given instruction in Mississippi

2020“Ordinarily, failure to object to a given instruction at trial results in a procedural bar 10 on appeal, unless its granting amounts to plain error.” Berry v. State, 728 So. 2d 568, 571 (Miss. 1999) (citing Sanders v. State, 678 So. 2d 663, 670 (Miss. 1996)).

2007Additionally, Stark Hatchock, an employee at the Mississippi Crime Lab, testified at trial and at the hearing that all the spent cartridges present at the crime scene came from the same weapon. [6] As there was no objection to the given instruction at trial, it "results in a procedural bar on appeal, unless its granting amounts to plain error." Berry v. State, 728 So.2d 568, 571 (¶ 6) (Miss.1999) (citing Sanders v. State, 678 So.2d 663, 670 (Miss.1996)). [7] The record does not contain any other jury instructions granted at trial, only the single jury instruction at issue in this case.

2001Sanders v. State, 678 So.2d 663, 670 (Miss.1996) ("As a rule, the Supreme Court only addresses issues on plain error review when the error of the trial court has impacted upon a fundamental right of the defendant"); Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 606 (Miss.1995).

1999Sanders v. State, 678 So.2d 663, 670 (Miss.1996) ("As a rule, the Supreme Court only addresses issues on plain error review when the error of the trial court has impacted upon a fundamental right of the defendant"); Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 606 (Miss.1995).

1999U.S. v. Andrews, 22 F.3d 1328, 1345 (5th Cir.1994).

1998United States v. Andrews , 22 F.3d 1328 , 1345 (5 th Cir. 1994). § ¶ 40.

2020“Ordinarily, failure to object to a given instruction at trial results in a procedural bar 10 on appeal, unless its granting amounts to plain error.” Berry v. State, 728 So. 2d 568, 571 (Miss. 1999) (citing Sanders v. State, 678 So. 2d 663, 670 (Miss. 1996)).

2018"Ordinarily, failure to object to a given instruction at trial results in a procedural bar on appeal, unless its granting amounts to plain error." Berry v. State , 728 So.2d 568 , 571 (¶ 6) (Miss. 1999).

2016This Court addressed that question directly in the recent cases of Cofield v. Imperial Palace of Mississippi LLC, 147 So.3d 364, 367 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2014), and Bolden v. Murray, 97 So.3d 710, 718 (¶ 31) (Miss.Ct.App.2012), where we concluded: “[F]or purposes of summary judgment, /spoliation] of evidence, standing alone, is not enough to allow a party who has produced no evidence — or utterly inadequate evidence — in support of a given claim to survive summary judgment on that claim.” (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added; internal quotation m

2014Cofield cites to Thomas v. Isle of Capri Casino, 781 So.2d 125, 133 (¶ 37) (Miss.2001), for the proposition that “[w]hen evidence is lost or destroyed by one party ..., thus hindering the other party’s ability to prove his case, a presumption is raised that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its loss.” However, “for purposes of summary judgment, the destruction or spoliation of evidence, standing alone, is not enough to allow a party who has produced no evidence — or utterly inadequate evidence — in support of a given claim to survive summary judgment

2008No objection except for the request by co- *8 counsel about a stronger or different version of this in a negligent manner.” “[F]ailure to challenge a given instruction or offer another in its place renders this assignment of error meritless.” Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1333 (Miss.1987) (overruled in part on other grounds).

1995Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1333 (Miss. 1987) [emphasis supplied].

2007DUA-9 gives the correct statement of law pursuant to this Court's decision in Medlin, 889 So.2d at 498 (Miss. 2004).

2005DUA-9 gives the correct statement of law pursuant to this Court’s decision in Medlin, 889 So. 2d at 498 (Miss. 2004).

2004See also Flowers v. State, 842 So.2d 531, 563 (Miss.2003).

2002See also Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531, 563 (Miss. 2003).

2020In Chatman, the analysis was described as follows: [I]n applying the plain-error rule, we determine: “(1) whether the trial court deviated from a legal rule; (2) whether the error is plain, clear, or obvious; and (3) whether the error prejudiced the outcome of the trial.” We will only reverse if the error “resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” 15 The given instruction also included the instruction on the elements of the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon, which is not at issue. 21 Id. (quoting Willie v. State, 204 So. 3d 1268, 1279 (¶29) (Miss. 2016)). ¶49.

2020“We apply the plain-error rule only if a defendant’s substantive or fundamental rights are affected.” Willie, 204 So. 3d at 1279 (¶29) (internal quotation mark omitted).

2016This Court addressed that question directly in the recent cases of Cofield v. Imperial Palace of Mississippi LLC, 147 So.3d 364, 367 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2014), and Bolden v. Murray, 97 So.3d 710, 718 (¶ 31) (Miss.Ct.App.2012), where we concluded: “[F]or purposes of summary judgment, /spoliation] of evidence, standing alone, is not enough to allow a party who has produced no evidence — or utterly inadequate evidence — in support of a given claim to survive summary judgment on that claim.” (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added; internal quotation m

2016This Court addressed that question directly in the recent cases of Cofield v. Imperial Palace of Mississippi LLC, 147 So.3d 364, 367 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2014), and Bolden v. Murray, 97 So.3d 710, 718 (¶ 31) (Miss.Ct.App.2012), where we concluded: “[F]or purposes of summary judgment, /spoliation] of evidence, standing alone, is not enough to allow a party who has produced no evidence — or utterly inadequate evidence — in support of a given claim to survive summary judgment on that claim.” (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added; internal quotation m

2015This Court reasoned that a plaintiff “can certainly not be expected to show reliance on a warning which was not given.” Id. “[I]f a plaintiff complains that a given warning was defective, the plaintiff must have read and relied upon the defective warning to complain of it.” Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 67.

2015This Court reasoned that a plaintiff “can certainly not be expected to show reliance on a warning which was not given.” Id. “[I]f a plaintiff complains that a given warning was defective, the plaintiff must have read and relied upon the defective warning to complain of it.” Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 67.

2015Op. ¶ 41 (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. Nix, 142 So.3d 374, 390 (Miss.2014) (citing Palmer v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 904 So.2d 1077, 1083 (Miss.2005))).

2014Cofield cites to Thomas v. Isle of Capri Casino, 781 So.2d 125, 133 (¶ 37) (Miss.2001), for the proposition that “[w]hen evidence is lost or destroyed by one party ..., thus hindering the other party’s ability to prove his case, a presumption is raised that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its loss.” However, “for purposes of summary judgment, the destruction or spoliation of evidence, standing alone, is not enough to allow a party who has produced no evidence — or utterly inadequate evidence — in support of a given claim to survive summary judgment