severability clause in Georgia

2014See siso Bulloch South, Inc. v. Gosai, 250 Ga. App. 170, 175 (1) (b) ( 550 SE2d 750 ) (2001) (“The parties’ intent maybe expressed directly, through a severability clause.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted).

2014See siso Bulloch South, Inc. v. Gosai, 250 Ga. App. 170, 175 (1) (b) ( 550 SE2d 750 ) (2001) (“The parties’ intent maybe expressed directly, through a severability clause.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted).

2020“There can be no ‘blue pencil theory’ of severability of covenants not to compete even where there is a severability clause[.]” Lane Co. v. Taylor, 174 Ga. App. 356, 358 (2) (330 12 SE2d 112 ) (1985) (physical precedent only).

2017See Bodiford v. State , 328 Ga. App. 258 , 262 (1) n.3, 761 S.E.2d 818 (2014) ("[A] unanimous decision by a three-judge panel of this Court remains binding precedent until such time as it is modified or reversed by this Court en banc or our Supreme Court." (punctuation omitted)). 44 See, e.g. , Griffin , 215 Ga. App. at 62 (2), 449 S.E.2d 858 (noting that "[t]he parties agreed upon the severability of the document's covenants and provisions"); Lane , 174 Ga. App. at 356 , 330 S.E.2d 112 (quoting the relevant agreement's severability clause).

2007See also Advance Technology Consultants v. RoadTrac, 250 Ga. App. 317, 320 (2) ( 551 SE2d 735 ) (2001) (noting that “in restrictive covenant cases strictly-scrutinized as employment contracts, Georgia does not employ the ‘blue pencil’ doctrine of severability”) (footnote omitted).

2007See also Advance Technology Consultants v. RoadTrac, 250 Ga. App. 317, 320 (2) ( 551 SE2d 735 ) (2001) (noting that “in restrictive covenant cases strictly-scrutinized as employment contracts, Georgia does not employ the ‘blue pencil’ doctrine of severability”) (footnote omitted).

2026See Justice Outdoor Displays, 266 Ga. at 403–04; Nixon v. State, 256 Ga. 261, 264 (1986); Mangelly, 243 Ga. at 363–64; Elliott v. State, 91 Ga. 694 , 696–97 (1893).

2006Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 , 313, 56 S.Ct. 855 , 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936). [Cit.] Id. at 363-364 , 254 S.E.2d 315 .

1985There can be no “blue pencil theory” of severability of covenants not to compete even where there is a severability clause (see Richard P. Rita Personnel Services v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, 317 ( 191 SE2d 79 ) (1972); Howard Schultz & Assoc. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 185 ( 236 SE2d 265 ) (1977)), but this does not mean that provisions (ii) and (iv) must of necessity suffer the same fate as (iii).

1985There can be no “blue pencil theory” of severability of covenants not to compete even where there is a severability clause (see Richard P. Rita Personnel Services v. Kot, 229 Ga. 314, 317 ( 191 SE2d 79 ) (1972); Howard Schultz & Assoc. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 185 ( 236 SE2d 265 ) (1977)), but this does not mean that provisions (ii) and (iv) must of necessity suffer the same fate as (iii).

2013Advance Technology Consultants v. Roadtrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 320-321 ( 551 SE2d 735 ) (2001); Paramount Tax & Accounting v. H & R Block Eastern Enterprises, 299 Ga. App. 596, 602 ( 683 SE2d 141 ) (2009).

2013Advance Technology Consultants v. Roadtrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 320-321 ( 551 SE2d 735 ) (2001); Paramount Tax & Accounting v. H & R Block Eastern Enterprises, 299 Ga. App. 596, 602 ( 683 SE2d 141 ) (2009).

1975The remaining question for decision is whether or not such Act as a whole must fall or whether, under decisions exemplified by Hancock v. State, 114 Ga. 439, 442 ( 40 SE2d 317 ); Elliott v. State, 91 Ga. 694, 696 ( 17 SE 1004 ), and similar cases, and particularly in view of the severability clause included in such Act by the General Assembly (Section 12) when the unconstitutional provisions of such Act are removed is there enough of such Act remaining to preserve the legislative scheme.

