Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
24 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1947–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sugarloaf Citizens Assoc., Inc. v. Gudisgreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n, Inc. v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 573-77 (1990) (describing and performing a severability analysis). 2017For instance, otherwise valid provisions will not be severed where they are “inextricably mingled” with the invalid ones, Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 133 (1960), where “the two sets of provisions [are] ‘inseparably connected in substance,’” Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 576 (1990) (quoting Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 654 (1925)), where “those parts which might be held valid become so inoperative and inexplicable as to deprive the Act of its purposes and force,” Brennan, 180 Md. at 387 , or where the valid portions “are impracti | 3 | 5 |
Police Commissioner v. Siegel Enters., Inc.green2 sentences2017For instance, otherwise valid provisions will not be severed where they are “inextricably mingled” with the invalid ones, Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 133 (1960), where “the two sets of provisions [are] ‘inseparably connected in substance,’” Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 576 (1990) (quoting Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 654 (1925)), where “those parts which might be held valid become so inoperative and inexplicable as to deprive the Act of its purposes and force,” Brennan, 180 Md. at 387 , or where the valid portions “are impracti 2017For instance, otherwise valid provisions will not be severed where they are “inextricably mingled” with the invalid ones, Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 133 (1960), where “the two sets of provisions [are] ‘inseparably connected in substance,’” Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 576 (1990) (quoting Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 654 (1925)), where “those parts which might be held valid become so inoperative and inexplicable as to deprive the Act of its purposes and force,” Brennan, 180 Md. at 387 , or where the valid portions “are impracti | 2 | 4 |
Mayor of Baltimore v. O'Conorgreen2 sentences2017For instance, otherwise valid provisions will not be severed where they are “inextricably mingled” with the invalid ones, Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 133 (1960), where “the two sets of provisions [are] ‘inseparably connected in substance,’” Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 576 (1990) (quoting Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 654 (1925)), where “those parts which might be held valid become so inoperative and inexplicable as to deprive the Act of its purposes and force,” Brennan, 180 Md. at 387 , or where the valid portions “are impracti 2017For instance, otherwise valid provisions will not be severed where they are “inextricably mingled” with the invalid ones, Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 133 (1960), where “the two sets of provisions [are] ‘inseparably connected in substance,’” Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 576 (1990) (quoting Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 654 (1925)), where “those parts which might be held valid become so inoperative and inexplicable as to deprive the Act of its purposes and force,” Brennan, 180 Md. at 387 , or where the valid portions “are impracti | 2 | 2 |
Heubeck v. Mayor of Baltimoregreen2 sentences2017For instance, otherwise valid provisions will not be severed where they are “inextricably mingled” with the invalid ones, Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 133 (1960), where “the two sets of provisions [are] ‘inseparably connected in substance,’” Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 576 (1990) (quoting Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 654 (1925)), where “those parts which might be held valid become so inoperative and inexplicable as to deprive the Act of its purposes and force,” Brennan, 180 Md. at 387 , or where the valid portions “are impracti 2017For instance, otherwise valid provisions will not be severed where they are “inextricably mingled” with the invalid ones, Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 133 (1960), where “the two sets of provisions [are] ‘inseparably connected in substance,’” Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 576 (1990) (quoting Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 654 (1925)), where “those parts which might be held valid become so inoperative and inexplicable as to deprive the Act of its purposes and force,” Brennan, 180 Md. at 387 , or where the valid portions “are impracti | 2 | 2 |
