given instruction in Illinois

1981The issue before the court then can be rephrased in the language used by the supreme court in People v. Underwood: ° ° whether the definitional instruction omitted was so basic to the given instruction * * * that failure of the trial court to sua sponte give it resulted in an unfair trial.” 72 Ill. 2d 124,130-31 , 378 N.E.2d 513, 516 .

1981The issue before the court then can be rephrased in the language used by the supreme court in People v. Underwood: ° ° whether the definitional instruction omitted was so basic to the given instruction * * * that failure of the trial court to sua sponte give it resulted in an unfair trial.” 72 Ill. 2d 124,130-31 , 378 N.E.2d 513, 516 .

1977App. 2d 410 , 229 N.E.2d 386 .) The given instruction on self-defense clearly, concisely and impartially stated the applicable law; moreover, it was the pertinent Illinois Pattern Instruction which was required to be given under Rule 451.

1973(People v. Jackson (1969), 116 Ill.App.2d 304 , 253 N.E.2d 527 ; People v. Lockett (1967), 85 Ill.App.2d 410 , 229 N.E.2d 386 .) The given instruction on self-defense clearly, concisely and impartially stated the applicable law; moreover, it was the pertinent Illinois Pattern Instruction which was required to be given under Rule 451.

2006Thus, we find the jury to still have been fairly apprised of the law under the instruction it received." 353 Ill.App.3d at 34 , 288 Ill.

2006Thus, we find the jury to still have been fairly apprised of the law under the instruction it received.” 353 Ill.

2005App. 3d 252 , 555 N.E.2d 1055 (1990), for the proposition that it was not error to refuse a definitional instruction for the term “highest degree of care.” The Lockett instruction given, however, did not include the word “negligence,” while the given instruction in the instant case does.

2005The majority relies on our opinion in Lockett v. Board of Education for School District No. 189, 198 Ill.App.3d 252 , 144 Ill.Dec. 536 , 555 N.E.2d 1055 (1990), for the proposition that it was not error to refuse a definitional instruction for the term "highest degree of care." The Lockett instruction given, however, did not include the word "negligence," while the given instruction in the instant case does.

2005App. 3d 1035 , 657 N.E.2d 37 (1995), in which our colleagues in the First District held that a plaintiff cannot maintain a products liability action premised on a failure-to-adequately-warn theory where a plaintiff admits he never read the given warnings.

2005App. 3d 1035 , 657 N.E.2d 37 (1995), in which our colleagues in the First District held that a plaintiff cannot maintain a products liability action premised on a failure-to-adequately-warn theory where a plaintiff admits he never read the given warnings.

2003A plaintiff is contributorily negligent, if, one, it fails to use ordinary care for the safety of its property; two, its failure to use such ordinary care is a proximate cause of the alleged injury; and, three, affected Defendant’s preparation of the audit.” The appellate court found that the given instruction accurately states the law in Illinois and is neither misleading nor argumentative, although the court observed that it might have been worded differently. 333 Ill.

2003Although, as the appellate court noted, “the instruction might have been worded differently in part” the given instruction nevertheless accurately stated the law. 333 Ill.

1999According to plaintiffs, “[t]he fundamental public policy at stake in the present action is to protect insureds and injured third parties in an effort to make sure that there is coverage available for a given claim,” citing DC Electronics, Inc. v. Employers Modern Life Co., 90 Ill.

1999According to plaintiffs, "[t]he fundamental public policy at stake in the present action is to protect insureds and injured third parties in an effort to make sure that there is coverage available for a given claim," citing DC Electronics, Inc. v. Employers Modern Life Co. , 90 Ill.

1999App. 3d 342 (1980), and Walrus Manufacturing Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 184 F. Supp. 214 (S.D.

1999App. 3d 342 (1980), and Walrus Manufacturing Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. , 184 F. Supp. 214 (S. D.

1990(People v. Smith (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 95, 104 , 374 N.E.2d 472, 475 .) However, if the interests of justice require, substantial defects in jury instructions in criminal cases are not waived by failing to object properly. 107 Ill. 2d R. 451(c); People v. Reding (1989), 191 Ill.

1990(People v. Smith (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 95, 104 , 374 N.E.2d 472, 475 .) However, if the interests of justice require, substantial defects in jury instructions in criminal cases are not waived by failing to object properly. 107 Ill. 2d R. 451(c); People v. Reding (1989), 191 Ill.

1982(People v. Harris (1976), 39 Ill.

1980App. 3d 805 , 350 N.E.2d 850 ) and that only slight evidence on a given defense has been required to justify an instruction on that defense (People v. Willis (1977), 50 Ill.

1979This given instruction also told the jury to consider whether plaintiff, “in the exercise of ordinary care, would have known the dangers existed.” This statement is entirely erroneous in view of the requirement that a subjective test is to be applied in determining this issue (Williams, 45 Ill. 2d 418, 430 ), and the further requirement of actual knowledge by plaintiff of the risk which was a proximate cause of her injury {Court, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 149 ).

