54 New York opinions name it 9 courts 1851–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Seaberggreen2 sentences2015Accordingly, the order appealed from should be affirmed. 2 While the factors raised by the dissent -- whether a defendant has previously entered a guilty plea waiving rights to appeal, signed a written appeal waiver or taken a prior appeal -- certainly would be relevant to determining defendant's understanding of the terms of a waiver, this Court's review of a defendant's background, as it impacts upon the validity of an appeal waiver, has not been so confined (see People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 265-266 [2011]; People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 11-12 [1989]). 2015While the factors raised by the dissent — whether a defendant has previously entered a guilty plea waiving rights to appeal, signed a written appeal waiver or taken a prior appeal — certainly would be relevant to determining defendant’s understanding of the terms of a waiver, this Court’s review of a defendant’s background, as it impacts upon the validity of an appeal waiver, has not been so confined (see People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 265-266 [2011]; People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 11-12 [1989]). | 2 | 3 |
IDT Corp. v. Tyco Group, S.A.R.L.green2 sentences2012(IDT Corp. v Tyco Group, S.A.R.L., 54 AD3d 273 [1st Dept 2008].) We reasoned that the settlement agreement was a preliminary agreement that although “incomplete” nonetheless bound the parties to “their ultimate contractual objective upon the subsequent occurrence of a contingency” — namely, “either the insistence of one party on the terms of the standard agreements after they come into existence or a resolution of the remaining terms through further negotiation.” ( 54 AD3d at 275 [internal quotation marks omitted].) We further found that under this agreement the parties were obligated to negot 2012(IDT Corp. v Tyco Group, S.A.R.L., 54 AD3d 273 [1st Dept 2008].) We reasoned that the settlement agreement was a preliminary agreement that although “incomplete” nonetheless bound the parties to “their ultimate contractual objective upon the subsequent occurrence of a contingency” — namely, “either the insistence of one party on the terms of the standard agreements after they come into existence or a resolution of the remaining terms through further negotiation.” ( 54 AD3d at 275 [internal quotation marks omitted].) We further found that under this agreement the parties were obligated to negot | 2 | 2 |
People v. Callahangreen2 sentences2010Instead, “defendant’s appellate claim [is] addressed merely to the adequacy of the procedures the court used to arrive at its sentencing determination,” and it is therefore foreclosed by the waiver (People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 281 [1992]; see also People v Samms, 95 NY2d 52, 56-58 [2000]). 2004Thus, the court did not make a determination, “apparent on the face of the record,” that defendant understood the terms of the waiver (see People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 280 [1992]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sheagreen2 sentences2004Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that the plea and waiver were knowing, voluntary and intelligent (see People v Barrett, 301 AD2d 790, 790-791 [2003]; People v Shea, 254 AD2d 512, 513 [1998]). 2003Recognizing that public policy considerations encourage the enforcement of waivers of the right to appeal (see People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 10 ), we find that defendant completely understood and willingly accepted the terms of his waiver (see People v Shea, 254 AD2d 512, 513 ). | 1 | 2 |
Andrea Juncadella v. Robinhood Financial LLCgreen2 sentences2026Even if implying the covenant of good faith did not negate the terms of the assignment clause, doing so is not needed to prevent the action taken by Apollo—exercising its discretion to assign the loan—from creating an unenforceable or illusory agreement ( see In re January 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litigation , 76 F4th at 1348). 2026Even if implying the covenant of good faith did not negate the terms of the assignment clause, doing so is not needed to prevent the action taken by Apollo—exercising its discretion to assign the loan—from creating an unenforceable or illusory agreement ( see In re January 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litigation , 76 F4th at 1348 ). | 1 | 1 |
511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co.green2 sentences2026We apply these rules to determine if application of the covenant would negate the terms of the clause [*11] at issue or, even if it would not, to see if such application is necessary to prevent one party from "destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract" (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp ., 98 NY2d at 153 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see also Erk , 11 NY3d at 456-459 [implied covenant could not limit plain text of contractual language]). 