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36 New Jersey opinions name it 4 courts 1903–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Proformance Insurance v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2026Co. v. Jones, 185 N.J. 406, 412 (2005) (quoting Matits v. Nationwide Mut. 2021Co. v. Jones, 185 N.J. 406, 412 (2005), (quoting Matits, 33 N.J. 496 -97) (emphasis added). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Katzgreen2 sentences2022We cannot conclude that such evaluations are always, in the terms of the standard test, "beyond the ken of the average juror[,]" . . . or that experts are invariably better equipped than laypersons are to make the judgment based on appearance alone. [Id. at 594 (citation omitted).] "Like any other fact, age is, of course, for the determination of the jury. " State v. Carlone, 109 N.J.L. 208, 211 (Sup. Ct. 1932). "[W]hether the age of a model in a child pornography prosecution can be determined by a lay jury without the assistance of expert testimony . . . must be determined on a case by case b 2021Such a case-by-case analysis may include where the children appear to fit along the spectrum of ages: "Like any other fact, age is, of course, for the determination of the jury." State v. Carlone, 109 N.J.L. 208, 211 , 160 A. 551, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1932). "[W]hether the age of a model in a child pornography prosecution can be determined by a lay jury without the assistance of expert testimony . . . must be determined on a case by case basis." United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1999). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Carlonegreen2 sentences2022We cannot conclude that such evaluations are always, in the terms of the standard test, "beyond the ken of the average juror[,]" . . . or that experts are invariably better equipped than laypersons are to make the judgment based on appearance alone. [Id. at 594 (citation omitted).] "Like any other fact, age is, of course, for the determination of the jury. " State v. Carlone, 109 N.J.L. 208, 211 (Sup. Ct. 1932). "[W]hether the age of a model in a child pornography prosecution can be determined by a lay jury without the assistance of expert testimony . . . must be determined on a case by case b 2021Such a case-by-case analysis may include where the children appear to fit along the spectrum of ages: "Like any other fact, age is, of course, for the determination of the jury." State v. Carlone, 109 N.J.L. 208, 211 , 160 A. 551, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1932). "[W]hether the age of a model in a child pornography prosecution can be determined by a lay jury without the assistance of expert testimony . . . must be determined on a case by case basis." United States v. Katz, 178 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1999). | 3 | 3 |
Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2019The rule provides that when a driver has permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the terms of a standard omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy. [ Matits , 33 N.J. at 496 -97 , 166 A.2d 345 .] In implementing the initial permission doctrine, New Jersey courts have refused to enforce insurance provisions that attempted to circumvent the permissive user rule by excluding categories of permissive users from a po 2019The rule provides that when a driver has permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the terms of a standard omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy. [ Matits , 33 N.J. at 496 -97 , 166 A.2d 345 .] In implementing the initial permission doctrine, New Jersey courts have refused to enforce insurance provisions that attempted to circumvent the permissive user rule by excluding categories of permissive users from a po | 2 | 14 |
DeHanes v. Rothmangreen2 sentences2021We cannot conclude that such evaluations are always, in the terms of the standard test, "beyond the ken of the average juror[,]" DeHanes v. Rothman, 158 N.J. 90, 100 , 727 A.2d 8, 13 (1999), or that experts are invariably better equipped than laypersons are to make the judgment based on appearance alone. [Id. at 583-84 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).] We further noted in May the capacity of laypersons to approximate the ages of children is highly dependent on the facts and circumstances. 2021We cannot conclude that such evaluations are always, in the terms of the standard test, "beyond the ken of the average juror[,]" DeHanes v. Rothman, 158 N.J. 90, 100 , 727 A.2d 8, 13 (1999), or that experts are invariably better equipped than laypersons are to make the judgment based on appearance alone. [Id. at 583-84 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).] We further noted in May the capacity of laypersons to approximate the ages of children is highly dependent on the facts and circumstances. | 2 | 2 |
Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Zullogreen2 sentences1984Co. v. Zullo, 48 N.J. 362, 373 (1966), held that an insurance policy "which purports to have a more restrictive omnibus coverage is automatically amended to conform to the statutory standard." Our Supreme Court has made it clear that restrictions on the initial permission rule in an attempt to limit automobile coverage run contrary to the public policy expressed in our compulsory insurance laws. 1970In Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 33 N.J. 488 (1960), it was held that "if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent *130 use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the terms of a standard omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy." N.J.S.A. 39:6-46(a) "is substantially the same as that of the standard omnibus clause construed in Matits * * * and therefore extends coverage in accordance with the initial permission rule." S | 2 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2020Court Rules, comment on R. 1:7-3 (2020) (citing State v. Johnson, 46 N.J. 289, 291 (1966)). | 1 | 1 |
Knorr v. Smealgreen1 sentence2017Because "[w]aiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right," Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003), there cannot be a clear and unambiguous agreement to waive without a "mutual understanding" of the terms of the waiver. | 1 | 1 |
United States Department of Energy v. Ohiored2 sentences1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). 1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). | 1 | 1 |
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Clubgreen2 sentences1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). 1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). | 1 | 1 |
Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belkgreen1 sentence1979Our Supreme Court adopted the policy that except in situations set forth within the terms of the rule "each litigant shall bear the expenses of prosecuting and defending his individual interests." Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, 167 (1960). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Frankelgreen1 sentence1961See 354 U.S., at pp. 491-492; 77 S.Ct., at pp. 1312-1313, 1 L.Ed. 2 d, at pp. 1510-1511; cf. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 , 67 S.Ct. 1538 , 91 L.Ed. 1877, 1883 (1947); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 , 72 S.Ct. 329 , 96 L.Ed. 367, 371 (1952); State v. Joas, 34 N.J. 179, 185 (1961); State v. Frankel, 42 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Joasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Petrillogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hodgson v. Applegategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Verriest v. Ina Underwriters Insurance
green
2 sentences2005Under this rule, “if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the terms of a standard omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance policy.” Id. at 411 , 662 A.2d 967 (quoting Matits v. Nationwide Mut. 2005Under this rule, “if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the terms of a standard omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance policy.” Id. at 411 , 662 A.2d 967 (quoting Matits v. Nationwide Mut. | 3 | 1996–2005 |
Schuncke v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurance
green
2 sentences1977Co., 33 N.J. 488 (1960), where this Court, after reviewing various approaches taken by other jurisdictions for determining the coverage available to persons other than the named insured under such a provision, adopted the broadest and most liberal approach, known as the "initial permission rule." The Court formulated this rule in these words: * * * [I]f a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the term 1977That opinion reduced the problem of coverage available to persons other than the named insured to two fact issues: (1) whether permission had been given to use the car, and (2) whether the use constituted "theft or the like." 42 N.J. at 413 . | 3 | 1966–1977 |
State v. May
green
1 sentence2022Thus, if A-3414-18 8 the "disputed images . . . depict either very young child-models or older 'models of sufficient maturity,'" expert testimony is not required "because a layperson can plainly make the determination whether the person so depicted is younger than sixteen." May, 362 N.J. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Patricia Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P. (072314)
green
2 sentences2017Atalese, supra, 219 N.J. at 446-47 . 2017Atalese, supra, 219 N.J. at 446-47 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Mancini v. EDS ON BEHALF OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE FULL INSURANCE UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION
green
2 sentences2008Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334 , 625 A. 2d 484 (1993). 2008Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334 , 625 A. 2d 484 (1993). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
French v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences2006Moreover, “[a]s long as the initial use of the vehicle is with the consent, express or implied, of the insured, any subsequent changes in the character or scope of the use ... do not require the additional specific consent of the insured.” French v. Hernandez, 184 N.J. 144, 152 , 875 A.2d 943 (2005) (quoting Verriest v. INA Underwriters Ins. 2006Moreover, “[a]s long as the initial use of the vehicle is with the consent, express or implied, of the insured, any subsequent changes in the character or scope of the use ... do not require the additional specific consent of the insured.” French v. Hernandez, 184 N.J. 144, 152 , 875 A.2d 943 (2005) (quoting Verriest v. INA Underwriters Ins. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.
