severability clause in New York

2023Nonetheless, we agree with plaintiff that, because the separation agreement contains a severability clause, not every part of the separation agreement is necessarily unenforceable, and the court therefore erred in granting that part of the cross-motion seeking to set aside the entire separation agreement without first holding a hearing on the issue of severability. "[W]hether the provisions of a contract are severable depends largely upon the intent of the parties as reflected in the language they employ and the particular circumstantial milieu in which the agreement came into being" ( Matter

2019The issue of severability turns also on the "question of intention, to be determined from the language employed by the parties" ( Christian v Christian , 42 NY2d 63, 73 [1977] [a separation agreement which included a legally unenforceable provision and a severability clause was enforceable as to the remaining legal provisions, based on the parties' intention as expressed in the language of the agreement]; cf. Realty Appraisals Co. v Astor-Broadway Holding Corp. , 5 AD2d 36, 38 [1957] [where the nonattorney plaintiff was hired to obtain a property tax reduction and the parties' agreement, which

2023Nonetheless, we agree with plaintiff that, because the separation agreement contains a severability clause, not every part of the separation agreement is necessarily unenforceable, and the court therefore erred in granting that part of the cross-motion seeking to set aside the entire separation agreement without first holding a hearing on the issue of severability. "[W]hether the provisions of a contract are severable depends largely upon the intent of the parties as reflected in the language they employ and the particular circumstantial milieu in which the agreement came into being" ( Matter

2013Defendants contend that, if a change in the definition of “Term Loan Exposure” had the effect of amending the definition of “Requisite Lenders,” it would have been unnecessary for section 10.5 (b) (ix) to mention “Pro Rata Share,” because “Pro Rata Share” is part of the definition of “LC Exposure,” and “LC Exposure” is part of the definition of “Requisite Lenders.” However, it was reasonable for the drafter(s) of section 10.5 (b) (ix) to mention “Pro Rata Share” directly instead of relying on “Pro Rata Share” being indirectly embedded in the definition of “Requisite Lenders.” Since plaintiffs

2023Under these circumstances, we see no reason to set aside the judgment of divorce" ( Sheridan v Sheridan , 202 AD2d 749, 752 [3d Dept 1994] [citation omitted]).

2008Under these circumstances, the divorce was properly granted (see Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 73 [1977]; Sheridan v Sheridan, 202 AD2d 749, 751-752 [1994]).

2013Defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether plaintiffs are estopped to contest defendants’ requisite lender status, since they did not show that plaintiffs misrepresented or concealed a material fact or that they detrimentally relied on plaintiffs (see BWA Corp. v Alltrans Express U.S.A., 112 AD2d 850, 853 [1st Dept 1985]).

2013Defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether plaintiffs are estopped to contest defendants’ requisite lender status, since they did not show that plaintiffs misrepresented or concealed a material fact or that they detrimentally relied on plaintiffs (see BWA Corp. v Alltrans Express U.S.A., 112 AD2d 850, 853 [1st Dept 1985]).

2013Defendants contend that, if a change in the definition of “Term Loan Exposure” had the effect of amending the definition of “Requisite Lenders,” it would have been unnecessary for section 10.5 (b) (ix) to mention “Pro Rata Share,” because “Pro Rata Share” is part of the definition of “LC Exposure,” and “LC Exposure” is part of the definition of “Requisite Lenders.” However, it was reasonable for the drafter(s) of section 10.5 (b) (ix) to mention “Pro Rata Share” directly instead of relying on “Pro Rata Share” being indirectly embedded in the definition of “Requisite Lenders.” Since plaintiffs

2013Defendants contend that, if a change in the definition of “Term Loan Exposure” had the effect of amending the definition of “Requisite Lenders,” it would have been unnecessary for section 10.5 (b) (ix) to mention “Pro Rata Share,” because “Pro Rata Share” is part of the definition of “LC Exposure,” and “LC Exposure” is part of the definition of “Requisite Lenders.” However, it was reasonable for the drafter(s) of section 10.5 (b) (ix) to mention “Pro Rata Share” directly instead of relying on “Pro Rata Share” being indirectly embedded in the definition of “Requisite Lenders.” Since plaintiffs

1986While we certainly do not condone that failure, we agree that, under the severability principle stated in People v Hansen ( 38 NY2d 17, 21-22 ), the briefcase and the envelopes which were involved in both incidents need not have been suppressed.