Anne Arundel County v. Moushabekgreen2 sentences1990But a severability clause of this sort adds little to the basic presumption of severability, for such a "clause is merely declaratory of an established rule of construction; it is an aid merely, not an inexorable command.” Anne Arundel County v. Moushabek, 269 Md. 419, 428, 306 A.2d 517, 522 (1973) (quoting Sanza v. Md. 1990But a severability clause of this sort adds little to the basic presumption of severability, for such a "clause is merely declaratory of an established rule of construction; it is an aid merely, not an inexorable command.” Anne Arundel County v. Moushabek, 269 Md. 419, 428, 306 A.2d 517, 522 (1973) (quoting Sanza v. Md. | 1 | 3 |
Dorchy v. Kansasgreen2 sentences1970Notwithstanding the fact that Ordinance No. 437 contained no severability clause, as this court pointed out in the Schneider case, supra, p. 336, the effect *530 of such a clause is ‘merely declaratory of an established canon of construction recognized by this court.’ Even had there been a severability clause, in the words of Justice Brandéis, it would have been ‘an aid merely, not an inexorable command.’ Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 .” Eor further discussion of the point, see States Attorney v. Triplett, 255 Md. 270, pages 280-285, 257 A. 2d 748 (1969). 1961Notwithstanding the fact that Ordinance No. 437 contained no severability clause, as this court pointed out in the Schneider case, supra, p. 336, the effect of such a clause is “merely declaratory of an established canon of construction recognized by this court.” Even had there been a severability clause, in the words of Justice Brandéis, it would have been “an aid merely, not an inexorable command.” Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 . | 1 | 3 |
Sanza v. Maryland State Board of Censorsgreen2 sentences1982Further, Ordinance 165 contains a severability clause, see n.8, Section 8, which creates a presumption that any portion of a statute can be invalidated without affecting the rest. *414 Sanza v. Maryland Board of Censors, 245 Md. 319, 338 , 226 A.2d 317 (1967). 1982Further, Ordinance 165 contains a severability clause, see n.8, Section 8, which creates a presumption that any portion of a statute can be invalidated without affecting the rest. *414 Sanza v. Maryland Board of Censors, 245 Md. 319, 338 , 226 A.2d 317 (1967). | 1 | 3 |
Mayor of Baltimore v. Stuyvesant Insurancegreen2 sentences1976Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48 , 129 N. E. 202, 207 (1920), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 702 (1921), quoted with approval by this Court in Baltimore City v. Stuyvesant Co., 226 Md. 379, 391 , 174 A. 2d 153 (1961), is equally applicable: “In [New York], we have gone far in subdividing statutes, and sustaining them so far as valid. * * * The tendency is, I think, a wholesome one. 1976Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48 , 129 N. E. 202, 207 (1920), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 702 (1921), quoted with approval by this Court in Baltimore City v. Stuyvesant Co., 226 Md. 379, 391 , 174 A. 2d 153 (1961), is equally applicable: “In [New York], we have gone far in subdividing statutes, and sustaining them so far as valid. * * * The tendency is, I think, a wholesome one. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc.green1 sentence2026We recognize a “strong presumption ‘that a legislative body generally intends its enactments to be severed if possible.’” Sugarloaf, 319 Md. at 574 (quoting State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 297 (1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp.green2 sentences2025We explained that, although amicus curiae had suggested that the unconstitutional parts could be severed and that there was a severability clause in the amendment, the parties took “the position that the amendment is not so severable but rather is integrated as a whole.” Id. at 614 , 415 A.2d at 265 . 2025We explained that, although amicus curiae had suggested that the unconstitutional parts could be severed and that there was a severability clause in the amendment, the parties took “the position that the amendment is not so severable but rather is integrated as a whole.” Id. at 614 , 415 A.2d at 265 . | 1 | 1 |
Worcester Mutual Insurance v. Marnellgreen2 sentences1997Co. v. Marnell, 398 Mass. 240 , 496 N.E.2d 158, 161 (1986). 1997Co. v. Marnell, 398 Mass. 240 , 496 N.E.2d 158, 161 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knappgreen2 sentences1976Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48 , 129 N. E. 202, 207 (1920), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 702 (1921), quoted with approval by this Court in Baltimore City v. Stuyvesant Co., 226 Md. 379, 391 , 174 A. 2d 153 (1961), is equally applicable: “In [New York], we have gone far in subdividing statutes, and sustaining them so far as valid. * * * The tendency is, I think, a wholesome one. 1976Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48 , 129 N. E. 202, 207 (1920), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 702 (1921), quoted with approval by this Court in Baltimore City v. Stuyvesant Co., 226 Md. 379, 391 , 174 A. 2d 153 (1961), is equally applicable: “In [New York], we have gone far in subdividing statutes, and sustaining them so far as valid. * * * The tendency is, I think, a wholesome one. | 1 | 1 |
