terms analysis in Louisiana

1987Hawthorne Oil and Gas Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 377 So.2d 285 (La. 1979); Reliance Trust v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 499 So.2d 202 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986).

1986Hawthorne Oil & Gas v. Continental Oil Company, 377 So.2d 285 (La.1979).

2015The court in Mack quoted from Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 , 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2492-93 , 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992), where the United States Supreme Court emphasized that it intended to narrowly apply its seminal decision in Jackson v. Virginia: 11sIn Jackson, we emphasized repeatedly the deference owed to the trier of fact and, correspondingly, the sharply limited nature of constitutional sufficiency review.

2015The court in Mack quoted from Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 , 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2492-93 , 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992), where the United States Supreme Court emphasized that it intended to narrowly apply its seminal decision in Jackson v. Virginia: 11sIn Jackson, we emphasized repeatedly the deference owed to the trier of fact and, correspondingly, the sharply limited nature of constitutional sufficiency review.

2015R.S. 15:458, that the evidence must negate every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, might change the terms of analysis and even add a second level of review.” Mack , 2013-1311 at p. 8, 144 So.3d at 988 -89 (citing and quoting from Shapiro, supra, Williams, supra, and Wright, supra).

2015R.S. 15:458, that the evidence must negate every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, might change the terms of analysis and even add a second level of review.” Mack , 2013-1311 at p. 8, 144 So.3d at 988 -89 (citing and quoting from Shapiro, supra, Williams, supra, and Wright, supra).

2015R.S. 15:458, that the evidence must negate every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, might change the terms of analysis and even add a second level of review.” Mack , 2013-1311 at p. 8, 144 So.3d at 988 -89 (citing and quoting from Shapiro, supra, Williams, supra, and Wright, supra).

2003In Ambrose v. New Orleans Police Department, 627 So.2d 238, 242-43 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1993), reversed on other grounds, 93-3099, 3110, 3112 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 216 , this court held that an emergency room technician was considered to have been following the instructions of a physician, pursuant to R.S. 40:1235(A), whether he had received those instructions via electronic means or he was following a “protocol,” defined as a prescribed set of instructions established by physicians of the Orleans Parish Medical Society.

2003State v. Parker, 625 So.2d at 1368 . .

1991This case is distinguishable from Badeaux v. Cook, 537 So.2d 725 (La.App. 5 Cir.1988) and McBroom v. Boudreaux, 582 So.2d 1002 (La.App. 5 Cir., 1991) an unpublished opinion, which applied the law as it stood prior to the 1987 amendment; there, the statute merely required that a waiver be in writing, signed by the named insured, and clearly evidence' a selection of lower limits.

1990Travis v. Waste Management of Mississippi, Inc., 509 So.2d 192 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987).

1987Hawthorne Oil and Gas Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 377 So.2d 285 (La. 1979); Reliance Trust v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 499 So.2d 202 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986).

1982Binders or other contracts for temporary insurance may be made, orally or in writing, and shall be deemed to include all the terms of such standard fire insurance policy and all such applicable endorsements, not disapproved by the fire insurance division as may be designated in such contract of temporary insurance; except that the cancellation clause thereof specifying the hour of the day at which the insurance shall commence, may be superseded by the express terms of such contract of temporary insurance." [3] For later cases on this issue, see the following: Stacy v. Petty, 362 So.2d 810 (La.

1982Binders or other contracts for temporary insurance may be made, orally or in writing, and shall be deemed to include all the terms of such standard fire insurance policy and all such applicable endorsements, not disapproved by the fire insurance division as may be designated in such contract of temporary insurance; except that the cancellation clause thereof specifying the hour of the day at which the insurance shall commence, may be superseded by the express terms of such contract of temporary insurance." [3] For later cases on this issue, see the following: Stacy v. Petty, 362 So.2d 810 (La.

