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76 Pennsylvania opinions name it 8 courts 1891–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. O'Sheagreen2 sentences1980Crim.P. 1100(d)] or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule [Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c)] if the Commonwealth is to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 14-15 , 364 A.2d 694, 697 (1976) quoting Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 465 Pa. 491, 496 , 350 A.2d 872, 874 (1976). 1980Crim.P. 1100(d)] or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule [Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c)] if the Commonwealth is to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 14-15 , 364 A.2d 694, 697 (1976) quoting Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 465 Pa. 491, 496 , 350 A.2d 872, 874 (1976). | 23 | 25 |
Commonwealth v. Sheltongreen2 sentences1980Crim.P. 1100(d)] or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule [Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c)] if the Commonwealth is to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 14-15 , 364 A.2d 694, 697 (1976) quoting Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 465 Pa. 491, 496 , 350 A.2d 872, 874 (1976). 1980Crim.P. 1100(d)] or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule [Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c)] if the Commonwealth is to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 14-15 , 364 A.2d 694, 697 (1976) quoting Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 465 Pa. 491, 496 , 350 A.2d 872, 874 (1976). | 16 | 25 |
Womer v. Hillikergreen2 sentences2025See Womer, 908 A.2d at 278 (“Rule 126 is available to a party who makes a substantial attempt to conform, and not to a party who disregards the terms of a rule in their entirety and determines for himself the steps he can take to satisfy the procedure that we have adopted to enhance the functioning of the trial courts”) (emphasis added). - 17 - J-A18006-24 conclusion ends the matter, we note that our Supreme Court may have had very good reason to exclude writs of summons from the amendment procedures authorized in Rule 1033, as application of Rule 1033 to writs of summons would be unjust. 2025While the Womer Court determined that Rule 1042.3 may be satisfied by “substantial compliance” under Pa.R.C.P. 126, substantial compliance does not permit a party to “disregard the terms of a rule in their entirety and determines for himself the steps he can take to satisfy the procedure [] adopted to enhance the functioning of the trial courts.” Womer, 908 A.2d at 278 . | 5 | 12 |
Toro, C. v. Fitness International, LLCgreen2 sentences2022See id. at 970 . 2022See id. at 970. | 2 | 2 |
Sahutsky v. H.H. Knoebel Sonsgreen2 sentences2008See Sahutsky, 782 A.2d at 1001 ; Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341 , 633 A.2d 125, 127 (1993). 2006See Sahutsky, 782 A.2d at 1001 ; Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341 , 633 A.2d 125, 127 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Metzgreen2 sentences2008See Sahutsky, 782 A.2d at 1001 ; Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341 , 633 A.2d 125, 127 (1993). 2008See Sahutsky, 782 A.2d at 1001 ; Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341 , 633 A.2d 125, 127 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Hines v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authoritygreen1 sentence2018Auth., 607 A.2d 301, 304 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (filing demand for jury trial not substantial compliance where notice of appeal was required, because “appellant simply didn’t comply” and “never perfected an appeal”). … Defendants did not “disregard[] the terms of a rule in their entirety and determin[e] for [them]sel[ves] the steps [they] can take to satisfy the procedure that [courts] have adopted to enhance the functioning of the trial courts.” [Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 271 (Pa. 2006)]. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2017Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 568 (Pa. 2005); 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(4); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9546(d). [J-53-2017 and J-63-2017] -5 Only the newly-recognized constitutional right exception is relevant here.6 We examined the terms of this exception, and a petitioner’s burden thereunder, in Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 812 A.2d 497 (Pa. 2002): Subsection (iii) of Section 9545[(b)(1)] has two requirements. | 1 | 1 |
