severability clause in Wisconsin

1989Milwaukee County v. Boos, 8 Wis. 2d 215, 224 , 99 N.W.2d 139 (1959). "[T]he existence of a severability clause, while not controlling, is entitled to great weight in determining whether valid portions of a statute or ordinance can stand separate from any invalid portion." Id. 66 Wis. 2d at 80 .

1989Milwaukee County v. Boos, 8 Wis. 2d 215, 224 , 99 N.W.2d 139 (1959). "[T]he existence of a severability clause, while not controlling, is entitled to great weight in determining whether valid portions of a statute or ordinance can stand separate from any invalid portion." Id. 66 Wis. 2d at 80 .

2025McStroul v. Lucas, 251 Wis. 285, 291 , 29 N.W.2d 73 (1947) (citing Henry for a severability analysis focused on whether the provisions “are separable . . . and were probably intended to stand even if said final clause is invalid”); State ex rel.

2025McStroul v. Lucas, 251 Wis. 285, 291 , 29 N.W.2d 73 (1947) (citing Henry for a severability analysis focused on whether the provisions “are separable . . . and were probably intended to stand even if said final clause is invalid”); State ex rel.

2025Milwaukee Cnty. v. Boos, 8 Wis. 2d 215, 224 , 99 N.W.2d 139 (1959) (same); Town of Burke v. City of Madison, 17 Wis. 2d 623, 636 , 117 N.W.2d 580 (1962) (same).

2025Milwaukee Cnty. v. Boos, 8 Wis. 2d 215, 224 , 99 N.W.2d 139 (1959) (same); Town of Burke v. City of Madison, 17 Wis. 2d 623, 636 , 117 N.W.2d 580 (1962) (same).

2008Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 11.8, at 11-164 (5th ed.2007) (rejecting the position of courts that have "held . . . that a severability clause renders an `any insured' exclusion meaningless . . . on the basis that, otherwise, the severability clause would itself be meaningless" and noting that "[a] severability clause would still have meaning in a variety of contexts.") (footnote omitted). [1] The court of appeals distinguished Jessica M.F. from an earlier decision involving arson, Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Nemetz, 135 Wis.2d 245 , 400 N.W.2d 33 (Ct.App. 1986).

2008Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 11.8, at 11-164 (5th ed.2007) (rejecting the position of courts that have "held . . . that a severability clause renders an `any insured' exclusion meaningless . . . on the basis that, otherwise, the severability clause would itself be meaningless" and noting that "[a] severability clause would still have meaning in a variety of contexts.") (footnote omitted). [1] The court of appeals distinguished Jessica M.F. from an earlier decision involving arson, Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Nemetz, 135 Wis.2d 245 , 400 N.W.2d 33 (Ct.App. 1986).

2010Noting that the severability rule applies to situations in which "a warrant's description of the property to be seized is overly broad" and "the seizure of items under an appropriately specific warrant was overly broad," the court concluded that the severability rule "applies equally where the description of the premises to be searched is overly broad." Id. at 77 , 477 N.W.2d 304 (citing Noll, 116 Wis.2d at 454-55 , 343 N.W.2d 391 ; Petrone, 161 Wis.2d at 548 , 468 N.W.2d 676 ).

2010Noting that the severability rule applies to situations in which "a warrant's description of the property to be seized is overly broad" and "the seizure of items under an appropriately specific warrant was overly broad," the court concluded that the severability rule "applies equally where the description of the premises to be searched is overly broad." Id. at 77 (citing Noll, 116 Wis. 2d at 454-55 ; Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d at 548 ).

1989Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d at 80 , 223 N.W.2d at 870 .

1989Milwaukee County v. Boos, 8 Wis. 2d 215, 224 , 99 N.W.2d 139 (1959). "[T]he existence of a severability clause, while not controlling, is entitled to great weight in determining whether valid portions of a statute or ordinance can stand separate from any invalid portion." Id. 66 Wis. 2d at 80 .

2022However, even if a contract contains a severability clause, a court will not sever a 13 No. 2021AP984 contractual provision from a contract if severing that provision will “defeat the primary purpose of the bargain.” Riley, 345 Wis. 2d 804, ¶45 (quoting Schara v. Thiede, 58 Wis. 2d 489, 495 , 206 N.W.2d 129 (1973)). ¶28 A review of this court’s decision in Madison Teachers illustrates when a term may be substituted in an arbitration agreement without nullifying the entire agreement.

2022However, even if a contract contains a severability clause, a court will not sever a 13 No. 2021AP984 contractual provision from a contract if severing that provision will “defeat the primary purpose of the bargain.” Riley, 345 Wis. 2d 804, ¶45 (quoting Schara v. Thiede, 58 Wis. 2d 489, 495 , 206 N.W.2d 129 (1973)). ¶28 A review of this court’s decision in Madison Teachers illustrates when a term may be substituted in an arbitration agreement without nullifying the entire agreement.

