terms rule in Utah

2015A 120 Barela asserts two related grounds for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2015A 120 Barela asserts two related grounds for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2015And finally, without reaching the merits of Barela’s post-trial request for a medical rec- ords subpoena under rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro- cedure, we interpret the terms of that rule as applied here. 1 See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 46 , 326 P.3d 645 (stating that, on sufficiency of the evidence claims, the court “review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ¶ 14 , 305 P.3d 1058 (indicating that we sustain all inferences made b

2015And finally, without reaching the merits of Barela’s post-trial request for a medical rec- ords subpoena under rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro- cedure, we interpret the terms of that rule as applied here. 1 See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 46 , 326 P.3d 645 (stating that, on sufficiency of the evidence claims, the court “review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ¶ 14 , 305 P.3d 1058 (indicating that we sustain all inferences made b

2015And finally, without reaching the merits of Barela’s post-trial request for a medical rec- ords subpoena under rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro- cedure, we interpret the terms of that rule as applied here. 1 See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 46 , 326 P.3d 645 (stating that, on sufficiency of the evidence claims, the court “review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ¶ 14 , 305 P.3d 1058 (indicating that we sustain all inferences made b

2015And finally, without reaching the merits of Barela’s post-trial request for a medical rec- ords subpoena under rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro- cedure, we interpret the terms of that rule as applied here. 1 See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 46 , 326 P.3d 645 (stating that, on sufficiency of the evidence claims, the court “review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ¶ 14 , 305 P.3d 1058 (indicating that we sustain all inferences made b

2015And finally, without reaching the merits of Barela’s post-trial request for a medical rec- ords subpoena under rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro- cedure, we interpret the terms of that rule as applied here. 1 See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 46 , 326 P.3d 645 (stating that, on sufficiency of the evidence claims, the court “review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ¶ 14 , 305 P.3d 1058 (indicating that we sustain all inferences made b

2015And finally, without reaching the merits of Barela’s post-trial request for a medical rec- ords subpoena under rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro- cedure, we interpret the terms of that rule as applied here. 1 See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 46 , 326 P.3d 645 (stating that, on sufficiency of the evidence claims, the court “review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ¶ 14 , 305 P.3d 1058 (indicating that we sustain all inferences made b

2015Our review of conclusions of law is accordingly de novo.”). 6 Cite as: 2015 UT 22 Opinion of the Court A ¶20 Barela asserts two related grounds for his claim of ineffec- tive assistance of counsel under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2015Our review of conclusions of law is accordingly de novo.”). 6 Cite as: 2015 UT 22 Opinion of the Court A ¶20 Barela asserts two related grounds for his claim of ineffec- tive assistance of counsel under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2024Id. § 63G-7-401(7). 6 ¶17 In Suazo v. Salt Lake City Corporation, we discussed and applied the governmental fault exception. 2007 UT App 282 , 168 P.3d 340 .

2024Id. § 63G-7-401(7). 6 ¶17 In Suazo v. Salt Lake City Corporation, we discussed and applied the governmental fault exception. 2007 UT App 282 , 168 P.3d 340 .

2024LP, 2021 UT 15, ¶ 36 , 493 P.3d 580 (“Only factual allegations, not opinions or legal conclusions, may be deemed judicial admissions.”). 20210606-CA 12 2024 UT App 19 Cottam v. IHC Health Services doctor argued that the terms of the immunity provisions of the bylaws did not encompass his claims and that the hospital was, therefore, not immune from suit on his claims.

2024LP, 2021 UT 15, ¶ 36 , 493 P.3d 580 (“Only factual allegations, not opinions or legal conclusions, may be deemed judicial admissions.”). 20210606-CA 12 2024 UT App 19 Cottam v. IHC Health Services doctor argued that the terms of the immunity provisions of the bylaws did not encompass his claims and that the hospital was, therefore, not immune from suit on his claims.

2024LP, 2021 UT 15, ¶ 36 , 493 P.3d 580 (“Only factual allegations, not opinions or legal conclusions, may be deemed judicial admissions.”). 20210606-CA 12 2024 UT App 19 Cottam v. IHC Health Services doctor argued that the terms of the immunity provisions of the bylaws did not encompass his claims and that the hospital was, therefore, not immune from suit on his claims.

2020See Johnson, 2017 UT 76 , ¶ 14 n.2; Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 18 , 266 P.3d 828 (“[W]e routinely consider new authority relevant to issues that have properly been preserved, and we have never prevented a party from raising controlling authority that directly bears upon a properly preserved issue.” (footnote omitted)). ¶7 We also reject the State’s view of the interaction between civil rule 41(a)(1)(A) and Utah Code section 78B-9-106(1)(d).

2020See Johnson, 2017 UT 76 , ¶ 14 n.2; Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 18 , 266 P.3d 828 (“[W]e routinely consider new authority relevant to issues that have properly been preserved, and we have never prevented a party from raising controlling authority that directly bears upon a properly preserved issue.” (footnote omitted)). ¶7 We also reject the State’s view of the interaction between civil rule 41(a)(1)(A) and Utah Code section 78B-9-106(1)(d).