1982Binders or other contracts for temporary insurance may be made, orally or in writing, and shall be deemed to include all the terms of such standard fire insurance policy and all such applicable endorsements, not disapproved by the fire insurance division as may be designated in such contract of temporary insurance; except that the cancellation clause thereof specifying the hour of the day at which the insurance shall commence, may be superseded by the express terms of such contract of temporary insurance." [3] For later cases on this issue, see the following: Stacy v. Petty, 362 So.2d 810 (La.

1982Binders or other contracts for temporary insurance may be made, orally or in writing, and shall be deemed to include all the terms of such standard fire insurance policy and all such applicable endorsements, not disapproved by the fire insurance division as may be designated in such contract of temporary insurance; except that the cancellation clause thereof specifying the hour of the day at which the insurance shall commence, may be superseded by the express terms of such contract of temporary insurance." [3] For later cases on this issue, see the following: Stacy v. Petty, 362 So.2d 810 (La.

1982Binders or other contracts for temporary insurance may be made, orally or in writing, and shall be deemed to include all the terms of such standard fire insurance policy and all such applicable endorsements, not disapproved by the fire insurance division as may be designated in such contract of temporary insurance; except that the cancellation clause thereof specifying the hour of the day at which the insurance shall commence, may be superseded by the express terms of such contract of temporary insurance." [3] For later cases on this issue, see the following: Stacy v. Petty, 362 So.2d 810 (La.

1976See in addition to the cases cited, Dunlap v. Chrysler Motors, 299 So.2d 495 (La.App.4th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Blanchard, 264 So.2d 364 (La.App.1st Cir. 1972); McLain v. Cuccia, 259 So.2d 337 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972); Juneau v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, 260 So.2d 919 (La.App.4th Cir. 1972); and Stumpf v. Metairie Motor Sales, 212 So.2d 705 (La.App.4th Cir. 1968).

1976See in addition to the cases cited, Dunlap v. Chrysler Motors, 299 So.2d 495 (La.App.4th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Blanchard, 264 So.2d 364 (La.App.1st Cir. 1972); McLain v. Cuccia, 259 So.2d 337 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972); Juneau v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, 260 So.2d 919 (La.App.4th Cir. 1972); and Stumpf v. Metairie Motor Sales, 212 So.2d 705 (La.App.4th Cir. 1968).

1976See in addition to the cases cited, Dunlap v. Chrysler Motors, 299 So.2d 495 (La.App.4th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Blanchard, 264 So.2d 364 (La.App.1st Cir. 1972); McLain v. Cuccia, 259 So.2d 337 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972); Juneau v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, 260 So.2d 919 (La.App.4th Cir. 1972); and Stumpf v. Metairie Motor Sales, 212 So.2d 705 (La.App.4th Cir. 1968).

1976See in addition to the cases cited, Dunlap v. Chrysler Motors, 299 So.2d 495 (La.App.4th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Blanchard, 264 So.2d 364 (La.App.1st Cir. 1972); McLain v. Cuccia, 259 So.2d 337 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972); Juneau v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet, 260 So.2d 919 (La.App.4th Cir. 1972); and Stumpf v. Metairie Motor Sales, 212 So.2d 705 (La.App.4th Cir. 1968).

1936In the instance of the latter it measures their loss, not by their value in a second-hand market, but by the value of their use to the owner who suffers from their deprivation. * * * However that may be, it is a self-evident proposition that factory buildings peculiarly adapted to the manufacture of malt must have depreciated in value when malt may no longer be manufactured) that buildings useful only for factory purposes have lost value when they are no longer used or usable for such purposes.” (Italics ours.) In the case at bar plaintiff contends that it is entitled to recover under the term

1929Boulanger v. British Underwriters, 141 La. 461 , 75 So. 207 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Company, 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Ins.

1929Boulanger v. British Underwriters, 141 La. 461 , 75 So. 207 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Company, 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Ins.

1929Boulanger v. British Underwriters, 141 La. 461 , 75 So. 207 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Company, 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Ins.

1929Boulanger v. British Underwriters, 141 La. 461 , 75 So. 207 ; Thompson v. State Assurance Company, 160 La. 683 , 107 So. 489 ; Stovall v. Sterling Fire Ins.