terms rule in Connecticut

1983“When a statute creates an exception to a general rule it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.” Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976), quoting Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937).

1983“When a statute creates an exception to a general rule it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.” Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976), quoting Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937).

1983“When a statute creates an exception to a general rule it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.” Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976), quoting Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937).

1983“When a statute creates an exception to a general rule it is to be construed strictly and its language is not to be extended beyond its evident intent.” Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110 , 374 A.2d 133 (1976), quoting Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446, 454 , 197 A. 85 (1937).

2024The trial court properly applied Cole v. Myers ( 128 Conn. 223 ) to determine the proper measure of damages to award to C: C provided no authority for his proposition that the doctrine of substantial performance applied to contingency fee agreement cases in which an attorney was discharged by his client prior to settlement, and, pursuant to Cole, an attorney in such a case was permitted to recover only the reasonable value of the services he performed on his client’s behalf; moreover, the trial court analyzed the work performed by C under the terms of rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Cond

2022Co., 221 Conn. 185 , 602 A.2d 1007 (1992).

2022Co., 221 Conn. 185 , 602 A.2d 1007 (1992).

2015Bermudez testified as to his involvement in the drug organization and to the terms of the immunity agreement he made with the state prior to testifying at the defendant’s trial.4 ‘‘[I]t is not improper for a prosecutor to remark on the motives that a witness may have to lie, or not to lie, as the case may be.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 585 , 849 A.2d 626 (2004).

2015Bermudez testified as to his involvement in the drug organization and to the terms of the immunity agreement he made with the state prior to testifying at the defendant’s trial.4 ‘‘[I]t is not improper for a prosecutor to remark on the motives that a witness may have to lie, or not to lie, as the case may be.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 585 , 849 A.2d 626 (2004).

2002The Nevada Court held: "If an offer recites that costs are included or specifies an amount for costs, and the plaintiff accepts the offer, the judgment will necessarily include costs; if the offer does not state that costs are included or an amount for costs is not specified, the court will be obliged by the terms of the rule to include in its judgment an additional amount which in its discretion, it determines to be sufficient to cover the costs." (Internal citations omitted) 737 P.2d at 520 .

2001Novella v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. , 163 Conn. 552 , 564 (1972).

1991Our certification was limited to the following issue: “What effect should a mortgage contingency clause, that does not comply with General Statutes § 49-5b, have where the buyers have waived the terms of the clause and are ready, willing and able to purchase the property without third party mortgage financing?” Booth v. Flanagan, 217 Conn. 807 , 584 A.2d 1191 (1991).

1991Our certification was limited to the following issue: “What effect should a mortgage contingency clause, that does not comply with General Statutes § 49-5b, have where the buyers have waived the terms of the clause and are ready, willing and able to purchase the property without third party mortgage financing?” Booth v. Flanagan, 217 Conn. 807 , 584 A.2d 1191 (1991).

1991The plaintiffs’ petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 23 Conn. App. 579 , is granted, limited to the following issue: “What effect should a mortgage contingency clause, that does not comply with General Statutes § 49-5b, have where the buyers have waived the terms of the clause and are ready, willing and able to purchase the property without third party mortgage financing?”

1941In the following cases recovery was denied on somewhat similar facts and our Dickinson case, discussed below, was distinguished as involving a slight deviation from a permitted use: Frederiksen v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., 26 Fed. (2d) 76; Denny v. Royal Indemnity Co., 26 Ohio App. 566, 572 , 159 N. E. 107 ; Johnson v. Automobile Ins.

1941In the following cases recovery was denied on somewhat similar facts and our Dickinson case, discussed below, was distinguished as involving a slight deviation from a permitted use: Frederiksen v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., 26 Fed. (2d) 76; Denny v. Royal Indemnity Co., 26 Ohio App. 566, 572 , 159 N. E. 107 ; Johnson v. Automobile Ins.

1935“The aim of interpretation is to ascertain what a writer intended by what he said, and not either to put words into his mouth or to give effect to that which it may be thought he either intended to say or would have wished to say but didn’t.” Ziulkoski v. Barker, 94 Conn. 491, 494 , 109 Atl. 185 ; Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Really Co., 114 Conn. 283, 289 , 158 Atl. 548 ; Gray v. Greenblatt, 113 Conn. 535, 539 , 155 Atl. 707 .

1935“The aim of interpretation is to ascertain what a writer intended by what he said, and not either to put words into his mouth or to give effect to that which it may be thought he either intended to say or would have wished to say but didn’t.” Ziulkoski v. Barker, 94 Conn. 491, 494 , 109 Atl. 185 ; Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Really Co., 114 Conn. 283, 289 , 158 Atl. 548 ; Gray v. Greenblatt, 113 Conn. 535, 539 , 155 Atl. 707 .

1935“The aim of interpretation is to ascertain what a writer intended by what he said, and not either to put words into his mouth or to give effect to that which it may be thought he either intended to say or would have wished to say but didn’t.” Ziulkoski v. Barker, 94 Conn. 491, 494 , 109 Atl. 185 ; Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Really Co., 114 Conn. 283, 289 , 158 Atl. 548 ; Gray v. Greenblatt, 113 Conn. 535, 539 , 155 Atl. 707 .