American Weekly, Inc. v. Pattersongreen2 sentences1975See Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, 186 Md. 508 , 47 A. 2d 372 (1946), wherein the Court separated the non-competition clauses in an employment contract containing a severability clause, but without referring to the severability clause, and American Weekly, Inc. v. Patterson, 179 Md. 109, 115 , 16 A. 2d 912 (1940), wherein the Court separated a non-competition *492 clause in a sale of a business situation. 1975See Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, 186 Md. 508 , 47 A. 2d 372 (1946), wherein the Court separated the non-competition clauses in an employment contract containing a severability clause, but without referring to the severability clause, and American Weekly, Inc. v. Patterson, 179 Md. 109, 115 , 16 A. 2d 912 (1940), wherein the Court separated a non-competition *492 clause in a sale of a business situation. | 1 | 1 |
Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, Inc.green2 sentences1975See Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, 186 Md. 508 , 47 A. 2d 372 (1946), wherein the Court separated the non-competition clauses in an employment contract containing a severability clause, but without referring to the severability clause, and American Weekly, Inc. v. Patterson, 179 Md. 109, 115 , 16 A. 2d 912 (1940), wherein the Court separated a non-competition *492 clause in a sale of a business situation. 1975See Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, 186 Md. 508 , 47 A. 2d 372 (1946), wherein the Court separated the non-competition clauses in an employment contract containing a severability clause, but without referring to the severability clause, and American Weekly, Inc. v. Patterson, 179 Md. 109, 115 , 16 A. 2d 912 (1940), wherein the Court separated a non-competition *492 clause in a sale of a business situation. | 1 | 1 |
Cromwell v. Jacksongreen2 sentences1958Bank, 174 Md. 403, 417 , 199 A. 119 . *290 It is true that the ordinances involved herein contained saving clauses; but this Court stated in Cromwell v. Jack son, 188 Md. 8, 28, 29 , 52 A. 2d 79 : “In the light of the prior decisions of this Court we hold that some of the duties imposed on the judges of the Circuit Court for Allegany County by Section 305 are quasi-legislative and hence nonjudicial, and that the Act as a whole is unconstitutional and invalid, despite the severability clause. 1958Bank, 174 Md. 403, 417 , 199 A. 119 . *290 It is true that the ordinances involved herein contained saving clauses; but this Court stated in Cromwell v. Jack son, 188 Md. 8, 28, 29 , 52 A. 2d 79 : “In the light of the prior decisions of this Court we hold that some of the duties imposed on the judges of the Circuit Court for Allegany County by Section 305 are quasi-legislative and hence nonjudicial, and that the Act as a whole is unconstitutional and invalid, despite the severability clause. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan
green
2 sentences2017For instance, otherwise valid provisions will not be severed where they are “inextricably mingled” with the invalid ones, Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 133 (1960), where “the two sets of provisions [are] ‘inseparably connected in substance,’” Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 576 (1990) (quoting Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 654 (1925)), where “those parts which might be held valid become so inoperative and inexplicable as to deprive the Act of its purposes and force,” Brennan, 180 Md. at 387 , or where the valid portions “are impracti 2017For instance, otherwise valid provisions will not be severed where they are “inextricably mingled” with the invalid ones, Police Comm’r of Baltimore City v. Siegel Enters., Inc., 223 Md. 110, 133 (1960), where “the two sets of provisions [are] ‘inseparably connected in substance,’” Sugarloaf Citizens Ass’n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 576 (1990) (quoting Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 654 (1925)), where “those parts which might be held valid become so inoperative and inexplicable as to deprive the Act of its purposes and force,” Brennan, 180 Md. at 387 , or where the valid portions “are impracti | 4 | 1947–2017 |
Michigan v. DeFillippo
green
2 sentences1995In disposing of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims for damages on Fourth Amendment grounds, the Court of Special Appeals relied on Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). 1995In disposing of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims for damages on Fourth Amendment grounds, the Court of Special Appeals relied on Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Cities Service Co. v. Governor