SALERA v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Companygreen2 sentences2011There was no basis or justification for this transparent procedural maneuver.” Id. at 485-88 . 2011There was no basis or justification for this transparent procedural maneuver." Id. at 485-88. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Howardgreen2 sentences1999To the extent that this allegation is intended to refer to the claims of withheld evidence that were addressed and found to be meritless in Yarris II, such allegation has been previously litigated and therefore cannot entitle Appellant to post-conviction relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 280-81 , 719 A.2d 233, 240 (1998). 7 . 1999To the extent that this allegation is intended to refer to the claims of withheld evidence that were addressed and found to be meritless in Yarris II, such allegation has been previously litigated and therefore cannot entitle Appellant to post-conviction relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 280-81 , 719 A.2d 233, 240 (1998). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Huntergreen2 sentences1992None of Dr. Fyfe’s testimony contradicts the postulates of Pennsylvania law as set forth in Bickert v. Borough of Riverside, 118 Pa.Commonwealth Ct 91, 545 A.2d 962 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Hunter, 240 Pa.Superior Ct. 23, 360 A.2d 702 (1976), relied upon by the City. 9 The standard of care exercised by a police officer when operating a motor vehicle is an appropriate subject for inquiry under the terms of the exception to governmental immunity. 1992None of Dr. Fyfe's testimony contradicts the postulates of Pennsylvania law as set forth in Bickert v. Borough of Riverside, 118 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 91, 545 A.2d 962 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Hunter, 240 Pa.Superior Ct. 23, 360 A.2d 702 (1976), relied upon by the City. [9] The standard of care exercised by a police officer when operating a motor vehicle is an appropriate subject for inquiry under the terms of the exception to governmental immunity. | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Zoning Hearing Boardgreen2 sentences1990The courts of this Commonwealth have held that once it has been established that the proposed use is allowable under the terms of exception in the zoning ordinance, the protestants must demonstrate “that the requested use would constitute a detriment to public health, safety or welfare.” Evans v. Zoning Hearing Board of Easttown Township, 40 Pa. Commw. 103, 108 , 396 A.2d 889, 892 (1979). 1990The courts of this Commonwealth have held that once it has been established that the proposed use is allowable under the terms of exception in the zoning ordinance, the protestants must demonstrate “that the requested use would constitute a detriment to public health, safety or welfare.” Evans v. Zoning Hearing Board of Easttown Township, 40 Pa. Commw. 103, 108 , 396 A.2d 889, 892 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Snydergreen2 sentences1982The Commonwealth therefore had 180 days from the filing of the complaint, or until February 21, 1980, to bring appellant to trial. 1 Since appellant was not tried until July 21, 1980, 331 days after the complaint was filed, the time beyond the prescribed period either must be excluded from the 180 day computation, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d), 2 or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c). 3 *229 Commonwealth v. Snyder, 280 Pa.Super. 127, 130 , 421 A.2d 438, 439 (1980). 1982The Commonwealth therefore had 180 days from the filing of the complaint, or until February 21, 1980, to bring appellant to trial. 1 Since appellant was not tried until July 21, 1980, 331 days after the complaint was filed, the time beyond the prescribed period either must be excluded from the 180 day computation, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d), 2 or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c). 3 *229 Commonwealth v. Snyder, 280 Pa.Super. 127, 130 , 421 A.2d 438, 439 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Myrickgreen2 sentences1982It is well settled, however, that the particular terms of rule 1100 “are neither directly granted by nor required by the Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Myrick, 468 Pa. 155, 161 , 360 A.2d 598, 600 (1976). 1982It is well settled, however, that the particular terms of rule 1100 “are neither directly granted by nor required by the Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Myrick, 468 Pa. 155, 161 , 360 A.2d 598, 600 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences1982See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (“We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.”); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297 , 297 A.2d 127 (1972). 1982See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (“We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.”); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297 , 297 A.2d 127 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Butler v. Bonner & Barnewall, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Quinn v. PERSHINGgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McFadden v. Maygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam
green
2 sentences2017Only the newly-recognized constitutional right exception is relevant here. 6 We examined the terms of this exception, and a petitioner’s burden thereunder, in Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 571 Pa. 219 , 812 A.2d 497 (2002): Subsection (iii) of Section 9545[ (b)(1) ] has two requirements. 2017Only the newly-recognized constitutional right exception is relevant here. 6 We examined the terms of this exception, and a petitioner’s burden thereunder, in Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 571 Pa. 219 , 812 A.2d 497 (2002): Subsection (iii) of Section 9545[ (b)(1) ] has two requirements. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Hamilton