1979(See People v Hansen, supra, pp 21, 22 .) Lazer, J.

2025The NYVRA also contains a severability clause stating that "[i]f any provision of this title or its application to any person, political subdivision, or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this title which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application" ( id. § 17-222; see Town of Islip v Caviglia , 141 AD2d 148, 167-[*11]168).

2025The NYVRA also contains a severability clause stating that "[i]f any provision of this title or its application to any person, political subdivision, or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this title which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application" ( id. § 17-222; see Town of Islip v Caviglia , 141 AD2d 148 , 167-[*11]168).

2020Co. , 288 AD2d 713, 716 [2001], quoting Christian v Christian , 42 NY2d at 73 [citations omitted]).

2019Plaintiff, a tax reduction service, is qualified to represent property owners challenging their property tax assessments pursuant to the SCAR procedure referenced in paragraph 3 of the agreement ( see Matter of Cipollone v City of White Plains , 181 AD2d 887, 888 [1992]; see also RPTL Title 1-A; Uniform Rules for Trial Cts [22 NYCRR] § 202.58), but is prohibited from representing defendant in any other judicial proceeding ( see Judiciary Law §§ 478, 484, 495).

2019The issue of severability turns also on the "question of intention, to be determined from the language employed by the parties" ( Christian v Christian , 42 NY2d 63, 73 [1977] [a separation agreement which included a legally unenforceable provision and a severability clause was enforceable as to the remaining legal provisions, based on the parties' intention as expressed in the language of the agreement]; cf. Realty Appraisals Co. v Astor-Broadway Holding Corp. , 5 AD2d 36, 38 [1957] [where the nonattorney plaintiff was hired to obtain a property tax reduction and the parties' agreement, which

2017The severability clause of the Agreement is likewise ineffective to save the Agreement if its terms are usurious ( see Bakhash v Winston , 134 AD3d 468, 469 [2015]; Fred Schutzman [*3] Co. v Park Slope Advanced Med., PLLC , 128 AD3d 1007, 1008 [2015]; Simsbury Fund v New St.

2017Louis Assoc. , 204 AD2d 182, 182 [1994]); nor was plaintiff's unilateral statement of willingness to accept 16% interest adequate to modify the Agreement and, thus, render it lawful and enforceable ( see 22A NY Jur 2d, Contracts § 483).

2017The severability clause of the Agreement is likewise ineffective to save the Agreement if its terms are usurious ( see Bakhash v Winston , 134 AD3d 468, 469 [2015]; Fred Schutzman [*3] Co. v Park Slope Advanced Med., PLLC , 128 AD3d 1007, 1008 [2015]; Simsbury Fund v New St.

2013Lamar Adv. of Penn, LLC v Town of Orchard Park, N.Y., 356 F3d 365, 375 [2d Cir 2004]), and we conclude that they cannot be severed.

2011Neither of the parties contends that section 10.07 (d) was rendered ineffective by the severance of the evidentiary standard (see generally Matter of Amanda RR., 230 AD2d 451, 452-453 [1997]; Matter of John AA., 89 AD2d 738 , 738-739 [1982], lv denied 58 NY2d 605 [1983]), and petitioner concedes that it must proceed herein under the most rigorous evidentiary standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

2009For these reasons alone, the severability clause and its significance are not properly before this Court (see Murray v City of New York, 195 AD2d 379, 381 [1993]; Recovery Consultants v Shih-Hsieh, 141 AD2d 272 [1988]).

2009For these reasons alone, the severability clause and its significance are not properly before this Court (see Murray v City of New York, 195 AD2d 379, 381 [1993]; Recovery Consultants v Shih-Hsieh, 141 AD2d 272 [1988]).

2007The Legislation contains a severability clause providing that, if any part of the act is adjudged to be invalid, “such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder thereof . . . .” (Legislation § 10.) The severability clause further states that “[i]t is hereby declared to be the intent of the legislature that this act would have been enacted even if such invalid provisions had not been included herein.” (Id.) The inclusion of a severability clause creates a presumption that the Legislature “did not intend the validity of the statute in question to depend on the validity of th

2007It is hereby declared to be the intent of the legislature that this act would have been enacted even if such invalid provisions had not been included herein.” A severability clause creates the presumption that the Legislature intended the act to be divisible (see Alaska Airlines, Inc. v Brock, 480 US 678, 686 [1987]; National Adv.

2007Servs., L.L.C. v Roth, 6 NY3d 410, 423 [2006]).