2017Therefore,” we’ve held, “the [Parole] Board’s decision of whether to grant parole does implicate the offender’s liberty interest because at the time an offender first comes before the [Parole] Board, no term of incarceration has been fixed.” Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994). “[B]y acknowledging . . . that the parole function is a complex, multi-dimensional proceeding which includes sentencing, we have opened the door to a more extensive review of the constitutional adequacy of procedures that the [Parole] Board, and probably the legislature, would prefer to exclude from such rev

2017Therefore," we've held, "the [Parole] Board's decision of whether to grant parole does implicate the offender's liberty interest because at the time an offender first comes before the [Parole] Board, no term of incarceration has been fixed." Neel v. Holden , 886 P.2d 1097 , 1101 (Utah 1994). "[B]y acknowledging ... that the parole function is a complex, multi-dimensional proceeding which includes sentencing , we have opened the door to a more extensive review of the constitutional adequacy of procedures that the [Parole] Board, and probably the legislature, would prefer to exclude from such re

2017Such an interpretation “runs afoul of the settled canon of preserving independent meaning for all [regulatory] provisions.” VCS, Inc. v. Utah Cmty. Bank, 2012 UT 89, ¶ 18 , 293 P.3d 290 .

2017Such an interpretation “runs afoul of the settled canon of preserving independent meaning for all [regulatory] provisions.” VCS, Inc. v. Utah Cmty. Bank, 2012 UT 89, ¶ 18 , 293 P.3d 290 .

2017Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 16 , 296 P.3d 673 .

2017Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 16 .

2017In Monson v. Carver , 928 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1996), for example, while we agreed that inmates were entitled to test the accuracy of a restitution order, we held that an inmate was not allowed to call character witnesses because the inmate had not shown that the proffered testimony had "anything to do with substantially furthering the accuracy and reliability of the [Parole] Board's fact-finding process." Id. at 1030 .

2017In Monson v. Carver , 928 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1996), for example, while we agreed that inmates were entitled to test the accuracy of a restitution order, we held that an inmate was not allowed to call character witnesses because the inmate had not shown that the proffered testimony had "anything to do with substantially furthering the accuracy and reliability of the [Parole] Board's fact-finding process." Id. at 1030 .

2017Therefore,” we’ve held, “the [Parole] Board’s decision of whether to grant parole does implicate the offender’s liberty interest because at the time an offender first comes before the [Parole] Board, no term of incarceration has been fixed.” Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994). “[B]y acknowledging . . . that the parole function is a complex, multi-dimensional proceeding which includes sentencing, we have opened the door to a more extensive review of the constitutional adequacy of procedures that the [Parole] Board, and probably the legislature, would prefer to exclude from such rev

2017Therefore," we've held, "the [Parole] Board's decision of whether to grant parole does implicate the offender's liberty interest because at the time an offender first comes before the [Parole] Board, no term of incarceration has been fixed." Neel v. Holden , 886 P.2d 1097 , 1101 (Utah 1994). "[B]y acknowledging ... that the parole function is a complex, multi-dimensional proceeding which includes sentencing , we have opened the door to a more extensive review of the constitutional adequacy of procedures that the [Parole] Board, and probably the legislature, would prefer to exclude from such re

2014Whereas the statute seems to categorically equate a "security" with a "note," the State noted that the instruction framed the matter in terms of a presumption subject to rebuttal-under exceptions and factors apparently incorporating the federal definition of security set forth in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61-65 , 110 S.Ct. 945 , 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990). 5 *1141 1 25 The distinction between the statutory text and the terms of the instruction may be 'more apparent than real.

2014Whereas the statute seems to categorically equate a "security" with a "note," the State noted that the instruction framed the matter in terms of a presumption subject to rebuttal-under exceptions and factors apparently incorporating the federal definition of security set forth in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61-65 , 110 S.Ct. 945 , 108 L.Ed.2d 47 (1990). 5 *1141 1 25 The distinction between the statutory text and the terms of the instruction may be 'more apparent than real.

2014But it appears to limit the application of the doctrine of merger to circumstances where the (continued...) 18 Cite as: 2014 UT 41 JUSTICE LEE, dissenting order was filed with the 54(b) memorandum, and not the prior summary judgment memorandum, the majority concludes that the summary judgment decision is not final and thus not before us on appeal.

2009R. 11(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 17 Given the terms of rule 11 and the use of the mandatory word "shall," we conclude that the movant must strictly comply with rule 11's requirement that the rule 11 motion be served on opposing counsel as a precondition to filing the motion with the court. 2 See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ¶10 , 150 P.3d 540 (describing the word "shall" as compulsory and the word "may" as permissive).

2009R. 11(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 17 Given the terms of rule 11 and the use of the mandatory word "shall," we conclude that the movant must strictly comply with rule 11's requirement that the rule 11 motion be served on opposing counsel as a precondition to filing the motion with the court. 2 See State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ¶10 , 150 P.3d 540 (describing the word "shall" as compulsory and the word "may" as permissive).