terms rule in Texas

2023“Provided the judge approves the dismissal that results from an immunity agreement, and is aware that the dismissal is pursuant to an immunity agreement, the judge does not have to be aware of the specific terms of that immunity agreement for it to be enforceable.” Id.

2021Provided the judge approves the dismissal that results from an immunity agreement, and is aware that the dismissal is pursuant to an immunity agreement, the judge does not have to be aware of the specific terms of that immunity agreement for it to be enforceable. 70 S.W.3d at 855 .

2011Safety, 972 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (concluding that appellate court lacked jurisdiction over cause because appellate 11 jurisdiction ―extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken‖), overruled, in part, on other grounds by City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. 2007); P.I.A. of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 837 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding) (concluding that under the terms of rule 329b, the trial court had no jurisdiction to seal the parties' divorce records over nine months after the suit h

2011Safety, 972 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (concluding that appellate court lacked jurisdiction over cause because appellate jurisdiction “extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken”), overruled, in part, on other grounds by City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.2007); P.I.A. of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 837 S.W.2d 844, 846 (TexApp.-Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding) (concluding that under the terms of rule 329b, the trial court had no jurisdiction to seal the parties’ divorce records over nine months after the suit had bee

2023While Cheek also argues that “everyone here knows the basis for the TRO,” this Court observed in El Tacaso that “[e]ven if a sound reason for granting relief appears elsewhere in the record, the Texas Supreme Court has stated in the strongest terms that rule of civil procedure 683 is mandatory.” El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 745 ; see also Elevacity, 2018 WL 915031 , at *2 (temporary restraining order violated Rule 683 by, among other things, referencing only applicant’s pleadings as support for order).

2022El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 745 (“Even if a sound reason for granting relief appears elsewhere in the record, the Texas Supreme Court has stated in the strongest terms that rule of civil procedure 683 is mandatory.”).

2022Holdings, Inc., 374 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (“Even if a sound reason for granting relief appears elsewhere in the record, the Texas Supreme Court has stated in the strongest terms the rule must be followed.”).

2014Partners, LLC v. Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holdings, Inc., 374 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (“Even if a sound reason for granting relief appears elsewhere in the record, the Texas Supreme Court has stated in the strongest terms the rule must be followed.”).

2016See State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1971) (Calvert, J., concurring) (“The requirement in Rule 683 that the reasons for issuing an injunction –3– be stated in the order could hardly be couched in stronger language.

2012State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex.1971) (Calvert, J., concurring) (“The requirement of Rule 683 that the reasons for issuing an injunction be stated in the order could hardly be couched in stronger language.

2007See Ballard , 174 S.W.3d at 265 (reaching similar conclusion on claims based on police force’s “customs and policies”). (footnote: 17) Because we conclude the summary judgment record shows as a matter of law that Hernandez’s claims do not fall within the terms of the waiver of immunity prescribed by § 101.021, we overrule her fourth issue.

2007See Ballard, 174 S.W.3d at 265 (reaching similar conclusion on claims based on police force’s “customs and policies”). 17 *762 Because we conclude the summary judgment record shows as a matter of law that Hernandez’s claims do not fall within the terms of the waiver of immunity prescribed by § 101.021, we overrule her fourth issue.

1960See Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232 , 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 ; Hannah v. Stephens, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 823 .

1953The commission of the crime, offense, or trespass is under the terms of this exception a part of the venue facts.” Compton v. Elliott, Tex.Com.App., 88 S.W.2d 91, 93 ; Hannah v. Stephens, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 823 .

2016Ford v. State, 179 S.W.3d 203, 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d); see also Bridges, 909 S.W.2d at 157 (“[T]he informer’s potential testimony must be shown to significantly aid appellant, and mere conjecture or supposition about possible relevance is insufficient.”).

2013Ford v. State, 179 S.W.3d 203, 210 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd).