1975The remaining question for decision is whether or not such Act as a whole must fall or whether, under decisions exemplified by Hancock v. State, 114 Ga. 439, 442 ( 40 SE2d 317 ); Elliott v. State, 91 Ga. 694, 696 ( 17 SE 1004 ), and similar cases, and particularly in view of the severability clause included in such Act by the General Assembly (Section 12) when the unconstitutional provisions of such Act are removed is there enough of such Act remaining to preserve the legislative scheme.

2026See Justice Outdoor Displays, 266 Ga. at 403–04; Nixon v. State, 256 Ga. 261, 264 (1986); Mangelly, 243 Ga. at 363–64; Elliott v. State, 91 Ga. 694 , 696–97 (1893).

1997Union City Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, 266 Ga. 393 (7), 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996); City Council of Augusta v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 363 , 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).

2006Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 , 313, 56 S.Ct. 855 , 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936). [Cit.] Id. at 363-364 , 254 S.E.2d 315 .

2006Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 , 313, 56 S.Ct. 855 , 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936). [Cit.] Id. at 363-364 , 254 S.E.2d 315 .

2001OCGA § 13-1-8; Charles v. Leavitt, 264 Ga. 160 ( 442 SE2d 241 ) (1994); Horne v. Drachman, 247 Ga. 802, 805-806 (2) ( 280 SE2d 338 ) (1981); Grove v. Sugar Hill Investment Assoc., 219 Ga. App. 781, 785-786 (3) ( 466 SE2d 901 ) (1995); Nat.

2001OCGA § 13-1-8; Charles v. Leavitt, 264 Ga. 160 ( 442 SE2d 241 ) (1994); Horne v. Drachman, 247 Ga. 802, 805-806 (2) ( 280 SE2d 338 ) (1981); Grove v. Sugar Hill Investment Assoc., 219 Ga. App. 781, 785-786 (3) ( 466 SE2d 901 ) (1995); Nat.

1985Even if we were to assume that the clauses appellant finds objectionable were violative of public policy, under the doctrine of severability “the invalid [provisions do] not render other provisions of the contract void. [Cits.]” Horne v. Drachman, 247 Ga. 802 (2) ( 280 SE2d 338 ) (1981). 4.

1985Even if we were to assume that the clauses appellant finds objectionable were violative of public policy, under the doctrine of severability “the invalid [provisions do] not render other provisions of the contract void. [Cits.]” Horne v. Drachman, 247 Ga. 802 (2) ( 280 SE2d 338 ) (1981). 4.

2026See Justice Outdoor Displays, 266 Ga. at 403–04; Nixon v. State, 256 Ga. 261, 264 (1986); Mangelly, 243 Ga. at 363–64; Elliott v. State, 91 Ga. 694 , 696–97 (1893).

2022Compare Wallace, 279 Ga. at 745-746 (1) (holding that a purchase agreement and subsequent escrow agreement did not merge because the purchase agreement included an obligation that the escrow agreement did not; the escrow agreement did not, however, contain a merger clause); Atlanta Integrity Mtg., 286 Ga. App. at 799 (“Because the contracts at issue did not involve the same parties or subject matter, and because the merger clause by its express terms did not supersede any prior agreements or contracts between [the parties], the trial court erred [by] holding that the [contracts] merged. . . .”

2022Compare Wallace, 279 Ga. at 745-746 (1) (holding that a purchase agreement and subsequent escrow agreement did not merge because the purchase agreement included an obligation that the escrow agreement did not; the escrow agreement did not, however, contain a merger clause); Atlanta Integrity Mtg., 286 Ga. App. at 799 (“Because the contracts at issue did not involve the same parties or subject matter, and because the merger clause by its express terms did not supersede any prior agreements or contracts between [the parties], the trial court erred [by] holding that the [contracts] merged. . . .”

2020See Vegesina, supra, 257 Ga. App. at 695 (1) (unenforceable liquidated damages provision in an employment contract was severable from the remainder of the contract even though the contract did not contain a severability clause).

2020See Vegesina, supra, 257 Ga. App. at 695 (1) (unenforceable liquidated damages provision in an employment contract was severable from the remainder of the contract even though the contract did not contain a severability clause).

