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30 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2024 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2023And, in addition to being instructed that to convict defendant of fourth-degree assault, it must find that he “recklessly caused physical injury” to the victim, the jury was instructed that to find that defendant acted recklessly, it had to find that he “disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a particular result will occur.” Thus, 218 State v. Parham Owen’s reasoning about “knowingly causes physical injury” does not demonstrate plain error in the given instruction about “recklessly causes physical injury.” See State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355 , 800 P2d 259 (1990) (to qualify as 2023And, in addition to being instructed that to convict defendant of fourth-degree assault, it must find that he “recklessly caused physical injury” to the victim, the jury was instructed that to find that defendant acted recklessly, it had to find that he “disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a particular result will occur.” Thus, 218 State v. Parham Owen’s reasoning about “knowingly causes physical injury” does not demonstrate plain error in the given instruction about “recklessly causes physical injury.” See State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355 , 800 P2d 259 (1990) (to qualify as | 1 | 2 |
Roberts v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Linesgreen2 sentences2002Id. at 131 ; Holland v. Srs. of St. 2000Id. at 128, 131 . 14 ORCP 59 D provides: “After retirement for deliberation, if the jury requests information on any point of law, the judge may require the officer having them in charge to conduct them into court. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Graygreen2 sentences2022See State v. Gray, 261 Or App 121, 129 , 322 P3d 1094 (2014) (applying that standard to review a given instruction); State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 441 , 7 P3d 522 (2000) (applying that standard to review of the failure to give an instruction). 2022See State v. Gray, 261 Or App 121, 129 , 322 P3d 1094 (2014) (applying that standard to review a given instruction); State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 441 , 7 P3d 522 (2000) (applying that standard to review of the failure to give an instruction). | 1 | 1 |
M. K. F. v. Miramontesgreen2 sentences2020Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 414 , 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons, 325 Or 46 , 932 P2d 1141 (1997); see also Foster v. Miramontes, 352 Or 401, 404 , 287 P3d 1045 (2012) (engaging in the same two-step analysis). 2020Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 414 , 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons, 325 Or 46 , 932 P2d 1141 (1997); see also Foster v. Miramontes, 352 Or 401, 404 , 287 P3d 1045 (2012) (engaging in the same two-step analysis). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vanornumgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Davis, 265 Or App 179, 183-84 , 335 P3d 1266 (2014) (concluding that the defendant preserved his argument that a jury instruction violated the state and federal constitutions, because, even though he did not cite the specific constitutional provisions at issue, his exception to the instructions sufficiently communicated that those provisions were the basis for his objection); see also State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614 , 632 n 11, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (“[T]he terms of a requested, but refused, instruction may sometimes go a long way to putting a trial court on notice of the deficiency in 2015See State v. Davis, 265 Or App 179, 183-84 , 335 P3d 1266 (2014) (concluding that the defendant preserved his argument that a jury instruction violated the state and federal constitutions, because, even though he did not cite the specific constitutional provisions at issue, his exception to the instructions sufficiently communicated that those provisions were the basis for his objection); see also State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614 , 632 n 11, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (“[T]he terms of a requested, but refused, instruction may sometimes go a long way to putting a trial court on notice of the deficiency in | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Davis, 265 Or App 179, 183-84 , 335 P3d 1266 (2014) (concluding that the defendant preserved his argument that a jury instruction violated the state and federal constitutions, because, even though he did not cite the specific constitutional provisions at issue, his exception to the instructions sufficiently communicated that those provisions were the basis for his objection); see also State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614 , 632 n 11, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (“[T]he terms of a requested, but refused, instruction may sometimes go a long way to putting a trial court on notice of the deficiency in 2015See State v. Davis, 265 Or App 179, 183-84 , 335 P3d 1266 (2014) (concluding that the defendant preserved his argument that a jury instruction violated the state and federal constitutions, because, even though he did not cite the specific constitutional provisions at issue, his exception to the instructions sufficiently communicated that those provisions were the basis for his objection); see also State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614 , 632 n 11, 317 P3d 889 (2013) (“[T]he terms of a requested, but refused, instruction may sometimes go a long way to putting a trial court on notice of the deficiency in | 1 | 1 |
