given standard in Florida

1965But, as is clear from the statute and the cited decisions, a cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a `good cause,' by which it is meant that `the adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action,' In re Jeffries' Estate, supra, contemplating `a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse,' or a `cause moving the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence,' and not mere `ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice.' 18 Words and Phrases, Good Cause, pp. 451, 455 et seq.

1965But, as is clear from the statute and the cited decisions, a cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a `good cause,' by which it is meant that `the adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action,' In re Jeffries' Estate, supra, contemplating `a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse,' or a `cause moving the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence,' and not mere `ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice.' 18 Words and Phrases, Good Cause, pp. 451, 455 et seq.

1965But, as is clear from the statute and the cited decisions, a cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a `good cause,' by which it is meant that `the adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action,' In re Jeffries' Estate, supra, contemplating `a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse,' or a `cause moving the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence,' and not mere `ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice.' 18 Words and Phrases, Good Cause, pp. 451, 455 et seq.

1965But, as is clear from the statute and the cited decisions, a cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a `good cause,' by which it is meant that `the adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action,' In re Jeffries' Estate, supra, contemplating `a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse,' or a `cause moving the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence,' and not mere `ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice.' 18 Words and Phrases, Good Cause, pp. 451, 455 et seq.

1965But, as is clear from the statute and the cited decisions, a cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a `good cause,' by which it is meant that `the adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action,' In re Jeffries' Estate, supra, contemplating `a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse,' or a `cause moving the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence,' and not mere `ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice.' 18 Words and Phrases, Good Cause, pp. 451, 455 et seq.

1965But, as is clear from the statute and the cited decisions, a cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a `good cause,' by which it is meant that `the adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action,' In re Jeffries' Estate, supra, contemplating `a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse,' or a `cause moving the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence,' and not mere `ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice.' 18 Words and Phrases, Good Cause, pp. 451, 455 et seq.

1977In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court, in quoting from In Re Jeffries' Estate, 136 Fla. 410 , 181 So. 833 (1938), held: "... [A] cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a `good cause', by which it is meant that the `adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action' . .. and not mere `ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice'...." See also Ellard v. Godwin, 77 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1955); and Exchange Nat.

1977In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court, in quoting from In Re Jeffries' Estate, 136 Fla. 410 , 181 So. 833 (1938), held: "... [A] cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a `good cause', by which it is meant that the `adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action' . .. and not mere `ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice'...." See also Ellard v. Godwin, 77 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1955); and Exchange Nat.

1986See Enfield's Miami Photo, Inc. v. Keyes Co., 489 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Wagner v. Nottingham Associates, 464 So.2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 475 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1985).

1986See Enfield’s Miami Photo, Inc. v. Keyes Co., 489 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Wagner v. Nottingham Associates, 464 So.2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 475 So.2d 696 (Fla.1985).

2013In accordance with Lambrix v. State, 39 So.3d 260 , 273 n. 13 (Fla.2010), in which we held that the failure to secure a ruling by the court below on a given claim waives it, Jackson has waived this claim.

2006Thus, we recede from Smith, Cumbie [ v. State, 345 So.2d 1061 (Fla.1977)], Wilcox, and their progeny to the extent that they require per se reversal, and we hold that the harmless error analysis set forth above should be applied where a trial court fails to conduct an adequate Richardson inquiry.

2005We now agree with the analytical approach of the court in Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. of New York v. Taylor, 525 So.2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), which explained, in pertinent part: In a "first-party" action against an insurance carrier founded upon section 624.155(1)(b), which affirmatively creates a company duty to its insured to act in good faith in its dealings under the policy, liability is based upon the carrier's conduct in processing and paying a given claim.

2003When Floyd's counsel was asked about the instruction by the trial judge, counsel not *416 only did not object to the given instruction, counsel affirmatively stated "no objection." In essence, what occurred with this instruction was that the instruction given was not wrong, but as the Fifth District said in Valentine, 774 So.2d at 937 , the instruction was "incomplete in light of Delgado." This means that, at worst, the instruction would be "vague" under the Delgado interpretation of the burglary statute.

2003It would be vague because it did not state that "remaining in" meant "surreptitiously remaining in." In this regard, it would be similar to what this Court determined concerning the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) instruction in Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994).

1998The same test is applied in deciding whether a given instruction was prejudicial or whether failure to give a requested instruction was erroneous.”) (citations omitted); Kinya v. Lifter, Inc., 489 So.2d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding that any error in trial court’s failure to give particular instruction did not amount to reversible error where instruction and special interrogatory verdict properly advised jury of law), review denied, 496 So.2d 142 (Fla.1986); Yacker v. Teitch, 330 So.2d 828, 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (“In determining whether a specific instruction is erroneous, it should be considered

1996See generally Smith v. State, 521 So.2d 106, 109 (Fla.1988)(Barkett, J., concurring); Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So.2d 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

1995DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1137 .

1991Because a proper jury instruction in a criminal case is a fundamental right, Rojas v. State, 552 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1989), we find reversible error on this basis as well.

1987Crosby, 142 So.2d at 359 .

1987It has been held that a legal excuse for extension exists where a claimant ... forgoes the commencement of an independent action under the belief that his objected-to claim will be paid or settled without the need for action, and he reasonably comes to that belief because of representations or actions of the personal representative of the estate or his agent.... [Citations omitted]. 384 So.2d at 226 .

1979With reference to good cause, the Goldman court held as follows: [A] cause sufficient to authorize an extension of time for filing suit must be a "good cause," by which it is meant that "the adjudication is to be governed by a given standard of judicial action." 79 So.2d at 848 .

1979The court then promulgated the rule which stands today: "[A] substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse," or a "cause moving the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence," and not mere "ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice." Id.

1977Bank of Winter Haven v. Field, 338 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976).

1969The order extending the time for filing suit may be granted upon petition filed after lapse of the prescribed period.” This record contains competent and substantial evidence, as in Sessions, supra, that the personal representative of this Estate had failed to take any action as a result of being lulled into a false sense of security concerning settlement of these claims and that “good cause” had been shown in this matter.

1955Bank of Jacksonville v. Kirkwood, 152 Fla. 59 , 10 So.2d 743 , we again held that the county judges of this State have power to extend the time fixed in the statute where good cause is shown why such extension should be granted.

1955Bank of Jacksonville v. Kirkwood, 152 Fla. 59 , 10 So.2d 743 , we again held that the county judges of this State have power to extend the time fixed in the statute where good cause is shown why such extension should be granted.