2017See Bodiford v. State , 328 Ga. App. 258 , 262 (1) n.3, 761 S.E.2d 818 (2014) ("[A] unanimous decision by a three-judge panel of this Court remains binding precedent until such time as it is modified or reversed by this Court en banc or our Supreme Court." (punctuation omitted)). 44 See, e.g. , Griffin , 215 Ga. App. at 62 (2), 449 S.E.2d 858 (noting that "[t]he parties agreed upon the severability of the document's covenants and provisions"); Lane , 174 Ga. App. at 356 , 330 S.E.2d 112 (quoting the relevant agreement's severability clause).

2017See Bodiford v. State , 328 Ga. App. 258 , 262 (1) n.3, 761 S.E.2d 818 (2014) ("[A] unanimous decision by a three-judge panel of this Court remains binding precedent until such time as it is modified or reversed by this Court en banc or our Supreme Court." (punctuation omitted)). 44 See, e.g. , Griffin , 215 Ga. App. at 62 (2), 449 S.E.2d 858 (noting that "[t]he parties agreed upon the severability of the document's covenants and provisions"); Lane , 174 Ga. App. at 356 , 330 S.E.2d 112 (quoting the relevant agreement's severability clause).

2017See Bodiford v. State , 328 Ga. App. 258 , 262 (1) n.3, 761 S.E.2d 818 (2014) ("[A] unanimous decision by a three-judge panel of this Court remains binding precedent until such time as it is modified or reversed by this Court en banc or our Supreme Court." (punctuation omitted)). 44 See, e.g. , Griffin , 215 Ga. App. at 62 (2), 449 S.E.2d 858 (noting that "[t]he parties agreed upon the severability of the document's covenants and provisions"); Lane , 174 Ga. App. at 356 , 330 S.E.2d 112 (quoting the relevant agreement's severability clause).

2017See Bodiford v. State , 328 Ga. App. 258 , 262 (1) n.3, 761 S.E.2d 818 (2014) ("[A] unanimous decision by a three-judge panel of this Court remains binding precedent until such time as it is modified or reversed by this Court en banc or our Supreme Court." (punctuation omitted)). 44 See, e.g. , Griffin , 215 Ga. App. at 62 (2), 449 S.E.2d 858 (noting that "[t]he parties agreed upon the severability of the document's covenants and provisions"); Lane , 174 Ga. App. at 356 , 330 S.E.2d 112 (quoting the relevant agreement's severability clause).

2015Capricorn Systems, Inc. v. Pednekar, 248 Ga. App. 424, 428 (2) (d) ( 546 SE2d 554 ) (2001).

2015Capricorn Systems, Inc. v. Pednekar, 248 Ga. App. 424, 428 (2) (d) ( 546 SE2d 554 ) (2001).

2009The divorce decree provided in Paragraph 15 (c) that if any provisions of the decree “are held to be invalid or unenforceable, all other provisions are, nevertheless, continued in full force and effect.” This language sets forth what is, in essence, a severability clause. 3 While such clauses are seen in statutory enactments and contracts, see generally DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Ferrante, 281 Ga. 273 (2) ( 637 SE2d 659 ) (2006); OCGA § 13-1-8; see also Alexander v. Alexander, 279 Ga. 116 ( 610 SE2d 48 ) (2005) (courts not bound by severability provisions in parties’ antenuptial agreements), a s

2009The divorce decree provided in Paragraph 15 (c) that if any provisions of the decree “are held to be invalid or unenforceable, all other provisions are, nevertheless, continued in full force and effect.” This language sets forth what is, in essence, a severability clause. 3 While such clauses are seen in statutory enactments and contracts, see generally DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Ferrante, 281 Ga. 273 (2) ( 637 SE2d 659 ) (2006); OCGA § 13-1-8; see also Alexander v. Alexander, 279 Ga. 116 ( 610 SE2d 48 ) (2005) (courts not bound by severability provisions in parties’ antenuptial agreements), a s

2004Pretermitting whether resolution of the issue of which forum should decide the challenge to the arbitration provision turns on the severability of the contract provisions, see Results Oriented v. Crawford, 245 Ga. App. 432, 440-441 (2) ( 538 SE2d 73 ) (2000) (court and not arbitrator should decide issue of arbitrability where contract contains severability clause), we find that the trial court erred in finding that the agreement at issue here was not severable.