green
2 sentences1992Cities Service Co. v. Governor, supra, 290 Md. at 576 , 431 A.2d at 676 ; O.C. 1992Cities Service Co. v. Governor, supra, 290 Md. at 576 , 431 A.2d at 676 ; O.C. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Schuller
green
2 sentences1978Bd. of Barber Ex. v. Kuhn, 270 Md. at 509-510 . *607 V The severability clause enacted by Acts 1967, ch. 394, § 2 does not save § 418. [5] State v. Schuller, 280 Md. at 318-321 , is dispositive of the point. 1978V The severability clause enacted by Acts 1967, ch. 394, § 2 does not save § 418. 5 State v. Schuller, 280 Md. at 318-321 , is dispositive of the point. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn
green
1 sentence1978Bd. of Barber Ex. v. Kuhn, 270 Md. at 509-510 . *607 V The severability clause enacted by Acts 1967, ch. 394, § 2 does not save § 418. [5] State v. Schuller, 280 Md. at 318-321 , is dispositive of the point. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Davidson v. Miller
green
2 sentences1978We noted the general rule, expressed in Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 83 , 344 A. 2d 422 (1975), and Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 48 , 343 A. 2d 521 (1975), that “a court, after finding that a statute is invalid in some respect, will separate the valid from the invalid provisions wherever possible.” Schuller at 319. 1978We noted the general rule, expressed in Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 83 , 344 A. 2d 422 (1975), and Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 48 , 343 A. 2d 521 (1975), that “a court, after finding that a statute is invalid in some respect, will separate the valid from the invalid provisions wherever possible.” Schuller at 319. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments
green
2 sentences1978We noted the general rule, expressed in Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 83 , 344 A. 2d 422 (1975), and Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 48 , 343 A. 2d 521 (1975), that “a court, after finding that a statute is invalid in some respect, will separate the valid from the invalid provisions wherever possible.” Schuller at 319. 1978We noted the general rule, expressed in Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 83 , 344 A. 2d 422 (1975), and Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 48 , 343 A. 2d 521 (1975), that “a court, after finding that a statute is invalid in some respect, will separate the valid from the invalid provisions wherever possible.” Schuller at 319. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Board of County Commissioners v. Fleming
neutral
1 sentence1974App. 261 , 282 A. 2d 512 (1971), we now examine Laws of 1973, ch. 794, which provides: “An act to add new Section 45 to Article 53 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1972 Replacement Volume), title “Landlord and Tenant”, to follow immediately after Section 44 thereof, and to be under the new subtitle “Limitations on Rental Fee Increases”, to impose certain limitations on the power of landlords to increase their rental fees; to provide certain exceptions to the limitations; to provide when this Act shall be superseded; to authorize local governments to enact measures concerning rental fees whic | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Atkinson v. Sapperstein
green
2 sentences1970In Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy, 170 Md. 685 , 185 A. 886 (1936) the Court of Appeals said, at page 688: “It follows that a restriction in the title must either confine the operation of the act to conform to that description, if such a construction is possible, or render the act void to the extent of the conflict.” See also La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450 , 58 A. 2d 913 (1948) and Atkinson v. Sapperstein, 191 Md. 301 , 60 A. 2d 737 (1948). 1970In Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy, 170 Md. 685 , 185 A. 886 (1936) the Court of Appeals said, at page 688: “It follows that a restriction in the title must either confine the operation of the act to conform to that description, if such a construction is possible, or render the act void to the extent of the conflict.” See also La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450 , 58 A. 2d 913 (1948) and Atkinson v. Sapperstein, 191 Md. 301 , 60 A. 2d 737 (1948). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
La Guardia v. State
green