green
2 sentences1977Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was promulgated in response to our Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297 , 297 A.2d 127 (1972), requires a trial to commence within 270 days in actions brought between June 30, 1973 and June 30, 1974. [3] In the instant case, trial was commenced on December 13, 1974, which was thirty-eight days beyond the 270-day period generally mandated by Rule 1100 and, as our Supreme Court recently held in Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8 , 364 A.2d 694 (1976), this delay "must be either excluded from the computat 1977Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was promulgated in response to our Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297 , 297 A.2d 127 (1972), requires a trial to commence within 270 days in actions brought between June 30, 1973 and June 30, 1974. [3] In the instant case, trial was commenced on December 13, 1974, which was thirty-eight days beyond the 270-day period generally mandated by Rule 1100 and, as our Supreme Court recently held in Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8 , 364 A.2d 694 (1976), this delay "must be either excluded from the computat | 2 | 1977–1982 |
Perlberger v. Perlberger
green
2 sentences2019Perlberger v. Perlberger , 426 Pa.Super. 245 , 626 A.2d 1186 , 1195 (1993). 9 Among these new rules was Rule 1920.42(b)(2), providing that affidavits of consent must be filed within thirty days of execution in order to trigger the procedure by which the court would enter a divorce decree by mutual consent without a hearing or further proceedings. 2019Perlberger v. Perlberger , 426 Pa.Super. 245 , 626 A.2d 1186 , 1195 (1993). 9 Among these new rules was Rule 1920.42(b)(2), providing that affidavits of consent must be filed within thirty days of execution in order to trigger the procedure by which the court would enter a divorce decree by mutual consent without a hearing or further proceedings. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dean v. Com., Dept. of Transp.
green
2 sentences2018JUSTICE WECHT Like the learned Majority, I believe that the plain language of the real estate exception, Subsection 8522(b)(4) of the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521 -28 ("the Act"), waives Commonwealth immunity for damages caused by dangerous guardrails affixed to Commonwealth real estate. 1 I agree as well that Dean v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation , 561 Pa. 503 , 751 A.2d 1130 (2000), does not control the outcome of this case, as Dean was predicated upon the absence of a guardrail, rather than the presence of a defective one. 2018JUSTICE WECHT Like the learned Majority, I believe that the plain language of the real estate exception, Subsection 8522(b)(4) of the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521 -28 ("the Act"), waives Commonwealth immunity for damages caused by dangerous guardrails affixed to Commonwealth real estate. 1 I agree as well that Dean v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation , 561 Pa. 503 , 751 A.2d 1130 (2000), does not control the outcome of this case, as Dean was predicated upon the absence of a guardrail, rather than the presence of a defective one. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. McNeal
green
1 sentence2017Id. (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 700(A)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Richards v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2014The decision in Commonwealth v. Au, 615 Pa. 330 , 42 A.3d 1002 (2012), expressed reservations about the application of the governing standard — whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave — on the terms on which such standard has evolved in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Au
green
1 sentence2014The decision in Commonwealth v. Au, 615 Pa. 330 , 42 A.3d 1002 (2012), expressed reservations about the application of the governing standard — whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave — on the terms on which such standard has evolved in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Granville Township v. Board of Assessment Appeals
green
1 sentence2013Nevertheless, we reiterated that “the burden of proof of liability for taxes is on the taxing authority where the real estate in question is owned by a governmental body.” Granville, 900 A.2d at 1016 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Toy Manufacturers Of America, Inc. v. Blumenthal
green
1 sentence1997The Second Circuit also states that where a court determines that a preemption provision provides a “reliable indicium of congressional intent a court is required to restrict its preemption analysis to the terms of that clause.” Toy Mfrs. of Am. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615 , 623 (2nd Cir.1993) (preemptive effect of Federal Hazardous Substances Act). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Bickert v. Borough of Riverside