2004Pretermitting whether resolution of the issue of which forum should decide the challenge to the arbitration provision turns on the severability of the contract provisions, see Results Oriented v. Crawford, 245 Ga. App. 432, 440-441 (2) ( 538 SE2d 73 ) (2000) (court and not arbitrator should decide issue of arbitrability where contract contains severability clause), we find that the trial court erred in finding that the agreement at issue here was not severable.

2004Ga. 1990). 15 537 U. S. 79 (123 SC 588, 154 LE2d 491) (2002). 16 217 Ga. App. 36, 37-38 (2), (3) ( 456 SE2d 631 ) (1995). 17 Howsam, supra at 83-84 . 18 Id. at 84 ; but compare North Augusta Assoc. v. 1815 Exchange, 220 Ga. App. 790, 792 (2) ( 469 SE2d 759 ) (1996) (court in effect finds that whether party has complied with a provision of arbitration agreement setting forth a condition precedent to arbitration is a gateway question for court). 19 Supra. 20 See id. (in accordance with a severability clause in the parties’ agreement, trial court did not err in striking a section of the arbitrati

2004Ga. 1990). 15 537 U. S. 79 (123 SC 588, 154 LE2d 491) (2002). 16 217 Ga. App. 36, 37-38 (2), (3) ( 456 SE2d 631 ) (1995). 17 Howsam, supra at 83-84 . 18 Id. at 84 ; but compare North Augusta Assoc. v. 1815 Exchange, 220 Ga. App. 790, 792 (2) ( 469 SE2d 759 ) (1996) (court in effect finds that whether party has complied with a provision of arbitration agreement setting forth a condition precedent to arbitration is a gateway question for court). 19 Supra. 20 See id. (in accordance with a severability clause in the parties’ agreement, trial court did not err in striking a section of the arbitrati

2004Ga. 1990). 15 537 U. S. 79 (123 SC 588, 154 LE2d 491) (2002). 16 217 Ga. App. 36, 37-38 (2), (3) ( 456 SE2d 631 ) (1995). 17 Howsam, supra at 83-84 . 18 Id. at 84 ; but compare North Augusta Assoc. v. 1815 Exchange, 220 Ga. App. 790, 792 (2) ( 469 SE2d 759 ) (1996) (court in effect finds that whether party has complied with a provision of arbitration agreement setting forth a condition precedent to arbitration is a gateway question for court). 19 Supra. 20 See id. (in accordance with a severability clause in the parties’ agreement, trial court did not err in striking a section of the arbitrati

2004Ga. 1990). 15 537 U. S. 79 (123 SC 588, 154 LE2d 491) (2002). 16 217 Ga. App. 36, 37-38 (2), (3) ( 456 SE2d 631 ) (1995). 17 Howsam, supra at 83-84 . 18 Id. at 84 ; but compare North Augusta Assoc. v. 1815 Exchange, 220 Ga. App. 790, 792 (2) ( 469 SE2d 759 ) (1996) (court in effect finds that whether party has complied with a provision of arbitration agreement setting forth a condition precedent to arbitration is a gateway question for court). 19 Supra. 20 See id. (in accordance with a severability clause in the parties’ agreement, trial court did not err in striking a section of the arbitrati

2001OCGA § 13-1-8; Charles v. Leavitt, 264 Ga. 160 ( 442 SE2d 241 ) (1994); Horne v. Drachman, 247 Ga. 802, 805-806 (2) ( 280 SE2d 338 ) (1981); Grove v. Sugar Hill Investment Assoc., 219 Ga. App. 781, 785-786 (3) ( 466 SE2d 901 ) (1995); Nat.

2001OCGA § 13-1-8; Charles v. Leavitt, 264 Ga. 160 ( 442 SE2d 241 ) (1994); Horne v. Drachman, 247 Ga. 802, 805-806 (2) ( 280 SE2d 338 ) (1981); Grove v. Sugar Hill Investment Assoc., 219 Ga. App. 781, 785-786 (3) ( 466 SE2d 901 ) (1995); Nat.