given instruction in Kentucky

2023We therefore reversed for a new trial given the error was not harmless but rather “clearly devastating to [Ordway’s] claim of self-defense.” Id.

2023We therefore reversed for a new trial given the error was not harmless but rather “clearly devastating to [Ordway’s] claim of self-defense.” Id.

1959The given instruction, we suppose, was patterned after an instruction prepared by this court in Ross v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Company, 202 Ky. 828 , 261 S.W. 590 .

1959The given instruction, we suppose, was patterned after an instruction prepared by this court in Ross v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Company, 202 Ky. 828 , 261 S.W. 590 .

2011As stated in Quisenberry , “these alleged errors, therefore, were not merely unpreserved, they were invited.” Id. at 37 .

2007The judge is required to give such an instruction, when requested by the defendant, and the given instruction must "minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify." Id. at 305 .

1961In Greenup County v. Redmond, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 335 , we thoroughly reviewed the proper elements of compensation for damages to or impairment of the market value of untaken land, commonly called consequential or resulting damages.

1961Kyle Furniture Co. v. Russell Dry Goods Co., Ky., 340 S.W.2d 220, p. 226 , in which we held that though the appellant had offered an instruction faulty in form, it should be “regarded as being tantamount to revealing the ground and sufficient to save its right to attack the given instruction.” This interpretation of Rule 51 as being sufficient to serve the purpose of directing the court’s attention to the point of possible error and afford the court an opportunity to correct an instruction proposed to be given if it be erroneous, is generally recognized.

1959Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Byrnes, 296 Ky. 560 , 178 S.W.2d 4 .

1959Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Byrnes, 296 Ky. 560 , 178 S.W.2d 4 .

1958In Gee v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 808 , 94 S.W.2d 17, 19 , where it was shown that the accused had paid some of his own living expenses and had made various statements which indicated that he had some earning capacity, the court said: “In view of this evidence, and the further fact that appellant’s business was solely that of a solicitor, we think it was a question for the jury whether he was prevented by illness or other circumstances from supporting the children, and the question was properly submitted by the given instruction.” In the case at bar, it was shown that about a month before the tr

1958In Gee v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 808 , 94 S.W.2d 17, 19 , where it was shown that the accused had paid some of his own living expenses and had made various statements which indicated that he had some earning capacity, the court said: “In view of this evidence, and the further fact that appellant’s business was solely that of a solicitor, we think it was a question for the jury whether he was prevented by illness or other circumstances from supporting the children, and the question was properly submitted by the given instruction.” In the case at bar, it was shown that about a month before the tr

1958The given instruction follows an instruction approved in Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356 , 281 S.W. 164 , and published in the first edition of Stanley’s Instructions to Juries.

1958The given instruction follows an instruction approved in Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356 , 281 S.W. 164 , and published in the first edition of Stanley’s Instructions to Juries.

1958However, in Mayre v. Commonwealth, Ky., 240 S.W.2d 852 , upon reconsideration, the court held that common law involuntary manslaughter should be based on gross negligence.

1951While the accused is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted in the instructions, the .rule as stated in Grigsby v. Com., 299 Ky. 721 , 187 S.W.2d 259, 261 , 159 A.L.R. 196 , is: “If the instruction which submits the commonwealth’s theory of the case is couched in such language as the ordinary layman, who sits upon the jury, can easily and readily understand and comprehend, and its negative completely and adequately cover the defense of the accused, it is unnecessary to give an affirmative instruction on the theory of the defendant”.

1951While the accused is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted in the instructions, the .rule as stated in Grigsby v. Com., 299 Ky. 721 , 187 S.W.2d 259, 261 , 159 A.L.R. 196 , is: “If the instruction which submits the commonwealth’s theory of the case is couched in such language as the ordinary layman, who sits upon the jury, can easily and readily understand and comprehend, and its negative completely and adequately cover the defense of the accused, it is unnecessary to give an affirmative instruction on the theory of the defendant”.

1948The given instruction authorized the acquittal ofi the defendant if the jury believed from the evidence that,, if at the time he shot Stilton (if he did so shoot) he believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, that Stilton and others of his party, acting in concert with him;, were about to inflict death or great bodily harm upon; him, the defendant, or Roberts, or Campbell, or Cornett, “or it reasonably appeared to the defendant that such; *489 was the case, and it further reasonably • appeared to him that the only reasonably safe means of protecting' himself, or them, against such danger

1948The given instruction authorized the acquittal ofi the defendant if the jury believed from the evidence that,, if at the time he shot Stilton (if he did so shoot) he believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, that Stilton and others of his party, acting in concert with him;, were about to inflict death or great bodily harm upon; him, the defendant, or Roberts, or Campbell, or Cornett, “or it reasonably appeared to the defendant that such; *489 was the case, and it further reasonably • appeared to him that the only reasonably safe means of protecting' himself, or them, against such danger

1945The given instruction of which plaintiff complains correctly states the duty of motorists approaching or crossing a one-way bridge, and evidently it was taken from the opinion in Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S. W. 2d 594 , which was followed in Foley’s Adm’r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S. W. 2d 81 , where a one-way bridge was defined.

1945The given instruction of which plaintiff complains correctly states the duty of motorists approaching or crossing a one-way bridge, and evidently it was taken from the opinion in Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S. W. 2d 594 , which was followed in Foley’s Adm’r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S. W. 2d 81 , where a one-way bridge was defined.