2026We apply these rules to determine if application of the covenant would negate the terms of the clause [*11] at issue or, even if it would not, to see if such application is necessary to prevent one party from "destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract" (511 W. 232nd Owners Corp ., 98 NY2d at 153 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see also Erk , 11 NY3d at 456-459 [implied covenant could not limit plain text of contractual language]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Guerrerogreen1 sentence2025We also note that the written waiver form states that the appeal waiver was being executed "[i]n consideration and as part of the plea agreement." Although the appeal waiver was not mentioned when the terms of the plea agreement were initially placed on the record, "defendant was informed during the plea colloquy . . . that a waiver of the right to appeal was part of the plea bargain" ( Peopl e v Guerrero , 194 AD3d at 1259 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Christopher B.green2 sentences2020Contrary to the People's contention, "these defects were not cured by the terms of the standard written appeal waiver form, which not only lacked detail and repeated many of the mischaracterizations contained in the court's colloquy, but further misstated that the defendant was giving up the right to all postconviction relief separate from the direct appeal" ( People v Howard , 183 AD3d at 640 ; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d at 565-566; People v Leiva , 184 AD3d 731 ; People v Chy , 184 AD3d 664 ; see also People v Christopher B. , 184 AD3d 657 ). 2020On this record, and based on the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's young age and his inexperience with the criminal justice system, we cannot conclude that the defendant understood the nature of the appellate rights that he was waiving ( see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d at 566; People v Christopher B. , 184 AD3d 657 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tulipgreen2 sentences2018County Court [*2](Richards, J.) explained that the waiver of the right to appeal was separate and distinct from the trial-related rights that defendant was forfeiting ( see People v Cayon , 158 AD3d 946 , 947 [2018], lv denied ___ NY3d ___ [May 30, 2018]; People v Tulip , 150 AD3d 1564, 1565 [2017]); after assuring the court that he could read, defendant reviewed and executed a detailed written waiver in open court, wherein he expressly waived the right to challenge the severity of his sentence and, in response to further inquiry by County Court, indicated that he had been afforded an opportun 2018County Court [*2](Richards, J.) explained that the waiver of the right to appeal was separate and distinct from the trial-related rights that defendant was forfeiting ( see People v Cayon , 158 AD3d 946 , 947 [2018], lv denied ___ NY3d ___ [May 30, 2018]; People v Tulip , 150 AD3d 1564, 1565 [2017]); after assuring the court that he could read, defendant reviewed and executed a detailed written waiver in open court, wherein he expressly waived the right to challenge the severity of his sentence and, in response to further inquiry by County Court, indicated that he had been afforded an opportun | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences2015Accordingly, the order appealed from should be affirmed. 2 While the factors raised by the dissent -- whether a defendant has previously entered a guilty plea waiving rights to appeal, signed a written appeal waiver or taken a prior appeal -- certainly would be relevant to determining defendant's understanding of the terms of a waiver, this Court's review of a defendant's background, as it impacts upon the validity of an appeal waiver, has not been so confined (see People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 265-266 [2011]; People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 11-12 [1989]). 2015While the factors raised by the dissent — whether a defendant has previously entered a guilty plea waiving rights to appeal, signed a written appeal waiver or taken a prior appeal — certainly would be relevant to determining defendant’s understanding of the terms of a waiver, this Court’s review of a defendant’s background, as it impacts upon the validity of an appeal waiver, has not been so confined (see People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257, 265-266 [2011]; People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 11-12 [1989]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sammsgreen1 sentence2010Instead, “defendant’s appellate claim [is] addressed merely to the adequacy of the procedures the court used to arrive at its sentencing determination,” and it is therefore foreclosed by the waiver (People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 281 [1992]; see also People v Samms, 95 NY2d 52, 56-58 [2000]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Barrettgreen1 sentence2004Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that the plea and waiver were knowing, voluntary and intelligent (see People v Barrett, 301 AD2d 790, 790-791 [2003]; People v Shea, 254 AD2d 512, 513 [1998]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Levine v. Shell Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1988The terms of the standard real estate contract of sale and the attached rider are unambiguous and represent the clear intentions of the parties (Chimart Assocs. v Paul, 66 NY2d 570 ; Laba v Carey, 29 NY2d 302 , rearg denied 30 NY2d 694 ; Levine v Shell Oil Co., 28 NY2d 205 ). 1987The terms of the standard real estate contract of sale and the attached rider are unambiguous and represent the clear intentions of the parties (Chimart Assocs. v Paul, 66 NY2d 570 ; Laba v Carey, 29 NY2d 302 , rearg denied 30 NY2d 694 ; Levine v Shell Oil Co., 28 NY2d 205 ). | 2 | 1987–1988 |
Laba v. Carey
green
2 sentences1988The terms of the standard real estate contract of sale and the attached rider are unambiguous and represent the clear intentions of the parties (Chimart Assocs. v Paul, 66 NY2d 570 ; Laba v Carey, 29 NY2d 302 , rearg denied 30 NY2d 694 ; Levine v Shell Oil Co., 28 NY2d 205 ). 1987The terms of the standard real estate contract of sale and the attached rider are unambiguous and represent the clear intentions of the parties (Chimart Assocs. v Paul, 66 NY2d 570 ; Laba v Carey, 29 NY2d 302 , rearg denied 30 NY2d 694 ; Levine v Shell Oil Co., 28 NY2d 205 ). | 2 | 1987–1988 |
