terms instruction in Nebraska

2014Resources, 282 Neb. 237 , 803 N.W.2d 28 (2011), disapproved in part on other grounds, Banks v. Heineman, 286 Neb. 390 , 837 N.W.2d 70 (2013); Eicher, supra note 3 ; In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994). 7 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 , 128 S. Ct. 2161 , 171 L.

2014Resources, 282 Neb. 237 , 803 N.W.2d 28 (2011), disapproved in part on other grounds, Banks v. Heineman, 286 Neb. 390 , 837 N.W.2d 70 (2013); Eicher, supra note 3 ; In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994). 7 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 , 128 S. Ct. 2161 , 171 L.

2014Resources, 282 Neb. 237 , 803 N.W.2d 28 (2011), disapproved in part on other grounds, Banks v. Heineman, 286 Neb. 390 , 837 N.W.2d 70 (2013); Eicher, supra note 3 ; In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994). 7 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 , 128 S. Ct. 2161 , 171 L.

2014Resources, 282 Neb. 237 , 803 N.W.2d 28 (2011), disapproved in part on other grounds, Banks v. Heineman, 286 Neb. 390 , 837 N.W.2d 70 (2013); Eicher, supra note 3 ; In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994). 7 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 , 128 S. Ct. 2161 , 171 L.

2014Resources, 282 Neb. 237 , 803 N.W.2d 28 (2011), disapproved in part on other grounds, Banks v. Heineman, 286 Neb. 390 , 837 N.W.2d 70 (2013); Eicher, supra note 3 ; In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994). 7 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 , 128 S. Ct. 2161 , 171 L.

2014Resources, 282 Neb. 237 , 803 N.W.2d 28 (2011), disapproved in part on other grounds, Banks v. Heineman, 286 Neb. 390 , 837 N.W.2d 70 (2013); Eicher, supra note 3 ; In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994). 7 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 , 128 S. Ct. 2161 , 171 L.

2014Nebraska Advance Sheets JACOBSON v. SHRESTA 625 Cite as 288 Neb. 615 determine how suits could be prosecuted against entities doing the government’s work. [6-9] Similarly, the Legislature has the right to decide the terms under which it will waive its sovereign and governmen- tal immunity for tort actions against the State or its politi- cal subdivisions.27 The common-law doctrine of governmental immunity applies to a political subdivision’s employees who are acting within the scope of their employment.28 And because the Legislature has determined when and how it will waive the State’s soverei

1984The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that `Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; . . .' The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends this liberty from `invasion by state action.' Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart , 427 U.S. 539 , 556 (1976).

1978We then went on to quote from Purdum v. Sherman, 163 Neb. 889 , 81 N. W. 2d 331 , and pointed out that adverse possession is founded upon the intent with which the occupant held possession and can best be determined by his acts.

1978We then went on to quote from Purdum v. Sherman, 163 Neb. 889 , 81 N. W. 2d 331 , and pointed out that adverse possession is founded upon the intent with which the occupant held possession and can best be determined by his acts.

1973Co. (1945), 145 Neb. 550 , 17 N. W. 2d 465 , we held: “An accident within the meaning of contracts of insurance against accidents includes any event which takes place without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected thereby.” While the Updike case, 131 Neb. 745 , 270 N. W. 107 , involved an accident within the terms of a standard workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability policy,' the facts indicate the range of interpretation herein.

1973Co. (1945), 145 Neb. 550 , 17 N. W. 2d 465 , we held: “An accident within the meaning of contracts of insurance against accidents includes any event which takes place without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected thereby.” While the Updike case, 131 Neb. 745 , 270 N. W. 107 , involved an accident within the terms of a standard workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability policy,' the facts indicate the range of interpretation herein.

1973Co. (1945), 145 Neb. 550 , 17 N. W. 2d 465 , we held: “An accident within the meaning of contracts of insurance against accidents includes any event which takes place without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected thereby.” While the Updike case, 131 Neb. 745 , 270 N. W. 107 , involved an accident within the terms of a standard workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability policy,' the facts indicate the range of interpretation herein.

1973Co. (1945), 145 Neb. 550 , 17 N. W. 2d 465 , we held: “An accident within the meaning of contracts of insurance against accidents includes any event which takes place without the foresight or expectation of the person acted upon or affected thereby.” While the Updike case, 131 Neb. 745 , 270 N. W. 107 , involved an accident within the terms of a standard workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability policy,' the facts indicate the range of interpretation herein.

1956See, Esterly & Son v. Van Slyke, 21 Neb. 611 , 33 N. W. 209 ; Sabin v. Cameron, 82 Neb. 106 , 117 N. W. 95 ; Koehn v. City of Hastings, 114 Neb. 106 , 206 N. W. 19 ; In re Estate of Steininger, 139 Neb. 284 , 297 N. W. 159 ; Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 ; Myers v. Willmeroth, supra. The terms of the instruction are in nowise uncertain or ambiguous.

1956See, Esterly & Son v. Van Slyke, 21 Neb. 611 , 33 N. W. 209 ; Sabin v. Cameron, 82 Neb. 106 , 117 N. W. 95 ; Koehn v. City of Hastings, 114 Neb. 106 , 206 N. W. 19 ; In re Estate of Steininger, 139 Neb. 284 , 297 N. W. 159 ; Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 ; Myers v. Willmeroth, supra. The terms of the instruction are in nowise uncertain or ambiguous.

1956See, Esterly & Son v. Van Slyke, 21 Neb. 611 , 33 N. W. 209 ; Sabin v. Cameron, 82 Neb. 106 , 117 N. W. 95 ; Koehn v. City of Hastings, 114 Neb. 106 , 206 N. W. 19 ; In re Estate of Steininger, 139 Neb. 284 , 297 N. W. 159 ; Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 ; Myers v. Willmeroth, supra. The terms of the instruction are in nowise uncertain or ambiguous.

