terms presumption in Maryland

2023Therefore, they “must be liberally construed in order to effectuate [their] broad remedial 24 Westminster points out that prospective tenants could decline to sign a lease, but “take-it-or-leave-it” is not the equivalent of negotiation. 27 purpose[s].” See Lockett, 446 Md. at 424 .

2023Therefore, they “must be liberally construed in order to effectuate [their] broad remedial 24 Westminster points out that prospective tenants could decline to sign a lease, but “take-it-or-leave-it” is not the equivalent of negotiation. - 27 - purpose[s].” See Lockett, 446 Md. at 424 .

1995In Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261, 266 , 434 A.2d 574 (1981), the Court of Appeals pointed out that A problem peculiar to the Barker test is its use of the terms presumption of prejudice and actual prejudice.

1995In Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261, 266 , 434 A.2d 574 (1981), the Court of Appeals pointed out that A problem peculiar to the Barker test is its use of the terms presumption of prejudice and actual prejudice.

2007When the landowner breached the terms of the waiver by erecting his house to a ultimate height of 24 feet, id., the Court of Special Appeals held that the neighbor was not estopped from pursuing relief for the breach.

2007Speer, 33 Md.App. at 729 , 366 A.2d at 101 . 32 .

2003In Icgoren, 103 Md.App. at 421-22 , 653 A.2d 972 , we said: “A problem peculiar to the Barker test is its use of the terms presumption of prejudice and actual prejudice.

2003In Icgoren, 103 Md.App. at 421-22 , 653 A.2d 972 , we said: “A problem peculiar to the Barker test is its use of the terms presumption of prejudice and actual prejudice.

2002In Duncan , we held that a public school teacher did not meet the terms of that exception because he “d[id] not make rules and regulations or determine county educational policy.” Id.

2002In Duncan , we held that a public school teacher did not meet the terms of that exception because he "d[id] not make rules and regulations or determine county educational policy." Id.

1953The appellant says that even if a question of title were in issue in the replevin suit, nevertheless, the judgment is void or is not conclusive because it does not comply with the requirements of Sec. 129 of Art. 75 of the Code of 1951, and so amounts to no more than a writ of retorno habendo, which under the holding of Dermer v. Faunce, 187 Md. 610 , 51 A. 2d 76 , was not a final order which was appealable.

1953The appellant says that even if a question of title were in issue in the replevin suit, nevertheless, the judgment is void or is not conclusive because it does not comply with the requirements of Sec. 129 of Art. 75 of the Code of 1951, and so amounts to no more than a writ of retorno habendo, which under the holding of Dermer v. Faunce, 187 Md. 610 , 51 A. 2d 76 , was not a final order which was appealable.

1915Co. (Miss.), 63 So. 346 , where the question we have been considering arose under somewhat similar conditions, it was held that a list, made by the assured, of all the goods, with their values, which were placed in the store when it was first opened for business, was an inventory within the intent of the Iron Safe Clause, and that as it had been made within a year before the date of the policy in suit, it was the duty of the assured, under the terms of the clause, to keep the books therein specified, without waiting to take another inventory within the thirty-day period.

1871Co., 32 N. Y., 399 , the policy was upon a “two-story framed building, used for winding and coloring yarn, and for storage of spun yarn, with the machinery and fixtures in it,” it was held, as the terms of the clause were fully satisfied as a description, they would not be construed to be a continuing warranty of future .-use.