Chimart Associates v. Paul
green
2 sentences1988The terms of the standard real estate contract of sale and the attached rider are unambiguous and represent the clear intentions of the parties (Chimart Assocs. v Paul, 66 NY2d 570 ; Laba v Carey, 29 NY2d 302 , rearg denied 30 NY2d 694 ; Levine v Shell Oil Co., 28 NY2d 205 ). 1987The terms of the standard real estate contract of sale and the attached rider are unambiguous and represent the clear intentions of the parties (Chimart Assocs. v Paul, 66 NY2d 570 ; Laba v Carey, 29 NY2d 302 , rearg denied 30 NY2d 694 ; Levine v Shell Oil Co., 28 NY2d 205 ). | 2 | 1987–1988 |
United States v. Remington
green
2 sentences1970Courts 1 do not preserve justice a Federal Court of Appeals aptly observed in a somewhat related context (United States v. Remington, 208 F. 2d 567, 570 , cert. den. 347 U. S. 913 ), ‘ by allowing further criminal activity to take place. ’ ’ ’ The similarity in content between the testimony at the examination before trial and the testimony uttered before the Grand Jury is not significant. 1967Courts “ do not preserve justice ”, a Federal Court of Appeals aptly observed in a somewhat related context (United States v. Remington, 208 F. 2d 567, 570 , cert. den. 347 U. S. 913 ), “ by allowing further criminal activity to take place.” In short, the courts below should not have granted Tomasello’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was immune from prosecution for perjury because he was a target or a possible defendant. | 2 | 1967–1970 |
Beck v. Renahan
neutral
2 sentences1970Citing Vescera v. Dancy ( 52 Misc 2d 830 ), decided on February 6, 1967 by the Albany County Special Term of the Supreme Court, Devinney contends that this motion does not lie because subdivision 2 of section 167 of the New York State Insurance Law makes Devinney, the driver, an “ insured ” under the terms of the standard automobile liability policies issued to every registered owner of a motor vehicle in this State and the ‘ ‘ payment of any verdict in such a case would be simply what the owner’s liability carrier is required to do.” Upon that basis, the court in Vescera concluded that1 ‘ Whi 1967If a jury should find that there was permission to operate the owner’s vehicle, then under the authority of Beck v. Renahan ( 46 Misc 2d 252 , and the cases and authorities cited therein) the operator would be an “ insured” under the terms of the standard automobile liability policy issued to every registered owner of a motor vehicle in this State (Insurance Law, § 167, subd. 2), and the payment of any verdict in such a case would be simply what the owner’s liability carrier is required to do. | 2 | 1967–1970 |
Cincinnati Butchers' Supply Co. v. Pfeifer
green
2 sentences1970Courts 1 do not preserve justice a Federal Court of Appeals aptly observed in a somewhat related context (United States v. Remington, 208 F. 2d 567, 570 , cert. den. 347 U. S. 913 ), ‘ by allowing further criminal activity to take place. ’ ’ ’ The similarity in content between the testimony at the examination before trial and the testimony uttered before the Grand Jury is not significant. 1967Courts “ do not preserve justice ”, a Federal Court of Appeals aptly observed in a somewhat related context (United States v. Remington, 208 F. 2d 567, 570 , cert. den. 347 U. S. 913 ), “ by allowing further criminal activity to take place.” In short, the courts below should not have granted Tomasello’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was immune from prosecution for perjury because he was a target or a possible defendant. | 2 | 1967–1970 |
Traub v. Dinzler
green
2 sentences1970Citing Vescera v. Dancy ( 52 Misc 2d 830 ), decided on February 6, 1967 by the Albany County Special Term of the Supreme Court, Devinney contends that this motion does not lie because subdivision 2 of section 167 of the New York State Insurance Law makes Devinney, the driver, an “ insured ” under the terms of the standard automobile liability policies issued to every registered owner of a motor vehicle in this State and the ‘ ‘ payment of any verdict in such a case would be simply what the owner’s liability carrier is required to do.” Upon that basis, the court in Vescera concluded that1 ‘ Whi 1967While an owner of a vehicle may cross claim against the operator on the theory that liability is imposed on him by statute for the active negligence of the operator (Traub v. Dinzler, 309 N. Y. 395 ), the court cannot ignore the realities of the situation and permit a cross claim which, on all the facts, a party is not entitled to (Beck v. Renahan, supra). | 2 | 1967–1970 |
People v. Santos
neutral
1 sentence2025The sole question on appeal is whether including the Shock waiver as part of the plea agreement is contrary to statutory authority or public policy.{**44 NY3d at 931} [*3] The majority holds that "the [Shock] waiver is not a component of the sentence" (majority mem at &mdash). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Howard
green
1 sentence2020Contrary to the People's contention, "these defects were not cured by the terms of the standard written appeal waiver form, which not only lacked detail and repeated many of the mischaracterizations contained in the court's colloquy, but further misstated that the defendant was giving up the right to all postconviction relief separate from the direct appeal" ( People v Howard , 183 AD3d at 640 ; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d at 565-566; People v Leiva , 184 AD3d 731 ; People v Chy , 184 AD3d 664 ; see also People v Christopher B. , 184 AD3d 657 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Chy