2 sentences1970In Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy, 170 Md. 685 , 185 A. 886 (1936) the Court of Appeals said, at page 688: “It follows that a restriction in the title must either confine the operation of the act to conform to that description, if such a construction is possible, or render the act void to the extent of the conflict.” See also La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450 , 58 A. 2d 913 (1948) and Atkinson v. Sapperstein, 191 Md. 301 , 60 A. 2d 737 (1948). 1970In Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy, 170 Md. 685 , 185 A. 886 (1936) the Court of Appeals said, at page 688: “It follows that a restriction in the title must either confine the operation of the act to conform to that description, if such a construction is possible, or render the act void to the extent of the conflict.” See also La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450 , 58 A. 2d 913 (1948) and Atkinson v. Sapperstein, 191 Md. 301 , 60 A. 2d 737 (1948). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy
green
2 sentences1970In Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy, 170 Md. 685 , 185 A. 886 (1936) the Court of Appeals said, at page 688: “It follows that a restriction in the title must either confine the operation of the act to conform to that description, if such a construction is possible, or render the act void to the extent of the conflict.” See also La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450 , 58 A. 2d 913 (1948) and Atkinson v. Sapperstein, 191 Md. 301 , 60 A. 2d 737 (1948). 1970In Buck Glass Co. v. Gordy, 170 Md. 685 , 185 A. 886 (1936) the Court of Appeals said, at page 688: “It follows that a restriction in the title must either confine the operation of the act to conform to that description, if such a construction is possible, or render the act void to the extent of the conflict.” See also La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450 , 58 A. 2d 913 (1948) and Atkinson v. Sapperstein, 191 Md. 301 , 60 A. 2d 737 (1948). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
State's Attorney v. Triplett
green
2 sentences1970Notwithstanding the fact that Ordinance No. 437 contained no severability clause, as this court pointed out in the Schneider case, supra, p. 336, the effect *530 of such a clause is ‘merely declaratory of an established canon of construction recognized by this court.’ Even had there been a severability clause, in the words of Justice Brandéis, it would have been ‘an aid merely, not an inexorable command.’ Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 .” Eor further discussion of the point, see States Attorney v. Triplett, 255 Md. 270, pages 280-285, 257 A. 2d 748 (1969). 1970Notwithstanding the fact that Ordinance No. 437 contained no severability clause, as this court pointed out in the Schneider case, supra, p. 336, the effect *530 of such a clause is ‘merely declaratory of an established canon of construction recognized by this court.’ Even had there been a severability clause, in the words of Justice Brandéis, it would have been ‘an aid merely, not an inexorable command.’ Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 .” Eor further discussion of the point, see States Attorney v. Triplett, 255 Md. 270, pages 280-285, 257 A. 2d 748 (1969). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
McKeldin v. Steedman
green
2 sentences1964McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 103-04 , 98 A. 2d 561 (1953). 1964McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 103-04 , 98 A. 2d 561 (1953). | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Large v. City of Elizabethton
neutral
1 sentence1961In Large v. City of Elizabethton, (Tenn.), 203 S. W. 2d 907 , it was held that despite the alleged invalidity of the portion of an ordinance requiring all taxicab operators to obtain a license, the remainder of the ordinance regulating the *391 taxicab business was valid. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
State Tax Commission v. Baltimore National Bank
neutral
2 sentences1958Bank, 174 Md. 403, 417 , 199 A. 119 . *290 It is true that the ordinances involved herein contained saving clauses; but this Court stated in Cromwell v. Jack son, 188 Md. 8, 28, 29 , 52 A. 2d 79 : “In the light of the prior decisions of this Court we hold that some of the duties imposed on the judges of the Circuit Court for Allegany County by Section 305 are quasi-legislative and hence nonjudicial, and that the Act as a whole is unconstitutional and invalid, despite the severability clause. 1958Bank, 174 Md. 403, 417 , 199 A. 119 . *290 It is true that the ordinances involved herein contained saving clauses; but this Court stated in Cromwell v. Jack son, 188 Md. 8, 28, 29 , 52 A. 2d 79 : “In the light of the prior decisions of this Court we hold that some of the duties imposed on the judges of the Circuit Court for Allegany County by Section 305 are quasi-legislative and hence nonjudicial, and that the Act as a whole is unconstitutional and invalid, despite the severability clause. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Bell v. Board of County Commissioners green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.