1935“The aim of interpretation is to ascertain what a writer intended by what he said, and not either to put words into his mouth or to give effect to that which it may be thought he either intended to say or would have wished to say but didn’t.” Ziulkoski v. Barker, 94 Conn. 491, 494 , 109 Atl. 185 ; Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Really Co., 114 Conn. 283, 289 , 158 Atl. 548 ; Gray v. Greenblatt, 113 Conn. 535, 539 , 155 Atl. 707 .

1935“The aim of interpretation is to ascertain what a writer intended by what he said, and not either to put words into his mouth or to give effect to that which it may be thought he either intended to say or would have wished to say but didn’t.” Ziulkoski v. Barker, 94 Conn. 491, 494 , 109 Atl. 185 ; Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Really Co., 114 Conn. 283, 289 , 158 Atl. 548 ; Gray v. Greenblatt, 113 Conn. 535, 539 , 155 Atl. 707 .

1935“The aim of interpretation is to ascertain what a writer intended by what he said, and not either to put words into his mouth or to give effect to that which it may be thought he either intended to say or would have wished to say but didn’t.” Ziulkoski v. Barker, 94 Conn. 491, 494 , 109 Atl. 185 ; Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Really Co., 114 Conn. 283, 289 , 158 Atl. 548 ; Gray v. Greenblatt, 113 Conn. 535, 539 , 155 Atl. 707 .

1929Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah, 574 , 106 Pac. 522 ; Van Gundy v. Shewey, 90 Kan. 253 , 133 Pac. 720 ; Attebery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363 , 91 N.E. 475 ; Maupin, Op. Cit., p. 795; 2 Sugden on Vendors (8th Amer.

1929Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah, 574 , 106 Pac. 522 ; Van Gundy v. Shewey, 90 Kan. 253 , 133 Pac. 720 ; Attebery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363 , 91 N.E. 475 ; Maupin, Op. Cit., p. 795; 2 Sugden on Vendors (8th Amer.

1929Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah, 574 , 106 Pac. 522 ; Van Gundy v. Shewey, 90 Kan. 253 , 133 Pac. 720 ; Attebery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363 , 91 N.E. 475 ; Maupin, Op. Cit., p. 795; 2 Sugden on Vendors (8th Amer.

1929Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah, 574 , 106 Pac. 522 ; Van Gundy v. Shewey, 90 Kan. 253 , 133 Pac. 720 ; Attebery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363 , 91 N.E. 475 ; Maupin, Op. Cit., p. 795; 2 Sugden on Vendors (8th Amer.

1929Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah, 574 , 106 Pac. 522 ; Van Gundy v. Shewey, 90 Kan. 253 , 133 Pac. 720 ; Attebery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363 , 91 N.E. 475 ; Maupin, Op. Cit., p. 795; 2 Sugden on Vendors (8th Amer.

1929Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah, 574 , 106 Pac. 522 ; Van Gundy v. Shewey, 90 Kan. 253 , 133 Pac. 720 ; Attebery v. Blair, 244 Ill. 363 , 91 N.E. 475 ; Maupin, Op. Cit., p. 795; 2 Sugden on Vendors (8th Amer.

1921The power of an owner to transfer property owned by him to his legatee, or to have the distributee named by the law receive it, “is a privilege granted by the State, which may properly dictate the terms on which the privilege may be enjoyed.” Nettleton’s Appeal, 76 Conn. 235, 243 , 56 Atl. 565, 567 ; Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506 , 65 Atl. 1058 . *365 The succession tax, by whatever name it is called, is a tax upon the privilege of receiving or transmitting property after death, and hence the tax is laid upon that portion of the estate which passes to the beneficiaries.

1921The power of an owner to transfer property owned by him to his legatee, or to have the distributee named by the law receive it, “is a privilege granted by the State, which may properly dictate the terms on which the privilege may be enjoyed.” Nettleton’s Appeal, 76 Conn. 235, 243 , 56 Atl. 565, 567 ; Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506 , 65 Atl. 1058 . *365 The succession tax, by whatever name it is called, is a tax upon the privilege of receiving or transmitting property after death, and hence the tax is laid upon that portion of the estate which passes to the beneficiaries.

1921The power of an owner to transfer property owned by him to his legatee, or to have the distributee named by the law receive it, “is a privilege granted by the State, which may properly dictate the terms on which the privilege may be enjoyed.” Nettleton’s Appeal, 76 Conn. 235, 243 , 56 Atl. 565, 567 ; Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506 , 65 Atl. 1058 . *365 The succession tax, by whatever name it is called, is a tax upon the privilege of receiving or transmitting property after death, and hence the tax is laid upon that portion of the estate which passes to the beneficiaries.

1921The power of an owner to transfer property owned by him to his legatee, or to have the distributee named by the law receive it, “is a privilege granted by the State, which may properly dictate the terms on which the privilege may be enjoyed.” Nettleton’s Appeal, 76 Conn. 235, 243 , 56 Atl. 565, 567 ; Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506 , 65 Atl. 1058 . *365 The succession tax, by whatever name it is called, is a tax upon the privilege of receiving or transmitting property after death, and hence the tax is laid upon that portion of the estate which passes to the beneficiaries.