green
1 sentence2020Contrary to the People's contention, "these defects were not cured by the terms of the standard written appeal waiver form, which not only lacked detail and repeated many of the mischaracterizations contained in the court's colloquy, but further misstated that the defendant was giving up the right to all postconviction relief separate from the direct appeal" ( People v Howard , 183 AD3d at 640 ; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d at 565-566; People v Leiva , 184 AD3d 731 ; People v Chy , 184 AD3d 664 ; see also People v Christopher B. , 184 AD3d 657 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Leiva
green
1 sentence2020Contrary to the People's contention, "these defects were not cured by the terms of the standard written appeal waiver form, which not only lacked detail and repeated many of the mischaracterizations contained in the court's colloquy, but further misstated that the defendant was giving up the right to all postconviction relief separate from the direct appeal" ( People v Howard , 183 AD3d at 640 ; see People v Thomas , 34 NY3d at 565-566; People v Leiva , 184 AD3d 731 ; People v Chy , 184 AD3d 664 ; see also People v Christopher B. , 184 AD3d 657 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Jacobson v. Sassower
green
1 sentence2011(Def ex 7 in support at 51:18-53:9, 59:22-60:4, 64:5-11, 145:11-17.) Accordingly, MPEG has collected billions of dollars without providing itself any manner of determining whether the monies are paid for branded products or products being sold to end users, both MPEG’s purported requirements for a sale to come within the ambit of being authorized and subject to the doctrine of “patent exhaustion.” Although Audiovox does not believe that any of the license agreement terms are ambiguous or that the court need consider such in light of MPEG’s conduct, it asserts that an ambiguity, if such exists, | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Alston v. State of New York
green
1 sentence2003They *206 withdrew this appeal following our decision in Alston v State of New York ( 97 NY2d 159 [2001] [holding that under the terms of the waiver of sovereign immunity in Court of Claims Act § 8, the State retained its immunity as to claims not complying with the time limitations in Court of Claims Act § 10 (4), upon which the waiver was conditioned]). 3 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. McDonald
green
1 sentence2003Because defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to appeal, his challenge to the severity of the sentence imposed is unpreserved for our review (see People v Varno, 297 AD2d 873, 874 ; People v McDonald, 295 AD2d 756, 757 , lv denied 98 NY2d 711 ). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Varno
green
1 sentence2003Because defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to appeal, his challenge to the severity of the sentence imposed is unpreserved for our review (see People v Varno, 297 AD2d 873, 874 ; People v McDonald, 295 AD2d 756, 757 , lv denied 98 NY2d 711 ). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Scavo v. Allstate Insurance
green
1 sentence2001Co., 238 AD2d 571 ; cf., New York Univ. v Continental Ins. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. George
green
1 sentence2000Such a disposition is not authorized under these circumstances (see, CPL 470.15) and, indeed, the proper remedy in this Court is enforcement of the waiver agreement (see, People v Seaberg, supra, at 10; People v George, 261 AD2d 711 , lv denied 93 NY2d 1018 ). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Sud v. Sud green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| In re Reich green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
In re the Arbitration between Teleserve Systems, Inc. & MCI Telecommunications Corp.
green
1 sentence1998We do find, however, that the excessive cost factor that is necessarily entailed in arbitrating before the ICC is unreasonable and surely serves to deter the individual consumer from invoking the process (see, Matter of Teleserve Sys. [MCI Telecommunications Corp.], 230 AD2d 585, 594 , lv denied App Div, 1st Dept, Sept. 30, 1997, 1997 NY App Div LEXIS 10626 ). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Bruken Realty Corp. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| LIN Broadcasting Corp. v. Metromedia, Inc. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Haskell v. Surita green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Randall Co. v. Alan Lobel Photography, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Bomze v. Jaybee Photo Suppliers, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Beveridge v. New York Elevated Railroad green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Kurek v. Port Chester Housing Authority green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Rock v. Concrete Materials, Inc. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Johnson v. Zerbst green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Matter of Basin St.(lubin) green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| In re Savoy Ballroom Corp. neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Wigand v. . Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Gutman v. Sal-Vio Masons, Inc. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Steinberg v. Carreras green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| In Re United Cigar Stores Co. of America green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| In Re United Cigar Stores Co. of America green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Vescera v. Dancy neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.