Department of Revenue v. Farisgreen1 sentence2013Oregon courts have not been consistent in their characterization of the rules, often refer- ring to them generally as “statutes.” See, e.g., Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 445 , 980 P2d 672 (1999) (“[T]he Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure provide statutory context for construing ORS 20.080[.]”); Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 442 , 963 P2d 678 (1998) (“ORS 174.120 applies to civil procedure statutes other than the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Garcia v. DMV, 195 Or App 604 , 608 n 5, 99 P3d 316 (2004) (“After enactment of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, ho | 1 | 1 |
Garcia v. Oregon Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2013Oregon courts have not been consistent in their characterization of the rules, often refer- ring to them generally as “statutes.” See, e.g., Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 445 , 980 P2d 672 (1999) (“[T]he Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure provide statutory context for construing ORS 20.080[.]”); Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 442 , 963 P2d 678 (1998) (“ORS 174.120 applies to civil procedure statutes other than the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Garcia v. DMV, 195 Or App 604 , 608 n 5, 99 P3d 316 (2004) (“After enactment of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, ho 2013Oregon courts have not been consistent in their characterization of the rules, often refer- ring to them generally as “statutes.” See, e.g., Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 445 , 980 P2d 672 (1999) (“[T]he Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure provide statutory context for construing ORS 20.080[.]”); Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 442 , 963 P2d 678 (1998) (“ORS 174.120 applies to civil procedure statutes other than the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Garcia v. DMV, 195 Or App 604 , 608 n 5, 99 P3d 316 (2004) (“After enactment of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, ho | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. the Holland, Inc.green2 sentences2013Oregon courts have not been consistent in their characterization of the rules, often refer- ring to them generally as “statutes.” See, e.g., Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 445 , 980 P2d 672 (1999) (“[T]he Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure provide statutory context for construing ORS 20.080[.]”); Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 442 , 963 P2d 678 (1998) (“ORS 174.120 applies to civil procedure statutes other than the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Garcia v. DMV, 195 Or App 604 , 608 n 5, 99 P3d 316 (2004) (“After enactment of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, ho 2013Oregon courts have not been consistent in their characterization of the rules, often refer- ring to them generally as “statutes.” See, e.g., Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 445 , 980 P2d 672 (1999) (“[T]he Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure provide statutory context for construing ORS 20.080[.]”); Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 442 , 963 P2d 678 (1998) (“ORS 174.120 applies to civil procedure statutes other than the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Garcia v. DMV, 195 Or App 604 , 608 n 5, 99 P3d 316 (2004) (“After enactment of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, ho | 1 | 1 |
Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp.green2 sentences2013Oregon courts have not been consistent in their characterization of the rules, often refer- ring to them generally as “statutes.” See, e.g., Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 445 , 980 P2d 672 (1999) (“[T]he Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure provide statutory context for construing ORS 20.080[.]”); Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 442 , 963 P2d 678 (1998) (“ORS 174.120 applies to civil procedure statutes other than the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Garcia v. DMV, 195 Or App 604 , 608 n 5, 99 P3d 316 (2004) (“After enactment of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, ho 2013Oregon courts have not been consistent in their characterization of the rules, often refer- ring to them generally as “statutes.” See, e.g., Rodriguez v. The Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 445 , 980 P2d 672 (1999) (“[T]he Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure provide statutory context for construing ORS 20.080[.]”); Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 442 , 963 P2d 678 (1998) (“ORS 174.120 applies to civil procedure statutes other than the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Garcia v. DMV, 195 Or App 604 , 608 n 5, 99 P3d 316 (2004) (“After enactment of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, ho | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cornellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oberg v. Honda Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1999The range that a rational juror is entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory and common law factors that the jury is instructed and permitted to consider when awarding punitive damages for a given claim.” 320 Or at 551 . 1999The range that a rational juror is entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory and common law factors that the jury is instructed and permitted to consider when awarding punitive damages for a given claim." 320 Or. at 551 , 888 P.2d 8 . | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Mansker v. Astoria