1976(Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 431 .) However, for the reasons above stated, we cannot regard this given instruction as a satisfactory model for use in other cases.

2022The given instruction included the original instruction’s three propositions required to prove aggravated battery to a peace officer and added a fourth proposition that the State must prove that defendant was not justified in using the force he used. ¶ 33 The State’s 16th instruction was a non-IPI instruction (People’s 16) derived from People v. Sain, 122 Ill.

2021No reasonable excuse for the failure has been shown.” The given instruction was stated in general terms and did not explicitly refer to the missing dashcam videos or any other specific pieces of evidence. ¶ 120 “Enlightened trial practice does not permit counsel under the guise of trial strategy to sit idly by and permit instructions to be given the jury without specific objections and then be given the advantage of predicating error thereon by urging the error for the first time in a post-trial motion.” Doe v. Parrilo, 2020 IL App (1st) 191286 , ¶ 62 (internal quotations omitted).

2021We combine the analyses, because “if an error was harmless, it most certainly cannot rise to the level of plain error.” Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 141 . ¶ 32 In considering whether a given error is harmless, a reviewing court may (1) focus on the error itself to determine if it might have contributed to the conviction; (2) examine the other, properly admitted evidence to see whether it overwhelmingly supports the conviction; or - 10 - 2021 IL App (2d) 190742-U (3) determine whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative of or duplicates properly admitted evidence.

2021In re Bobby F., 2012 IL App (5th) 110214, ¶ 23 .

2021Barner, 2015 IL 116949, ¶ 71 . ¶ 33 The State likens this case to Leach, where the court concluded that, even if the autopsy report in question were testimonial, allowing testimony about it was harmless error because the cause and manner of the victim’s death were not at issue.

2016Because the instruction incorrectly defined the State’s burden of proof, we hold that the court erred when it instructed the jury with IPI Civil (2011) No. 21.01. - 11 - 2016 IL App (2d) 151036 ¶ 29 Moreover, under the second prong of plain error, we conclude that defendant was deprived of a fair trial because the given instruction defined the State’s burden of proof as a lesser burden than what was required in a recovery hearing under the Act.

2006However, having just proclaimed that the given instruction provides a definitive statement of proximate cause and foreseeability, the majority only a few paragraphs later appears to retreat from its initial position of confidence and states that the instruction given in this cause was merely "adequate." 222 Ill.2d 407 , 305 Ill.Dec. at 937 , 856 N.E.2d at 1088 .

2006However, having just proclaimed that the given instruction provides a definitive statement of proximate cause and foreseeability, the majority only a few paragraphs later appears to retreat from its initial position of confidence and states that the instruction given in this cause was merely "adequate." 222 Ill.2d 407 , 305 Ill.Dec. at 937 , 856 N.E.2d at 1088 .

1992The given instruction states that physicians’ bills should be allowed, ‘if any’ are proven, and it must be assumed the jury did not consider items not proven.” (Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co. (1925), 319 Ill. 344, 349 , 150 N.E. 276, 278 .) However, in proving damages, the plaintiff has the burden to establish a reasonable basis for computing the damages, since an award of damages may not be based on conjecture or speculation and must be shown to have a causal relationship to the complained-of wrong.

1992The given instruction states that physicians’ bills should be allowed, ‘if any’ are proven, and it must be assumed the jury did not consider items not proven.” (Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co. (1925), 319 Ill. 344, 349 , 150 N.E. 276, 278 .) However, in proving damages, the plaintiff has the burden to establish a reasonable basis for computing the damages, since an award of damages may not be based on conjecture or speculation and must be shown to have a causal relationship to the complained-of wrong.

1992App. 3d 1056, 1064 , 405 N.E.2d 1142 .) The given instruction identified by the State does not specifically mention that the age and maturity of the witness and the nature of the statement should be considered, unrelated to the prescription of section 115 — 10(c).

1990App. 3d 280, 298 , 438 N.E.2d 1282, 1297 .) The language of the given instruction was taken from the language of section 9 — 3.

1990(People v. Smith (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 95, 104 , 374 N.E.2d 472, 475 .) However, if the interests of justice require, substantial defects in jury instructions in criminal cases are not waived by failing to object properly. 107 Ill. 2d R. 451(c); People v. Reding (1989), 191 Ill.

1989However, the contradiction between the two paragraphs raises at least a close question as to whether the jury might be so confused as to think the presumption was either mandatory or such as to place a burden on the defendant to prove his sobriety.” ( 113 Ill.

1989However, the contradiction between the two paragraphs raises at least a close question as to whether the jury might be so confused as to think the presumption was either mandatory or such as to place a burden on the defendant to prove his sobriety." ( 113 Ill.