2015That clause expressly directs that," [i]f any provision of this ordinance, or portion thereof, is adjudged . . . invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of this ordinance shall not be affected thereby." See LaCrosse, Wis., Ordinance No. 4810, § IX. ¶ 18. "[W]hile not controlling, the existence of a severability clause is entitled to great weight in determining whether the valid portion of an ordinance can stand separate from the invalid part." Stahl v. Town of Spider Lake, 149 Wis. 2d 230, 236 , 441 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1989).

2015That clause expressly directs that," [i]f any provision of this ordinance, or portion thereof, is adjudged . . . invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of this ordinance shall not be affected thereby." See LaCrosse, Wis., Ordinance No. 4810, § IX. ¶ 18. "[W]hile not controlling, the existence of a severability clause is entitled to great weight in determining whether the valid portion of an ordinance can stand separate from the invalid part." Stahl v. Town of Spider Lake, 149 Wis. 2d 230, 236 , 441 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1989).

2010For example, because express easements are subject to the statute of frauds, see Rock Lake Estates Unit Owners Association v. Township of Lake Mills, 195 Wis. 2d 348 , 373 n.15, 536 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1995), the conveying instrument must identify the easement with reasonable certainty.

2010For example, because express easements are subject to the statute of frauds, see Rock Lake Estates Unit Owners Association v. Township of Lake Mills, 195 Wis. 2d 348 , 373 n.15, 536 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1995), the conveying instrument must identify the easement with reasonable certainty.

2008While APCA suggests that the Declaration's lack of a severability clause means that the entire Declaration could be declared void, citing United Artists Corp. v. Odeon Building, Inc., 212 Wis. 150 , 248 N.W. 784 (1933), it has not explained why we should do so here.

2008While APCA suggests that the Declaration's lack of a severability clause means that the entire Declaration could be declared void, citing United Artists Corp. v. Odeon Building, Inc., 212 Wis. 150 , 248 N.W. 784 (1933), it has not explained why we should do so here.

2008Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 39 The Jessica M.F. court concluded that these considerations apply with "at least equal force to a policy-holder's expectations with respect to sexual assaults committed by his or her spouse." Jessica M.F., 209 Wis.2d at 57 , 561 N.W.2d 787 . ¶ 40 The Jessica M.F. court then addressed the "severability of interest" clause in the policies and distinguished its earlier Nemetz decision, which held that, despite an intentional acts exclusion, a severability clause in a homeowner's liability policy preserved coverage for a wife when her husband committed arson of their t

2008Cos., 170 Wis.2d 347, 364 , 488 N.W.2d 82 (1992)). ¶ 24 The coverage issue in this case turns on a dispute over the applicability of an intentional acts exclusion in each policy, and, ultimately, its interaction with a severability clause.

2008Cos., 170 Wis.2d 347, 364 , 488 N.W.2d 82 (1992)). ¶ 24 The coverage issue in this case turns on a dispute over the applicability of an intentional acts exclusion in each policy, and, ultimately, its interaction with a severability clause.

2008However, unlike Doyle, the severability clause provisions in Gulmire indicated that the policy applied to named insureds as if they were the "only one named," and to "other protected person[s]" "separately." Gulmire, 269 Wis. 2d 501, ¶ 24 . ¶ 54.

2008However, unlike Doyle , the severability clause provisions in Gulmire indicated that the policy applied to named insureds as if they were the "only one named," and to "other protected person[s]" "separately." Gulmire, 269 Wis.2d 501, ¶ 24 , 674 N.W.2d 629 . ¶ 54 Gulmire successfully argued that the fellow employee exclusion was inapplicable because the severability clause created separate policies as to each insured, thereby removing Klister from the "by you" in the exclusion.

2008In the Wangards' case, the severability clause reads: "Coverage applies separately to each covered person." Unlike Doyle, there is no express or implied intent in the language of the Wangards' policies that the contracts apply to Deborah and Steven individually "as if [he or she] was the only one named." Id. (emphasis added).

2008We'll apply this agreement: to each protected person named . . . as if that protected person was the only one named there; and separately to each other protected person." Id. at 291 n. 7, 580 N.W.2d 245 . ¶ 52 In the Wangards' case, the severability clause reads: "Coverage applies separately to each covered person." Unlike Doyle , there is no express or implied intent in the language of the Wangards' policies that the contracts apply to Deborah and Steven individually "as if [he or she] was the only one named. " Id. (emphasis added).