1956See, Esterly & Son v. Van Slyke, 21 Neb. 611 , 33 N. W. 209 ; Sabin v. Cameron, 82 Neb. 106 , 117 N. W. 95 ; Koehn v. City of Hastings, 114 Neb. 106 , 206 N. W. 19 ; In re Estate of Steininger, 139 Neb. 284 , 297 N. W. 159 ; Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 ; Myers v. Willmeroth, supra. The terms of the instruction are in nowise uncertain or ambiguous.

1956See, Esterly & Son v. Van Slyke, 21 Neb. 611 , 33 N. W. 209 ; Sabin v. Cameron, 82 Neb. 106 , 117 N. W. 95 ; Koehn v. City of Hastings, 114 Neb. 106 , 206 N. W. 19 ; In re Estate of Steininger, 139 Neb. 284 , 297 N. W. 159 ; Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 ; Myers v. Willmeroth, supra. The terms of the instruction are in nowise uncertain or ambiguous.

1956See, Esterly & Son v. Van Slyke, 21 Neb. 611 , 33 N. W. 209 ; Sabin v. Cameron, 82 Neb. 106 , 117 N. W. 95 ; Koehn v. City of Hastings, 114 Neb. 106 , 206 N. W. 19 ; In re Estate of Steininger, 139 Neb. 284 , 297 N. W. 159 ; Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 ; Myers v. Willmeroth, supra. The terms of the instruction are in nowise uncertain or ambiguous.

1956See, Esterly & Son v. Van Slyke, 21 Neb. 611 , 33 N. W. 209 ; Sabin v. Cameron, 82 Neb. 106 , 117 N. W. 95 ; Koehn v. City of Hastings, 114 Neb. 106 , 206 N. W. 19 ; In re Estate of Steininger, 139 Neb. 284 , 297 N. W. 159 ; Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 ; Myers v. Willmeroth, supra. The terms of the instruction are in nowise uncertain or ambiguous.

1956See, Esterly & Son v. Van Slyke, 21 Neb. 611 , 33 N. W. 209 ; Sabin v. Cameron, 82 Neb. 106 , 117 N. W. 95 ; Koehn v. City of Hastings, 114 Neb. 106 , 206 N. W. 19 ; In re Estate of Steininger, 139 Neb. 284 , 297 N. W. 159 ; Johnson v. Anoka-Butte Lumber Co., 141 Neb. 851 , 5 N. W. 2d 114 ; Myers v. Willmeroth, supra. The terms of the instruction are in nowise uncertain or ambiguous.

1942It follows that to the extent of this modification sought each is clearly within the terms of the rule: “Upon an application to modify an award under the workmen’s compensation statutes, the burden of proof rests upon the petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the disability has increased, decreased or terminated as alleged.” Metropolitan Dining Room v. Jensen, 126 Neb. 765 , 254 N. W. 405 .

1942It follows that to the extent of this modification sought each is clearly within the terms of the rule: “Upon an application to modify an award under the workmen’s compensation statutes, the burden of proof rests upon the petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the disability has increased, decreased or terminated as alleged.” Metropolitan Dining Room v. Jensen, 126 Neb. 765 , 254 N. W. 405 .

1942In the application of the foregoing rule, in Huff v. Omaha Cold Storage Co., 136 Neb. 907 , 287 N. W. 764 , this court announced the conclusion: “Before recovery may be had for an increase of incapacity due solely to the injury, within the meaning of subdivision (b) sec. 48-142, Comp.

1942In the application of the foregoing rule, in Huff v. Omaha Cold Storage Co., 136 Neb. 907 , 287 N. W. 764 , this court announced the conclusion: “Before recovery may be had for an increase of incapacity due solely to the injury, within the meaning of subdivision (b) sec. 48-142, Comp.

1933Appellants insist that the instant case is controlled by the views of the writer of the opinion in Bourne v. Baer, 107 Neb. 255 , to the effect that the demurrer for defect of parties defendant then under consideration, which was based on the fact “that the defendant James A. Shell was not brought into court and is not shown to be a nonresident of the state,” was not well taken.

1931St. 1929, and the controlling principle as to the presentation of this class of cases for review in this tribunal is: “A conviction under contempt proceedings can only be reviewed in the supreme court by the filing of a petition in error as in a criminal case.” State v. Dodd, 99 Neb. 800 ; Hanika v. State, 87 Neb. 845 ; Thompson v. Nelson, 4 Neb.

1931St. 1929, and the controlling principle as to the presentation of this class of cases for review in this tribunal is: “A conviction under contempt proceedings can only be reviewed in the supreme court by the filing of a petition in error as in a criminal case.” State v. Dodd, 99 Neb. 800 ; Hanika v. State, 87 Neb. 845 ; Thompson v. Nelson, 4 Neb.

1929Co., 218 Mo. App. 31 , also cited iby appellant, and describes it as a case where a furnace in a basement of a dwelling exploded and threw out upon the basement floor live chunks of coal, and it was there held that the live coals, thus thrown out from the furnace, would constitute actual ignition outside of the furnace so as to come within the terms of the rule stated.

1927The plaintiff herein is the same, and the terms of the standard marketing agreement, which appear attached to plaintiff’s petition as a part thereof, as well as the demand for relief, are substantially identical with the terms of the contract and pleadings before the court in Nebraska Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Norquest, supra. The plan of this association contemplated the creation of certain pools of wheat grown each year during the continuance of the agreement by the members of the association.