red
2 sentences1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). 1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
McMahon v. United States
green
2 sentences1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). 1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
cluster 518773
green
2 sentences1993The Secretary argues that the terms of Section 1702's "sue and be *621 sued" clause should not prevail over the terms of the immunity waiver contained in Section 702 of the APA, and that allowing the Secretary to be sued under the APA in state court would be "inconsistent with the scheme of the APA." The Secretary essentially relies on a Sixth Circuit decision resolving this same issue in Federal National Mortgage Association v. LeCrone, supra, 868 F. 2d 190 . 1993The Secretary argues that the terms of Section 1702's "sue and be *621 sued" clause should not prevail over the terms of the immunity waiver contained in Section 702 of the APA, and that allowing the Secretary to be sued under the APA in state court would be "inconsistent with the scheme of the APA." The Secretary essentially relies on a Sixth Circuit decision resolving this same issue in Federal National Mortgage Association v. LeCrone, supra, 868 F. 2d 190 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
McMahon v. United States
green
1 sentence1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Harman v. Southern Ry.
green
1 sentence1993See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 1633 , 118 L.Ed. 2d at 266 ; United States v. Nordic Village, supra, 503 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15 , 117 L.Ed. 2d at 187-88 ; see also Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 , 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3277-78 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 938, 944 (1983); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 , 72 S.Ct. 17, 19 , 96 L.Ed. 26, 30 , reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 899 , 72 S.Ct. 228 , 96 L.Ed. 673 (1951). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Shaer Shoe Corp. v. Granite State Alarm, Inc.
green
2 sentences1975Cases cited by Telephone Co. in support of this argument are authority for upholding the limitation of liability insofar as ADT is concerned; but the proposition espoused by Telephone Co. is that its own liability is likewise curtailed. *163 Shaer Shoe Corp. v. Granite State Alarm, Inc., 110 N.H. 132 , 262 A. 2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Wedner v. Fidelity Security Systems, 307 A. 2d 429 (Pa. Super. 1975Cases cited by Telephone Co. in support of this argument are authority for upholding the limitation of liability insofar as ADT is concerned; but the proposition espoused by Telephone Co. is that its own liability is likewise curtailed. *163 Shaer Shoe Corp. v. Granite State Alarm, Inc., 110 N.H. 132 , 262 A. 2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Wedner v. Fidelity Security Systems, 307 A. 2d 429 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Wedner v. Fidelity Security Sytems, Inc.
green
1 sentence1975Cases cited by Telephone Co. in support of this argument are authority for upholding the limitation of liability insofar as ADT is concerned; but the proposition espoused by Telephone Co. is that its own liability is likewise curtailed. *163 Shaer Shoe Corp. v. Granite State Alarm, Inc., 110 N.H. 132 , 262 A. 2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Wedner v. Fidelity Security Systems, 307 A. 2d 429 (Pa. Super. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Gronquist v. Transit Casualty Company
green
1 sentence1970In Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 33 N.J. 488 (1960), it was held that "if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent *130 use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the terms of a standard omnibus clause in an automobile insurance policy." N.J.S.A. 39:6-46(a) "is substantially the same as that of the standard omnibus clause construed in Matits * * * and therefore extends coverage in accordance with the initial permission rule." S | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Danek v. Hommer
green
1 sentence1965Super. 68 ( App. Div. 1953), affirmed 15 N.J. 573 (1954), leads to the inescapable conclusion that Kowalsky qualifies as an additional insured under the terms of the clause in the Nationwide policy which includes "any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof." In Danek the court stated: "The conclusion to be drawn from these statements is that the duty to defend comes into being when the complaint states a claim constituting a risk insured against. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Franke
green
1 sentence1963Co. v. Franke, 75 N.J. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Nicholas v. Independence Indemnity Co.
neutral
1 sentence1962Super. 373 ( App. Div. 1960)), or the alternative "conversion" rule (see 7 Appleman, Insurance, 169-181 (1942)), held: "* * * if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the terms of a standard omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance policy." *73 Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that the cases relied upon by plaintiff, Penza v. The Century Indemnity Co., 119 N.J.L. 446 ( E. & A. 1937 | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Penza v. Century Indemnity Co. of Hartford
green
1 sentence1962Super. 373 ( App. Div. 1960)), or the alternative "conversion" rule (see 7 Appleman, Insurance, 169-181 (1942)), held: "* * * if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use within the terms of a standard omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance policy." *73 Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that the cases relied upon by plaintiff, Penza v. The Century Indemnity Co., 119 N.J.L. 446 ( E. & A. 1937 | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Hodgson v. Applegate green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Heater v. Van Auken neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Hewitt v. Green neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Morrison v. City of Lawrence neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.