2011Safety, 972 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (concluding that appellate court lacked jurisdiction over cause because appellate 11 jurisdiction ―extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken‖), overruled, in part, on other grounds by City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. 2007); P.I.A. of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 837 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding) (concluding that under the terms of rule 329b, the trial court had no jurisdiction to seal the parties' divorce records over nine months after the suit h

2011Safety, 972 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (concluding that appellate court lacked jurisdiction over cause because appellate jurisdiction “extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken”), overruled, in part, on other grounds by City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.2007); P.I.A. of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 837 S.W.2d 844, 846 (TexApp.-Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding) (concluding that under the terms of rule 329b, the trial court had no jurisdiction to seal the parties’ divorce records over nine months after the suit had bee

2011See id. 9 .

2010See id. [9] The Stowers demand letter does not constitute a notice of the suit in accordance with section 2-305.

2011Safety, 972 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (concluding that appellate court lacked jurisdiction over cause because appellate 11 jurisdiction ―extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken‖), overruled, in part, on other grounds by City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. 2007); P.I.A. of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 837 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding) (concluding that under the terms of rule 329b, the trial court had no jurisdiction to seal the parties' divorce records over nine months after the suit h

2011Safety, 972 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (concluding that appellate court lacked jurisdiction over cause because appellate jurisdiction “extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken”), overruled, in part, on other grounds by City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.2007); P.I.A. of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 837 S.W.2d 844, 846 (TexApp.-Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding) (concluding that under the terms of rule 329b, the trial court had no jurisdiction to seal the parties’ divorce records over nine months after the suit had bee

2008See Wright v. Brooks, 773 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).

1991See Wright v. Brooks, 773 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1989, writ denied).

2002The supreme court held the description sufficient, stating: The stated ownership of the property is in itself a matter of description which leads to the certain identification of the property and brings the description within the terms of the rule that ‘the writing must furnish within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land to be conveyed may be identified with reasonable certainty.’ Id. at 224 (citation omitted).

1959Having proved up the Hardin deed making Barrow’s interest thereby definite at the time he executed the deed to McManus, et al., the following language from Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207 , 223 S.W.2d 222 , at page 224, is appropriate: “The stated ownership of the property is in itself a matter of description which leads to the certain identification of the property and brings the de *343 scription within the terms of the rule that 'the writing must furnish within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land to he conveyed may be identi

1980See Edgar v. Bartek, 507 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1974, writ dism’d w.o.j.).

1978Edgar v. Bartek, supra. The record on appeal includes the transcript and a 47 page statement of facts with attached exhibits.

2025See, e.g., In re City of Dickinson, 568 S.W.3d 642 , 645–46 (Tex. 2019).

2022Dansby v. State, 448 S.W.3d 441, 447 (Tex. Crim.

2020If a statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence necessarily must guess at the statute’s meaning and differ as to its application, the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.15 In the parts of section 671.001 at issue in today’s case, the statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in only one instance — requiring that death be pronounced before artificial means of supporting a person’s respiratory and circulatory functions may be terminated.16 The terms of this requirement are not so vague that people of comm

2020If a statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence necessarily must guess at the statute’s meaning and differ as to its application, the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.15 In the parts of section 671.001 at issue in today’s case, the statute forbids or requires the doing of an act in only one instance — requiring that death be pronounced before artificial means of supporting a person’s respiratory and circulatory functions may be terminated.16 The terms of this requirement are not so vague that people of comm

2020Trenz v. Peter Paul Petroleum Co., 388 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

2019See In re H.N.T., 367 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (holding that when the original divorce decree did not include a geographic restriction, the custodial parent’s move to a new city “represent[ed] an anticipated circumstance because Father knew nothing within the decree prohibited Mother from moving with H.N.T. at anytime to anywhere”).

2016Ford v. State, 179 S.W.3d 203, 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d); see also Bridges, 909 S.W.2d at 157 (“[T]he informer’s potential testimony must be shown to significantly aid appellant, and mere conjecture or supposition about possible relevance is insufficient.”).