788 (1969)). | 2 | 2003–2008 |
Dorchy v. Kansas
green
2 sentences2002“The presence or absence of a severability clause merely provides one rule of construction which may be considered and may sometimes aid in determining legislative intent, ‘[b]ut it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.’ ” Id. (quoting Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S.Ct. 323 , 68 L.Ed. 686 (1924) (Brandéis, J.)). 2002“The presence or absence of a severability clause merely provides one rule of construction which may be considered and may sometimes aid in determining legislative intent, ‘[b]ut it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.’ ” Id. (quoting Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S.Ct. 323 , 68 L.Ed. 686 (1924) (Brandéis, J.)). | 2 | 1962–2002 |
Hill v. Wallace
green
2 sentences1962The presence or absence of a severability clause merely provides one rule of construction which may be considered and may sometimes aid in determining legislative intent, “but it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.” Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S.Ct. 323, 325 , 68 L.Ed. 686, 689 ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 71 , 42 S.Ct. 453, 459 , 66 L.Ed. 822, 831 ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vigil, 40 N.M. 190 , 57 P.2d 287 . 1962The presence or absence of a severability clause merely provides one rule of construction which may be considered and may sometimes aid in determining legislative intent, “but it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.” Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S.Ct. 323, 325 , 68 L.Ed. 686, 689 ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 71 , 42 S.Ct. 453, 459 , 66 L.Ed. 822, 831 ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vigil, 40 N.M. 190 , 57 P.2d 287 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vigil
green
2 sentences1962The presence or absence of a severability clause merely provides one rule of construction which may be considered and may sometimes aid in determining legislative intent, “but it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.” Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S.Ct. 323, 325 , 68 L.Ed. 686, 689 ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 71 , 42 S.Ct. 453, 459 , 66 L.Ed. 822, 831 ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vigil, 40 N.M. 190 , 57 P.2d 287 . 1962The presence or absence of a severability clause merely provides one rule of construction which may be considered and may sometimes aid in determining legislative intent, “but it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.” Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 , 44 S.Ct. 323, 325 , 68 L.Ed. 686, 689 ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 71 , 42 S.Ct. 453, 459 , 66 L.Ed. 822, 831 ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vigil, 40 N.M. 190 , 57 P.2d 287 . | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.