green
2 sentences1978The rules and regulations, however, must be reasonable, Schaefer v. West Lawn Memorial, 222 Or 241 , 352 P2d 744 (1960); Mansker v. Astoria, 100 Or 435 , 198 P199, 199 P 381 (1921), and a person’s agreement to be bound by the rules and regulations of a cemetery is ineffectual if the given rule is unreasonable. 1960As pointed ont in the case of Mansker v. Astoria, supra, 100 Or 435, 455 , “* * * The authorities agree that all rules and regulations adopted by the proprietor of the cemetery must be equal, uniform and reasonable. * * * The authorities do not always agree, however, that a given rule is reasonable.” If the requirement of the purchase of a marker through the association is such that it would deprive the purchaser of the right to properly mark the grave of loved ones, there can be little question but that any court would consider this regulation unreasonable and unenforcible. | 2 | 1960–1978 |
State v. Ramirez
neutral
1 sentence2024Ultimately, however, we need not decide whether the error was harmless or not because we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the trial court’s error. 1 As charged in this case, second-degree assault occurs when a person “knowingly causes serious physical injury to another.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 334 Or App 391 (2024) 393 We decline to do so because, even if there is some likelihood that the verdict would have been different if the court correctly instructed the jury, “it is an extremely low likelihood.” State v. Horton, 327 Or App 256, 266 , 535 P3d 338 (2023); see also id. at 264 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Horton
green
2 sentences2024Ultimately, however, we need not decide whether the error was harmless or not because we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the trial court’s error. 1 As charged in this case, second-degree assault occurs when a person “knowingly causes serious physical injury to another.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 334 Or App 391 (2024) 393 We decline to do so because, even if there is some likelihood that the verdict would have been different if the court correctly instructed the jury, “it is an extremely low likelihood.” State v. Horton, 327 Or App 256, 266 , 535 P3d 338 (2023); see also id. at 264 2024Ultimately, however, we need not decide whether the error was harmless or not because we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the trial court’s error. 1 As charged in this case, second-degree assault occurs when a person “knowingly causes serious physical injury to another.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 334 Or App 391 (2024) 393 We decline to do so because, even if there is some likelihood that the verdict would have been different if the court correctly instructed the jury, “it is an extremely low likelihood.” State v. Horton, 327 Or App 256, 266 , 535 P3d 338 (2023); see also id. at 264 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Eckleberry v. Kaiser Foundation Northern Hospitals
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 626 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Reyes-Camarena
green
2 sentences2022See State v. Gray, 261 Or App 121, 129 , 322 P3d 1094 (2014) (applying that standard to review a given instruction); State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 441 , 7 P3d 522 (2000) (applying that standard to review of the failure to give an instruction). 2022See State v. Gray, 261 Or App 121, 129 , 322 P3d 1094 (2014) (applying that standard to review a given instruction); State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 441 , 7 P3d 522 (2000) (applying that standard to review of the failure to give an instruction). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Moorehead v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District
green
2 sentences2021Because plaintiff contends that the instruction that the trial court gave regarding an invitee’s duty was erroneous, “we review the given instruction to determine whether it probably created an erroneous impression of the law in the minds of the jurors that affected the outcome of the case.” Moorehead v. TriMet, 273 Or App 54, 64 , 359 P3d 314 (2015), rev den, 358 Or 550 (2016). 2021Because plaintiff contends that the instruction that the trial court gave regarding an invitee’s duty was erroneous, “we review the given instruction to determine whether it probably created an erroneous impression of the law in the minds of the jurors that affected the outcome of the case.” Moorehead v. TriMet, 273 Or App 54, 64 , 359 P3d 314 (2015), rev den, 358 Or 550 (2016). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 414 , 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons, 325 Or 46 , 932 P2d 1141 (1997); see also Foster v. Miramontes, 352 Or 401, 404 , 287 P3d 1045 (2012) (engaging in the same two-step analysis). 2020Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 414 , 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons, 325 Or 46 , 932 P2d 1141 (1997); see also Foster v. Miramontes, 352 Or 401, 404 , 287 P3d 1045 (2012) (engaging in the same two-step analysis). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, Inc.