1945The offered instruction seems to have followed the form approved in Leming’s Adm’r v. Leachman, 268 Ky. 781 , 105 S. W. 2d 1043 , being Sec. 113, Stanley’s Instructions to Juries.

1945The offered instruction seems to have followed the form approved in Leming’s Adm’r v. Leachman, 268 Ky. 781 , 105 S. W. 2d 1043 , being Sec. 113, Stanley’s Instructions to Juries.

1945The given instruction of which plaintiff complains correctly states the duty of motorists approaching or crossing a one-way bridge, and evidently it was taken from the opinion in Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S. W. 2d 594 , which was followed in Foley’s Adm’r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S. W. 2d 81 , where a one-way bridge was defined.

1945The given instruction of which plaintiff complains correctly states the duty of motorists approaching or crossing a one-way bridge, and evidently it was taken from the opinion in Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S. W. 2d 594 , which was followed in Foley’s Adm’r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S. W. 2d 81 , where a one-way bridge was defined.

1944The given instruction followed See. 70 on page 95 of Stanley’s Instructions to Juries, which instruction was approved in Brown v. Weathers, 247 Ky. 306 , 57 S. W. (2d) 4 , where the proof of the dog’s habits was confined to its relation with people.

1944The given instruction followed See. 70 on page 95 of Stanley’s Instructions to Juries, which instruction was approved in Brown v. Weathers, 247 Ky. 306 , 57 S. W. (2d) 4 , where the proof of the dog’s habits was confined to its relation with people.

1944In the later case of Smith v. Com., 284 Ky. 468 , 145 S. W. 2d 51, 52 , where there was a conviction under an indictment charging malicious cutting and wounding with intent, the argument was made that a given instruction was erroneous because omitting the word “maliciously.” We there held that the error was cured by a subsequent instruction, which told the jury they could not convict unless they believed the cutting was done maliciously.

1944In the later case of Smith v. Com., 284 Ky. 468 , 145 S. W. 2d 51, 52 , where there was a conviction under an indictment charging malicious cutting and wounding with intent, the argument was made that a given instruction was erroneous because omitting the word “maliciously.” We there held that the error was cured by a subsequent instruction, which told the jury they could not convict unless they believed the cutting was done maliciously.

1942Stanley on Instructions, Sec. 113; Buck v. Kleinschmidt, 279 Ky. 569 , 131 S. W. (2d) 714, 715 .

1942Stanley on Instructions, Sec. 113; Buck v. Kleinschmidt, 279 Ky. 569 , 131 S. W. (2d) 714, 715 .

1938The given instruction is more favorable to the plaintiffs than that directed to be given upon another trial in New York Indemnity Company v. Ewen, 221 Ky. 114 , 298 S. W. 182 .

1938The given instruction is more favorable to the plaintiffs than that directed to be given upon another trial in New York Indemnity Company v. Ewen, 221 Ky. 114 , 298 S. W. 182 .

1932The language of the given instruction is the same as that complained of in Walker v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 471 , 31 S. W. (2d) 721, 722 .

1932The language of the given instruction is the same as that complained of in Walker v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 471 , 31 S. W. (2d) 721, 722 .

1930It will be perceived that the contention of counsel concedes that his client was guilty of contributory negligence, which he seeks to avoid upon the ground that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a submission of what is known as the “Last-Clear-Chance” doctrine, and he relies in support of that contention upon the general law applicable to the subject, and especially the cases of Ross v. Louisville Taxicab Co., 202 Ky. 828 , 261 S. W. 590 ; Myers v. Cassity, 209 Ky. 315 , 272 S. W. 718 ; and Cumberland Grocery Co. v. Hewlett, 231 Ky. 702 , 22 S. W. (2d) 97 , involving automobile collisio

1930It will be perceived that the contention of counsel concedes that his client was guilty of contributory negligence, which he seeks to avoid upon the ground that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a submission of what is known as the “Last-Clear-Chance” doctrine, and he relies in support of that contention upon the general law applicable to the subject, and especially the cases of Ross v. Louisville Taxicab Co., 202 Ky. 828 , 261 S. W. 590 ; Myers v. Cassity, 209 Ky. 315 , 272 S. W. 718 ; and Cumberland Grocery Co. v. Hewlett, 231 Ky. 702 , 22 S. W. (2d) 97 , involving automobile collisio

1930In Louisville & Nashville Bailroad *409 Co. v. Bnrley Tobacco Society, 147 Ky. 22 , 143 S. W. 1040, 1044 , the court in approving the instructions said: “The instructions, singly and collectively, presented the law of the case as warranted by the evidence under the pleadings as fully and fairly as appellant was entitled to have them. ’ ’ While the instructions given in that case are not set out in the opinion, we have examined the record and find that instruction No. 1 given in this case is precisely the same as the instruction defining the duty of the railroad company with reference to spark

1930In Louisville & Nashville Bailroad *409 Co. v. Bnrley Tobacco Society, 147 Ky. 22 , 143 S. W. 1040, 1044 , the court in approving the instructions said: “The instructions, singly and collectively, presented the law of the case as warranted by the evidence under the pleadings as fully and fairly as appellant was entitled to have them. ’ ’ While the instructions given in that case are not set out in the opinion, we have examined the record and find that instruction No. 1 given in this case is precisely the same as the instruction defining the duty of the railroad company with reference to spark