given claim in New York

2002(People v Brown, 98 NY2d 226 .) In a case centering on the issue of identity, the defendant, especially an innocent one, is not usually in a position to “correlate the proffered testimony with the facts of the case to demonstrate the relevance of the expert testimony” as required by Radcliffe (at 548).

2002(Matter of Constantine v Leto, 77 NY2d 975 [1991]; People v Bagley, 279 AD2d 426 [1st Dept 2001]; compare People v Almonor, 93 NY2d 571 [1999] [permitting compelled disclosure of a defendant not required by, but consonant with, the statutory notice provisions of CPL 250.10].) A court cannot compel a defendant to commit to a given defense before trial.

2002(Matter of Constantine v Leto, 77 NY2d 975 [1991]; People v Bagley, 279 AD2d 426 [1st Dept 2001]; compare People v Almonor, 93 NY2d 571 [1999] [permitting compelled disclosure of a defendant not required by, but consonant with, the statutory notice provisions of CPL 250.10].) A court cannot compel a defendant to commit to a given defense before trial.

1996(Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gibertson, 501 US 350, 362-363 .) The respondent’s first cause of action is, therefore, time barred as the securities were purchased in 1989 and respondent was aware of the losses as early as June 1990.

1984Somewhat similarly, the Appellate Division, First Department, has held in People v Williams (supra) that the defendant’s position as 1 of 4 or 5 persons in a given bar who fit the description of a recent seller of narcotics at that location could not suffice to support his search without a warrant (cf. People v Valo, 92 AD2d 1004 , app dsmd 60 NY2d 588 ).

1984Somewhat similarly, the Appellate Division, First Department, has held in People v Williams (supra) that the defendant’s position as 1 of 4 or 5 persons in a given bar who fit the description of a recent seller of narcotics at that location could not suffice to support his search without a warrant (cf. People v Valo, 92 AD2d 1004 , app dsmd 60 NY2d 588 ).

1984“Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value — as a criminal defendant his liberty — this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden * * * of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 525-526 .) The New York Legislature has prescribed the traditional standard of proof in civil proceedings, the preponderance standard, for adjudication of abuse or neglect in a child protective proceeding.

1984Thus, a given standard of proof both calibrates and allocates the risk of error to be borne by the respective parties. “[T]he choice of the standard for a particular variety of adjudication * * * reflects] a very fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations.” Justice Harlan concurring in Matter of Winship ( 397 US, at p 370 ).

1979Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well. ” (Emphasis supplied.) Not only did it thus mandate dismissal of the State claim on jurisdictional grounds when the Federal claim is dismissed on nonjurisdictional grounds, but it noted ( 383 US, at p 727 ) that: "The question of power will ordinarily be resolved on the pleadings.” The Restatement of Judgments, 2d, correctly interprets Gibbs as not barring a second State action under the circumstances of this case, for it states in

1938This makes it unnecessary to decide whether or not the claim is barred in any event by the six-year Statute of Limitations on the theory that if the claim had a valid basis it could be enforced at law (Wells v. Scofield, 157 App. Div. 8 ; Dixon v. Chapman, 56 id. 542) as well as in equity (De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, supra), and, therefore, the six-year statute would apply (Rundle v. Allison, 34 N. Y. 180 ; Butler v. Johnson, 111 id. 204, 217 ; Keys v. Leopold, 241 id. 189 ), because where both remedies are available in respect of a given claim, the shorter statute is controlling.

1938This makes it unnecessary to decide whether or not the claim is barred in any event by the six-year Statute of Limitations on the theory that if the claim had a valid basis it could be enforced at law (Wells v. Scofield, 157 App. Div. 8 ; Dixon v. Chapman, 56 id. 542) as well as in equity (De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, supra), and, therefore, the six-year statute would apply (Rundle v. Allison, 34 N. Y. 180 ; Butler v. Johnson, 111 id. 204, 217 ; Keys v. Leopold, 241 id. 189 ), because where both remedies are available in respect of a given claim, the shorter statute is controlling.

1898Foster v. Bookwalter, 152 N. Y. 166 , 46 N. E. 299 .

1898Foster v. Bookwalter, 152 N. Y. 166 , 46 N. E. 299 .