green
2 sentences2020Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 414 , 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons, 325 Or 46 , 932 P2d 1141 (1997); see also Foster v. Miramontes, 352 Or 401, 404 , 287 P3d 1045 (2012) (engaging in the same two-step analysis). 2020Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 414 , 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons, 325 Or 46 , 932 P2d 1141 (1997); see also Foster v. Miramontes, 352 Or 401, 404 , 287 P3d 1045 (2012) (engaging in the same two-step analysis). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Harrison
green
1 sentence2019The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument and held that, because the trial court’s given instruction was legally correct, the trial court was “not required to give an instruction that was merely an enlargement on another correct and complete instruction already given.” Harrison, 292 Or App at 241 (citing Laubach v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 286 Or 217, 225 , 593 P2d 1146 (1979)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Laubach v. Industrial Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences2019The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument and held that, because the trial court’s given instruction was legally correct, the trial court was “not required to give an instruction that was merely an enlargement on another correct and complete instruction already given.” Harrison, 292 Or App at 241 (citing Laubach v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 286 Or 217, 225 , 593 P2d 1146 (1979)). 2019The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument and held that, because the trial court’s given instruction was legally correct, the trial court was “not required to give an instruction that was merely an enlargement on another correct and complete instruction already given.” Harrison, 292 Or App at 241 (citing Laubach v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 286 Or 217, 225 , 593 P2d 1146 (1979)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Illig-Renn
green
1 sentence2015Honstein v. Metro West Ambulance Service, 193 Or App 457, 461 , 90 P3d 1030 , rev den, 337 Or 327 (2004). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Honstein v. Metro West Ambulance Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Honstein v. Metro West Ambulance Service, 193 Or App 457, 461 , 90 P3d 1030 , rev den, 337 Or 327 (2004). 2015Honstein v. Metro West Ambulance Service, 193 Or App 457, 461 , 90 P3d 1030 , rev den, 337 Or 327 (2004). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Nolan v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Bachelor, Inc., 317 Or 328, 337 , 856 P2d 305 (1993) (quoting Waterway Terminals v. P. S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370 , 474 P2d 309 (1970)); Stiles v. Freemotion, Inc., 185 Or App 393, 395 , 59 P3d 548 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003). 2004Bachelor, Inc., 317 Or 328, 337 , 856 P2d 305 (1993) (quoting Waterway Terminals v. P. S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370 , 474 P2d 309 (1970)); Stiles v. Freemotion, Inc., 185 Or App 393, 395 , 59 P3d 548 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Waterway Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord Mechanical Contractors
green
2 sentences2004Bachelor, Inc., 317 Or 328, 337 , 856 P2d 305 (1993) (quoting Waterway Terminals v. P. S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370 , 474 P2d 309 (1970)); Stiles v. Freemotion, Inc., 185 Or App 393, 395 , 59 P3d 548 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003). 2004Bachelor, Inc., 317 Or 328, 337 , 856 P2d 305 (1993) (quoting Waterway Terminals v. P. S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370 , 474 P2d 309 (1970)); Stiles v. Freemotion, Inc., 185 Or App 393, 395 , 59 P3d 548 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Stiles v. Freemotion, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Bachelor, Inc., 317 Or 328, 337 , 856 P2d 305 (1993) (quoting Waterway Terminals v. P. S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370 , 474 P2d 309 (1970)); Stiles v. Freemotion, Inc., 185 Or App 393, 395 , 59 P3d 548 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003). 2004Bachelor, Inc., 317 Or 328, 337 , 856 P2d 305 (1993) (quoting Waterway Terminals v. P. S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370 , 474 P2d 309 (1970)); Stiles v. Freemotion, Inc., 185 Or App 393, 395 , 59 P3d 548 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2003Cf. State v. Smith, 98 Or App 543 , 779 P2d 1097 (1989) (statute indicated an intention to provide the trial court with alternative, but not cumulative, options for a given violation of probation). 2003Cf. State v. Smith, 98 Or App 543 , 779 P2d 1097 (1989) (statute indicated an intention to provide the trial court with alternative, but not cumulative, options for a given violation of probation). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Thompson v. Inskeep
green
1 sentence2000Id. at 692 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999We described the BMW analysis in Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 156 Or App 257, 275 , 965 P2d 440 (1998): “Under BMW, the starting point for examination of a punitive damage award is identification of the state’s interests that a punitive award is designed to serve. 1999We described the BMW analysis in Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 156 Or App 257, 275 , 965 P2d 440 (1998): “Under BMW, the starting point for examination of a punitive damage award is identification of the state’s interests that a punitive award is designed to serve. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
green
2 sentences1999The range that a rational juror is entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory and common law factors that the jury is instructed and permitted to consider when awarding punitive damages for a given claim.” After this standard was announced, the United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559 , 116 S Ct 1589 , 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996), articulated three guideposts to identify constitutionally excessive awards. 1999The range that a rational juror is entitled to award depends, in turn, on the statutory and common law factors that the jury is instructed and permitted to consider when awarding punitive damages for a given claim.” After this standard was announced, the United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559 , 116 S Ct 1589 , 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996), articulated three guideposts to identify constitutionally excessive awards. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| McGanty v. Staudenraus green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Angelos v. State Board of Dental Examiners green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Schaefer v. West Lawn Memorial Cemetery green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Cole v. Zidell Explorations, Inc. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Stromberg v. French neutral | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Lowe v. Harmon green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Keyes v. CHAMBERS green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Northwestern Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Galloway neutral | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Silverwood v. Latrobe green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.