green
2 sentences1992None of Dr. Fyfe’s testimony contradicts the postulates of Pennsylvania law as set forth in Bickert v. Borough of Riverside, 118 Pa.Commonwealth Ct 91, 545 A.2d 962 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Hunter, 240 Pa.Superior Ct. 23, 360 A.2d 702 (1976), relied upon by the City. 9 The standard of care exercised by a police officer when operating a motor vehicle is an appropriate subject for inquiry under the terms of the exception to governmental immunity. 1992None of Dr. Fyfe's testimony contradicts the postulates of Pennsylvania law as set forth in Bickert v. Borough of Riverside, 118 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 91, 545 A.2d 962 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Hunter, 240 Pa.Superior Ct. 23, 360 A.2d 702 (1976), relied upon by the City. [9] The standard of care exercised by a police officer when operating a motor vehicle is an appropriate subject for inquiry under the terms of the exception to governmental immunity. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Wyoming Radio, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Broadcast Employees & Technicians
green
2 sentences1992The second, Wyoming Radio Inc. v. National Association of Broadcast Employees & Technicians, 398 Pa. 183 , 157 A.2d 366 (1960), held that, where such a clause exists by the agreement of the parties to a contract, the parties are bound by their commitment to resolve any contractual dispute under the specific terms of the clause, just as if they had entered into a stipulation in court. 1992The second, Wyoming Radio Inc. v. National Association of Broadcast Employees & Technicians, 398 Pa. 183 , 157 A.2d 366 (1960), held that, where such a clause exists by the agreement of the parties to a contract, the parties are bound by their commitment to resolve any contractual dispute under the specific terms of the clause, just as if they had entered into a stipulation in court. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
CHESTER SCH. AUTH. v. Aberthaw Const.
green
2 sentences1992The third, Chester City School Authority v. Aberthaw Construction Co., 460 Pa. 343 , 333 A.2d 758 (1975), held that it is improper to avoid the provisions of such a clause by a party’s unilateral termination of the contract. 1992The third, Chester City School Authority v. Aberthaw Construction Co., 460 Pa. 343 , 333 A.2d 758 (1975), held that it is improper to avoid the provisions of such a clause by a party’s unilateral termination of the contract. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Commonwealth v. Knupp
neutral
1 sentence1986Commonwealth v. Knupp, 340 Pa.Super at 311, 490 A.2d at 4 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Commonwealth v. Martin
green
2 sentences1985Cf. Commonwealth v. Martin, 300 Pa.Super. 497 , 446 A.2d 965 (1982). 1985Cf. Commonwealth v. Martin, 300 Pa.Super. 497 , 446 A.2d 965 (1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Hoffman
neutral
2 sentences1983Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 255 Pa.Super. 66 , 386 A.2d 138 (1978). 1983Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 255 Pa.Super. 66 , 386 A.2d 138 (1978). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Commonwealth v. Cameron green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Schreibstein v. Cohen neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Commonwealth v. Woods green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| McCrea v. Automatic Heat, Inc. green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Adams v. Bachert neutral | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Teufel v. Wienir green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Hirst's Estate green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Reuss Estate green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Rae's Estate neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Deal's Estate green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Conrad's Estate green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Moore Estate neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Kenna Estate green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Schwoyer's Estate green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Dulles v. Dulles green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Bundy v. Myers green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Lauderbach-Zerby Co. v. Lewis green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Marshall v. Mellon green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Wilcox v. Mutual Fire Insurance neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| County of Schuylkill v. Copley green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Sproul's Appeal neutral | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Thompson's Estate neutral | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Railroad Company v. Fremont County green | 1 | 1891–1891 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.